Official Transcript of Proceedings

Before the

UNITED STATES POSTAL RATE COMMISSION

In the Matter of:

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POSTAL RATE AND FEE CHANGES

Docket No.

4

R97-1

VOLUME 23



File

- DATE: Friday, February 20, 1998
- PLACE: Washington, D.C.

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PAGES: 11938 - 12441

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1	BEFORE THE
2	POSTAL RATE COMMISSION
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4	In the Matter of: :
5	POSTAL RATE AND FEE CHANGES : Docket No. R97-1
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8	Third Floor Hearing Room
9	Postal Rate Commission
10	1333 H Street, N.W.
11	Washington, D.C. 20268
12	
13	Volume 23
14	Friday, February 20, 1998
15	
16	The above-entitled matter came on for hearing,
17	pursuant to notice, at 9:31 a.m.
18	
19	BEFORE:
20	HON. EDWARD J. GLEIMAN, CHAIRMAN
21	HON. W. H. "TREY" LeBLANC, III, COMMISSIONER
22	HON. GEORGE W. HALEY, COMMISSIONER
23	HON. GEORGE A. OMAS, COMMISSIONER
24	
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PROCEEDINGS

[9:31 a.m.]

3 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Good morning. Today we 4 continue hearings in Docket R97-1 to receive direct cases of 5 participants other than the zPostal Service including their 6 rebuttal to the Postal Service.

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2

Scheduled to appear today are Association of
Alternate Postal Systems Witnesses Bradstreet and Green;
Saturation Mail Coalition Witness Buckel; Witness Haldi
appearing on behalf of Nashua Photo, Inc., District Photo,
Inc., Mystic Color Labs, Seattle Filmworks; and Merck Medco
Managed Care; Office of Consumer Advocate Witness Callow;
and Advertising Mail Marketing Association Witness Schick.

Yesterday I issued two procedural Presiding Officer's rulings that may be of interest. Ruling 101 established the date for submitting designations of institutional responses for this round of hearings. Extra copies of the rulings are available over on the hearing table in the front of the room.

20 Ruling Number 102 revised the schedule of the 21 appearance of witnesses in response to requests that we had 22 received from parties and also scheduled additional 23 witnesses relative to responses to certain NOIs.

Does any participant have a procedural matter to raise before we begin today?

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1 We are going to change the previously announced 2 order of the witnesses as long as there is no objection and we will hear from Witness Green on behalf of AAPS first, and 3 then we will follow with Witness Bradstreet. 4 5 Does this cause anyone in particular any heartburn? 6 7 [No response.] CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If not, Ms. Blair, would you 8 identify your witness so that I can swear him in. 9 MS. BLAIR: Good morning, Mr. Chairman. 10 I would 11 like ask Mr. Joe Green to take the stand. CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Mr. Green, before you settle 12 13 in, if I could ask you to raise your right hand. Whereupon, 14 15 JOE GREEN, a witness, was called for examination by counsel for the 16 Association of Alternate Postal Systems and, having been 17 first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 18 DIRECT EXAMINATION 19 BY MS. BLAIR: 20 21 0 Would you state your name, please? My name is Joe Green. 22 Α And Mr. Green, did you prepare testimony on behalf 23 Q of the Association of Alternate Postal Systems dated 24 December 30th, 1997? 25

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1	A Yes, I did.
2	Q If I were to ask you the questions set forth in
3	that testimony this morning, would your answers be as shown?
4	A Yes.
5	MS. BLAIR: Mr. Chairman, I request that Mr.
6	Green's testimony be accepted and copied into the record.
7	CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Are there any objections?
8	Hearing none, Mr. Green's testimony and exhibits
9	are received into evidence and I direct that they be
10	transcribed into evidence at this point.
11	[Direct Testimony and Exhibits of
12	Joe Green, AAPS-T-2, was received
13	into evidence and transcribed into
14	the record.]
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BEFORE THE POSTAL RATE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20268-0001

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POSTAL RATE AND FEE CHANGES, 1997

1.4

Docket No. R97-1

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JOE GREEN ON BEHALF OF ASSOCIATION OF ALTERNATE POSTAL SYSTEMS

Bonnie S. Blair Thompson Coburn 700 14th Street, N.W. Suite 900 Washington, D.C. 202-508-1000 (office) 202-508-1010 (facsimile)

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Attorney for Association of Alternate Postal Systems

December 30, 1997

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BEFORE THE POSTAL RATE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20268-0001

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POSTAL RATE AND FEE CHANGES, 1997

111.5

Docket No. R97-1

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF JOE GREEN ON BEHALF OF THE ASSOCATION OF ALTERNATE POSTAL SYSTEMS

1 My name is Joe Green and I am the primary owner of R-J Delivery, in business in 2 Pekin, Indiana for the past 20 years. We are a member of the Association of Alternate Postal 3 Systems. R-J Delivery is a sister company to Green Banner Publications, a publisher of seven 4 weekly, community newspapers which I own. I served on the board of directors of the 5 Association of Alternate Postal Systems (AAPS) for nine years and had the privilege of serving 6 as president of this association in 1991.

R-J. Delivery is an alternative delivery company that was born out of the concept of
being able to control the delivery of Green Banner Publications' newspapers. R-J has also
delivered, in the past, items ranging from a partial ounce sample of hand cream to a 9.5 pound
phone book and has done this in several states, including New York, California, Minnesota,
Texas and Florida. Our primary business has been and remains the distribution of free
newspapers and standard mail type circulars to the 48,000 residences in the area of Southern

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Indiana we call home. Other than the affiliated newspapers, we deliver about 12.5 million
 pieces per year, mostly for local merchants.

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Though I have never before testified before the Postal Commission, my relationship with AAPS Executive Director Ken Bradstreet and our attorneys, as well as my personal experience in my small business over the past 20 years, gives me a perspective that I would like to share.

I understand that the rate making process is a complicated process, and I leave it to Mr.
Bradstreet and our attorneys to debate the allocation of attributable and institutional costs of the
Postal Service and how these affect the rates in each sub-class. What I understand better is the
effect that these rates have on competition and that this is part of the consideration in setting
the rates.

12 The Postal Service has managed to limit our participation in the delivery business to 13 only what would be classified today as a portion of Standard mail and magazines. We employ 14 twelve full and part time employees and work with approximately 100 independent contractors, 15 who deliver our products. These people work in our limited scope of available business that 16 we can deliver without running into the portions of the market that the Postal Service claims 17 are protected.

18 The problem that we have faced in the past, and fear facing today, is that the part of the 19 mail stream we are allowed to compete for has continually been held down in terms of rate 20 increases. As a result, the Postal Service is doing deliveries for less money, in real dollars, 21 then they were receiving fifteen years ago.

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1	This would be understandable if all classes of mail were receiving the same treatment,
2	but I understand that the rates for mail where we cannot compete have risen more rapidly than
3	those where we are allowed to compete. The current proposal not only will continue this trend
4	but will also reduce the rates for the heavier pieces, adversely affecting our ability to compete.
5	As a result the Postal Service continues to do more for less in areas where we are
6	allowed to compete. The impression is that the areas where we are not allowed to compete are
7	subsidizing the areas where the Postal Service actually has to compete. We are not asking for
8	a portion of the market to be handed to the private sector. What we are asking is that the
9	protected portions of the mail stream not be used to crush competition in the areas where
10	competition is allowed.
11	We are concerned that if this is allowed to continue, our small business will be faced
12	with a difficult decision of continuation. This will not only affect us and our colleagues in this
13	business but will affect the thousands of carriers our industry employs. These are people who
14	may be able to work only part time or are using their part time position to help them get caught
15	up or ahead.
16	This rate proposal will also affect our customers who have been able to take advantage
17	of services and opportunities that the private sector offers. They sometimes find that they

18 cannot take advantage of the shared mail packages (when they are even available) due to the

19 nature of other pieces in the package, and they find the costs of direct, solo mail to be

20 prohibitive. We can and do provide an alternative.

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1	Businesses like ours are very important to the marketplace. We must make a profit,
2	and we pay taxes on that profit. We also provide competition and choice in the marketplace.
3	The continuation of unfair pricing on the part of the Postal Service that seems targeted at
4	competitors goes against the concept of a competitive market place. Without that competition,
5	jobs will be lost, income opportunities will be lost, selection will be lost and innovation and
6	ingenuity, the building blocks of our economy, will be severely stifled.
7	R-J Delivery, in itself, is not a major player in the market. It would be a stretch to say
8	that we have an effect, as one company, in the market outside of our small distribution area.
9	But we are representative of hundreds of companies in the United States that can be very
י 0 י	adversely affected by Postal Service efforts to use revenues from noncompetitive mail services
11	to cover costs for services that face competition.

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CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: I do not have any designated 1 written cross examination for this witness, which is unusual 2 3 and concerns me. Did anyone designate any written cross 4 examination? 5 6 [No response.] 7 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Is there anyone here today who wants to designate any written cross examination? 8 [No response.] 9 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If that is the case, then we 10 11 will proceed. There doesn't appear to be any -- we will proceed with oral cross examination. 12 Only one participant, the Postal Service, has 13 requested oral cross examination of Witness Green. 14 Does any other participant wish to cross examine 15 this witness? 16 [No response.] 17 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If not, then Mr. Cooper, when 18 you are ready, you can begin. 19 MR. COOPER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 20 CROSS-EXAMINATION 21 BY MR. COOPER: 22 Good morning, Mr. Green. 23 Q 24 Α Good morning. I am Rick Cooper for the Postal Service and I just 25 Q

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have a few questions for you this morning.

As I understand your testimony, you run a deliverycompany, RJ Delivery?

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4 A Yes, sir.

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5 Q And according to your testimony, it is your 6 opinion that the Postal Service is keeping your delivery 7 company out of portions of the delivery market, isn't that 8 right?

9 A Well, it is the Private Express Statutes that have 10 limited our participation.

11 Q Now you are not suggesting that the Postal Service 12 ignore the Private Express Statutés, are you?

13 A No. My testimony addresses saturation mail.

Q So it is your testimony that one of the ways in which the Postal Service limits your company's participation in the delivery market is by enforcing federal law, is that right?

18 A I think that that might be a little out of 19 context. It is relevant to the fact that we are limited to 20 participating in saturation mail.

It is not a major part of my testimony that I am complaining about being limited by federal law, no.

23 Q All right. Well, let's look at the portion of the 24 delivery market where RJ Delivery may legally compete.

25 With respect to these competitive services, it is

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1 your testimony that the Postal Service has restricted its 2 rate increases in such a way as to inhibit competition, 3 isn't that right?

ALC:

4 A Where are you referencing to?

5 Q Well, look at page 2, lines 18 and following.

6 A Okay.

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7 Q Where you say the problem that we have faced in 8 the past is, and fear facing today, is that the part of the 9 mail stream we are allowed to compete for has continually 10 been held down in terms of rate increases.

11 A That appears to be the appearance of what is 12 happening, yeah. I mean, in reality, that appears to be --13 that the rates for that particular part of mail seems to not 14 have risen as quickly as the rates for the other mail 15 streams, or other parts of the mail.

16 Q And you are not saying, are you, that the Postal 17 Service is restricting rate increases in those segments of 18 its business to inhibit competition, are you?

A There is an appearance that that particular form of mail, or that particular rate in the rate scheme of the Postal Service has not risen correspondingly with the other rates in the postal stream. The First Class rate, for example, and other rates have risen much quicker than the Third Class or the saturation rates.

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Q Well, in fact, on page 3, starting at line 2 of

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your testimony, you said that you understand that the rates for mail where we can not compete have risen more rapidly than those where we are allowed to compete. Is that the impression you are talking about?

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5 A That's the impression, yeah. Really, Mr. 6 Bradstreet that is the one that is the individual that 7 really understands the rate structures much better than I 8 do.

9 Q Well, what is the basis of your understanding of 10 the rate structure?

11 Α My understanding is from a standpoint of a small business person, and see what is happening with the rate 12 that I am competing against it, and seeing that it really is 13 14 not raising, it is staying flat, has stayed pretty much flat for a long time, and in real dollars, I quess, has basically 15 gone down, become less expensive. As a small business 16 person, I see that rate is flat and yet I see my First Class 17 rate that I send my bills out with -- rising a great deal. 18 19 And, so, as a result, the appearance is that the rate that I can compete with has stayed flat, or gone down in real 20 dollars, and the rate that I can't compete with has risen 21 quite rapidly. 22

Q But you didn't do a systematic, any kind of systematic analysis of competitive versus non-competitive services to compare those rates?

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1 A No, I don't -- I don't have the resources to do 2 that.

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3 Q Now, your company delivers magazines, is that 4 right?

5 A No.

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Q Okay. So on page 2, where you say the Postal Service has managed to limit our participation in the delivery business to only what would be classified today as a portion of Standard mail and magazines, you are not referring to your company, you are referring to "our" in a larger sense?

12

I am not sure of the question there.

Q Well, here is what your testimony says, "The Postal Service has managed to limit our participation --'our' participation in the delivery business to only what would be classified today as a portion of Standard mail and magazines." Now, I am asking you who is the "our" in that sentence?

A Well, the "our" is my company, that is the -- that is what I am limited to. I did not state that I did magazines. I am stating that I am limited to -- that is the only thing I am limited to being to able to deliver.

23 Q Under the Private Express statutes?

19 î —

- 24 A Correct.
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Q Okay. So your company has deliberately chosen not

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to participate in the magazine market for other reasons?

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A Correct.

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Q Okay. Does your company deliver parcels such as
-- of the type that might be carried by parcel post?

5 A We have done a few jobs in the past where we have 6 delivered phone books, large phone books, to specific 7 addresses that, theoretically, could have gone parcel post. 8 But that is just a couple of jobs and was very minimal.

9 Q Are you aware the parcel post rates increased by 10 18 percent following Docket R-90-1?

11 A No, I am not aware of that. And, you know, again, 12 I am not -- you know, I don't -- parcel post really doesn't 13 effect me in my business, I don't think.

Q So you, likewise, wouldn't be aware of how much the parcel post rates increased after Dockets No. R-94 or MC-95-1?

17 A No, because parcel post really is not a part of my18 business.

Q Okay. Would you turn to page 3, line 6, of your testimony? Now, the sentence which begins on line 6 reads, "The impression is that the areas where we are not allowed to compete are subsidizing the areas where the Postal Service actually has to compete." Do you see that sentence? A Yes.

25 Q Is this your impression?

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A That is my impression, yes.

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2 Q Is it your testimony that the rates recommended by 3 the Postal Rate Commission and adopted by the Postal Service 4 in recent cases were marked by illegal cross-subsidy?

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5 A No, I am saying that the impression is that the 6 rates where we can compete have stayed down, and the rates 7 where we cannot compete have risen substantially greater 8 than the rates where we cannot compete, and that is my 9 impression of what seems to be happening.

10 Q What do you mean by cross-subsidy?

11 A Where do you -- where do you refer to that?

12 Q I am sorry, you don't say the word cross-subsidy. 13 You say some rates are subsidizing others. Can you tell me 14 what you mean by that?

Well, it appears -- again, Mr. Bradstreet is Α 15 better versed at allocated and unallocated costs and so 16 17 forth. But what it appears is that the cost burden is being shifted -- it appears that that cost burden is being shifted 18 into areas where we are not allowed to compete. The Private 19 Express statutes protect those portions of mail, and it 20 appears that those portions of mail are rising much faster 21 22 in their rates in order to produce greater income and, again, saturation mail does not rise, it seems to stay 23 pretty much flat, or go down in real dollars. And so the 24 appearance is that one is rising faster than inflation, one 25

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is not. And so it appears that costs are being covered in
 one area where it is a protected market in order to hold
 down an unprotected area.

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Q Is it your opinion that the Postal Service, in its competitive service offerings, is charging rates which fail to generate enough revenues to cover the costs caused by those classes?

8 Α I don't have access to those figures. I really couldn't answer that guestion. I just -- I know that part 9 of the ratemaking process is to take into consideration the 10 effects that the Postal Service has on competition. I know 11 that, I would admit, probably justifiably so, the Postal 12 Service has certain protected areas of the market to 13 guarantee service across the country in an equal and 14 equitable fashion. And I know that we are limited to a 1.5 certain area of the mail stream. 16

And so, you know, the big thing that I want to bring to the table today is that, as a small business person, I am very much effected by the rates that you are setting for saturation, and that you have requested for saturation. And, as a small business person, you know, I think my position needs to be taken into consideration.

Q But on the issue of cross-subsidization, or subsidization of one class by another, if it can be shown that every class is covering its own costs, then there

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1 wouldn't be any subsidization of one class by another, would 2 there?

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The problem with doing that is that I have to 3 Α cover all my costs with one class of mail, and I don't have 4 multiple classes to cover my overhead. And so to say that 5 6 the Postal Service, who does have all these classes of mail 7 to cover their overhead, can cover their costs in the area 8 where you have to compete with me and, therefore, that is 9 fair, that is not fair. I have to cover all my costs with 10 one class of mail. You have multiple classes of mail to 11 cover your costs. So just because you can verify and show 12 that you can cover your costs in one of those multiple classes of mail, to me, is not justification to lower your 13 14 rates to the point where you drive me out of business.

You have a certain specific franchise in with the 15 Private Express statutes give you, and that franchise is 16 17 given to guarantee service, equitable service across the country, and that is fine. But to take that and use those 18 multiple classes of mail to justify your lower costs in one 19 class where I am allowed to compete, does me in, because I 20 can only -- I only have one class of mail to cover my 21 22 overhead.

23 So I would say just because you can cover your 24 costs in that one class of mail, no, that does not 25 justifying maintaining a rate or lowering a rate. I think

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you have to take into account other factors of that same law that created the Postal Service that says you have to look at the effects that you have on competition, and that is my point that I need -- would like to make, and that is that that has to be factored in also.

6 Q You would agree, though, that if every class is 7 covering its own costs, then every class is making a 8 contribution to the Postal Service's overhead, isn't that 9 right?

10 A I'm sorry, say that again.

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11 Q If each class of service offered by the Postal 12 Service has rates that generate revenues in excess of the 13 costs caused by each class, each of those classes, then 14 every one of those classes is making a contribution to the 15 Postal Service's overhead, isn't it?

16 A It is making a contribution, but whether it is 17 making an equitable contribution, I have no idea. I don't 18 have the resources to delve into that study. It is making a 19 contribution, but whether it is a relevant one and an 20 equitable one, I don't know.

Q Okay. So when you refer to subsidizing of one class by another, you are talking about some kind of fair distribution of the overhead?

A No. I am not talking about a fair distribution of the overhead.

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Q Then are you talking about classes of mail not
 covering their own costs?

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Again, you are delving into an area I don't know. 3 Α I can not -- I mean, you know, what I have is the impression 4 that the rate that I compete with is staying low and the 5 rate that I cannot compete with because of Private Express 6 statutes is going up. And to -- you know, it depends on 7 what numbers you use, and I just don't have the resources to 8 generate, you know, combatant data to compare with the data 9 10 that you have. And I, you know, I don't know. Just because a class of mail is making its contribution to the overhead, 11 as determined by the way you keep your books, is one factor, 12 and the other factor is how it effects the private 13 enterprise and the business people, or the business industry 14 out there, is another factor. And the point I hear to make 15 is that factor needs to be taken into consideration. 16 I have no further questions. MR. COOPER: 17 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Is there any follow-up? 18 Ouestions from the bench? Commissioner LeBlanc. 19 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Mr.Green, I am trying to 20 understand exactly what it is that your business does. Now, 21

22 you deliver what now?

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THE WITNESS: We have -- we publish free weekly newspapers that are delivered saturation through multiple communities.

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1 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: This is Green Banner 2 Publications?

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3 THE WITNESS: Yes, sir. And RJ Delivery is a 4 sister company that was initially established to perform the 5 distribution of those publications.

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6 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: And I take it then that you 7 can't use shared mail or solo mail, or choose not to do 8 that?

9 THE WITNESS: We have certain quality issues in 10 the distribution and publication, and we also are not 11 welcome in shared mail packages. We are actually direct 12 competitors of shared mail.

13 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Can you elaborate on that 14 for me?

THE WITNESS: Well, our publications carry inside 15 of them a lot of printed inserts. These printed inserts are 16 17 the exact same pieces that shared mail is after. The other problem is the shared mail is in the post office and it is 18 mailed. And so, as a result, when I drop in 40 pages of 19 tabloid newsprint, along with six inserts, it drives that 20 cost up substantially to where I don't really fit in their 21 package. I would have to pay, you know, the incremental 22 cost of putting my piece into their package would make it 23 prohibitive. 24

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COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: And please do not

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misunderstand this next statement, but one of our jobs is to try to balance these criteria that you were talking about with counsel, discrimination, anti-competitive, et cetera, et cetera. There are basically nine of them, or eight of them, depending on how you look at it. But you seem to be saying, with all due respect, that we should give you deference over somebody else.

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8 And I mean I am just -- I don't mean that in a 9 negative sense, I am just trying to understand. You talked 10 about unfair distribution of overhead a minute ago with the 11 counsel. So, I am just trying to find out exactly here, are 12 we talking about making a choice here, on our standpoint, of 13 possibly you over, say, somebody else? And if so, that's 14 fine. I am not trying to put words in your mouth here.

THE WITNESS: I am not sure that that is exactly 15 -- that is actually not what I am trying to say. The point 16 that I am trying to make is there is a specific area in the 17 mail stream in which we are allowed to compete. And there 18 are certain -- there's other areas of the mail stream where 19 we can not compete. And, again, it is understandable that 20 those areas have to be protected in order to provide what 21 the initial concept of the Postal Service was, and that was 22 fair distribution of information to everyone, and whether 23 they live in the middle of Colorado or downtown D.C. 24 And my point is that we are allowed to compete in 25

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only a specific area and yet the Postal Service is allowed 1 to spread their costs over a large, multiple classes of 2 mail, and, therefore, their economics of scale kick in and 3 we get -- we get clobbered with that. We get hit with that. 4 And that's the point. And one of those criteria is the 5 effect of competition has to be there. Now, the law states 6 7 that they are protected in those areas, and so they are not 8 facing competition in those areas, so they are guaranteed a certain amount of economics of scale when they get to the 9 10 classes where they are competitive, they have to compete. COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Do you have any idea what 11 kind of -- maybe Mr. Bradstreet will get into this also, but 12 do you have any idea what type of volume your industry has? 13 THE WITNESS: Oh, gosh. 1415 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: I mean volume as a percent, as a number, as anything that you may have available to you? 16 THE WITNESS: No, I don't have that figure. 17 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Okay. 18 THE WITNESS: That's a little larger scope than I 19 have looked at before. 20 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Fine. Thank you, sir. 21 Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 22 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: I don't have a question, just a 23 If you had been asking for some deference relative 24 comment. to other participants in the case, that certainly wouldn't 25

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be novel. I think that that is probably what these 1 2 proceedings are all about. 3 [Laughter.] CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: So don't be shy if you want to 4 5 ask for deference. 6 Follow-up as a consequence of questions from the bench? 7 Mr. McLaughlin? 8 9 CROSS-EXAMINATION 10 BY MR. MCLAUGHLIN: I'm Tom McLaughlin, representing the Saturation 11 0 12 Mail Coalition. You mentioned mail as an alternative for your 1.3 publication. What is the typical weight of your 14 15 publication, including inserts? That's a difficult question, because we haven't 16 Α been concerned with weight for so long since we're in the 17 hand delivery. It's -- our publications range from 24 tab 18 pages to 48. I know that 30 -- I believe 32 tab pages is 19 where the pound rate is, which would be approximately about 20 3.3 ounces. So I would say we're probably ranging -- and 21 this is really of the top of my head -- we're ranging from 22 two to five or six ounces just for the publication. 23 Q And then --24 25 А Then within that publication are multiple inserts

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1 which fluctuate from a 20-pound bond piece of paper that 2 size to 24-page tabloid insert. 3 0 So -- and a 24-page tab insert would be two ounces 4 or so, wouldn't it? Α Right. 5 So if you have seven or eight inserts for a 6 0 typical week, you could have seven, eight ounces even? 7 А Possibly. 8 9 Q And on the low side would it be four to five ounces, or --10 The low side probably would go down to two to 11 A 12 three ounces. Even with inserts? 13 0 There are weeks when we only have maybe one or 14 А 15 two. Okay. If -- you mentioned -- so if you were to Q 16 mail that publication yourself --17 А Um-hum. 18 You would be paying in general at the pound rate? 19 Q For the most part, yes, the bulk of it. 20 Α And likewise you mentioned the possibility of 21 Q putting it into a shared mail package. If it were put in 22 the shared mail package, that would almost certainly all 23 have to pay the pound rate, the current pound rate? 24 25 Α Yes.

