

The Regulation of, and Promotion of Competition in, UK Postal Services

Peter John and Matthew Ward

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- Introduction and legislative framework
- Promotion of effective competition
- Price regulation
- Development of access/worksharing

What is Postcomm?



- The Postal Services Commission is the regulator of the postal industry in the UK.
- Established by the Postal Services Act 2000
- Statutory Duties:
 - Act in a manner best calculated to ensure the provision of a universal postal service at an affordable, uniform tariff
 - Further the interests of postal users by promoting effective competition
 - Promote efficiency and economy on the part of operators
 - Have regard to licensees' ability to finance their licensed activities
- Postcomm's vision: "a range of reliable, innovative and efficient postal services, including a universal postal service, valued by customers and delivered through a competitive postal market".





- Since 1981, Post Office sole conveyer of letters under 350g/£1 (the "reserved area")
- 4,000 + operators in non-reserved area
- Postal Services Act (2000) replaced reserved area with licensed area (turnover £4.2bn in 2000/01)
- Postcomm issued its first licence to Consignia plc on 26 March 2001
- Postcomm issued its interim licensing policy (April 2001). 6 licences have been issued, including to Hays, to operate in licensed area (September 2001)
- Currently considering applications from several more operators





- Granted on 3/26/2001 to Consignia
 - Conditions 2 and 3: Provision of universal postal service in the United Kingdom
 - Condition 9: Access to the Post Office's facilities (requires an access code)
 - Condition 11: Promotion of effective competition (no undue discrimination between customers, no predatory pricing)
 - Condition 16: Provision of information to Postcomm
 - Condition 19: Prices for postal services



Promotion of effective competition

Why promote competition?



- Current model broken (declining service standards, high prices, little innovation)
- Postcomm's explicit statutory duty to promote effective competition.
- European Directive and international trend towards liberalisation
- Effective competition will:
 - encourage efficiency and innovation
 - give customers greater choice
 - place an emphasis on customer satisfaction
 - place downward pressure on prices
 - reveal information about the efficient costs of postal services, providing more information about the cost of the universal service
- However, price and quality of service regulation required for medium term where competition not effective
- Competition NOT inconsistent with profitability in mail: competitive postal activities consistently profitable (operating profit of £292m on £2,165m turnover in 2000/01)

Process



- September 2000 first consultation document on introduction of competition
- June 2001 cost of universal service paper published
 cost estimated at £81m using NAC methodology
- June 2001 second consultation document on introduction of competition
- January 2002 proposals for introduction of competition
- April 2002 decision for introduction of competition

Postcomm's Jan 2002 proposals (1)



- Two phases of transition:
 - April 2002 to March 2004 (c. 40% of market by volume opened to competition):
 - indefinite licences for bulk mailing services (>4,000 items)
 - consolidation licences
 - defined activity (e.g. local delivery) licenses
 - continuation of licenses under interim licensing policy
 - April 2004 to March 2006 (further 30% of market by volume opened to competition):
 - large mailing licences
 - End date review
- Date for full opening of UK postal market no later than 31 March 2006





- Throughout, access to Consignia's supply chain promoted (Condition 9)
- Financial viability modelling by independent consultants to ensure Consignia can finance USO and other licensed activities. Under all scenarios examined Consignia still viable, provided costs are reduced to efficient level
- Postcomm to monitor Consignia's pricing to ensure charges consistent with effective competition during transition period, leading to full flexibility subject to Competition Act 1998
- Position on Value Added Tax under review

Future of competition in UK postal services



- "Competition is the best regulator"
- Final proposals to be published in April 2002
- Postal services industry challenged by competition from other media (telecomms, e-substitution, etc.)
- Only competition can deliver efficiency gains and innovation while simultaneously ensuring prices reflecting efficient costs



Price regulation






- Before privatisation of utilities, investors needed security of revenues
- Littlechild paper: Regulation of British Telecommunications' Profitability (1983)
- UK regulated industries controlled by price cap regulation, set for 4-5 years

Revenue = Efficient costs (operating and capital expenditure) + rate of return; or

Price = [Efficient costs (operating and capital expenditure) + rate of return]/volume

Price control regulation





UK price control regulation (2) – advantages of price caps



 Promotion of efficiency. Other UK regulated industries have achieved impressive efficiency gains