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2 MR. McLAUGHLIN: I have no further questions. CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Is there any further followup? 3 4 Redirect? 5 MS. BLAIR: No. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 6 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If there's no redirect, then, Mr. Green, I want to thank you. We appreciate your 7 8 appearance here today and your contributions to our record, and if there's nothing further, you're excused. 9 10 THE WITNESS: Thank you. [Witness excused.] 11 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Ms. Blair, you may call your 12 13 next witness. MS. BLAIR: Mr. Chairman, the next witness on 14 behalf of the Association of Alternate Postal Systems is Mr. 15 Kenneth L. Bradstreet. I ask that he take the stand. 16

17 Whereupon,

18 19 KENNETH L. BRADSTREET,

a witness, was called for examination by counsel for the
Association of Alternate Postal Systems and, having been
first duly sworn, was examined and testified as follows:
CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Ms. Blair.
DIRECT EXAMINATION

23 DIRECT EXAMINAT

24 BY MS. BLAIR:

25 Q State your name, please.

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11976 1 Α My name is Kenneth L. Bradstreet. 2 Mr. Bradstreet, did you prepare testimony dated 0 3 December 30, 1997, in this proceeding? 4 Α Yes, I did. 5 0 And if I were to -- if you were to testify today, would your testimony be as shown in that prepared material? 6 7 А Yes, it would. 8 MS. BLAIR: I'd ask that Mr. Bradstreet's testimony be accepted and copied into the record, Mr. 9 Chairman. 10 11 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Are there any objections? 12 Hearing none, Mr. Bradstreet's testimony and 13 exhibits are received into evidence, and I direct that they 14 be transcribed into the record at this point. [Direct Testimony and Exhibits of 15 Kenneth L. Bradstreet, AAPS-T-1, 16 17 was received into evidence and transcribed into the record.] 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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BEFORE THE POSTAL RATE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20268-0001

POSTAL RATE AND FEE CHANGES, 1997)

Docket No. R97-1

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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF KENNETH L. BRADSTREET ON BEHALF OF ASSOCIATION OF ALTERNATE POSTAL SYSTEMS

Bonnie S. Blair Thompson Coburn 700 14th Street, N.W. Suite 900 Washington, D.C. 202-508-1000 (office) 202-508-1010 (facsimile)

Attorney for Association of Alternate Postal Systems

December 30, 1997

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BEFORE THE POSTAL RATE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20268-0001

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POSTAL RATE AND FEE CHANGES, 1997

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Docket No. R97-1

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DIRECT TESTIMONY OF KENNETH L. BRADSTREET ON BEHALF OF ASSOCIATION OF ALTERNATE POSTAL SYSTEMS

1	I. INTRODUCTION
2	My name is Kenneth L. Bradstreet. I am the Vice President and General Manager of
3	Advertisers Postal Service (APS) in Gaylord, Michigan. APS is a private enterprise delivery
	system in rural northern Michigan. In addition to private delivery, APS also operates a mailing
5	service which does mail preparation for various shopping guides, newspapers, and retailers in
6	the area.
7	I joined APS in April of 1977 as Assistant District Manager. I worked at that position
8	until September 1977, at which time I was asked to coordinate special projects for APS. In
9	September of 1978 I was promoted to Assistant General Manager. I became General Manager
10	in 1982 and Vice President in 1985.
11	In August of 1983, APS joined the Association of Private Postal Systems (APPS), which
12	is a trade association made up of private delivery companies similar to APS. In February 1984,
13	I was appointed to the Postal Affairs Committee of APPS.

Also, in early 1984 I helped to establish the Coalition of Non-Postal Media (CNPM),
 and I served as its Vice-Chairman. In that capacity I submitted testimony to the Postal Rate

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Commission in Dockets R84-1 and R87-1. CNPM was a common interest group of publishers,
 alternate delivery companies, and other media that compete with the USPS.

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was elected President of APPS, and I served two terms as President of APPS. In February 1990,
the name, Association of Private Postal Systems, was changed to the Association of Alternate
Postal Systems (AAPS). AAPS participated in R90-1 as a limited participant. In R90-1 I
submitted testimony on behalf of AAPS. AAPS again participated in the MC95-1 classification
case, and I submitted testimony in that case.

In February 1987, I was elected to the Board of Directors of APPS. In February 1989. I

9 In addition to personal participation in three rate cases and a classification case, I have
10 also represented the alternate delivery industry on various panels at a number of conferences
11 and forums. I participated as a speaker at the Cato Institute forum on postal privatization in
April 1988. In March 1990, the morning following the filing of R90-1, I appeared opposite
13 Postmaster General Anthony Frank on a morning news show produced by WWOR in the New
14 York City market, and broadcast to cable systems throughout the United States. The segment
15 was a discussion of the 1990 postal rate proposal.

On June 1, 1995 I assumed the duties of Executive Director of AAPS, a position which
carries with it the responsibility for representing the interests of the alternate delivery industry.
It is in that capacity that I offer testimony in this proceeding.

My 20 years of experience as a competitor of the Postal Service, as a mailer, and more recently as president and representative of a trade association of private delivery companies, has given me a great deal of exposure to postal issues, particularly as they affect private delivery companies throughout the country. Given that one of the criteria for the establishment of postal rates is the consideration of the effect of rates on, among others, "enterprises in the

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private sector of the economy engaged in the delivery of mail matter other than letters," I
consider it essential that competitors of the U.S. Postal Service participate in the ratemaking
process.

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Our industry learned in 1981 that we could not afford to sit back and assume that the Postal Service will deal fairly with us. As a result of the 1981 rate decision, the third class rates with which we compete were reduced precipitously, putting many of our number out of business. Since that time, the well-being of the alternate delivery industry has been tied more to postal rates than to any other factor.

9

II. PURPOSE AND SUMMARY OF TESTIMONY

My testimony is not technical. It is written almost exclusively by me -- not by a group of consultants and attorneys -- from the perspective of certain competitors of the USPS, many of them very small businesses. My testimony is written to remind the United States Postal Service, and the Commission, of the basic mission of the USPS as defined by Congress. It is written to remind the USPS, and the Commission, that the rate-setting criteria established by Congress include the consideration of competition and competitors, something that, in my experience, the USPS has not been doing appropriately.

17 It is clear to me as a layperson, from a reading of the Postal Reorganization Act, that 18 the USPS was intended by Congress to be a public service, not an aggressive competitor. It is 19 also clear from observing the USPS over the past eighteen years that in many regards it 20 considers itself more a competitor than a public service.

21 My testimony will encourage the Commission to view the USPS as Congress viewed it 22 as a public service. It will encourage the Commission to shape rates for monopoly mail and for competitive mail accordingly, following carefully the criteria of the Postal Reorganization Act.

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And it will encourage the Commission to follow not only the letter of the Act, but to catch the
spirit of the Act as well, and to shape postal rates accordingly.

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3 More specifically, I will first address the importance of the Postal Service monopoly. Next, I will address the great pride the Postmaster General has taken in driving a "competitor" 4 out of business, and then turn to a discussion of the Postal Reorganization Act and its 5 ratemaking criteria. I will next discuss the proposal in this case, including "Ramsey Pricing," 6 7 the over-reliance upon cost coverage, the inadequate weight/cost study, the anticompetitive and unsupportable proposal to lower the ECR pound rate, the failure to attribute all attributable 8 9 costs, the failure to recognize cost differences between letters and non-letters and between 10 loose and bound pieces, and the proposed shape surcharge as an inappropriate justification for 11 the pound rate reduction. I conclude with an appeal to the Commission to again reject an anticompetitive, unjustifiable rate proposal.

13

III. THE ASSOCIATION OF ALTERNATE POSTAL SYSTEMS

The Association of Alternate Postal Systems is a trade association of approximately 100 private, door-to-door delivery companies located in 30 states. Many of these member companies are solely private postal systems; that is, they are independently owned and are not an affiliate of any particular publication. A number of member companies are owned, and are an operating division of, a weekly or daily newspaper. Still others are owned and operated by publishers of shopping guides or "penny-savers."

By far the majority of items delivered by AAPS members would qualify as saturation or
 near saturation Standard A flats. Therefore, AAPS members, all of whom compete with the
 USPS for the delivery of Standard ECR saturation or high density advertising, are vitally
 concerned with any USPS proposal that affects Standard ECR rates.

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AAPS members are mainly engaged in the delivery of weekly TMC shopping guides, saturation shopping guides and accompanying preprinted inserts. In addition, most AAPS members distribute community and telephone directories and product samples. The USPS proposal would significantly harm these businesses, especially in competing for those items weighing 4 ounces and above. Some AAPS members also distribute second-class magazines and periodicals to specific addresses.

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7 IV. THE UNIQUE NATURE OF THE POSTAL SERVICE'S MONOPOLY POSITION

8 When it comes to operating a business in the private sector, there are, or at least should 9 be, few restrictions on the operating environment. Businesses should be free to set their own 10 rates. They should be free to enter or withdraw from new markets, new products, new services. 13 As long as a business operates within the framework of the law and does not operate in an 14 anticompetitive manner, a business is, or at least ought to be, free to compete unrestricted in 15 the open marketplace of goods and services.

14 While this is true of private business operating in a free market economy, the same 15 cannot be said of legal or natural monopolies. This freedom to operate unencumbered carries 16 with it the presumption that the business in question enjoys no special advantages such as a 17 legal monopoly, or special treatment with respect to governmentally granted advantages. On 18 the other hand, utilities that provide an essential service and that have a monopoly on that 19 service are not, and should not be, allowed to set rates independently or to compete 20 unrestrained in other areas of the open market. The opportunities for abuse are too great, and 21 therefore utilities are, and have historically been, highly regulated businesses.

22 The United States Postal Service has a monopoly on the carriage of "letters." This monopoly is mandated by federal law embodied in the Private Express Statutes. Moreover, the

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USPS has the power to define what a letter is. No private company may compete with the
 USPS in the delivery of letters. This monopoly represents about \$42 billion per year of
 protected revenue for the USPS (if you consider First Class and Regular Standard to be
 protected).

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Further, the USPS enjoys special pricing advantages that go far beyond its protected
monopoly, advantages that even private sector regulated utilities do not enjoy. First, regulated
utilities must build a profit margin into their rates, even if that margin is regulated. The
dollars of profit are dollars in the rates collected from customers.

9 Second, privately owned utilities pay real estate taxes, income taxes, all the taxes to
10 which a business in the private sector, like APS, is subject. This cost factor increases the rates
11 a regulated utility must charge by the collective amount of the taxes payable.

The USPS is virtually unique among organizations, companies or utilities. The USPS rates do not reflect either of the factors mentioned above. The USPS operates on a break even basis, so USPS rates are significantly lower than they would be if the USPS were obligated to factor in, say, a 10% profit margin. Also, the huge amount of taxes that the USPS would otherwise pay if it were not tax exempt is also absent from USPS rates. As a result of these and other unique advantages (does USPS get and pay parking tickets, business licensing fees?), USPS rates are substantially lower than they would be without these special privileges.

Beyond the advantages of a utility-type monopoly, its tax exempt status and rates that reflect no need for a profit margin give the USPS an advantage far beyond its mere monopoly advantage. Therefore, the USPS must be regulated far more carefully than if its only advantage were a monopoly privilege. Tax exempt status, added to non-profit status, added to a monopoly revenue base of \$42 billion create a potential for abuse unique only to the U.S. Postal Service.

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Persistent USPS cries, both at the Commission and before Congress, for relaxation of 1 rate controls reek with the likelihood of abuse. These cries are ominous to competitors and 2 should be just as ominous to most mailers and to the general public. With a \$42 billion base 3 guaranteed by law, with tax exempt status, and with non-profit status, even if there is no 4 evidence of abuse present, certainly the potential for abuse is ever present. It is important that 5 the Commission constantly evaluate the USPS with respect to its competitive performance. 6 Most importantly, the Postal Reorganization Act places solely upon the Commission 7 the responsibility to assure that the interests of the public, of mailers, and of competitors are 8 protected. Small competitors of the USPS have no other recourse but to rely on the 9 Commission to prevent abuses that, as we shall see, have characterized the actions of the 10 USPS over the past fifteen to twenty years. 11

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V. "ONE HELL OF A COMPETITOR"

It is clear from USPS declarations and actions that the USPS chafes under this 13 necessary regulation. It is equally clear, and understandable, that it does not agree with a high 14 level of regulation. Certainly no entity appreciates regulation that prevents it from doing what 15 it is otherwise inclined to do. Utilities no doubt would prefer to set rates independently of 16 public service commissions. But the Postal Service has been more than persistent in 17 attempting to free itself of accountability. From friendly customer "blue ribbon" task forces, to 18 pressure on Congress to let it set its own rates, the Postal Service has done everything it can 19 think of to escape PRC review. 20

The USPS obviously views itself more as a private business, and yearns for the
opportunity to compete freely without any restraint. This self-perception is evident in the
USPS treatment of Third Class/Standard mail since the late 1970s. It is further demonstrated

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by the USPS special treatment of Advo Corporation, and of other shared and saturation
 mailers.

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It is clear from observing the USPS over the past 16 years, and from participating in 3 several rate and classification cases, that the USPS views itself as an aggressive competitor. 4 5 While that self-view is not what Congress intended for the USPS, as I will discuss below, it has 6 nonetheless shaped Postal Service's mission, rates and proposals since the early 1980s at least. 7 Saturation Third Class/Standard mail has been targeted by the USPS for special 8 treatment since the late 1970s. ECR saturation and high density mail are the only significant 9 part of the Standard Mail mailstream open to competition. It is interesting to track the history of First and third class rates since the mid-1970s. Saturation advertising has time after time 10 11 been the recipient of favorable proposals and favorable rates, albeit (thanks to the Commission) less favorable rates than proposals. 13 Following is a chart that tracks the history of the rates paid by saturation third 14 class/Standard mailers. The chart compares the lowest rate for saturation flats, typically the 15 most competitive, with the highest (or least sorted) rate for regular bulk third class, typically

16 those third class/Standard mailers with few or no options. It also compares the rate for

17 monopoly First-class letters and the rate for subsequent ounces for First-class mail.

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Year	1c letter	1c Add Wt	3c / Stand Basic	3c / Stand ECR-sat	3c Add Wt ECR-sat
1978	.15	.13	.084	.084	2.25 (36.0)
1979	.15	.13	.084	.069	2.25 (36.0)
1980	.15	.13	.084	.067	2.25 (36.0)
1981	.18	.17	.104	.064	2.06 (33.0)
1981	.20	.17	.109	.079	2.81 (45.0)
1983	.20	.17	.110	.074	2.81 (45.0)
1985	.22	.17	.125	.083	2.38 (38.0)
1988	.25	.20	.167	.101	3.00 (48.0)
1991	.29	.23	.223	.105	3.10 (49.6)
1995	.32	.23	.266	.120	3.55 (56.8)
1996 (current)	.32	-23	.306	.114	3.45 (55.2)
Current Total	113%	77%.	264%	36%	53%
1998 (prop)	.33	.23	.300	.118	2.63 (42.0)
Proposed Total	120%	77%	257%	40%	17%

Table A A Rate Trend Comparison Saturation Flats VS. Monopoly Mail

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5 It should be fairly plain that there has been for many years a favored type of mail, a type 6 (now a subclass) that has been protected from any significant rate increases, and a type that 7 would cost even less today had the Commission granted the rates requested by the USPS. 8 In the late 1970s the Postal Service began the systematic separation of third class rates 9 into rate categories that had more to do with competition than with anything else. In R84-1 I 10 testified about the trend of the USPS to "polarize" the rates for the competitive portion from the monopoly portion of third class mail. Since that time, and especially with the advent of 11 12 Standard mail, rates for advertising have been structured more in relation to the number of 13 competitive options, if any, than any other factor.

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1 There are two key elements in the rates for competitive advertising. These are the 2 minimum piece rate and the pound rate. As shown above, the piece rate separation between 3 competition and monopoly advertising matter has been dramatic. The rates in 1978 were the 4 same for all third class mail, except for that which was "bound." Though the lower rate for 5 bound materials made sense from a cost standpoint, it didn't make competitive sense, to be 6 sure. Most bound material had no alternatives. That rate distinction disappeared in 1981.

7 The first key element that affects the competitive balance is the minimum piece rate.
8 As you can see from Table A, the piece rate for the most competitive saturation advertising has
9 increased just 36% since 1978. The slight increase in R97-1 proposed piece rate would increase
10 that 20-year spread to 40%

The other key element of postal rates that affects the competitive balance is the pound 11 rate for saturation advertising. Shopping guides and free distribution newspapers make choices based more upon the pound rate than on the piece rate. This is because the typical publication 13 weighs between 3 and 6 ounces. However, publishers, like shared mail companies, sell the 14 delivery of preprinted inserts to advertisers. With one or more regular inserts, the combined 15 weight of the publication and its inserts is in the 4 to 10 ounce range, and often higher. The 16 17 cost of the incremental weight is a major consideration on the part of a publisher whether to use the Postal Service, to use an alternate delivery provider, or perhaps even whether to start a 18 delivery system of his own. The cost of weight determines, to a large extent, the cost of 19 handling preprinted inserts. 20

Certainly the U.S. Postal Service is aware of this key rate, as it clearly explained in MC95-1, and acknowledges again in R97-1. That the proposed pound rate is only 17% higher than the rate paid by saturation advertisers in 1978 shows just how protected this rate has

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been. By way of comparison, the pound rate for mailers with the fewest competitive 1 alternatives, or perhaps none, is now 67.7 cents, 88% higher than in 1978. The proposed rate 2 of 65 cents would bring that 20 year increase to 81%, compared to the 17% increase for the 3 most competitive of saturation advertising over that same 20 years. Indeed, the US Postal 4 Service has been so intent on making this pound rate the focus of its attack on alternate 5 6 delivery competitors that it has rigged at least three separate weight studies to give its rate 7 preference the appearance of legitimacy from a cost standpoint. 8 I would venture to guess that if the public were generally aware that the U.S. Postal 9 Service were proposing a change whereby major advertising interests, which had experienced

cumulative rate increases over the past 19 years of only 53%, would now get a reduction, there
 would be some serious pressure for change. I suspect that the reaction would not favor the
 USPS or saturation advertisers.

I can't include a discussion of the history of such favored treatment without pointing 13 out that it could be worse, and it indeed would have been worse had the USPS gotten all that it 14 had asked for. In R90-1, the USPS proposed to reduce the lowest saturation rate from \$0.101 15 to \$0.091 per piece, a 10% reduction. The Commission recommended instead that the low rate 16 be .105 for saturation flats, an increase of only 4%, but an increase none-the-less. In 1995 17 18 during the re-classification case, the USPS proposed a pound rate for saturation advertising of 19 as little as 39.9 cents per pound. The Commission recommended instead the current rate of 55.2 cents and above. 20

In spite of the positive contributions of the Commission over the past several cases,
 this highly competitive class of mail has escaped the large increases experienced by other
 mailers. Not content, however, the Postal Service once again is proposing substantial

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decreases in the rates paid by this privileged class of mailers, decreases of as much as 18%. We
 urge the Commission to consider the history of rates for this privileged class, and to consider
 that it is one of the most highly competitive classes in the mailstream.

Probably by far the largest shared mail company in the United States is Advo. For its
fiscal year ending September 27, 1997, Advo mailed 3.11 billion shared mail packages
(representing more than 10% of commercial ECR) containing more than 26.5 billion pieces. It
is therefore understandable that the USPS greatly values Advo as a customer. Advo has been a
regular active participant in postal matters, and you will have to pardon me for observing that
the USPS and Advo are generally on the same side of most issues. That may even qualify as a
gross understatement.

In R84-1 it was revealed by us that USPS officials had been ordering mail handlers to 11 give Advo mailings special treatment, far above the service standards for third class mail. In a 13 memo authored by then MSC Postmaster Cooper McCauslen in Grand Rapids, Michigan, individual postmasters were ordered, "Delivery of the [Advo] mailing MUST be made on 14 15 Tuesday and Wednesday, each week Delivery <u>MUST NOT</u>, under any circumstances, be made on or before Monday. It is for Tuesday and Wednesday delivery only." (Emphasis in original) 16 17 McCauslen went on to say, "The intent of this program is to recapture the advertisement that was lost to the newspapers, as supplements to their papers several years 18 ago. In many cities the program has been quite successful and the potential for the USPS to 19 20 recapture significant advertising business rests with our ability to handle the job well."

Efforts to get the USPS and its witnesses to comment on this memo, or the "program" described in it, were fruitless. The USPS refused to answer our questions about the memo or program, and the USPS defied an order from the Commission to produce answers.

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ı	The infamous memo, and supporting personal experience from newspapers and
2	alternative delivery companies throughout the United States, established clearly that Advo was
3	getting a value of service that often exceeded the service standards for First class mail. An
4	exchange between Chairman Gleiman and USPS witness Moeller in MC95-1 demonstrated
5	that Montgomery Ward was getting similar special treatment. (MC95-1;Tr. 4352-55)
6	The current competitive drive of the USPS is well illustrated by a speech made by
7	Postmaster General Marvin Runyon shortly after the results of the MC95-1 case were in. In
8	that case, the Postal Service made it abundantly clear that its prime targets were alternate
9	delivery companies that through the early 1990s were gaining a small foothold in the delivery
10	of subscriber magazines.
11	In the early 1990s, Time Warner started a company named Publishers Express (PubEx)
	to organize the private delivery of subscription magazines. At that time another company,
13	Alternate Postal Delivery (APD) of Grand Rapids, Michigan, had demonstrated the feasibility
14	of delivering subscription magazines, and had developed delivery capability in a number of
15	major markets. With the addition of Publishers Express, by 1994 more than 80 markets were
16	being served by either APD or PubEx affiliates, most of which were members of AAPS. The fact
17	that the volumes delivered outside the mail were extremely small did not stop the Postal
18	Service's search and destroy mission.
19	Thus, the USPS proposal in MC95-1 would have split regular rate periodicals into two
20	subclasses, producing rate reductions for favored large magazine publishers (those whose
21	density made them prospects for APD and PubEx) at the expense of large rate increases for
22	small magazines that did not produce the density to make alternate delivery viable for them.
23	Although the Rate Commission rejected this aspect of reclassification, it did order rate

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1	decreases for the mass circulation periodicals, leading to the abandonment of alternate delivery
2	by several major magazine publishers. As a result, Publishers Express announced in mid-
3	February, 1996, that it would cease operations.
4	Just days later, on February 20, Postmaster General Marvin Runyon, in a speech to the
5	NAPUS Leadership Conference in Washington, DC addressed the demise of Publishers Express
6	with unmistakable glee:
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 15 16	I would like to close with a story that tells it all. Remember the alternate delivery company called Publishers Express? They came on the scene a few years back with a lot of fanfare and tough talk. They said they were going to deliver magazines and advertisements faster and cheaper than us. Eleven days ago, they quietly went out of business. They said that they were no longer needed. They had no more customers. We ran them out of business, by improving service and keeping costs low! I can't say that I am sorry to see them go. But they taught us two valuable lessons. First, if we don't do our jobs, somebody else will. And, second, when we get our act together, we can be one hell of a competitor.
19	Certainly, that doesn't "tell it all." Actions say it all - not speeches. Those actions say loudly
20	and clearly that the Postal Service is intent on manipulating rates in such a way as to lower
21	rates for competitive mail and increase rates for mail that has no competitive options. It
22	would be comic, if it were not so serious, that when the Postal Service succeeds by creative
23	pricing in driving a competitor out of business, the PMG publicly seizes the credit - chalking it
24	up to "improving service and keeping costs low." I wasn't there, but I wonder if he delivered
25	that line with a straight face. I wonder if he cared about the jobs he "ran out," and about the
26	investment by small companies in magazine delivery that the Postal Service wiped out.
27	Apparently, people in our industry contributed to the millions of dollars of bonuses paid to
28	postal executives.

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Clearly the Postal Service has embraced a mission of aggressive competition. It views 1 itself as "one hell of a competitor" first and foremost. It proposes rates and classifications 2 3 purely for competitive reasons, and for the purpose of harming its competitors. It seeks postal "reform" that would free it from PRC accountability, so that it can compete even more 4 effectively. Its cost computations are not trustworthy. It computes rates in such a way as to 5 make monopoly mail seem expensive and to make competitive mail seem inexpensive. In 6 short, it does not accept the mission and the public service role established for it by the U.S. 7 8 Congress.

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VI. THE POSTAL SERVICE ACCORDING TO CONGRESS

In the private sector, companies respond all the time to pressures from customers.
They make concessions to valued customers, they lower rates, they add free services. What's
wrong with the Postal Service doing the same thing?

The answer to that question should be obvious, but in view of the current proposal, and the recent MC95-1 case, it appears that the answer has gotten lost somewhere in the jumble of detail. Quite simply, any entity that enjoys governmentally protected monopoly revenue of \$42 billion dollars, non-profit status, and tax-exempt status must be carefully regulated both in areas inside as well as outside the parameters of its monopoly. That is the main purpose of the Postal Rate Commission, and that was one of the main concerns of Congress as manifested in the Postal Reorganization Act.

20 Certainly the potential for abuse in the competitive areas is obvious, and it was obvious 21 to Congress when it wrote the Postal Reorganization Act. In light of the Act, I am baffled by 22 the trend of the USPS toward aggressive competition and the increased talk in recent years at

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the USPS concerning the need to be more competitive. It is clear from the Act that Congress 1 did not intend for the USPS to be aggressively competing with the private sector. 2 3 From the beginning of the Republic, the postal service was regarded as a vital governmental service. It was the purpose of the postal system (the Post Office Department) to 4 provide the nation with a common, universally accessible medium of communication. In a far 5 less technical environment, without the postal service, communication would come to a 6 standstill, and it was not feasible for private enterprise to provide that service. 7 8 Communication was essential in order for freedom of expression and enterprise to flourish. It was particularly vital as the western expansion increased the boundaries of the 9 nation. And to make the postal service more viable, private individuals and companies were 10 prohibited from delivering letters in the limited areas where it might be economically feasible 11 to do so. 13 There was no hint or suggestion then that the purpose of the postal service was to 14 compete with and destroy private businesses. In those days, government did what private 15 enterprise would not or could not do, for the common benefit of all. The postal service was 16 regarded as an essential service. It was not a profit making entity, but a necessary medium of 17 communication, virtually the only medium of personal communication out of earshot. But by the late 1960s the Post Office Department was in serious condition. Far from 18 19 the lofty ideals that viewed the service as a vital service, the post office had become the means 20 of repaying political debts. Postal management jobs were rewards for political loyalists. Service broke down as labor morale suffered, and management accountability was non-existent. In 21 22 1970 Congress decided that the postal service needed reform.

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L	It is clear from reading the Postal Reorganization Act that Congress's goal was
2	threefold. First, it sought to restore the high view of the postal service in its historic sense, free
3	of political favors and considerations. Second, it sought to provide a framework within which
4	the postal service could operate in an orderly, efficient manner, with accountability
5	throughout. Third, throughout the Act are numerous protections from the potential abuse by
6	the USPS of its position of special privilege. The USPS described in the Postal Reorganization
7	act was never meant by Congress to be "one hell of a competitor."
8	A. The Historical View
9	It is obvious that the Postal Reorganization Act was written to regain that historical
10	view of the postal service, wherein the service is viewed as an essential service of government.
11	To establish that view of the USPS, Congress began the entire Act with the following definitive
<i>ببد</i>	statement, Section 101;
13	(a) The United States Postal Service shall be operated as a basic and
14	fundamental service provided to the people by the Government of the United
15	States, authorized by the Constitution, created by Act of Congress, and
16	supported by the people. The Postal Service shall have as its basic function the
17	obligation to provide postal services to bind the Nation together through the
18	personal, educational, literary, and business correspondence of the people. It
19	shall provide prompt, reliable, and efficient services to patrons in all areas and
20	shall render postal services to all communities. The costs of establishing and
21	maintaining the Postal Service shall not be apportioned to impair the overall
22	value of such service to the people. (emphasis added)

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Needless to say, there is not a hint of reference to a competitive role for the USPS.
Certainly this opening, definitive statement has all the marks of the historic postal service role
as essential government service. It would be incorrect to suggest that the absence of a reference
to competition in the introductory section of the Act should be automatically construed to
suggest that competition was not anticipated or was non-existent. Certainly competition
existed at that time, and before that time. But it is clear from the Act that the USPS was
expected to act cautiously in that area.

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8 <u>B. A "Business-Like" Postal Service</u>

9 The second objective of Congress was to create an efficient postal service. I have often 10 heard it said that Congress intended to create a more "business-like" postal service. I have no 11 problem with the concept of a "business-like" postal service. "Business-like" to me suggests 12 efficiency, careful accounting and accountability. But over the past years it has come to mean 13 more than that.

14 "Business-like" in discussions of USPS issues has come to imply a competitive posture, 15 and I take issue with that implication. First, an aggressive, competitive USPS contradicts the 16 spirit and the letter of the Postal Reorganization Act. As I have pointed out, Congress viewed 17 the new USPS as a government service in the historic sense of the old postal service. The 18 criteria for establishing rates require the Commission to go to some length to assure that 19 neither captive postal customers nor the USPS's competitors are intentionally harmed by 20 postal rates.

21 Second, despite the oft-repeated phrase that Congress wanted a "more business-like 22 postal service," it is worth noting that Congress never stated in the law itself that it wanted a "business-like" postal service. References to speed and efficiency are plentiful, but never is the

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1	concept of an aggressive, competitive USPS even hinted at. To the contrary, we shall see that
2	Congress took special precautions to guard against such a competitive postal service.
3	One aspect of this more "business-like" service was the USPS's new responsibility to
4	determine the timing of its own rate increases. Prior to the Act Congress itself established
5	postal rates and changed rates as it saw fit. Of course if it is Congress's desire that the Postal
6	Service operate efficiently, with better accountability, and with more direct responsibility for its
7	own success or failure, the USPS would need to have the capability to increase its overall
8	revenue as overall economic conditions required.
9	A few years ago a segment on public radio detailed how the U.S. Marine Corps was
10	studying Wal-Mart's inventory control system, in order to enable the Marines to operate in "a
11	business-like manner." Does that suggest that the USMC needs to be more competitive? Of
	course there is no such thing as a free enterprise competitor to the Marine Corps. In this case
13	it had nothing to do with competition. It simply meant to borrow some good ideas from a
14	successful business for the purpose of increasing efficiency.

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15 C. Special Protections Against Competitive Abuse

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16 The current, popular self-view of the USPS as an aggressive competitor in the open 17 market clearly runs counter to the Act. Quite to the contrary, Congress understood that a tax 18 exempt postal service, operating without a profit margin, and possessing a legally mandated 19 monopoly has the potential for abuse. Because of this, in 1970 it established three specific 20 criteria to protect competitors and to protect mailers from suffering the results of 21 anticompetitive rate structures. Implied clearly is that Congress did not view the USPS in a 22 competitive role.

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1	The Postal Reorganization Act, Section 3622,(b), lists the criteria for the development
2	of postal rates. In this section of the Act, the Postal Rate Commission is directed to "make a
3	recommended decision on the request for changes in rates or fees in each class of mail or type
4	of service in accordance with the policies of this title and the following factors" There follow
5	nine specific criteria for setting rate and service levels. Of those nine, Criteria 3, 4, and 5 taken
6	together reveal Congress's view and its clear intent with respect to competition. These three
7	criteria are as follows:
8 9 10 11 12	(3) the requirement that each class of mail or type of mail service bear the direct and indirect postal costs attributable to that class or type plus that portion of all other costs of the Postal Service reasonably assignable to such class or type.
13 14 15	(4) the effect of rate increases upon the general public, business mail users, and <i>enterprises in the private sector of the economy engaged in the delivery of mail matter other than letters</i> ; (emphasis added)
7 18 19	(5) the available alternative means of sending and receiving letters and other mail matter at reasonable costs.
20	It is significant to note that these specific criteria were new concepts. There were no
21	such specific protections for competitors in the former Title 39, which the Postal
22	Reorganization Act rewrote. The former Title 39 was very general in its rate criteria, Congress
23	being the rate setters.
24	The general concept contained in Criterion 3 wasn't entirely new, but the specificity
25	was. Sections 2302 and 2304 of the former Title 39 in a very general sense provided for cost
26	review every two years, and specific adjustment recommendations were to come from the
27	Postmaster General to Congress every two years. Further, the law was very general (in Section
28	2304) as to attributable costs or coverage of costs by rates for each class. There was no specific
2,9	requirement that each class or subclass pay at least its own costs.

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1	Similar to the current Criterion 4 above, the former law also contained a general
2	"protection" clause, but the protection was only for mailers. The old law declared that Congress
3	would consider "the effect of postal services and the impact of postal rates and fees on users of
4	the mails." (former Title 39; Section 2302,(c),(1),(D))
5	Finally, there was nothing to correspond with the present Criterion 5 protection.
6	Nothing in the former Title 39 specifically addressed the need to protect mailers that had few
7	or no alternatives.
8	It should be obvious that the protections being extended for the first time to the USPS's
9	competitors, and to mailers with no alternatives, were added in 1970 as a counterweight to the
10	increased freedom and independence being granted the USPS by the Postal Reorganization Act.
11	With the newfound level of independence, and armed with the letter monopoly, the resulting
	new potential for abuse was to be tempered by new protections for those most likely to be
1.2	victims of that abuse.
13	victures of that abuse.
13	The language of Criterion 4 is especially interesting. It directs the Commission to
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•	that Congress assumed that periodic rate changes would take the form of an increase, and that
2	the increases should be high enough so as not to harm fair competition.
3	In the present case, the USPS has apparently taken the novel, and ludicrous, position
4	that the Criterion 4 consideration of competitors is dropped from the Act in the event of a rate
5	decrease. AAPS was required to file a motion with the Presiding Officer to compel USPS to
6	answer AAPS/USPS-6, which asked whether the Postal Service had conducted or
7	commissioned a study or report on alternative delivery since the Strategic Analysis, Inc. (SAI)
8	report that had been dragged into the light during MC95-1. The Postal Service, after admitting
9	that such work had been done, strenuously objected to providing it or revealing what it
10	contained.
11	One of the subjects that the USPS ultimately acknowledged is contained in the new
	study is information that analyzed the "reaction" of the alternate delivery industry to price
13	change. AAPS contended that this is exactly the kind of information that must be considered
14	under Criterion 4. The Postal Service incredibly responded that while the Act required that the
15	effect of increases on competitors had to be considered, the effects of decreases could be
16	ignored! "The (b)(4) criterion only requires an evaluation of 'rate increases' on alternative
17	delivery; the statute is silent with respect to rate decreases." (Emphasis in original). Supposedly
18	the new, super-aggressive Postal System can now lower competitive rates with impunity
19	without any consideration of Criterion 4.
20	To whatever extent the attempts to satisfy the rate setting criteria were altruistic, the
21	USPS never made any serious attempt to apply Criterion 4 to its proposals. We raised the
2 2	Criterion 4 issue repeatedly in R84-1, in R87-1, and in R90-1. Though attempting to satisfy

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the other criteria, USPS conducted itself as if the competition clause of Criterion 4 did not
exist.

3 Yet when it served its own purpose before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second 4 Circuit in Time Inc. v. USPS in 1982, the USPS, in a specific reference to alternate delivery, 5 correctly pointed out in its January 20, 1982 initial brief that Criterion 4, "mandates that the 6 effect on competing businesses is an additional factor to be considered in establishing postal 7 rates." Note use of the word "mandates" and reference to "establishing" rates, not just 8 "increasing" them. 9 Even though the USPS demonstrated its familiarity with the competitors' clause in 10 Criterion 4, in R84-1 Criterion 4 received no attention, not even lip service. USPS witnesses 11 admitted that they made no effort to study the alternate delivery industry (Tr. 1251, Docket R84-1) and that they did not even discuss private delivery among themselves in preparing the

13 rate proposal (Tr. 2004-05, Docket R84-1).

14 R87-1 was no better. In his initial testimony, USPS witness Lyons suggested that the
15 proposal considered "the continued competitiveness of newspapers and private delivery firms."
16 When questioned about that consideration, Lyons referred to an article he had read in
17 <u>Advertising Age</u> which did mention newspapers but did not mention private delivery (see Tr.
18 3844, Docket R87-1).

In R90-1 witness Lyons proposed a rather novel interpretation of Criterion 4. It was apparently his testimony that Criterion 4 was automatically satisfied as long as Criterion 3 was satisfied. The new doctrine was that as long as rates covered their direct cost (direct testimony at 39 and 41), and as long as rates are not specifically designed to hurt competitors (Tr. 4293-94), then that amounted to due consideration of competitors and satisfied Criterion

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1	4. (This is similar to Donald J. O'Hara's view in the present case. He concludes, "Given the
2	very high cost coverage of the ECR sub-class, this rate increase [decrease] does not result in
3	unfair competition for its competitors." Testimony, page 35.)
4	Of course, making Criterion 4 dependent upon Criterion 3 writes Criterion 4 out of the
5	Act. It should go without saying that if Congress did not mean something additional to
6	Criterion 3 in writing Criterion 4, then Criterion 4 is redundant and unnecessary. Obviously,
7	since it was added as a separate criterion, it means (and requires) something additional.
8	In MC95-1 the Postal Service proposed rates under new classification headings that it
9	freely admitted were developed for competitive reasons. Its "consideration" of competitors was
10	apparently a consideration of how to put them out of business. It was to some extent
11	successful, as the PMG's speech concerning Publishers Express cited above demonstrates.
	In R97-1, the Postal Service, with tongue firmly planted in cheek, claims that none of
13	the rate proposals has been made for competitive reasons. Nowhere in R97-1 have I discovered
14	the USPS witnesses referring to Standard ECR rates as competitive, as they did in MC95-1.
15	They mention only vaguely that there is competition for Standard ECR mail.
16	Indeed, in the same objection cited above concerning AAPS/USPS-6, the Postal Service
17	states, "Nowhere in the Postal Service's testimony is there a claim that the existence of a
18	'competitive threat' from alternative delivery forms the basis for any of the rate and
19	classification proposals in this docket." Two years ago, competition was the driving force
20	behind reclassification. Now it's gone from the radar screen.
21	That being the case, or alleged as the case, it is curious that the USPS is so secretive
22	about its new SAI study with regard to alternate delivery competitors. While it has steadfastly
<u>_9,3</u>	refused to disclose the contents, beyond the highly censored and therefore useless version

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produced, it claims to be unaffected by these competitors in requesting new, more competitive
 rates.

The USPS fought hard to avoid releasing the complete new SAI study. The study was 3 4 apparently so controversial - and perhaps inconsistent with the testimony of its witnesses that the Postal Service didn't even let the witness that testified about impact on competition 5 and competitors (O'Hara) see it or learn of its existence! O'Hara was to "describe what efforts 6 7 the Postal Service made to determine whether the rate decreases proposed will have an adverse impact on competitors or on competition." He responded, "...A quantitative assessment of the 8 effects on competitors would require information on competitors' costs, prices, and volumes, 9 and as far as I am aware this information is not available...." TR. 116. Unbeknownst to Mr. 10 O'Hara, this type of information was indeed available. The powers that be just decided not to 11 tell him.

Witness Moeller, who was charged with the rate design for the highly competitive ECR 13 rates, was obviously not aware of the SAI study either. He acknowledged that he had not 14 reviewed competitors' rates for two and a half years. He thought he might have logged onto 15 16 some web sites for information, but couldn't remember seeing any rate information. He had 17 acknowledged studying competitive rates, however, in preparation for MC95-1. One cannot 18 help but question the integrity of a process that collects information vital to a key rate-setting consideration and then fails to disclose not only the actual data but the fact that it even exists 19 to those charged with setting the rates. Combine this disgraceful behavior by a governmental 20 public service with gloating by its leader when it crushes a private sector competitor, and it 21 22 becomes apparent why the alternate delivery industry is so skeptical about Postal Service data, 73 claims and motives.

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1	In this regard, why should we, or the Commission believe that what was a serious
2	competitive threat in MC95-1, a threat that formed the very basis of reclassification, is no
3	longer a threat in R97-1. And what credibility can be given to the assertion that the
4	competitive basis for a huge pound rate reduction for Standard ECR in MC95-1 is presumably
5	not a factor in proposing another huge pound rate reduction for Standard ECR in R97-1.
6	I encourage the Commission to view the USPS as Congress viewed it in the Postal
7	Reorganization Act. It is not a competitor first and foremost. It is first and foremost a
8	government service charged with serving the public good. I encourage the Commission to apply
9	all the criteria of the Act, including Criteria 3, 4, and 5, to each USPS rate proposal.
10	VII. ANOTHER PROPOSAL WITH SERIOUS FLAWS
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11 12 13 14 15	In early December the US Postal Service announced that it would earn a surplus of \$1.3 billion for fiscal 1997. Because the present rate request proposed fairly low average increases to begin with, it seemed that the proposed rates were more opportunistic in terms of adjusting the competitive balance than they were necessary in raising needed revenue. Add to that good news the continuing volume increases – particularly in advertising
11 12 13 14 15 16	In early December the US Postal Service announced that it would earn a surplus of \$1.3 billion for fiscal 1997. Because the present rate request proposed fairly low average increases to begin with, it seemed that the proposed rates were more opportunistic in terms of adjusting the competitive balance than they were necessary in raising needed revenue. Add to that good news the continuing volume increases – particularly in advertising mail – and a rate case at this time is curious to say the least. It does make sense, however, if

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that whatever the rate being charged, mailers will have to pay it since only the Postal Service 20

can legally deliver "letters." I recognize the possibility of substantial diversion to electronic 21

media, but submit that such diversion is much more a function of technological change than 22

: First Class rates

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The current proposal calls for a one -cent increase in the price of First Class letter stamps, and no increase in the rate for additional First Class ounces. Standard mail is a mixed bag. Most of Standard Mail Regular is part of the letter monopoly, but most of Standard Mail ECR is mail for which the Postal Service must compete. So it is no surprise to find the USPS proposing moderate increases for Standard Mail Regular, and decreases for much of the highly competitive Standard Mail ECR in this proceeding, decreases of as much as 18%.

Certainly the engine that drove MC95-1 was the desire to drive an even larger wedge
between the competitive portion of third class mail and the monopoly portion, and to make
the rates for the competitive portion of third class mail more "competitive." Witness Joseph
D. Moeller's direct testimony (MC95-1, at 14) confirmed that a major purpose for

11 reclassification was to develop "more competitive rates for local, high-density advertising." The concept of competition and the need to address the serious problem of the "Diversion of Mail

13 Volume" to "alternative hard-copy delivery [companies]" were paramount in the MC95-1

14 testimony of Charles C. McBride.

15 The USPS-sponsored testimony in R97-1 is different from the MC95-1 testimony in 16 one respect. In MC95-1, McBride and Moeller made no bones about the purpose of 17 reclassification. They made it surprisingly clear that competitive considerations were driving 18 the whole process. By way of contrast, the R97-1 testimonies of Moeller and O'Hara are 19 certainly better disguised. But the results of a major decrease are just as damaging to 20 competitors as if they had again fully described their intentions.

21 A. Ramsey Pricing and Rate Elasticity

22 This rate case breaks some new ground with respect to competition. The introduction by the USPS of Peter Bernstein's testimony officially praising the application of Ramsey Pricing

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to postal ratemaking speaks as loudly to competitors as would a formal cover letter from the
PMG himself accompanying the rate case testimony declaring that his objective it to put our
whole industry out of business (not just the subscription magazine part).

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I am certainly not an economist, but it is clear to me from what I have read in this case
(and in prior cases) that sponsoring Ramsey Pricing in a postal context is tantamount to
ignoring Congress and tossing nearly the entire ratemaking criteria section out of the Postal
Reorganization Act. While Ramsey pricing concepts have been introduced by other witnesses
in the past, and have been debated and discussed in past cases, this is the first time the Postal
Service has officially endorsed and sponsored Ramsey Pricing testimony.

No one from the USPS is actually proposing any rates based upon Ramsey Pricing,
 going only so far as to say that it is a useful guide. That's what makes the sponsorship of Mr.
 Bernstein's testimony a bit curious. The effect of Bernstein's testimony appears to be simply to
 lurk in the background, perhaps to be relied upon by others, and to serve as a basis for lower
 competitive rates when the USPS can't support them through application of proper postal
 ratemaking criteria.

16 And of course the bottom line is that Mr. Bernstein has concluded that highly 17 competitive Standard ECR mail should really be priced at about an average 8 cents per piece, 18 roughly one half its current average rate. In that event, according to Mr. Bernstein, Standard 19 ECR mail volumes would grow by 36%, from 31 billion pieces to over 42 billion pieces (Tr. 20 5088). Mr. Bernstein would venture no guess publicly where that volume increase would come 21 from (TR. 5089-90). What is obviously difficult for a highly trained economist to figure out, 22 however, is fairly simple for an AAPS member competing for its small share of those 12 billion 7.3 pieces that are up for grabs.