Compound Annual Growth

Of Real Unit Operating Expenditure

after price cap regulation

(Post	- 1.8%)
Water	- 3.7%
Sewerage	- 4.1%
Electricity transmission	- 6.5%
Electricity distribution	- 6.8%
Gas transportation	- 9.1%

- (Source: Europe Economics Report http://www.rail-reg.gov.uk/boozalle/euro_econ.htm#_Toc469389015)
- Regulatory certainty from medium-term reviews
- Much risk shifted to regulated firm

UK price control regulation (3)

disadvantages of price caps



- Incentive to reduce quality of service. Potentially intrusive regulation therefore necessary
- Incentive to reclassify operating expenditure as capital expenditure
- Requires medium term projections of demand, cost of capital, operating costs, etc.
- Requires lengthy, time-consuming and often confrontational reviews
- Introduction into a competitive industry can harm development of competition if price controls too tight

Interim price control



- Prices formerly at discretion of Secretary of State
- Current control in Licence divides Consignia's products into three groups for price control purposes:
 - Category A: products where there is no competition. Fixed at 1/1/01 levels in nominal terms (65% of revenues)
 - Category B: products where some competition exists. Fixed at 1/1/01 levels in real terms (24% of revenues)
 - Category C: products where competition is established. Not controlled by licence (10% of revenues)
- Post Office may apply to raise prices if it identifies a risk to its finances and did on 11th April 2001: application subsequently suspended
- Control expires on 1st April 2003





- Price control review underway: aim is to establish a medium term (3-5 years) regime once interim control expires
- Control necessary to:
 - protect customers in the absence of competition (competition- based test); and
 - ensure that licensee can finance licensed activities and provide the universal service.
- Published issues document in November 2001. Draft proposals in Summer 2002; final proposals in Autumn 2002; licence amendments thereafter
- The Post Office may appeal to the Competition Commission if final proposals do not leave it able to finance its licensed activities





- Purpose: assessment of efficient operating expenditure over next five years
- Undertaken by consortium of independent consultants led by WS Atkins. Duration about one year
- Terms of reference include:
 - Obtaining necessary information
 - Internal and international benchmarking;
 - Identification of efficient operating practices;
 - Estimation of cost savings from application of such practices; and
 - Consideration of central cost allocation between regulated and nonregulated business
- Preliminary draft conclusions published in competition proposals envisage reduction of $\sim 30\%$ in operating costs over next five years



Development of access/worksharing

Why access?



- Upstream competition
 - Productive and allocative efficiency
 - innovation
- First stage of full pipeline competition
 - Volumes required before investment in a network
 - Different approaches by different operators
- Has been introduced in other industries (telecoms, electricity, gas, etc)

Consignia's licence conditions



Licence Condition 9

- Part 1
 - Consignia must negotiate with licensed operators or large users
 - Access price to reflect a reasonable allocation of costs
- Part 2
 - A code is to be determined by Consignia
- No need to rely on UK/EC competition law

Consignia's current discounts



- Consignia already offers a number of workshare discounts off both first and second class:
 - Cleanmail
 - 3-5% discount
 - Mailsort
 - 8 32% discount
 - Walksort
 - 36% discount

Downstream access: likely developments



- Currently 2 licensed operators require access:
 - Hays:
 - Requires access to inward mail centres
 - Accepting current workshare discounts
 - Business Post (UK Mail)
 - Requires access to mail centres and delivery offices
 - Not accepting current discounts
 - Possible determination

Upstream access



- Expressions of interest
 - Post Office Counters Ltd (POCL) network
- 'Reciprocal exclusiity' (RE)
 - Agreement in pace between Consignia and POCL
 - UK competition law
 - Who benefits from RE?
 - Pricing access to POCL

Issues to address



Price methodology

- Extend workshare discounts, or charge attributable cost of delivery plus a mark up?
- Geographical (de)averaging?
- Cost allocation
- Efficient costs? X-factor?
- Financial modelling
- Legal implications (price discrimination)
- Terms of reference issued

Timing



- Aligned with price control
 - Due to impact on Consignia, implications for workshare discounts
 - Proposals in summer 2002
 - Code developed by spring 2003
- Subject to a specific determination...
- ...or judicial review

Plans for the access code



- A specific code:
 - Access points
 - Price
 - Conditions
 - Transparency
- Negotiation
 - Flexibility
 - Innovation