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Naturally the Postal Service has generously decided not to cut these competitive rates in
half. Armed with this ideal, however, it has decided to cut the rate for some of the most
competitive of Standard mail as much as 18%. While this is consistent with past proposals,
Mr. Bernstein has given the Postal Service some intellectual cover this time.

5 The USPS's semi-embracing of the Ramsey Pricing is no surprise. Ramsey Pricing is the 6 product of calculating price elasticity, one of Postal Service's favorite ratemaking tools. Much 7 postal rate elasticity results from the artificial result of the Private Express Statutes, so that 8 Ramsey Pricing calls for high rates for monopoly mail and low rates for competitive mail. And 9 that result is consistent with what the USPS has been trying to do with only limited success 10 during the past several rate and classification cases.

" <u>B. An Over-Reliance on Cost Coverage</u>

AAPS has been critical of the Postal Service's over-reliance on percentage cost coverage since it began participating in these rate cases. For example, as we stated at page 33 of our initial brief in R90-1, the saturation mailers will argue that the rates for saturation mail "are too high because the 'attributable cost coverage' is higher for that particular type of mail than for other particular types of mail."

It was AAPS's position then, and it is AAPS's position now, that the USPS's embrace of percentage cost coverage (whether attributable, incremental or volume variable) has "elevated a convenient but misleading tool of comparison into the exclusive rate making tool." In fact, in the words I used while testifying in R90- 1 (Tr. 18490), the percentage attributable cost coverage concept has "evolved into a rigged system where first-class mailers are forced to pay a hugely disproportionate share of institutional costs, whereas third-class mailers pay a meager share of the total."

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1	In his dissent in R84-1, Commissioner Crutcher (at page 3) was critical of a "strict
2	adherence to percentage markups" which, he said, "ignores absolute unit cost contribution to
3	institutional costs." Mr. Crutcher was simply reiterating what the Commission found in R80-
4	1. There it explained (at page 455, footnote 1) that use of percentage cost coverage "can
5	misrepresent" institutional cost burdens where there are substantial differences in attributable
6	costs and that, consequently, the Commission "must be guided more by the per piece cost
7	contributions than by percentage cost coverage" in comparing first-class letters and third-class
8	bulk mail.
9	To its credit, the Commission recognized this important concept in evaluating the
10	Postal Service's proposals in recent rate cases, and, as a result, has tempered the first-class
11	increases and rejected USPS attempts to impose either small or negative rate increases on
	Third Class/Standard ECR saturation mailers. The Commission should consider the
13	disproportionately low burden now being borne by Standard ECR in assessing the USPS's
14	proposal to reduce even further the rate for many saturation flats.
15	As AAPS, and I, have contended in previous cases, the shortcomings of the percentage
16	markup analysis become more pronounced as mailers bypass attributable costs and, therefore,
17	attempt to free themselves from institutional costs burdens as well. I repeat below footnote 16
18	from page 36 of the AAPS initial brief in Docket No. R90-1, which predicted the dilemma that
19	the Postal Service is just beginning to recognize here:
20 21 22 23 24 25	In earlier cases, the Coalition of Non-Postal Media had hypothesized a class of mail handed to the letter carrier on the way out the door, in which the attributable costs are to be extremely low and which would, therefore, be 'assigned' a very low percentage of institutional carrier street time, contrary to all logic. The Postal Service's deep discounts in this case for walk-sequenced, delivery office mail show that our earlier

25 case for walk-sequenced, delivery office mail show that our earlier
26 hypothetical analogy is becoming frightfully real.

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2 With today's rates, First Class mailers now must pay about 63% of the institutional 3 cost load, despite the fact that First Class makes up only about 52% of the volume. Standard A 4 mail collectively represents about 41% of USPS pieces but only 21% of the contribution to 5 institutional costs. Standard, Commercial ECR mail, comprising an estimated 15% of the 6 volume and a higher percentage of the total weight, picks up only about 9% of the total 7 institutional cost burden. As "attributable" costs continue to be bypassed, the concept of 8 coverage is becoming nearly meaningless. Stated otherwise, assessment of cost coverage is 9 difficult for mail that typically uses little more than the Postal Service's delivery function, 10 especially because 60-65% of those costs are deemed to be institutional. See Tr. 3151-52, 11 where the Presiding Officer raised this point with Witness Moeller.

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The unit contribution to institutional costs will continue to show a much more severe burden on First Class than on Standard mail pieces. According to witness O'Hara, Tr. 190, under the R97-1 proposal, each piece of First Class mail will make a contribution of between 17.17 cents and 18.04 cents toward institutional costs. Standard Regular will contribute 7.52 cents, and Standard ECR will contribute 8.43 cents per piece, both less than half the First Class per piece contribution.

Add to these per-piece contributions the fact that the average Standard Commercial mail piece weighs approximately three times what the average First Class piece weighs, and you have a First Class per-pound contribution of about six times the per-pound contribution of Standard Commercial. Yet despite these glaring discrepancies, the USPS continues to rely on attributable cost coverage percentages to try to widen these gaps still further.

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C. Still Another Very Selective Weight Study

Of course it should come as no surprise that the USPS makes invalid comparisons to 2 3 pursue its rate objectives. It is even understandable that the USPS would rely on favorable, albeit illogical, cost coverage numbers in proposing competitively beneficial rates. However it 4 5 seems somewhat inappropriate to engineer a weight study in an incomplete, selective manner 6 that tends to fulfill the desired ends at the price of distorting the truth.

7 In MC95-1 we made this point concerning the weight study performed by Christensen 8 Associates, referred to there as Library Reference MCR-12. This study presumed to measure 9 the relationship between weight and cost for third class regular rate mail. The study was, 10 without question, incomplete. Page one of the study listed the factors considered, "The costs 11 included in the analysis are those associated with mail processing, window service, and city carrier in-office activities."

13 If the USPS really wanted to determine the relationship between weight and cost, this 14 study had no value. It ignored obvious weight driven cost segments, and it relied instead on 15 cost segments that were entirely in-house and were only affected minimally by weight.

16 This is not said in order to impugn the integrity of Christensen Associates. Without 17 doubt the study was conducted as ordered by the USPS. I point out only that the USPS-18 ordained scope of the study was inadequate for anything other than to serve as a pretext for 19 still lower competitive rates.

20 In MC95-1 USPS witness Moeller, though relying on this weight study for his proposed 21 rate of 51 cents per pound for Enhanced Carrier Route mail, recognized the incomplete nature 22 of the study, and the fact that the Commission has repeatedly asked for better information. 23 "The Commission has repeatedly expressed its desire for a study of the weight-related costs in

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1	third-class The Postal Service shares this desire, but a study of weight that excludes the
2	effect of other cost-causing factors has been difficult to conduct." (Direct Testimony, Page 12)
3	Moeller was at least in part correct. The Commission has pressed for a weight study
4	since at least 1983, when AAPS (then APPS) participated in the Joint Postal Service/ Postal
5	Rate Commission/Mailers Study Group on Third Class Bulk Mail. In a letter written to this
6	study group, dated September 26, 1983, James Anderson, then the APPS Director of
7	Governmental Affairs, stated the following:
8 9 10 11 12 13	We are vitally concerned with the approach to this study because as competitors to the Postal Service it is very important that the Postal Service properly identify and assign its operating costs. If the Postal Service properly identifies its costs and structures rates to adequately cover those costs, private sector competitors like ourselves can fairly compete for the business.
14 15	Our experience tells us that weight and shape have a significant impact on costs even though we are not involved in the areas of sortation and processing that this study is focusing on.
18 19 20 21 22 23	We have heard from the Postal Service that weight and shape are not significant factors in other cost segments. We are here to testify that weight and shape have an eminently significant impact on operating costs. It is difficult for us to understand how the Postal Service can move these same products and not recognize that impact.
24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31	Our objections to this study as presently proposed are as follows: First, the study focuses only on in-house processing and sorting functions that are largely bypassed by the carrier route presorted mail that is subject to competition from the private sector. As presently structured this study will reveal nothing about the effect of rate (sic) and shape on that portion of the mail stream that is subject to competition. (emphasis added)
32	This was written more than fourteen years ago. Despite our efforts and the efforts of
33	the Consumer Advocate that date back at least as far as 1983, the USPS has refused to identify
34	costs for weight driven cost segments other than those segments that furthered its purpose.
	The result in 1983 was a study that included only in-office costs. A similar study was

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conducted in MC95-1 by Christensen Associates. And now, for a third time, the USPS in
 R97-1 has commissioned the Christensen Associates once again to conduct another carefully
 controlled study (R97-1; LR-H-182, Exhibit 44B) which, like the 1983 study and the
 Christensen Study in 1995, are preordained to produce the desired answer: weight has little
 effect on cost for highly competitive Standard ECR mail.

6 In private delivery, and I submit from personal experience, in any delivery, there is a 7 significant weight/cost relationship at the point of delivery. Another weight/cost relationship is 8 experienced in transporting materials. A third is in the warehousing and handling element. It 9 has been my experience that weight drives in-office costs very little, if at all. Most in-office 10 handling costs are piece related, not weight related, and certainly the Postal Service is aware of 11 that. An over-reliance on in-office costs only discredits the USPS's cost data.

Any weight/cost study that fails to study the impact of weight on the most obvious weight driven costs, but simply assumes there is none, is a rigged study. Understandably, it does serve the purpose of proving that Enhanced Carrier Route rates should be low by comparison. The only costs the USPS selected for study are those which are low to begin with, and which disappear with local entry and route pre-sorting and pre-sequencing.

Imagine two postal employees. One works at a work station in a postal facility. He
sorts pieces of mail. The other is a walking carrier who services 600 houses on his route.

The first handles pieces of mail. He moves skids or carts of mail to his work station, and he sorts through the pieces. Some of the pieces are heavy and some of the pieces are light. But the weight makes little difference, other than the small amount of his time that he spends moving the skid or cart to his work station. In sorting pieces, he can move through a stack of Standard Mail catalogs about as quickly as he can a stack of Standard Mail letters. His speed is

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predominately piece related. More importantly to the Postal Service, most highly competitive
 ECR mail avoids this first employee.

Consider the city carrier with those 600 stops on his route. That carrier cases his mail before delivering the route. He sits in front of a sorting rack and he sorts pieces of mail into that rack. At this point it doesn't really matter very much if the pieces weigh 1 ounce or 8 ounces. Since he is sorting one piece at a time, he can sort heavier pieces just about as fast as he can sort light pieces. It would seem logical that this part of his job will take about twice as long if he has twice as many pieces to sort.

9 The carrier finishes the sorting process. At this point the piece-related work is done.
10 Unfortunately, at this point the Christensen Associates study ends as well. What remains for
11 the carrier is by far the greater part of his labor hours. Any variability from this point on from the normal amount of labor hours is dependent not upon pieces but upon weight and bulk.
13 The individual pieces have all been put in order. The only question concerning whether this
14 carrier can accomplish his normal loops is whether he can carry all the load to complete each
15 loop or whether he will have to make extra trips due to extra weight or bulk. It has nothing at
all to do with the number of pieces.

However, in response to an interrogatory concerning the most recent Christensen
Associates study, "Please explain why city carrier street costs are distributed to weight
increment in proportion to mail volume," witness Moeller answered, "This assumption was
made in interests of simplifying the analysis. Although there may be some weight related costs
in city carrier street time, it is believed that the majority of costs are piece related." (Tr. 7708)
How can that be? The piece work at this point has been finished. The number of stops and
regular loops are fixed - the same every day. The only variables now are weight and bulk. (It

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seems also that simplicity, rather than accuracy, was the primary goal of the study. See also Tr.
7778.)

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Witness Moeller appears far less than certain in this answer, probably because it is so
counterintuitive. Indeed the next question was, "Is it your opinion that weight has no effect on
city carrier street costs?" Moeller answered, "No." Yet carrier street time was not calculated or
considered in the Christensen Associates study once again.

Back to our street carrier. Once sorted, the pieces are loaded into his vehicle for delivery
to the 600 homes. Consider that a carrier may comfortably carry only about 30 to 35 pounds
of mail at a time. Consider also the difference in 600 ECR saturation pieces that weigh 1/4
ounce each, and 600 ECR saturation pieces that weigh even a modest 3.3 ounces each. These
two different pieces collect the same amount of postage.

The 1/4 ounce piece represents 9.4 pounds of mail, easily absorbed into the carrier's delivery routine. However, the 3.3 ounce pieces add an extra 124 pounds of mail. That 124 pounds is not quite so easily absorbed. It means slower progress and likely some extra trips to the vehicle. Simply put, extra weight translates into extra time, which translates into extra labor cost.

17 If we can assume 10 minutes to go to the vehicle and replenish the pouch, 4 trips 18 means 40 added minutes. If we can assume the carrier earns \$25 per hour in wages and 19 benefits, which may be low, that's 2.8 cents per piece more in direct labor cost, roughly one 20 cent per ounce. Yet, the USPS proposes that the 1/4 ounce piece and the 3.3 ounce piece 21 should be priced the same.

As if to add insult to injury, the USPS has suggested, through its current weight study,
Exhibit 44B, that if the piece weighs 13 ounces (meaning that this piece will add 487 pounds to

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1 a typical carrier), that carrier will presumably find it easier to handle than if it weighs 4 ounces. 2 The R97-1 Christensen Associates study has concluded that it costs 7.1 cents to handle a 4 3 ounce ECR piece, and 6.6 cents to handle a 13 ounce ECR piece. Moreover, that 14th ounce is 4 the back-breaker. According to this study, it costs 13.0 cents to handle a 14 ounce piece, about twice as much as the cost to handle a 13 ounce piece. This and other strange results of the 5 6 study could not be explained (See Tr. 7699-7700 and 7790-7793). Perhaps the study's flaws 7 result from the very thin data (Tr. 7797-7798; 7800). 8 Of these two postal employees, the USPS has made the calculated decision to consider

9 the first one, the guy at his work station inside the postal facility, and to consider the second 10 one only for that portion of his day that he is sorting mail at his case rack. But once the carrier 11 leaves the post office and actually begins to lug the weight around his route, the cost experts 12 stop watching.

The Postal Service tried to argue around these obvious problems. In response to
AAPS/USPS-T36-8, redirected from witness Moeller (Tr. 7654-7655), the USPS described a
similar city carrier but loaded this carrier not with 14 ounce pieces but with non-credible
assumptions.

Question: "Assume that on day one a carrier delivers 500 identical Standard pieces each weighing 1 ounce, for a total of 31.25 pounds, and on day two he delivers 500 standard pieces each weighing 7 ounces, for a total of 218.75 pounds. Assume further that all other mail to be delivered is identical. Will there be any difference in carrier street costs on the two days? Please explain."

The USPS didn't like the realistic assumption posed by AAPS, so it substituted its own assumptions before answering the question. "In interests of simplicity, let us further assume

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that both the one ounce pieces and the seven ounce pieces are the same shape, say flats. *[fair*enough] Also assume that the carrier has no other mail on these two days *[we had asked him*to assume that other mail was identical, not non-existent!], and that the 500 pieces on each
day are addressed to the same 500 stops."

5 After loading the assumptions to produce a scenario that this carrier delivers no mail 6 except 500 one-ounce pieces the first day, and no mail except 500 seven-ounce pieces the 7 second day, a scenario that could never happen in the real world, the Postal Service concludes 8 that there will be no difference in the carrier street costs.

9 Any reasonable observer will notice the obvious - that it is not the seven ounce pieces
10 by themselves that are likely to increase the carrier's street time, it is the seven ounce pieces in
11 addition to the other mail that would normally be delivered at the same time that causes
additional dismounts and extra trips back to the vehicle, thus increasing carrier street time.

The point is that the USPS continues to base its conclusions about weight on untested,
unproven, and unquestionably incorrect assumptions about street time.

15 When AAPS/USPS-T36-10 pointed out several serious anomalies in the study, such as 16 that the cost for a 13-ounce piece was the same as the cost for a one-ounce piece, that the cost 17 per piece actually declines from one ounce to three ounces, that a 4-ounce piece costs 39% 18 more than either a 3-ounce piece or a 5-ounce piece, that a 9-ounce piece costs 14% less than 19 an 8-ounce piece, the Postal Service responded that "the study presented in Library Reference H-182 was not intended to measure specific cost relationships between individual weight cells, 20 but rather to provide the overall relationship between weight and cost for Standard Mail(A)." 21 (Tr. 7657) 22

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If a study intended to establish weight/cost relationships cannot even come close to
measuring "specific cost relationships between individual weight cells" without more
questionable cost numbers than realistic numbers, and if it can't even produce a clearly
discernable graphic trend between 1-ounce and 13-ounce pieces, what good is it? Why would
the Postal Service be so anxious to embrace such results?

Asked to explain some of the anomalies of the weight study, USPS Witness McGrane
could not come up with any real explanation (Tr. 7699,7700). Asked whether there was any
point at which he might begin to get uncomfortable with such anomalous results, McGrane
answered (Tr. 7792), "It depends on what you mean by uncomfortable. I think that you can
make a solid conclusion from the study that the relationship weight with cost for ECR mail is
not nearly as great as what the current pound rate is set at," which, of course, is exactly the
preordained result of the study.

A study that ignores obvious weight related factors and addresses only in-office costs would be an inadequate basis for any "solid conclusion," even if it were accurate and had the appearance of a logical progression. A study that ignores obvious weight related factors and is illogical at the same time would hardly qualify as the basis for solid conclusions.

17 Certainly it would be speculative on my part to try to assume or estimate the unknown 18 costs. I freely admit I do not know the exact level of costs involved for additional weight for 19 carriers, just as I don't know how much Advo's (and others') odd-shaped, loose sets add to 20 carrier time and cost, compared to bound or enclosed material (although as the Presiding 21 Officer surmised (Tr. 7831-7832), they are considerable). But certainly there are costs 22 involved, and I doubt that anyone, other than the Postal Service, would argue seriously that

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there are none. In fact, even witness McGrane (who is not a postal employee) admitted that bulkiness and "openness" could have an effect on unit costs (Tr. 7788-7789).

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My own experience with U. S. postal carriers confirms this conclusion. In developing private delivery in a number of communities, our employees involved in development are commonly aided by postal carriers who are anxious to help us with routing information. Their attitude is that they will do anything they can to help us, hoping that we will transfer material from their route out of the mail first.

Normally, when we succeed, we are taking a weekly newspaper or shopping guide out of
the mail. With printed inserts, these typically weigh 10 to 12 ounces per set, representing an
additional 300 to 500 pounds of mail for that carrier one day each week. The reason Postal
carriers tend to be very helpful is because they want to get rid of the extra load and extra work.
It is safe to say that if this material did not represent extra time and effort they would not care,
nor would they volunteer their assistance to a competitor.

Carrier street time is not the only missing cost segment. I could add vehicle service drivers and rural carriers. I could add the obvious capital cost for purchasing additional vehicles, or vehicles capable of hauling heavier loads. I could add the cost of maintaining a larger fleet of vehicles.

18 The Commission should disregard the Christensen Associates' weight study and the 19 USPS conclusions that rely on it. It inappropriately includes only in-office cost segments, and 20 it continues a fourteen year trend of avoiding a complete study that could provide some 21 accurate cost data for the Commission's consideration. A misleading study is worse than no 22 study at all.

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D. 42 Cents Per Pound vs. \$3.68 Per Pound

One thing is certain with respect to the study of weight-related costs. The in-office personnel who were studied by the Christensen Associates had to be different postal employees than those studied to justify the \$3.68 pound rate for First Class mail. Based on the 23 cent charge for the second ounce of First Class mail, other postal employees must have found it was nearly twice as difficult and took nearly twice as long to handle a First Class piece weighing 2 ounces as a piece weighing 1 ounce.

8 Currently the basic pound rate for Standard ECR mail ranges from 55.2 to 66.3 cents
9 per pound, depending on Destination Entry Discounts. Although this is slightly lower than
10 the pound rate that was being paid for comparable saturation Third Class prior to MC95-1, it
11 was far more favorable than what the USPS had proposed. We owe the Commission a debt of
13 thanks for that. The USPS proposal in MC95-1 was for a huge reduction in the Third Class
13 pound rate, to an ECR range of 39.9 to 51 cents. That proposed reduction was based upon the
14 first Christensen Associates weight study, which had the same basic flaws as the more recent
15 study.

16 It is beyond question that Standard ECR mail is more subject to competition than is 17 Standard Regular. Witness Moeller confirms (Tr.2799) that the weight reduction for Standard 18 is 4% (65 cents) and the weight reduction for ECR is 20% (53 cents). He further confirms that 19 he selected rather than calculated the 53 cent rate. He confirms that his reasons for proposing this reduction in this case were about the same reasons he proposed similar reductions in 20 MC95-1, which the Commission rejected. He confirms (Tr.. 2791) that, "the rates for other 21 22 advertising media were an additional consideration in the pound rate proposal." Perhaps this is ٦3 witness Moeller's way of considering competitors under Criterion 4.

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1	There is no rational cost justification to support an incremental weight rate of \$3.68
2	per pound for First Class mailers and an incremental rate of \$.42 to \$.53 for mailers of
3	saturation advertising. The First Class "pound" rate is an obvious effort to generate excessive
4	revenues from those who have no delivery alternatives. This huge discrepancy exists despite
5	Congress' clear instruction to give special rate consideration to mailers with no alternatives.
6	The equally extreme (extreme on the low side) pound rate for saturation advertising is an
7	obvious effort to generate volume in a highly competitive subclass of mail.
8	Small delivery companies have been successful over the past ten years in building
9	business volumes on weekly newspapers, TMC advertisements, phone books, and product
10	samples. USPS volume and profit figures demonstrate that these privately delivered materials
11	have not negatively impacted the USPS. There is more advertising mail volume than ever.
	Certainly a reduction of as much as 18% per piece for this type of mail would have a severe
13	impact on the private delivery of these heavier pieces. How many more notches does the
14	Postmaster General need on his gunstock?

15 E. Attributable Costs That Are Not Attributed

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Over the past several cases I have mentioned a number of costs related to direct-mail
advertising that go un-attributed. In the present case, another example has surfaced and is
worth mentioning.

According to witness Takis, in response to a UPS interrogatory, of the \$235 million
spent in advertising, only \$66 million is attributed to a specific class of mail. Tr. 4732.
Presumably the other \$169 million is regarded as an institutional cost. It's been a long time
since I saw an advertisement from the Postal Service to use its services for my one-ounce First

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ו 2 Class mail - in fact I have yet to see one. However, First Class mailers get to pay the bulk of this \$169 million advertising expense, as they pay the lion's share of institutional costs.

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As for direct advertising mailers, they are charged with a whopping \$1.5 million of that 3 advertising expense (0.6% of the total). Tr. 4702. According to witness Takis, advertising 4 directed to "direct mail" or "advertising mail" can refer to more than one subclass, so the costs 5 6 are not assigned to any class, Tr. 4703, which means in reality the costs are predominately 7 borne by First Class mailers. I think we all understand that pitches for more advertising mail, 8 such as the fancy, multimedia collection discussed at Tr. 4783-85, is a pitch for Standard mail 9 even though, of course, ads may be sent as First-Class mail. In fact, in my experience, the predominant use of First Class for advertising is by mailers that insert ads to "use up" their 10 11 one ounce, a practice that produces greater postal costs without greater revenues.

12 F. Failure to Recognize Cost Difference Between Letters and Non-Letters

Even though there are substantial differences in the cost of handling flats compared with letters, the USPS has elected to pass through only 35% of the difference to mailers of ECR letters. Indeed, the differential at the basic level is 0%. Saturation flats are the most competitive of the ECR volumes, and anything that results in a more competitive rate for saturation flats seems to play well at the Postal Service.

The USPS in MC95-1 proposed no difference between letters and flats for the ECR subclass. It maintained that ECR mail was intended to be a category predominately for flats, so there should be no difference. The Commission rejected that reasoning and established a difference between the two. Now the USPS is intent on minimizing that difference. It tends to be quick to recognize discounts and cost factors (not to mention studies) that result in lower

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rates for saturation flats. Real cost data that would drive the rate for saturation flats higher
tend to be ignored.

3 G. The Proposed Shape Surcharge

Once again the Postal Service has proposed a competitive rate shift that will cost it a
little volume in exchange for a lot of volume. By a huge margin, most of the volume being
carried outside the mailstream by alternate delivery is saturation or high density flats. This is
a highly competitive type of mail, and it makes up most of the Postal Service's Standard ECR
volume as well. That is where the volume and the dollars are.

9 Occasionally an alternate delivery company will carry a product sample, and even though such samples are important sources of revenue, they usually come no more frequently 10 than once or twice a year. The flats, on the other hand, are distributed every single week and ןו are the lifeblood of our industry. Our systems could not exist to deliver samples if we did not -2 13 have to flats to deliver on a regular basis. In some more rural markets, there are rarely if ever product samples to deliver. In my own rural market in Northern Michigan, we deliver printed 14 15 advertising every Saturday evening. In addition, several times during the year we do special 16 deliveries in the middle of the week. We have delivered no parcels or samples for several years.

17 The Postal Service is now proposing a 10 cent surcharge for pieces that are neither 18 letters nor flats. No doubt this will offset some of the proposed pound rate reduction for the 19 odd-sized pieces, but alternate delivery companies are already getting quite a bit of sample 20 business in the more major markets under the current rate structure. Therefore, with an 21 appropriate pound rate, the surcharge is not necessary to assure fair competition at the higher 22 weights. While a higher effective rate for product samples is appealing to alternate delivery,

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that appeal is lost if the surcharge is used to reduce an inadequate and anticompetitive pound
rate.

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As with the selective weight study, the surcharge proposal is competitively selective as well. It is interesting that the Postal Service does not differentiate between flats that are difficult to handle and those that are easy to handle, as it once did. Throughout the 1970s the Postal Service charged a lower third class rate for pieces that were "bound" than it charged for pieces that were clumsy to handle.

From my experience handling and delivering both, this distiction made good sense from
a cost standpoint, but it didnt make sense from competitive standpoint. Loose, clumsy
advertising was charged a higher rate, but it accounted for considerable volume that could be
lost to alternate delivery. Bound catalogs were charged a lower rate, but they were pretty much
low-volume, address specific matter not susceptible to a competitive threat. The favorable rate
for bound third class mail was dropped in the early 1980s as the Postal Service became
increasingly obsessed with competing and competition.

AAPS would be supportive of a surcharge that recognizes the difference between a
bound catalog and a shared mail set containing several odd-sized slippery pieces that can fall all
over the place when handled. Such a surcharge would be more appropriate in that it would at
recognize the cost of handling all different kinds of ECR mail.

However, we're not holding our breath waiting for the Postal Service to conduct a shape study that explores the difficulty in handling some of the Postal Service's most competitively favored customers. Since the Commission directed the Postal Service fourteen years ago to study the weight issue, it has have yet to produce anything other than a competitive pretext.

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AAPS therefore supports rejection of the surcharge in conjunction with significant increase in
the pound rate.

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VIII. AN APPEAL TO THE COMMISSION

As I have pointed out, the USPS was established by Congress as a public service. The
Commission is instructed in numerous places in the Postal Reorganization Act to apply
criteria to rates and classifications that protect mailers with no alternatives, consider the value
of content of the mail, and consider the impact of rates on, among others, the USPS's
competitors.

9 As I have also pointed out, the USPS does not view itself as Congress viewed it.
10 While it insists on retaining all its advantages, it views itself as a competitor in the open
11 market that should have every right to compete, with little restraint.

Unfortunately, the playing field will never be level under the present 2 arrangement. Tens of billions in guaranteed business, tax exempt status, no profit margin, 13 14 these all make for a very tilted playing field. In view of these USPS advantages, Congress has 15 entrusted to the Commission the responsibility of making the playing field as level as possible. 16 We urge the Commission to apply all the criteria of the Postal Reorganization Act to this current rate proposal, and in particular, Criteria 3, 4, and 5 as they pertain to competitors 17 of the Postal Service. Clearly the present proposal by the Postal Service utterly fails to consider 18 19 Criteria 4 and 5, and its supporting studies cast doubt on Criterion 3 as well.

20 The Postal Service has become obsessed with competition. It has exploited its 21 monopoly customers for competitive purposes. Our survival as an industry will largely be 22 determined, over this and the next few rate cases, by the proper application of these 3 ratemaking criteria.

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We ask that the Commission recognize the USPS proposal to reduce a highly
competitive rate for what it is - an overt attempt by the Postal Service to grab additional
volumes from its competitors. We ask that the Commission, at the very least, maintain the
present level of rate relationships, and that any new attempt to lower the highly competitive
Standard ECR pound rates be denied. We don't want our demise to be the subject of the next
Postmaster General speech.

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CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Mr. Bradstreet, have you had an 1 opportunity to examine the packet of designated written 2 cross-examination that was made available earlier today? 3 Those are the responses that you previously submitted in 4 5 writing. MR. STRAUS: Is 18 corrected? 6 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have. 7 8 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If these questions were asked of you today, would your answers be the same as those you 9 previously provided in writing? 10 THE WITNESS: Yes, they would. 11 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: That being the case, I'm going 12 to provide two copies to the reporter and direct that the 13 designated written cross-examination of Witness Bradstreet 14 be accepted into evidence and transcribed into the record at 15 this point. 16 [Designation of Written 17 Cross-Examination of Kenneth L. 18 Bradstreet, AAPS-T-1, was received 19 into evidence and transcribed into 20 the record.] 21 22 23 24 25

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BEFORE THE POSTAL RATE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20268-0001

Postal Rate and Fee Changes, 1997

Docket No. R97-1

DESIGNATION OF WRITTEN CROSS-EXAMINATION OF ASSOCIATION OF ALTERNATE POSTAL SYSTEMS WITNESS KENNETH L. BRADSTREET (AAPS-T1)

Party Advo, Inc.

Interrogatories

MOAA/AAPS-T1-2-11 USPS/AAPS-T1-5, 8, 18 VP-CW/AAPS-T1-2-3

Mail Order Association of America

MOAA/AAPS-T1-1-11 USPS/AAPS-T1-1-18 VP-CW/AAPS-T1-1-3

Newspaper Association of America

MOAA/AAPS-T1-3, 6-7, 11 USPS/AAPS-T1-1, 6-14, 18 VP-CW/AAPS-T1-3

United Parcel Service

MOAA/AAPS-T1-3, 8 USPS/AAPS-T1-10

United States Postal Service

USPS/AAPS-T1-1-18 VP-CW/AAPS-T1-2-3

Val-Pak Direct Marketing Services, Val-Pak Dealers Association, and Carol Wright VP-CW/AAPS-T1-1-3

Respectfully submitted,

narpet P. Cunskaul

Mårgåret P. Crenshaw Secretary

Interrogatory: MOAA/AAPS-T1-1 MOAA/AAPS-T1-2 MOAA/AAPS-T1-3 MOAA/AAPS-T1-4 MOAA/AAPS-T1-5 MOAA/AAPS-T1-6 MOAA/AAPS-T1-7 MOAA/AAPS-T1-8 MOAA/AAPS-T1-9 MOAA/AAPS-T1-10 MOAA/AAPS-T1-11 USPS/AAPS-T1-1 USPS/AAPS-T1-2 USPS/AAPS-T1-3 USPS/AAPS-T1-4 USPS/AAPS-T1-5 USPS/AAPS-T1-6 USPS/AAPS-T1-7 USPS/AAPS-T1-8 USPS/AAPS-T1-9 USPS/AAPS-T1-10 USPS/AAPS-T1-11 USPS/AAPS-T1-12 USPS/AAPS-T1-13 USPS/AAPS-T1-14 USPS/AAPS-T1-15

Designating Parties: MOAA ADVO, MOAA ADVO, MOAA, NAA, UPS ADVO, MOAA ADVO, MOAA ADVO, MOAA, NAA ADVO, MOAA, NAA ADVO, MOAA, UPS ADVO, MOAA ADVO, MOAA ADVO, MOAA, NAA MOAA, NAA, USPS MOAA, USPS MOAA, USPS MOAA, USPS ADVO, MOAA, USPS MOAA, NAA, USPS MOAA, NAA, USPS ADVO, MOAA, NAA, USPS MOAA, NAA, USPS MOAA, NAA, UPS, USPS MOAA, NAA, USPS MOAA, NAA, USPS MOAA, NAA, USPS ·MOAA, NAA, USPS MOAA, USPS

Interrogatory: USPS/AAPS-T1-16 USPS/AAPS-T1-17 USPS/AAPS-T1-18 VP-CW/AAPS-T1-1 VP-CW/AAPS-T1-2 VP-CW/AAPS-T1-3 1

Designating Parties: MOAA, USPS MOAA, USPS ADVO, MOAA, NAA, USPS MOAA, VP-CW ADVO, MOAA, USPS, VP-CW ADVO, MOAA, NAA, USPS, VP-CW

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MOAA/AAPS-T1-1

With respect to page 5 of your testimony, is it correct to conclude that AAPS members compete with the USPS directly only for the delivery of pieces eligible for entry as ECR or high density within Standard Mail A?

<u>Answer</u>

No. As I said in by testimony, "by far the majority" of what we deliver can be so described.

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MOAA/AAPS-T1-2

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With reference to your testimony on page 6, please provide the total volumes of magazines and periodicals delivered by AAPS members and the volumes of other pieces (1) weighing 4 ounces and above and (2) pieces weighing less than four ounces.

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Answer

AAPS does not collect or maintain this information.

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MOAA/AAPS-T1-3

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On page 7 of your testimony you recite certain factors which you characterize as USPS "pricing advantages." Would you agree that the fact that the USPS cannot independently set its own rates or product lines, but only pursuant to recommended decisions of the PRC represents a "pricing" disadvantage? If you disagree, please explain fully.

<u>Answer</u>

Yes. I fully elaborated on that in my testimony. The pricing advantages that I mentioned in my testimony result in a huge competitive advantage for the Postal Service. Having to submit to PRC review is necessary to help offset these advantages and to help assure that the Postal Service competes honestly and fairly.

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MOAA/AAPS-T1-4

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Would you agree that the fact that the Postal Service has no independent ability to establish wages for rank and file employees, but only pursuant to binding arbitration represents a competitive disadvantage?

<u>Answer</u>

It could be, depending upon how the arbitrators rule and how its competitors' wages are set.

MOAA/AAPS-T1-5

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What wage rates are paid to the employees of APS to perform the delivery function?

<u>Answer</u>

Because we operate in a very competitive market, that information is proprietary and confidential. However, for you purposes, I can state that the wages we pay are substantially lower than those paid by the Postal Service.

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RESPONSE OF AAPS WITNESS BRADSTREET TO INTERROGATORIES MOAA/AAPS-T1-1-11

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MOAA/AAPS-T1-6

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Are AAPS member companies able to set prices for their delivery services without review by any regulatory agency?

<u>Answer</u>

Of course, owing to the fact that we have no volume of business that is guaranteed by law.

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MOAA/AAPS-T1-7

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Is it your testimony that the rates for saturation and high density ECR Standard Mail A should be set at levels higher than proposed by the USPS based solely on the competitive concerns expressed in your testimony?

Answer

No.

MOAA/AAPS-T1-8

Is is (sic) your testimony that the members of AAPS have suffered significant competitive harm from competition from the USPS? If your answer is anything other than an unqualified no, please provide complete support for any claim of harm by providing a statement of collective volumes, revenues and profits for AAPS members for the years 1995 through 1997.

<u>Answer</u>

It is my testimony that many members have suffered significant competitive harm from the Postal Service. Unfortunately, AAPS is a small organization. I am the only person who receives any remuneration, just over \$5,000 per year. I work for AAPS on a very limited, part-time basis. AAPS does not collect the data which you request, and I certainly do not have the time or the resources to attempt to put together such information. Besides, <u>collective</u> information would not be relevant to my statement about "many" members.

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MOAA/AAPS-T1-9

Please provide the schedule of rates charged by APS.

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<u>Answer</u>

APS does not have a publicly available schedule of rates.

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MOAA/AAPS-T1-10

Please provide copies of rates charged by AAPS members.

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Answer

We do not have this information. See my answer to MOAA/AAPS-T1-8

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On page 18 of your testimony you include the text of Section 101 of the Postal Reorganization Act. Would you not agree that the obligation of the Postal Service to "provide prompt, reliable, and efficient services to patrons in all areas and . . . to all communities" is facilitated by the Postal Service's ability to offer services for which there is private sector competition? If your answer is anything other than an unqualified yes, please explain completely.

Answer

Yes, but it would also be "facilitated" by USPS engaging in non-postal business where it could use its enormous size and monopoly revenues to hurt competitors and competition. Should Post Offices become mini Seven-Elevens if that "facilitated" its ability to serve postal customers? Or, a little closer to home, should the Postal Service enlarge its offices into department stores and compete with MOAA members if it determined that that would facilitate its ability to serve postal customers?

ANSWERS OF AAPS WITNESS KENNETH L. BRADSTREET TO INTERROGATORIES USPS/AAPS-T1-1-18

USPS/AAPS-T1-1. In your Docket No. MC95-1 testimony, you described the proposed pound rate as "an overtly competitive move designed to shift privately carried advertising and a growing sample delivery market into the mailstream." (Docket No. MC95-1, AAPS-T-1, page 43, lines 16-17).

a. Is it your testimony that the USPS-proposed pound rate for ECR in this docket is an overtly competitive move to divert samples into the mainstream? If yes, explain fully, specifying how the proposed rates (including the proposed residual shape surcharge) will shift samples to the mainstream. If no, explain fully.

b. Would you characterize the current sample delivery market as growing? Please explain fully, providing the complete basis for your opinion.

Answer:

a. Not samples per se, but eventually it would have that effect. Most samples are delivered by companies who deliver flats every week and deliver samples a few times per year. If the company goes out of business because it cannot compete for flats at the proposed pound rate, there will be one less private delivery option for the delivery of samples. Soon there would be fewer private delivery options, and eventually there would be markets in which former private delivery options for samples no longer exist. The end result is that sample producers are left with fewer options, and in some cases no options other than using the mail.

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b. Yes. That is what I am hearing from our members.

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USPS/AAPS-T1-2. Please see your testimony at page 45, line 22 through page 46, line 2.

a. Is it your understanding that the residual shape surcharge is being used to reduce the pound rate? Please explain fully.

b. If the answer to part a. is anything other than an unqualified "no", please explain fully how the surcharge is being used to reduce the pound rate.

c. If the answer to part a. is anything other than an unqualified "no", please quantify the extent to which the pound rate is proposed to reduce due to the surcharge.

Answer:

a. Perhaps my testimony would have been more precise if I had said that the surcharge is used to support a reduced pound rate.

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b. Because it is used as a justification.

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c. I have no idea.

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USPS/AAPS-T1-3. Please provide an estimate of the weight of the typical sample delivered through alternate delivery and provide the complete basis for your estimate.

Answer:

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I am not sure what in meant by a "typical sample." The weight range for samples could be anywhere from one ounce to more than a pound.

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USPS/AAPS-T1-4. Please describe the contents of a typical sample delivered through alternate delivery.

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Answer:

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The contents of a sample are the same as the contents of the substance that the sample is a sample of - typically either a liquid or a solid.

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USPS/AAPS-T1-5. Please see your testimony at page 13, lines 11 through 16.

a. Do alternate delivery firms usually deliver advertisements on the day or days specified by the advertisers? Please explain fully.

b. Do newspapers usually print the advertising in the paper, or insert the inserts into the newspaper, on the day or days specified by the advertisers? Please explain fully.

Answer:

a. They certainly try, and usually succeed.

b. Not personally being in the newspaper business, I would only guess that the answer to part "a" above would also apply to the newspaper business.

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USPS/AAPS-T1-6. Please see your testimony at page 12, line 6.

a. Please provide a complete definition of term "rigged" as used in this passage.

b. Is it your position that there are no legitimate reasons for lowering the pound rate? Please explain fully.

c. In your view, under what conditions (actual or hypothetical) would a lowering of the pound rate be legitimate? Please explain fully.

Answer:

a. I'll stick with Webster on that one: rig vt rigged; rigging [rig (swindle)] 1: to manipulate or control usu. by deceptive or dishonest means <-an election> 2: to fix in advance for a desired result <-a quiz program>

b & c. I suppose, hypothetically, if the Postal Service had proposed a reduction of 25% in the weight rate for first class letters, and 25% in the weight rate for Standard Regular, I would have to agree that they might be generally overcharging for weight, and across the board reductions would be appropriate. I can only compare pound rates for mail which has no competition and for mail which has serious competition. In this case, the Postal Service proposes a token reduction in the pound rate of Standard Regular, no change in the weight rate for First Class mail, (both of which are non-competitive classes) and a huge reduction in the pound rate for competitive ECR. In MC95-1 the Postal Service witnesses freely admitted that the proposed reduction in the ECR pound rate was competitive in nature. Even though the witnesses in this case were not quite so open about the motive for the huge reduction in the ECR pound rate (perhaps their openness about the competitive nature of the proposed rate in MC95-1 contributed in part to its failure), the pound rate reduction in this docket has clearly been proposed for the same competitive reasons. While there might be hypothetical instances where a reduction would be appropriate, as in the example above, based upon the rate setting criteria in the Postal Reorganization Act, which is the law, it is my opinion that there is no legitimate reason for any selective reduction in a highly competitive rate. The proposed ECR pound rate, when compared with the pound rate for monopoly First Class mail (and the Standard Mail Regular pound rate, even given the token reduction), appears to be a purely competitive proposal.

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USPS/AAPS-T1-7. Please see your testimony at page 16, lines 2-3.

a. Is it your testimony that the proposed pound rate for Enhanced Carrier Route has been proposed by the Postal Service "purely for competitive reasons, and for the purpose of harming its competitors?" Please explain your answer fully, providing all bases for your opinion.

b. Is it your testimony that the residual shape surcharge has been proposed by the Postal Service "purely for competitive reasons, and for the purpose of harming its competitors?" Please explain your answer fully, providing all bases for your opinion.

Answer:

a. It is my testimony that the lowering of the pound rate is for these purposes, as the Postal Service admitted in MC95-1. The bases for my opinion are included throughout my testimony.

b. I believe I addressed that in my testimony as well (see pages 45, line 3 - page 47, line 2).

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USPS/AAPS-T1-8. Please see your testimony at page 22, lines 18-20.

a. Please confirm that there have been instances in the past ten years in which domestic postal rates were lowered for categories which you deem as competitive with alternate delivery. If you do not confirm, please explain fully.

b. Please confirm that in Docket No. MC95-1, the rate for saturation non-letter mail was lowered from 12.0 to 11.4 cents. If you do not confirm, please explain fully.

c. Is it your position that the rate lowering referred to in part b., above, is "not allowed" under applicable law? If yes, provide the relevant legal standards upon which you rely and explain your answer fully, providing the complete basis for your opinion.

Answer:

a. confirmed

b. confirmed, if you are referring to the piece rate for locally entered ECR.

c. Certainly any rate change must pass the scrutiny of the Postal Rate Commission, which applies the rate-setting criteria. The Commission allowed the reduction.

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USPS/AAPS-T1-9. Please see your testimony at page 28, lines 4-6.

a. Please define "much" as used in line 5 of this passage.

b. Given that the overall increase for ECR is 3.2 percent, is there a certain threshold percentage of ECR volume for which you believe it is inappropriate to lower rates? If so, what is that percentage? Please explain fully.

Answer:

a. Certainly saturation mail would constitute "much" of the Standard ECR mix.

b. I don't know how the "given" portion of the question affects the remainder. "Given" that the Postal Service is proposing substantial reductions for the most competitive ECR mail matter, I'm not sure what any percentages or averages have to do with it. It will be small consolation for the alternate delivery company owner or manager or carrier who is forced to look for another job because of this reduction to be able to say, "At least the average ECR change was an increase, and at lease some of the ECR mailers had to pay more." I doubt that he will find that comforting.

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USPS/AAPS-T1-10. Please see your testimony at page 29, lines 16-23.

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a. Please confirm that it is your understanding that witness Bernstein says a Ramsey Pricing framework would suggest a average rate decrease for the ECR subclass of roughly 50 percent. If you do not confirm, please explain fully.

b. Please confirm that the proposed average rate increase for ECR is 3.2 percent. If you do not confirm, please explain fully, stating what you believe to be the proposed average rate change.

c. Please confirm that it is your understanding that witness Bernstein says a Ramsey Pricing framework could result in a volume increase of 36 percent. If you do not confirm, please explain fully.

d. If, indeed, the Postal Service were trying to harm the interests of competitors, why would it not propose rates more in line with the results of a Ramsey pricing analysis? Explain your answer fully.

Answer:

a. confirmed

b. I can confirm that the Postal Service claims it is (see my answer to USPS/AAPS-T1-9). I have not done an independent analysis of the Postal Service's arithmetic.

c. I say exactly that in the testimony to which you refer. I confirm it again.

d. If indeed the Postal Service did not intend to move in the direction of Ramsey Pricing, why would it sponsor such testimony? The Postal Service knows that as long as the Postal Rate Commission must review rate proposals, it would be futile to propose rates resembling those resulting from the application of Ramsey Pricing. Under the current rate-making structure the Postal Service will have to content itself with moving toward this type of rate structure a piece at a time. Also, knowing that the Commission protects small mailers and competitors, the Postal Service is seeking legislation under which it in fact could implement rates in line with Ramsey Pricing because the Commission would largely be excluded from the process.

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USPS/AAPS-T1-11. Please see your testimony at page 43, lines 3-6. Is it your testimony that heavier First Class pieces have fewer alternatives than lighter First Class pieces? Please explain fully, providing the complete basis for your opinion.

Answer:

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No. As a practical matter there is little if any difference. Probably there are pieces mailed at first class rates which would fall outside of the Postal Service's definition of a "letter". I would guess that this probably is more common at heavier weights, but I don't know that for sure. My point was not a comparison of light versus heavy first class. The point was that most heavy first class is captive to the postal service, either directly or indirectly. Some is captive by virtue of the Postal Service's direct application of the Private Express Statutes in defining the contents as letters. Some is captive as a practical matter because the application of the Private Express Statutes to most of the first class mailstream restricts the volume that would be available to a competitor. That lack of available volume eliminates private delivery as a viable concept, which in turn eliminates any alternative to the mail. I have to conclude that there is no practical difference in a lack of alternatives caused by the direct application of the Private Express Statutes. Either way, it's still a lack of alternatives.

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USPS/AAPS-T1-12. Please see your testimony at page 11, lines 16-20.

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a. Is it your testimony that the pound rate be set so as to remove the use of the Postal Service from consideration on the part of a publisher? Please fully explain your response.

b. What do you mean by the "cost of weight" in line 19? Please explain fully.

Answer:

a. No. I was simply pointing out that a huge reduction in the pound rate will have a severe effect on alternate delivery companies. Many publishers have declared by their actions that the Postal Service is a good deal and the current pound rate is at an acceptable level. A number of publishers over the past five years, former AAPS members, have "voted with their feet" as it were, and have begun using the mail. Obviously they think the current rate is at an acceptable level as well. The Postal Service has a substantial volume of publication type business - the type which I described in the testimony cited above. Other witnesses in this case represent publishers have opted for alternative delivery. Right now there appears to be a balance between Postal and alternative delivery where postal volumes are growing and where alternate delivery, though in many instances struggling, is able to compete somewhat effectively. A substantial reduction in the pound rate will tip that balance heavily toward the Postal Service at the expense of alternative providers.

b. The cost of weight for a publisher is the added cost to the publisher for producing a heavier piece.

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USPS/AAPS-T1-13. Please see your testimony at page 45, line 17-20, where you state, in part, that "alternate delivery companies are already getting quite a bit of sample business in the more major markets under the current rate structure." Confirm that, all other things being equal, imposition by the Postal Service of any positive residual shape surcharge would make alternate delivery companies more attractive to sample senders. If you cannot confirm, please explain fully.

Answer:

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Confirmed, noting that "all other things being equal" assumes that the pound rate remains unchanged.

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USPS/MPS-T1-14. Please see your testimony at page 48, line 4. Please fully define "highly competitive" as it is used in this passage.

Answer:

Highly competitive obviously means mail matter for which there is vibrant competition between the Postal Service and private enterprise, in the passage cited, ECR saturation.

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USPS/MPS-T1-15. Please confirm that the study of the cost/weight relationship for Standard (A) mail presented in exhibit USPS-44B included the vehicle service driver and transportation costs segments directly in the analysis. If you do not confirm, explain fully.

Answer:

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They appear to be included, though to what degree and with what assumptions I do not know.

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USPS/MPS-T1-16. Please confirm that the study of the cost/weight relationship for Standard (A) mail presented in exhibit USPS44B assumed that transportation costs were directly related to weight. If you do not confirm, please explain fully.

Not confirmed. The study notes that highway transportation "costs are distributed in proportion to estimated cubic volume."

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USPS/MPS-T1-17. Please confirm that the study of the cost/weight relationship for Standard (A) mail presented in exhibit USPS44B assumed that vehicle service driver costs were directly related to weight. If you do not confirm, please explain fully.

Not confirmed. The study notes that costs for vehicle service drivers "are distributed in proportion to estimated cubic volume."

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(corrected February 4, 1998)

USPS/AAPS-T1-18. Please refer to the discussion of city carrier street time costs on page 37 of your testimony. Most of the discussion centers around what the Postal Service calls a park and loop route.

a. Are you assuming that the standard operating procedure for a park and loop route is to carry all of the mail for a route in one circuit without returning to the vehicle? Please explain fully, describing any assumptions you employ.

b. Please discuss how the hypothetical situation described at page 37 lines 7 -21 would change if the normal park and loop route consisted of 10 separate circuits, with the carrier returning to the vehicle before each circuit.

c. Please describe how your analysis of the effect of weight on the cost of delivery would be different for mounted routes (routes where the carrier makes each delivery form her vehicle).

d. What percentage of deliveries by the members of your association are made by carriers on foot? What percentage are made from a vehicle?

Answer:

(a) No. Note that I referred to "extra" trips to the vehicle. My assumptions are that the Postal Service has designed routes efficiently, and that the established parks and loops accommodate normal mail volume while allowing for some residual capacity. I assume that some loops are established based upon volume and some are established based upon the unique geography involved. I assume that there are some light-weight pieces of saturation mail which could be absorbed within that residual capacity for most loops, some heavier pieces which could be absorbed within fewer loops, and some very heavy pieces which would require substantial alterations of the route on a given delivery. For instance, how would a carrier accommodate a 12 ounce publication with inserts, or a 15 ounce telephone directory in addition to his normal load? Certainly this would require modifying a number of loops from the normal delivery pattern.

(b) The hypothetical situation to which you refer assumes a postal street carrier route of 600 addresses, and compares the delivery of a ¼ ounce saturation piece with the delivery of a 3.3 ounce saturation piece, both of which are charged the same postal rate. Using your assumption of 10 separate circuits, the carrier would average 60 deliveries for each circuit. Carrying an extra saturation piece weighing .25 ounces would add an average of 15 ounces to each circuit, some more or less. If each circuit had the residual capacity available, it would require no additional trips back to the vehicle. Compare this to the same carrier delivering a 3.3 ounce saturation piece. In this instance, the carrier must add an average 12+ pounds for each circuit, more or less based upon the actual number of stops on each circuit. This would require one extra trip back to the vehicle for each circuit which did not have the residual capacity to absorb this extra 12+ pounds. Now lets consider the carrier above who has the 12 ounce publication with inserts, and which the publisher has been assured a certain day of

delivery – a situation which happens all the time. The carrier has to absorb an average additional 45 pounds on each established circuit, more than the total capacity of the carrier if he had no other mail to deliver. With the other mail considered, the carrier would have at least one additional trip for each circuit, and in some instances two additional trips. How much 'extra time would an extra 15 trips take? In the case of the 15 ounce telephone directory, the carrier would be adding an average 56+ pounds for each circuit, probably close to 20 additional trips.

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Certainly a mounted route would experience some effect for heavier pieces, though probably not to the same extent as the foot carrier. My own experience in delivering routes from a vehicle is that adding weight does add a considerable amount of time. If a delivery set weighs 3 ounces or less, the pieces can be put in bundles of 100 pieces. The carrier delivering to 600 addresses would have to stop and replenish his supply 6 times. However, a delivery set weighing 10 ounces would likely be tied in no more than 25 per bundle. This requires the driver to make 24 stops to replenish his supply. I assume that a mounted postal carrier experiences some of the same problems in blending into his normal mail volume saturation pieces of varying weights.

Operating within this hypothetical route, it is possible to ascertain a cost difference for these pieces. Assuming that the 3.3-ounce pieces can be accommodated within the residual capacity in eight out of the ten circuits, this would cause two extra trips. Assuming 15 extra trips for the 12-ounce piece, there is a difference of 13 trips, each consuming between five and ten minutes of time. Assuming conservatively an average of seven minutes per additional trip, we have 91 extra minutes which are entirely weight related. At \$40 per labor hour, we have an added cost of \$60, or 10 cents per peice. The difference in weight between the two pieces being 8.7 ounces, this calculates into a direct weight-related cost of 18.4 additional cents per pound, an additional weight-driven cost, the existence of which the Postal Service refuses to admit.

(c) Based upon our 1997 directory, I have calculated that 89% are delivered on foot, and 11% are delivered from a vehicle.

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RESPONSE OF AAPS WITNESS BRADSTR4EET TO INTERROGATORIES VP-CW/AAPS-T1-1-3

VP-CW/AAPS-T1-1

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Please see your testimony at page 16, lines 2-5, where you state that the Postal Service's "cost computations are not trustworthy." In view of your statement at page 4, line 10, that your testimony is not technical, why should the Commission believe your statement that the Postal Service's cost computations are not trustworthy?

Answer

I think I have presented some non-technical reasons. You may want to refer to USPS/AAPS-T1-18 for a non-technical example.

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RESPONSE OF AAPS WITNESS BRADSTREET TO INTERROGATORIES VP-CW/AAPS-T1-1-3

VP-CW/AAPS-T1-2

Please see your testimony at page 22, lines 18-20, where you state that "not only is the USPS not allowed to lower rates for the purpose of hurting fair competition, it is clearly instructed to consider the impact of 'increases' to avoid hurting competitors."

a. Is it your testimony that the Postal Service may not propose competitive rates, in order to ensure competitors can charge more for their services?

b. Is it your testimony that any rate change that cause a Postal Service competitor to lose business to the Postal Service violates the statute, because the Postal Service has not avoided hurting competitors?

c. Is it your testimony that the Postal Service must raise its rates when its competitors raise their rates, in order to avoid hurting competitors?

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<u>Answer</u>

a. No

b. No

c. That would be nice, but no.

RESPONSE OF AAPS WITNESS BRADSTREET TO INTERROGATORIES VP-CW/AAPS-T1-1-3

VP-CW/AAPS-T1-3

a. What percentage of your customers demand day-certain delivery?

- b.What percentage of your customers receive day-certain delivery?
- c. What percentage of your volume comes with a demand for day-certain delivery?
- d. What percentage of your volume receives day-certain delivery?

<u>Answer</u>

I assume that the questions refer to APS as opposed to AAPS. Most APS customers are interested in a time range. APS offers a weekly delivery beginning late Saturday afternoon, with a mid-night deadline. Most customers who use our regular weekly delivery are happy with the timing, or I assume they would go elsewhere for delivery services. APS also does special deliveries at other times in the week as contracted. Special deliveries are usually timesensitive and are more expensive, as the cost is usually borne by a single customer or very few customers. Special deliveries account for about 3% of our volume. Concerning the regular weekend deliveries:

a. Some customers are satisfied with a 24 hour window (estimated 25%). Some need a narrower time-span such as an 8 hour window (estimated 50%). Some indicate no real preference (25%).

b. I believe that all of our customers receive delivery within a satisfactory time-frame.

c. Estimated 75%

d. Estimated 75%

1	CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Does any participant have
2	additional written cross-examination for the witness?
3	[No response.]
4	CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: There doesn't appear to be any.
5	Three participants requested oral
6	cross-examination of Witness Bradstreet: ADVO, Inc.,
7	Val-Pak Direct Marketing, Inc., and Val-Pak Dealers'
8	Association and Carol Wright promotions, all one party, and
9	the United States Postal Service.
10	Does any other participant have oral
11	cross-examination for the witness?
12	[No response.]
13	CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If not then, Mr. McLaughlin, if
14	you're prepared.
15	MR. McLAUGHLIN: Mr. Chairman, we have no
16	questions.
17	CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: We'll move right on with
18	Val-Pak, et al.
19	MR. OLSON: Mr. Chairman, we also have no
20	questions.
21	CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Think we should go for a
22	three-peat?
23	[Laughter.]
24	CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: I don't think we're going to
25	make it.

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Mr. Cooper, you don't have any questions; is that 1 2 correct? MR. COOPER: I think I'll try a few and see how it 3 4 goes. CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Proceed when you're ready. 5 CROSS-EXAMINATION 6 BY MR. COOPER: 7 Mr. Bradstreet, good morning. 8 Q 9 А Good morning. 0 I'm Rick Cooper, for the Postal Service. 10 11 I'd like to ask you first about your response to 12 Postal Service Interrogatory No. 2. Now in this response you say that the residual 13 shape surcharge sought by the Postal Service is used to 14 15 support a reduced pound rate; is that correct? As I stated in the answer, I perhaps should have А 16 said that it's used to support or to justify a reduced pound 17 18 rate. Okay. Now in your responses, are you referring to 19 Q the ECR pound rate? 20 That's correct. 21 А Can you tell me where in the Postal Service's 22 0 direct case its testimony or interrogatory responses such a 23 justification appears? 24 No, not right off the top of my head. 25 Α

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Q I'd be happy to give you as much time as you'd
 like to look for it.

3 A No, I can't.

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Q Would you also look at your response to Postal Service Interrogatory 6? Actually, turn first to page 12 of your testimony, but keep that Interrogatory response handy.

7 Okay. Now, starting at line 4, you state that the 8 Postal Service has been so intent on making this pound rate 9 the focus of its attack on alternate delivery competitors 10 that it has rigged at least three separate weight studies to 11 give its rate preference the appearance of legitimacy from a 12 cost standpoint, is that right?

13

That is correct.

14 Q Now, would you clarify for us what the three 15 weight studies are that you are talking about?

Back in, I think it was 1984, we appeared in 16 Α connection with a proposed study. It is my understanding, 17 and my memory is a little foggy going that far back, but, as 18 I recall, the Commission had asked the Postal Service to do 19 a study which would determine what impact weight would have 20 on costs and, if I recall correctly, the Postal Service did 21 a study which included only in-house costs shortly after 22 that period of time. 23

And we had appeared before the Commission in discussing what that study, or what form that study should

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1 take, to argue that carrier street time was one obvious
2 example where, we believe, that weight had more -- more of
3 an impact on costs than any other factor, and that the
4 Postal Service had determined and that carrier street time
5 costs were predominantly piece-related and they were going
6 to confine their study to in-house handling and sorting, as
7 I understand it.

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8 Subsequent to that, in the reclassification case, 9 the Postal Service commissioned a study from, I believe it 10 was Christensen & Associates, which essentially did the same 11 thing and ignored carrier street time as a factor in their 12 study. And the most current study by Christensen & 13 Associates has again done the same thing.

14 Q Did you at any time speak to the people working on 15 these studies regarding their intentions or goals in 16 conducting the studies?

17 A You mean after the study is all finished?18 Q At any time?

A No, I wasn't aware that there was a study inprogress until it was finished.

Q Now, in your testimony, at page 12, you say that the Postal Service analysts working on these studies deliberately rigged the results. That is your choice of words, right?

25 A That is correct.

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12066 1 Q In your response to Interrogatory No. 6 from the Postal Service, you define "rigged" as "to manipulate or 2 3 control, usually by deceptive or dishonest means," and you also define as "to fix in advance for a desired result," 4 isn't that correct? 5 That's -- I copied that out of the dictionary. Α 6 7 Well, that is the definition you chose to provide 0 to us when we asked you to define the term as you used in 8 this passage, right? 9 Α That is correct. 10 So it is your sworn testimony that the Postal 11 0 Service analysts were deceptive or dishonest in conducting 12 these studies, is that right? 13 It's hard to accuse them of being deceptive and 14 Α dishonest, but when they ignore what I believe is the major 15 16 weight-related cost in a weight study, it is hard to conclude that their motives are altruistic. 17 So you are saying that they were biased, that they Q 18 19 were --Certainly. 20 Α -- trying to reach a pre-determined result? 21 Q Certainly, at the least, yes. Α 22 Now, in your response to Part B, Parts B and C, 23 0 you refer to a reduction of 25 percent in the weight rate 24 for First Class letters and 25 percent in the weight rate 25

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for Standard Regular, do you see that? 1 2 Α Yes. 3 0 How did you compute that percentage? А The 25 percent? 4 5 Q Yes. How did you arrive at that? А I just used it as a hypothetical, as I point out 6 7 here. Okay. So you are not saying that is the actual 8 Q reduction? 9 10 Α No. No, I am not. 11 Q Would you turn to your response to Postal Service 12 Interrogatory No. 7? Here you were asked, in Part B, 13 whether the residual shape surcharge proposed by the Postal Service was being proposed purely for competitive reasons 14 and for the purpose of harming its competitors, and I am not 15 16 sure you have answered that question. Are you saying that the sole basis for this proposal is to harm competitors? 17 18 Α No. There are other reasons, --19 0 20 Α Yes. 21 -- more legitimate reasons, isn't that correct? Q 22 А More legitimate reasons? 23 0 Yes. I am not sure of that. But there are other 24 Α 25 reasons.

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There are no legitimate reasons, you are stating, 1 Q 2 for this proposal? No, I didn't say that either. I said there -- you 3 А said, Are there more legitimate reasons? I say, no, not 4 more legitimate reasons, there are probably some other 5 6 reasons. 7 0 I didn't mean to suggest that crushing competition was a legitimate reason. 8 9 MR. COOPER: Thank you very much. I have no 10 further questions. CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Is there any follow-up? 11 Questions from the bench? Commissioner LeBlanc. 12 13 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Mr. Bradstreet, just very briefly, you seem to be going on and on about being an 14 aggressive competitor, the Postal Service is an aggressive 15 competitor to your industry. 16 17 THE WITNESS: Yes. COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: You talk about where Marvin 18 Runyon made the speeches, putting Publishers Express out of 19 business, and you talk about all that through here. 20 Then you talk about, on page 13 of your testimony, where -- on 21 22 line 13, or page 13, it says that MSC Postmaster Cooper McLaughlin -- McClausen in Grand Rapids, Michigan, 23 individual Postmasters were ordered to deliver the Advo 24 mail, must be made on time, must not under any circumstances 25

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1 be made on or before Monday.

2 Then on the next page, you talk about Chairman 3 Gleiman's exchange between he and Witness Molar on 4 Montgomery Ward.

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5 THE WITNESS: Yes.

6 COMMISSIONER LEBLANC: And you go on and on about 7 this for a couple, three or four pages in here, and I guess 8 what I am really wanting to ask here is do you see any kind 9 of deliberate approach, a deliberate attempt, if you will,

10 any kind of forcefulness against you?

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THE WITNESS: Oh, certainly.

12 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: I mean you seem to be 13 indicating that Advo, Montgomery Ward, all the ECR mailers, 14 some of the other people in here, were, in a lot of ways, a 15 product of the Postal Service's own making, if you will.

16 THE WITNESS: Let me -- if I could expand on that. 17 You asked me about a memo that the Postmaster in Grand 18 Rapids issued to his Postmasters in the various Post 19 Offices.

20 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Well, I am just saying that 21 was on page 13 of your testimony --

22 THE WITNESS: Right.

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23 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: -- where you talked about 24 that. And then you talked about Chairman Gleiman's exchange 25 and so forth and so on.

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THE WITNESS: Yes.

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2 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: So it seems to be that your 3 are indicating that there's some kind force out here that is 4 actually pushing this on.

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THE WITNESS: Well, they refer in the memo to a 5 I'll read the quote, "The intent of this program 6 program. 7 is to recapture the advertisement that was lost to the newspapers as supplements to their papers several years ago. 8 In many cities, this program has been quite successful, and 9 the potential for the United States Postal Service to 10 recapture significant advertising business rests with our 11 ability to handle the job well." 12

13 Now, if there is a program --

14 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Now, excuse me, that comes 15 off of where?

16 THE WITNESS: That is in my -- that is my 17 testimony. I am quoting --

18 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: On what page? On what 19 page?

20 THE WITNESS: On page 13.

21 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: That's on page 13.

22 THE WITNESS: Page 13.

23 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: That was on the bottom of 24 it right?

25 THE WITNESS: Yeah, beginning on line 17.

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1 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Yes. 2 THE WITNESS: And I think we asked back in -- I 3 think this was 1984, we asked what program are you referring to? The Postal Service would not respond to those 4 questions. And, in fact, when the Commission compelled an 5 6 answer they even, as I recall, refused to answer the 7 question. 8 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Now, changing gears on you, 9 you talk about cost coverage and contribution per piece. 10 THE WITNESS: Correct, yes. COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Why is contribution per 11 12 piece so important to you? 13 THE WITNESS: Contribution per piece. Well, --14 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: I mean that is as I understood it. Correct me if I am wrong. 15 16 THE WITNESS: Yes, that's correct. We theorized, and in my testimony on page 31, I list a quote from one of 17 our previous briefs, in R-90. If I could take that a step 18 19 further. What if the Postal Service were to propose a 2 20 cent per piece discount for people who were willing to bundle saturation mail? Not just take it to the post 21 22 office, but actually load it in the carrier's jeep, so that 23 there's -- it avoids almost entirely any attributable costs 24 because carrier street time is predominantly considered 25 institutional cost. You have nothing to base -- if you

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determine that if you are willing to bring the mail down and 1 load it in the carrier's jeep, that you have avoided 2 virtually all the attributable costs, and so you can -- you 3 4 can identify one penny worth of cost, a 200 percent cost coverage would be at a rate of 2 cents. 5 That really doesn't -- at some point, you have to 6 start looking at unit contribution, because the percentages, 7 if you are relying on a service that is almost entirely 8 institutional cost, you have to start to looking at unit 9 contribution as opposed to percentage mark-up. 10 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Okay. Now, you almost 11 mentioned about Ramsey pricing. 12 THE WITNESS: Yes. 13 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: And you say, I believe, it 14 ignores the pricing criteria. 15 THE WITNESS: As I understand Ramsey pricing --16 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: How do you -- please 17 elaborate on that one for me. 18 THE WITNESS: Yes. And I am not an economist. As 19 I understand it, it is a means of trying to arrive at the 20 most efficient type of pricing, and within that framework, 21 the only criterion is efficiency. It does not include 22 impact on competitors. It doesn't include available 23 alternatives. It doesn't include anything except 24 efficiency. And what I am saying is Ramsey pricing would 25

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replace the criteria of the Postal Reorganization Act with
 one criteria which is efficiency.

3 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Because -- the reason I am 4 asking this is because at the bottom of page 28, top of page 5 29, where you are talking about that in your testimony, you 6 talk about the introduction by Peter Bernstein's testimony, 7 I am paraphrasing now, "officially praising the application 8 of Ramsey pricing to Postal Ratemaking speaks loudly to 9 competitors as would a formal letter of the PMG himself."

10 So you seem to be, in effect, saying that there, 11 again, is some kind of push out there to make this work. 12 THE WITNESS: Yes, I believe that is the case.

13 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Right. I think I'll stop 14 there. Thank you very much, sir.

15 Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

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16 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Does any participant have 17 follow-up as a consequence of questions from the bench? 18 [No response.]

19 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If not, that brings us to 20 redirect. Would you like some time?

21 MS. BLAIR: None, Mr. Chairman.

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22 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If that is the case, then, Mr. 23 Bradstreet, I want to thank you. We appreciate your 24 appearance here today and your contributions to our record. 25 And if there is nothing further, you are excused.

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1 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 2 [Witness excused.] 3 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Mr. McLaughlin, when you are ready, you can identify your witness so that I can swear him 4 5 in. MR. McLAUGHLIN: Mr. Chairman, the Saturation Mail 6 7 Coalition calls as its witness, Harry J. Buckel. 8 Whereupon, 9 HARRY J. BUCKEL, a witness, was called for examination by counsel for the 10 Saturation Mail Coalition and, having been first duly sworn, 11 was examined and testified as follows: 12 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Please be seated. 13 14 DIRECT EXAMINATION BY MR. McLAUGHLIN: 15 Mr. Buckel, I am handing you two copies of a 16 Q document captioned "Direct Testimony of Harry J. Buckel on 17 Behalf of the Saturation Mail Coalition, " designated as 18 SMC-T-1. Was this testimony prepared by you or under your 19 direction and supervision? 20 Yes, it was. 21 Ά 22 0 Is it true and correct to the best of your knowledge and belief? 23 Yes, it is. 24 Α And if you were to testify orally today, would 25 Q

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your testimony be the same?

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2 A Yes, it would.

MR. McLAUGHLIN: Mr. Chairman, at this point I 3 move that SMC-T-1 be received into evidence and transcribed 4 into the record. 5 I am handing two copies to the reporter. 6 7 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Thank you, sir. Are there any objections? 8 9 [No response.] CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Hearing none, Mr. Buckel's 10 testimony and exhibits are received into evidence. I direct 11 that they be transcribed into the record at this point. 12 13 [Direct Testimony and Exhibits of Harry J. Buckel, SMC-T-1, was 14 received into evidence and 15 transcribed into the record.] 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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BEFORE THE POSTAL RATE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D. C. 20268-0001 Dec 30 | 35 711 '97 UFFICE -

POSTAL RATE AND FEE CHANGES, 1997

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Docket No. R97-1

DIRECT TESTIMONY OF HARRY J. BUCKEL ON BEHALF OF THE SATURATION MAIL COALITION

Communications with respect to this document should be sent to:

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Counsel for the Saturation Mail Coalition

December 30, 1997

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TESTIMONY OF HARRY J. BUCKEL

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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

1	My name is Harry J. Buckel. I am Chief Executive Officer of Newport Media,		
2	Inc., the publisher of several shopper publications in Long Island, New York.		
3	have held this position since 1996 when I purchased the company. I have been		
4	involved in the community newspaper and advertising shopper industry for over		
5	twenty years.		
6	I received a BSBA Finance from Xavier University in 1966 and an MS degree		
7	in Regional Economics from Michigan State University in 1970.		
8	From 1970-72, I served as Assistant to the President and Vice President for		
9	Finance and Development for the Michigan Chamber of Commerce.		
10	From 1972-1978, I held several management positions for the Panax		
11	Corporation involving the publication of various community newspapers:		
12	Director of Marketing;		
13 14	General Manager of the <u>Community News</u> of Suburban Detroit (100,000 circulation);		
15	Group Vice President, Southeast Michigan Newspapers;		
16	Vice President, Corporate Staff and Assistant to the President;		
17	Vice President, Publisher of the Miami Beach Sun Reporter		
18	I joined Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. in 1978 and served in the		
19	following positions prior to becoming President of the PennySaver, a Harte-Hanks		
20	shopper in Southern California:		
21	President and Publisher, San Francisco Progress		
22	President and Publisher, Ypsilanti Press		
23	President and Publisher, Glouchester County Times		

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President and Publisher, Journal Publishing Company, Hamilton, Ohio In 1982, I became Publisher of the PennySaver, a position I held until 1996 when I

In 1982, I became Publisher of the PennySaver, a position I held until 1996 when I
Ieft the company to form Newport Media, Inc. In addition, I served as a Corporate
Vice President and Senior Vice President of Harte-Hanks Communications (19861996; 1991-96) and President of Harte-Hanks Shoppers (1987-1996).

7 Throughout my career, I have participated actively in advertising and 8 shopper industry affairs. In 1989, I served as Industry Co-Chairman of the 9 Postmaster General's Worksharing Task Force. I served as Executive Vice Chairman of the Third Class Mail Association from 1989 to 1991, and as 10 11 Chairman of the Advertising Mail Marketing Association from 1991 through 1993. 12 In addition, I presented testimony to the Postal Rate Commission on behalf of 13 Harte-Hanks Shoppers in Dockets R90-1 and R94-1. Recently, I have been 14 involved in forming and organizing the Saturation Mailers Coalition, working closely with other saturation mailers. 15

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PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY

1	I am testifying on behalf of the Saturation Mailers Coalition, a recently-		
2	formed coalition of local, regional, and national companies involved in the		
3	saturation mail advertising business. The Coalition supports the Postal Service's		
4	proposed rates and rate structure for Standard A Enhanced Carrier Route (ECR)		
5	Mail. The purposes of my testimony are to:		
6	 Describe the Saturation Mailers Coalition and the characteristics of its 		
7	members;		
8	 Describe the nature of the saturation mail advertising market and the 		
9	customers our industry serves, particularly the many small businesses		
10	that use and depend upon saturation mail to reach their customers;		
11	 Describe the highly competitive nature of our business, particularly in 		
12	relation to non-postal competition;		
13	 Explain the importance to our industry and our customers of maintaining 		
14	affordable postal rates for saturation mail, and the benefits of the Postal		
15	Service's proposal to moderate the current high pound rate for ECR		
16	mail.		
17	In addition, my testimony describes the operation of Newport Media Inc.,		
18	including its production and distribution; the markets it serves, its customers and		
19	competitors; and the significance and growing success of alternate delivery in our		
20	markets.		
21	THE SATURATION MAIL COALITION		
22	I have long believed that mailers in the saturation mail industry, despite		
23	being competitors with one another, have strong common interests on postal		
24	issues, both as an industry and as representatives of our small business		
25	advertising customers. Over the last several years, I and other leaders in the		

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industry have informally discussed the idea of forming a coalition to cooperate and
participate in postal matters of mutual interest. These discussions ultimately led
to a meeting of industry representatives earlier this year and formation of the
Coalition. The Coalition is co-chaired by Norman Schultz, President and CEO of
Mail Marketing Systems in Jessup, Maryland, and Richard Mandt, owner of The

6 Flyer in Tampa, Florida.

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Currently the Coalition has 36 members, listed in the appendix to my 7 testimony. The membership reflects the diversity of the industry. It includes 8 9 publishers of free community papers and shopper publications, shared mail 10 programs, companies that also do solo saturation mailings, and organizations 11 whose members are primarily interested in saturation mail issues. Although 12 many of the members operate programs that are 100% mailed, a number also distribute a portion of their circulations via private delivery. The diversity is also 13 14 reflected in the sizes of the members' programs and their markets, ranging from large national or regional mailers like Advo and Harte-Hanks who serve major 15 metropolitan markets and provide total weekly circulation to millions of 16 households, down to small local mailers like the Antigo Shoppers Guide in Antigo, 17 Wisconsin who serve rural markets with weekly circulation to less than 20,000 18 households. 19

20

THE SATURATION MAIL INDUSTRY

From my experiences with Harte-Hanks, mailer trade associations, and prior postal cases, I am aware of the common misperception that the saturation mail industry consists of only a few large mailers. In fact, the industry has a great diversity of companies offering a variety of mailing programs that, in total, reach virtually every household in the nation. The industry serves hundreds of thousands of advertisers, including not only large national retailers but predominantly small local businesses and individual entrepreneurs throughout the nation.

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1 There are more than a thousand local and regional free community papers 2 and shopper publications in the United States, serving over 50 million 3 households. Roughly half are distributed by mail, and of those, virtually all are 4 mailed at Enhanced Carrier Route rates. Although many of these are 100 percent 5 advertising publications, many, like ours, contain local community news, free 6 announcements, and other non-advertising reader services and editorial matter. 7 These publications typically have a newspaper tabloid or booklet format, and many 8 also carry preprint advertising inserts.

9 The saturation mail industry also includes many saturation shared mail 10 programs. While Advo is the largest of these, with programs in major metropolitan 11 markets, there are a number of others that serve local or regional markets 12 throughout the country. In addition, there are a number of saturation coupon 13 programs serving local markets, either independently or through regional or 14 national franchise programs.

15 Regardless of the type or size of their programs, all saturation mailers
16 share many common market characteristics:

- The focus of all saturation mail programs, even those of regional or national companies, is on individual local markets.
- All are geared toward serving local retailers, service businesses, and
 other advertisers who need to reach potential consumers who reside
 near their stores or businesses, typically within a radius of 2-5 miles.
- The primary advertising appeal of saturation mail programs is for goods
 and services with potential appeal to a broad segment of consumers,
 such as groceries, fast food, local retailers, auto sales and services, and
 home-related services.
- Small local business advertisers are an essential element of saturation
 mailers' success, and vice versa.
- All operate in a highly competitive market, competing with each other,
 and with newspapers and private delivery companies for distribution of
 retail preprint inserts.

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rates play an important role in their ability to survive and grow. The essential common element of saturation mail programs is that they 5 6 offer accessible advertising targeted by geographic area, at affordable prices, to 7 small local businesses that do not have cost-effective media alternatives. For 8 many small businesses, the cost of advertising is second only to the owner's draw 9 as a cost of doing business. Saturation mail is a vital component for small businesses that need to advertise their goods and services. 10

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SATURATION MAIL CUSTOMERS


12 Saturation mail customers represent a wide range and size of businesses. 13 They include a mixture of many small local service and retail businesses who have limited advertising resources and alternatives; and larger regional or national 14 15 chains who have a number of competitive alternatives for distribution of preprint inserts, or even non-print media. While the precise mix of advertisers will vary from 16 one saturation mailer to another, depending on the nature of its program and the 17 specific markets it serves, this blending of large and small business advertisers is 18 characteristic of saturation mail programs. 19

The customers that use saturation mail, regardless of size, all have a 20 common objective: to reach consumers that live near their businesses. The 21 makeup of these customers is quite diverse, but consists predominantly of small 22 local businesses. If viewed as a pyramid, the foundation of saturation mail is 23 individual service providers, entrepreneurs, and small "mom and pop" service 24 businesses that constitute 60 to 80 percent of all saturation mail users: 25

usually weekly or monthly, and are highly workshared.

Saturation mail programs are mailed on a regular, predictable schedule,

Postage is typically their largest single cost item, and affordable postage



1 The next tier is small to mid-size local retailers, such as local grocers, fast food 2 and restaurants, hardware, and auto dealers and services, that comprise 15 to 20 3 percent of all saturation mail users. Larger chain retailers, both regional and 4 national, constitute 5 to 10 percent of saturation mail users, but because of their 5 broad advertising coverage and frequency they are often critical to the success of a 6 saturation mail program. The final category of saturation mail users, comprising 7 perhaps less than one percent of total saturation advertisers, is national 8 advertisers, primarily food and consumer product manufacturers using the mail to 9 distribute coupons.

10 The small business focus of saturation mail is reflected in Newport Media's 11 programs. The core of our business is the small retailer/service provider/ 12 individual entrepreneur trying to sell goods or services in a limited geographic 13 area around a single location. The majority of our ads are mailed to five or fewer 14 zones (less than 60,000 households), reflecting the fact our advertisers are 15 typically small businesses.

In a typical week, a single zoned edition of our book will carry over 600
advertisements, adding up to more than 12,000 ads weekly across all our zones.
Although display ads account for more than half of the pages in our books, they
represent less than 20% of our total advertisers. Even our full-page display

advertisers tend to be independent local businesses such as neighborhood
 grocery stores and car dealers, rather than national chain stores. Our partial-page
 display advertisers are even smaller businesses, like local home improvement
 contractors, dry cleaners, and auto repair businesses.

The smallest of our customers -- classified advertisers -- account for more 5 6 than 80% of the ads we carry. Our classified ads include employment, real estate, auto, personals, and our largest single advertising category, service businesses 7 8 and small entrepreneurs. This latter category is a small business potpourri: lawn and garden services, gutter, window and chimney cleaning, tree services, trash 9 10 hauling, moving and storage, professional services, and every variety of home 11 improvement and repair services from general contractors to handymen. Many of these ads are from the smallest of small businesses, individuals like a one-truck 12 trash hauler whose livelihood depends on business generated by ads in our 13 14 publication.

15

NEWPORT MEDIA INC. - SHOPPERS

Newport Media Inc. was formed in August of 1996. We are located in a 16 single plant in Hicksville, New York, with five sales and marketing locations 17 throughout the market area, currently employing over 650 people. We have now 18 acquired six publications, five of which are home-delivered, saturation-targeted 19 shoppers. Four of those publications are mailed, one is delivered by hand. Our 20 publications reach over 2 million households weekly, of which 1.6 million are 21 mailed. Our total annual mail volume is over 80 million, all mailed at Enhanced 22 23 Carrier Route saturation rates.

Our shopper publications are local saturation advertising booklets mailed (and in some cases hand delivered) to 2 million addresses in the New York Metropolitan and Southern New Jersey markets, reaching approximately 98% of

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the homes in the areas served. Our market covers Nassau and Suffolk Counties
 on Long Island, Brooklyn, Staten Island in New York, and the counties of
 Burlington, Camden and Gloucester in southern New Jersey, across from
 Philadelphia.

5 Our market is divided into 150 zones. Each zone contains approximately 6 12,000 residences. A separate and unique book is printed for each zone each 7 week. An advertiser can choose to run an ad in any one zone, any combination of 8 zones, or all 150 zones.

9 The content of our books is about 90% advertising, with 10% devoted to free 10 community announcements, personal financial advice and history columns, 11 horoscope, crossword and other puzzles, and reader contests. Advertising is in 12 the form of display ads (picture ads) or reader ads (comparable to classified ads). 13 The mailed books measure 11 x 7 inches and average 68 pages, with an average 14 weight of about 2.6 ounces. Preprinted advertising circulars, commonly called 15 "retail preprints" or "preprint inserts," are also inserted in the books. We average 16 about 3 to 4 preprint inserts per book, mostly light-weight 1-4 page inserts from 17 local or regional advertisers.

Our operations begin with the solicitation of advertisements by our sales 18 19 force. We then prepare the graphics and layout work to design each zoned version of the books, and do our own printing. The books then go to the distribution area 20 of our plant where the appropriate preprint inserts for each zone are inserted. The 21 books are then strapped in bundles of 25, each with a facing slip denoting the 22 carrier route number, the bundle number, and the total number of bundles and 23 pieces for the route. The bundles are placed on wheeled containers as required 24 by the Postal Service. Trays of carrier walk sequenced detached address labels 25 for each zone are placed with the corresponding containers, together with a 26 placard containing identifying information required by the Postal Service. We then 27

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truck the mail directly to the destination post offices, stations and branches for
 delivery, using our own transportation.

The services that we provide go far beyond simply taking an order for advertising and producing mailings. The great majority of our customers, due to their small size and limited resources, have little or no advertising or marketing expertise. We work closely with them to define their marketing needs and objectives, to target their advertising coverage and frequency, and to design their ads to maximize effectiveness and response.

9 First, we help our customers understand and define their targeted 10 marketing zones. We look at the nature of the customer's business in relation to 11 advertising needs. We review the customer's sales records to determine the 12 areas where most of its past business has come from, and recommend ways of 13 obtaining additional sales data such as recording address or ZIP code information 14 from sales. We use maps and demographic data by zone to identify the primary 15 marketing area surrounding the customer's business location, matching the 16 customer's business characteristics to demographic data, and taking into account 17 other factors such as locations of the customer's competitors and areas for 18 potential market expansion.

Second, we help to design an advertising program tuned to the customer's 19 needs and resources. A lawn service with a seasonal business, for example, may 20 21 require different ad frequencies and messages during the year, and we will even recommend additional services that they might offer and advertise during the off-22 23 season, such as leaf, mulching, and winter landscaping/cleanup services. For a small painting business that needs a steady stream of jobs, we may recommend 24 a less expensive but weekly classified ad rather than a more expensive monthly 25 display ad. Conversely, for a construction contractor that does larger projects, the 26 27 monthly display ad may be the better choice.

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1 Third, we help our customers create a strong advertising message to 2 consumers that will drive a good response. In the case of a shoe store that was 3 offering small discounts on selected shoes, we showed them that a stronger offer of "\$10 off on any shoes" would generate greater sales. For a tire store whose 4 5 ads focused on sales of low-margin tires, we showed that advertising specials on 6 their much higher-margin car services (oil changes and lube jobs) would generate 7 higher profits. For a small grocer whose ads offered modest specials, we showed 8 how offering super-bargain prices on selected items could generate more store 9 traffic and sales. For a restaurant with a successful evening dinner business, we 10 showed that advertising "early bird" specials for its off-peak 5-7pm period would 11 generate business from senior citizens and price-conscious diners without 12 diminishing their evening business.

Like all saturation mail programs, we know that our success as a business is linked to the success of our customers, and vice versa. The more affordable and effective their advertising is, the better their chances are to survive and grow as a business, and to continue or expand their use of saturation mail advertising.

17

THE NEED FOR AFFORDABLE SATURATION MAIL ADVERTISING

Over my years in the saturation mail business, I gained a growing 18 appreciation for the importance of affordable saturation advertising for small 19 20 businesses. Now that I am running my own company, I have more contact with 21 our customers and have seen even more closely how critical our form of advertising can be to the small business person or struggling entrepreneur. Many 22 of our advertisers are one-person service businesses like the gutter cleaner or the 23 handyman, or the entrepreneur trying to get started. These are not "pinstripe and 24 briefcase" entrepreneurs, but hard working people trying to make a living. Their 25 modest business is their primary or sole source of income. For them, effective 26

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advertising can be the difference between success or failure, and the term
 "affordable" advertising has a real pocketbook meaning.

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3 Unlike larger businesses with multiple locations, high sales volumes. 4 substantial advertising budgets, and advertising competitors clamoring for their 5 business, the great majority of our customers have limited advertising choices. 6 Broad coverage mass media like television and radio may work for the large - 7 retailer with stores through the market area, but not for the typical small business 8 whose potential customers reside within a few miles of the store. Even the small 9 service provider needs to generate nearby customers, as the time lost in traveling 10 to jobs across the metro area increases costs and limits the number of jobs that 11 can be done in a day. Similarly, advertising in newspapers may only reach 12 subscribers, omitting an important segment of consumers, and may not be zoned 13 finely enough to match the business's primary market area.

14 Many of these individuals and small businesses need to advertise 15 frequently. The freelance plumber doing small jobs needs a steady flow of 16 customers, perhaps four or five each day. Every day without work is a day without 17 pay. The cost of advertising on a regular weekly or monthly basis becomes a 18 major financial decision. Our typical small commercial classified ad customer, 19 advertising weekly, may spend \$3,000 to \$4,000 annually. A business using our 20 small display ads may spend \$10,000 to \$12,000 annually. These are very substantial amounts for such small businesses. For many of our customers, their 21 advertising expenditures with our publications are their single largest cost of doing 22 23 business.

In a broader sense, the ultimate customers of our mailing programs are consumers. I know that our publications are highly valued by recipients. Based on independent surveys, over 70 percent of adults in our New York market area read our publication, a readership that is higher than our competitors. This readership

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is also confirmed by the high response we get from recipients to various contests
and promotions that we run in our publications. The ultimate test of consumer
acceptance is advertising response. We know from our customers that
consumers do use and respond to the advertising in our programs. The
significant repeat business from our existing customers and growth from new
customers is the best indication of consumer responsiveness to our product.

7 The value to consumers goes beyond simply responding to ads. For value-8 conscious consumers (which today encompasses far more than just lower and 9 middle-income households), saturation mail is an effective way to comparison 10 shop and find good values. It also offers consumers the benefit of finding goods 11 and services that are located in or near their neighborhoods, a convenience that 12 for many time-pressed consumers is as valuable as a bargain price.

13

SATURATION MAIL COMPETITION

14 Although small business advertisers are the heart of our publications, the 15 long-term viability of our industry and customers depends in large measure on the 16 extent to which we can compete for distribution of retail advertising preprints. The 17 competition for these larger, highly sought retail advertisers is fierce. Daily newspapers, most of which offer total market coverage (TMC) programs to reach 18 19 nonsubscribers via mail or private delivery, are generally the dominant 20 competitors, although private delivery companies are also significant competitors in a number of markets, including the New York and Philadelphia markets we 21 22 serve.

The single largest and dominant competitor for insert business in the Boroughs of New York is Distribution Systems of America (DSA), a hand delivery (alternate delivery) program which distributes to over 6 million households in the New York Metropolitan area. Every major retail preprint customer in the market (K-

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Mart, Sears, all retail food and drug, etc.) delivers their preprints to households in the Boroughs of New York through this program, <u>not</u> in the mail. In fact, since the 1987 postal rate increase, there have been no weekly or monthly saturation mail programs serving the New York City boroughs. This is a growing and vibrant private delivery program and a significant threat to direct mail programs since its cost is dramatically lower than the use of mail.

In the Philadelphia market, there is a combination of direct mail and hand 7 8 delivery (the hand delivery portion is growing) again offering significant cost 9 advantages to the advertiser, to the detriment of the mail. Like the New York 10 market, virtually all retail, food, drug and hard goods retailers inserts in the 11 Philadelphia market are delivered by a combination of hand delivery and mail. The 12 south Jersey market also has three suburban dailies, the Camden Courier Post, 13 the Gloucester County Times, and the Burlington County Times, as well as the New Jersey edition of the Philadelphia Enquirer -- all with strong TMC programs. 14

15

THE NEED FOR A LOWER, MORE REASONABLE POUND RATE.

The cost disadvantage of mail distribution vis-a-vis newspaper or hand-16 delivery services is due largely to the current rate structure for Enhanced Carrier 17 Route mail, specifically the high pound rate above the 3.3-ounce breakpoint. 18 Under current rates for Saturation ECR mail, postage for pieces above the 19 breakpoint increases in a direct 1-to-1 ratio with increased weight, with postage 20 doubling as the weight doubles. Although I am not a postal costing expert, I 21 cannot imagine that postal handling costs above the breakpoint are purely weight-22 related, or even anywhere near the steep slope of the current pound rate. 23

The effect of this high pound rate on our ability to compete for inserts is dramatic. Unlike preprint insert rates of our non-postal competitors that increase only moderately as preprint weight increases, rates for mailed inserts must

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1 increase steeply with weight to cover the high linear pound rate postage cost. The 2 Postal Service's proposed pound rate will moderate, but not eliminate, this 3 disparity. For traditional retail preprints, such as a 2-or-more-ounce circular typical of the major retail preprints carried in newspapers, even the lower pound rate 4 would still leave us priced out of the market. The lower pound rate, however, 5 6 would at least enable us retain the preprint business we currently have and help 7 us compete at the margin for some portion of the lighter-weight preprint business, 8 particularly under 1-ounce.

9 I know from discussions with others in the saturation mail industry that the 10 high pound rate is an impediment not only to attracting insert volumes but to 11 expanding circulation in existing and new markets. The ability to generate preprint 12 inserts is often a critical "go or no-go" factor in expanding or opening new markets.

13 I also believe that reduction of the pound rate to a more reasonable level will encourage free community papers and shoppers and perhaps even newspaper 14 TMC programs that are currently hand delivered to consider returning to the mail. 15 16 Ironically, a number of shoppers and free community papers that use private delivery previously used the mail, but were driven away by increased postal rates. 17 The 1987 postal rate increase, in particular, had a dramatic impact on the 18 saturation mail business. That increase caused the diversion of many previously-19 mailed newspaper TMC programs and shoppers from the mail into private 20 delivery, and rapid growth of private delivery operations. Most if not all of the 21 programs that shifted to private delivery were those with piece weights above the 22 3.3-ounce breakpoint, where the high pound rate created an artificially high cost 23 24 spread between mail and hand delivery.

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CONCLUSION

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The Postal Service faces growing competition for many segments of its business, including saturation mail. In other segments, such as portions of First Class mail, the competition comes primarily from new communications technologies that offer greater speed or convenience, where price is less likely to be a decisive factor. In the case of saturation mail, the competition is a function of postal pricing.

The Postal Service's future in the saturation mail market depends on postal 8 pricing decisions. The current saturation mail volumes and contribution cannot be 9 10 taken for granted. Without affordable rates that allow mailers to compete in the 11 marketplace, the Postal Service risks losing this price sensitive volume to 12 newspaper competitors and to new or expanded private delivery operations. 13 Existing mailers may also be forced to shift to private delivery, just as occurred 14 following the Docket R87 rate increase. With affordable rates, saturation mail growth from existing mailers, and from former mailers that previously switched to 15 private delivery due to increased postal rates (particularly the high pound rate), can 16 17 offset declines in other volumes due to changes in communication technology. On behalf of the Saturation Mail Coalition and the hundreds of thousands of 18

businesses and individuals that use saturation mail advertising, I urge the
Commission to recommend rates that will enable saturation mail to remain a vital
and competitive advertising medium.

Saturation Mail Coalition Members

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Mail South, Inc.	Helena, AL 35080
Arizona Pennysaver Group	Tempe, AZ 85281
Tucson Shopper	Tucson, AZ 85745
Harte-Hanks Shoppers	Brea, CA 92621
ValuMail, Inc.	Hartford, CT 06103
ADVO, Inc.	Windsor, CT 06095
The Flyer	Tampa, FL 33619
Today's Advantage	Alton, IL 62002
PennySaver Publications	Tinley Park, IL 60477
National Mail It	Shreveport, LA 71118
Action Unlimited	Concord, MA 01742
Berkshire Penny Saver	Lee, MA 01238
Market America Corporation	Baltimore, MD 21244
Impulse Publications	Bel Air, MD 21050
The Maryland Pennysaver	Hanover, MD 21076
Mail Marketing Systems, Inc.	Jessup, MD 20794
Target Marketing Maine, Inc.	Rockland, ME 04841
Metro Marketing Associates	Eagan, MN 55121
Alliance of Independent Store Owners and Professionals	Minneapolis, MN 55402
Advertising Preprint Distributors	Jackson, MS 39289

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Saturation Mail Coalition Members

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Advantage Mail Network	Charlotte, NC 28208
PAGAS Mailing Service, Inc.	Tarboro, NC 27886
Focus On Results	Weddington, NC 28173
Eastern Marketing Services	Durham, NH 03824
Target Direct NH, VT	North Havehill, NH 03774
Independent News	Pompton Lakes, NJ 07442
Decker Advertising, Inc.	Delhi, NY 13753
Newport Media	Hicksville, NY 11801
Yorktown Pennysaver Group	Yorktown Heights, NY 10598
Rural Advertising Mail	Philadelphia, PA 19134
Market Select Inc.	Reading, PA 19605
The Reminder	Coventry, RI 02816
CAP Medica Network	Memphis, TN 38018
Coupon Concepts	Waco, TX 76702
Winmill Publishing Corp.	Brattleboro, VT 05302
Antigo Area Shoppers Guide	Antigo, WI 54409

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I have on this date served the foregoing document upon all participants of record in this proceeding in accordance with section 12 of the Rules of Practice.

____ Thomas W. McLaughlin

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December 30, 1997

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1 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Mr. Buckel, have you had an 2 opportunity to examine the packet of Designated Written 3 Cross-Examination that was made available earlier today? 4 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have.

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5 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: And if these questions were 6 asked of you today, would your answers be the same as those 7 you previously provided in writing?

MR. McLAUGHLIN: Mr. Chairman, there is -- let me, 8 first of all, explain -- a general correction, and then, 9 secondly, there is a specific amendment that Mr. Buckel has. 10 On all of the Designations of Interrogatories by AAPS, we 11 inadvertently copied a misspelling in the caption from them 12 13 onto all of our responses. They are all designated as AAPS-SCM-whatever, and it should be SMC for Saturation Mail 14 15 Coalition.

We have, in fact, corrected all of those copies, all those responses to have that SMC corrected, and they have been incorporated into the packets for the record. CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Thank you, sir.

20 MR. McLAUGHLIN: And I believe there is also one 21 correction that Mr. Buckel has of a substantive nature.

THE WITNESS: We have a correction on the NAA
Interrogatories, and it is, I believe, ---

24 MR. McLAUGHLIN: I believe is No. 4.

21 Y -

25 THE WITNESS: Page 4, yeah, page 4. The response

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to the question of destination, delivery to destination SCF, or the destination delivery office, in fact, should be 3 percent to the SCF and 97 percent to destination delivery office.

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5 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Has that correction been made 6 in the packages?

7 MR. McLAUGHLIN: No, in fact, it hasn't, but I do 8 have corrected copies right here with me. I can do either 9 now or in a few minutes, whenever we are finished.

10 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: I think we had best do it now. 11 I never know when these packages are going to disappear from 12 the room. So --

MR. McLAUGHLIN: You want me to do it right now.Okay.

15 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Mr. McLaughlin, thank you for16 your help there.

Mr. Buckel, with the changes that have been noted, if the questions were asked of you today, would your answers be the same?

20 THE WITNESS: They would.

(11-1)

21 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Okay.

International statements

Mr. McLaughlin has provided two copies of the corrected designated written cross-examination of Witness Buckel to the reporter, and I direct that they be accepted into evidence and transcribed into the record at this point.

> ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD. Court Reporters 1250 I Street, N.W., Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 842-0034

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1	[Designation of Written
2	Cross-Examination of Harry J.
3	Buckel, SMC-T-1, was received into
4	evidence and transcribed into the
5	record.]
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BEFORE THE POSTAL RATE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20268-0001

Postal Rate and Fee Changes, 1997

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Docket No. R97-1

DESIGNATION OF WRITTEN CROSS-EXAMINATION OF SATURATION MAILERS COALITION, THE WITNESS HARRY J. BUCKEL (SMC-T1)

Party

Mail Order Association of America

Interrogatories

AAPS/SMC-T1-2-3, 6, 11-12, 14, 16, 18 NAA/SMC-T1-1-5

Newspaper Association of America

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AAPS/SMC-T1-2, 7, 13, 19 NAA/SMC-T1-1-2, 4-8

United States Postal Service

AAPS/SMC-T1-1, 3-4, 7-8, 10, 12-15, 18 NAA/SMC-T1-1-8

Respectfully submitted,

Margant P. Curiskand

Margaret P. Crenshaw Secretary

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INTERROGATORY RESPONSES OF SATURATION MAILERS COALITION, THE WITNESS HARRY J. BUCKEL (T1) DESIGNATED AS WRITTEN CROSS-EXAMINATION

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Interrogatory: AAPS/SMC-T1-1 AAPS/SMC-T1-2 AAPS/SMC-T1-3 AAPS/SMC-T1-4 AAPS/SMC-T1-6 AAPS/SMC-T1-7 AAPS/SMC-T1-8 AAPS/SMC-T1-10 AAPS/SMC-T1-11 AAPS/SMC-T1-12 AAPS/SMC-T1-13 AAPS/SMC-T1-14 AAPS/SMC-T1-15 AAPS/SMC-T1-16 AAPS/SMC-T1-18 AAPS/SMC-T1-19 NAA/SMC-T1-1 NAA/SMC-T1-2 NAA/SMC-T1-3 NAA/SMC-T1-4 NAA/SMC-T1-5 NAA/SMC-T1-6 NAA/SMC-T1-7 NAA/SMC-T1-8

Designating Parties: USPS MOAA, NAA MOAA, USPS USPS MOAA NAA, USPS **USPS** USPS MOAA MOAA, USPS NAA, USPS MOAA, USPS USPS MOAA MOAA, USPS NAA MOAA, NAA, USPS MOAA, NAA, USPS MOAA, USPS MOAA, NAA, USPS MOAA, NAA, USPS NAA, USPS NAA, USPS NAA, USPS

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RESPONSES OF SATURATION MAIL COALITION WITNESS HARRY BUCKEL TO INTERROGATORIES OF ASSOCIATION OF ALTERNATE POSTAL SYSTEMS

AAPS/SMC-T1-1. At page 2, you state that you have been involved in forming and organizing the Saturation Mailers Coalition. Please identify the other individuals involved in forming and organizing the Coalition and provide a copy of the Coalition's mission statement or other descriptive material identifying its membership and purposes.

In addition to myself, the other representatives that were directly involved are Pete Gorman of Harte-Hanks, Dick Mandt of The Flyer, Carol Toomey of Action Unlimited, Kam Kamerschen of Advo, Jim Deroy of Advantage Mail Network, Donna Hanbery of AISOP, Gary Webb of Metro Marketing Associates, and Norm Schultz of Mail Marketing Systems. In addition, there were several other representatives who supported the formation of a coalition but were unable to participate directly. The mission of the Coalition is to advocate for and represent the interests of saturation mail. A membership list is attached to my testimony as Appendix A. AAPS/SMC-T1-2. Of the 36 members of the Coalition, please identify any that predominantly mail low-weight (that is, under the breakpoint) standard mail pieces.

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Specific information from individual members is proprietary and not available. However, to the best of my knowledge, all of the Coalition's members predominantly mail pieces that are near or under the breakpoint.

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AAPS/SMC-T1-3. At page 4, lines 22-23, you identify a "misperception" that a few large mailers dominate the saturation mail industry. Please provide an estimate of the percentage of saturation mail currently mailed by the single largest mailer, by the five largest mailers, and by the ten largest mailers.

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You have not accurately characterized what I said. My statement was that I am aware of the common misperception that the saturation mail industry "consists of only a few large mailers." As I explained in the following two paragraphs of my testimony, the saturation mail industry consists of hundreds of companies of varying sizes that mail a variety of saturation mail publications and programs.

I do not have specific volume information for other saturation mailers. My best estimate is that the single largest saturation mailer accounts for a little over 40% of total saturation volume, the five largest mailers account for about 50%, and the ten largest mailers account for well less than 60%. I would estimate that the hundreds of mailers smaller than the top ten account for more than 4 billion saturation mail pieces annually, comprising more than 40% of total saturation mail volume.

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AAPS/SMC-T1-4. Please identify the source of the data found at page 6, lines 23-25, where you refer to "mom and pop" businesses constituting 60 to 80 percent of saturation mail users. Also, is this reference to "users" a reference to those whose advertisements are being mailed or a reference to those that are doing the mailing?

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My statement was not confined to "mom and pop" businesses, but also included individual service providers and entrepreneurs. In the context of this statement, the reference to "users" is to those whose advertisements are being mailed.

There is no industry wide "source" for this information. My statement is based on my own experience over many years in the industry working with a number of community papers and shoppers, my knowledge of other saturation mail programs, and my contacts and discussions with others in the industry. For Newport Media's shopper programs, the percentage of small business advertisers is even higher than my 60-80 percent figure. On a typical week, our program includes 8,000 to 12,000 classified advertisers and 3,500 display advertisers (90 percent of which are small businesses), compared to about 300 to 400 insert advertisers (some of which are also relatively small businesses). This is not unique, but is a common characteristic of shoppers.

CALIFORNIA CONTRACTOR

AAPS/SMC-T1-6. At page 8, lines 16-23, you describe Newport Media Inc. You state that four of your five home-delivered shoppers are mailed, and one is delivered by hand. Please identify these shoppers and explain why those mailed are not delivered by hand, and why that delivered by hand is not mailed.

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The Yankee Trader, Huntington Pennysaver, Results Media, and Shopper's Guide South Jersey are all mailed. The Marketeer in Brooklyn and Staten Island is hand delivered.

Our shoppers that are mailed have been mailed in most cases since their inception and as a matter of customer demand. The Shopper's Guide was converted to the mail in January 1997 due to customer demand.

The Marketeer is hand delivered. Our preference would be to mail the product, but the current postal rates make it prohibitive from a cost perspective due to the weight of the publication and inserts.

A. A.

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AAPS/SMC-T1-7. You state at page 9, lines 13-14, that your average mailed book weighs 2.6 ounces. You state at lines 15-11 that you average 3-4 preprint inserts per book.

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(a) With the inserts, what is your average weight per book?

 $t(dp(u), t_{n+1}, \dots, t_{n+1}) \in \{1, \dots, n\}$

- (b) What percentage of your mailed pieces exceed the breakpoint?
- (a) Our records are not maintained in a manner that allows the average total weight to be readily calculated, but I would estimate that the average weight including inserts is near 4 ounces.
- (b) About half.

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AAPS/SMC-T1-8. At page 10, you describe a range of services you provide to your advertising customers. Do you provide these services only for your customers whose ads are in your mailed product, or do you provide the same services to customers whose ads are in your hand-delivered product?

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We offer these services to all customers.

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AAPS/SMC-T1-10. At page 14, lines 2-6, you state that there is no weekly or monthly saturation mail program serving New York City. Please describe briefly the quality of mail service in New York City and state whether, in your opinion, quality of service has anything to do with the alleged absence of a saturation mail program.

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I am not aware that quality of service has anything to do with the absence of such saturation mail programs, but I do know that cost has a lot to do with it.

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AAPS/SMC-T1-11. You state at page 14, lines 4-6, that the cost of private delivery in the New York City area "is dramatically lower than the use of mail." Please provide the data upon which you relied to support that statement.

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My statement is based in part on my knowledge of our own privately delivered program. Although our cost data are proprietary, I can assure you that the cost of private delivery for this program is substantially below what it would cost us to mail the program at the current Postal Service pound rates.

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AAPS/SMC-T1-12. Please provide the data upon which you relied to support your statement at page 14, lines 7-9, that private delivery offers a significant cost advantage in the Philadelphia market.

Information on Advo's private delivery operation in the Philadelphia market is contained in Docket MC95-1. There, witness Kamerschen stated that:

"The postage costs for a shared mail package range from a minimum of 12¢ to over 16¢, depending on weight. Our private delivery distribution costs range from less than 9¢ to roughly 11¢ per hand delivery package. The differential between our postal and private delivery distribution costs widens as piece weight increases." MC95-1 Transcript at p. 10171.

Kamerschen also stated that the lower cost of private delivery compared to the high postal pound rate enabled Advo to offer customers a blended rate. Other statements from newspaper industry sources, cited by Kamerschen, confirm that the postal rate structure is out of line with private delivery costs. See the MC95-1 Transcript at pp. 10161-62.

Our own experience is consistent with this. When we acquired the Shopper's Guide, which serves the South Jersey portion of the Philadelphia metropolitan market, it was hand delivered. The cost differential was very similar to that described by witness Kamerschen. We purposefully converted the program to mail delivery despite the higher mail distribution cost due to customer demand.

AAPS/SMC-T1-13. At page 14, lines 16-18, you blame the "high pound rate" for ECR mail for the "cost disadvantage of mail distribution" Please confirm that the pound rate does not affect pieces such as, for example, those described at page 9 of your testimony that contain 68 pages with an average weight of 2.6 ounces.

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It depends how you look at it. If you are looking in isolation at one of our books that weighs 2.6 ounces and ignoring additional inserts, that item is not, by itself, directly affected by the pound rate. However, if looked at from the standpoint of the actual postage we pay to mail a 2.6 ounce book with its accompanying inserts, then the pound rate does have an effect.

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AAPS/SMC-T1-14. You state at page 14 that you are not a postal costing expert but that you cannot imagine that postal handling costs above the breakpoint are purely weight-related or that the cost slope isn't nearly as steep as that contained in the current pound rate. Do you believe that the cost of delivering 14-ounce pieces exceeds the cost of delivering 4-ounce pieces?

For a 4-ounce saturation flat piece drop shipped to the destination delivery office, the current postage rate is 13.8 cents. For a 14-ounce piece, the rate is 48.3 cents. The 14-ounce piece is 3-1/2 times heavier than the 4-ounce piece, and is charged exactly 3-1/2 times the postage. I believe the 14-ounce piece may have a higher cost than the 4-ounce piece, but surely nowhere near 3-1/2 times as much.

Your example actually highlights the absurdity of the current high pound rate. At the current rates, a mailer is charged substantially more to mail a <u>single</u> 14-ounce piece than to mail <u>three</u> 4-ounce pieces (48.3¢ for a single 14-ounce piece v. 41.4¢ for <u>three</u> 4-ounce pieces).

The Postal Service's proposal would moderate this effect somewhat. At its proposed rates, a 14-ounce flat piece would still be charged 2.9-times more than a 4-ounce piece (39.95ψ v. 13.7ψ). In essence, the proposed rate for the 14-ounce piece consists of a 3.2ψ piece charge and a 36.75ψ pound charge, so that the pound element represents 92% of the total postage -- compared to 100 percent under the current rates. I think that this still overstates the weight effect, but it is certainly a step in the right direction compared to the current 100% weight-related postage charge.

AAPS/SMC-T1-15. You testify at pages 14-15 that rates for mailed inserts must increase steeply with weight to cover the high pound-rate postage cost. What is the additional postage cost to your company of adding a "light-weight I-4-page insert" to your typical 2.6-ounce book? How much would you typically charge the customer for your mailing of that 1-4-page insert?

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The context of my statement was that: "Unlike preprint insert rates of our nonpostal competitors that increase only moderately as preprint weight increases, the rates for mailed inserts must increase steeply with weight to cover the high linear pound rate postage cost." (pages 14-15). As I further explained (page 15, lines 3-8), this steep pound rate generally prices saturation mail out of the market for traditional preprints weighing over one ounce, while the lower proposed pound rate would "enable us to retain the preprint business we currently have and help us compete at the margin for some portion of the lighter-weight preprint business, particularly under 1-ounce."

The example of a "light-weight 1-4-page insert" which would typically weigh less than half an ounce represents the segment of the preprint market that we are largely confined to currently because of the steep pound rate. For a 4-page insert weighing 0.4 ounces, the incremental postage cost at the current pound rate is about \$14 per thousand pieces, compared to an incremental postage cost of \$69 per thousand for a two-ounce insert. The insert rates that we charge customers are proprietary, but must cover not only postage costs but also our production/insertion costs, sales commissions and related costs, variable overhead costs, and make some contribution to fixed overhead costs and profit.

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AAPS/SMC-T1-I6. You testify at page 15, lines 13-15, that a reduction of the pound rate will encourage free newspapers and shoppers and perhaps newspaper TMC programs that are hand delivered to consider returning to the mail. Assuming that you believe that such return to the mail is a desirable result of a lowering of the pound rate, please explain why you believe that the movement of material from private delivery to the mail is a good thing.

I am not advocating movement of material from private to postal delivery just for the sake of expanding postal volumes (although I believe that would be beneficial to the postal system). My point is that the current rate structure with its excessive pound rate has unnecessarily driven profitable mail from the postal system, and that a more reasonable pound rate could help to recapture some of that lost volume.

The irony of the current high pound rate is that the more successful a saturation mail program becomes, the greater the incentive to convert that program to private delivery. AAPS/SMC-T1-18. Please confirm that, based upon your experience, most saturation advertising mail has been walk sequenced by the mailer over the past ten years for service reasons even though, during some of that time, walk sequencing was not a prerequisite to obtaining the lowest available postal rate. If you cannot confirm, please provide your opinion on this subject.

Not confirmed. A Postal Service survey presented in Docket R90-1, reflecting volume data prior to the introduction of the walk sequence discount, showed that only about 40 percent of total saturation volume was delivery (or walk) sequenced. See USPS Library Reference F-199, Appendix 10, Table II-A Revised, Docket R90-1. I suspect that this substantial volume of non-walk sequenced saturation mail came primarily from the many smaller-volume saturation mailers referred to in my response to your interrogatory 3. Even in the case of mailers that did walk sequence prior to the discounts, such walk-sequencing was not done solely for "service reasons." In many cases, mailers were strongly urged by local post offices to sequence their mail as a means of reducing postal handling costs.

AAPS/SMC-T1-19. (a) The Postal Service has proposed an average increase of 3.2% for ECR mail. Under the proposed rates that you support, by how much will the postage bill of Newport Media increase if the proposal is approved as filed (assuming volume remains constant)?

(b) If the proposed ECR rates would produce a decrease in Newport Media's postage bill, please state by how much that bill would be reduced annually, both in dollar terms and in terms of percentage of profits.

(a-b) Based on our current volume profile, and under your assumed constraint that the lower proposed pound rate would result in <u>no</u> increase in either pieces or weight mailed, our annual postage bill would hypothetically decrease by about 0.9 percent, or roughly \$90,000. Our profits are proprietary information.

However, in the real world, I fully expect that our total postage bill will increase, probably significantly, if the USPS proposed rates were adopted. This is because the lower pound rate will enable us to generate new inserts that will pay additional incremental postage at the pound rate. For example, every extra one-tenth of an ounce in average weight added to our volume will produce new incremental postage in excess of \$100,000 annually. In addition, the lower pound rate will enhance our ability and desire to expand geographically, generating new volumes and postage.

RESPONSES OF SATURATION MAIL COALITION WITNESS HARRY BUCKEL TO INTERROGATORIES OF NEWSPAPER ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

NAA/SMC-T1-1. At page 8, lines 5-6 of your direct testimony, you state that the smallest of your customers account for more than 80 percent of the ads your carry. What percentage of your revenues are accounted for by these ads?

My statement referred to our classified advertisers, who account for about onefourth of our total revenues. In addition, most of our display ad customers and a portion of our insert customers are also small local businesses, although typically not as small as those that depend on classified advertising. Advertising orders of less than \$500 account for about 40 percent of our total revenues.

NAA/SMC-T1-2. Please define the term "saturation-targeted" as used at page 8, line 19 of your direct testimony.

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Our publications reach every household (saturate) in specific geographic zones of approximately 12,500 households each (targeted). NAA/SMC-T1-3. Please refer to page 8, line 20 of your direct testimony. Please explain why you hand-deliver one of the five saturation-targeted shoppers.

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We acquired a publication that was hand delivered since its inception in 1981. The size and weight of the publication, with its inserts, make it cost prohibitive to distribute with the Postal Service under the current rate structure.

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(Revised Response)

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NAA/SMC-T1-4. Please provide the following information regarding your annual mail volumes. (If precise data are not available, estimates are sufficient.)

- a. What proportion of your total annual volume of over 80 million is dropshipped to:
 - i. the destination BMC,

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- ii. the destination SCF,
- iii. the destination delivery office.
- b. What proportion of your total annual volume is entered at the non-letter rate?
- c. What proportion of your total annual volume exceeds the breakpoint weight of 3.3 ounces?
- d. What proportion of your total annual volume, if any, would be subject to the proposed parcel surcharge if approved by the Postal Rate Commission?
- a. i. None.
 - ii. 3%.
 - iii. 97%.
- b. 100%.

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- c. About one-half.
- d. None.

NAA/SMC-T1-5. Please list your principal competitors in the Philadelphia markets.

- a. Which of these competitors rely on the Postal Service delivery of their product?
- b. Shouldn't you and your competitors want to have available a viable private delivery alternative to the Postal Service?

Our principal competitors in the Philadelphia market are the Philadelphia Inquirer, The Gloucester Times, The Camden Courier Post, The Burlington Times, ADVO, and several smaller rack and mail publications.

- Both the Courier Post and ADVO use a mixture of mail and private delivery in this market. The Courier Post uses non-postal delivery to deliver its publication to subscribers, and uses the mail to deliver its TMC program to nonsubscribers. ADVO uses both mail and private delivery to distribute its shared mail program.
- b. There already are viable private delivery alternatives in our markets, and I do not expect this to change, other than to expand. If you are suggesting that postal rates should be raised to make private delivery even more viable, then I would strongly disagree. Our preference is to remain in the mail, so long as postal rates allow us to remain competitive. Artificially driving up postal rates for the competitive benefit of private delivery companies and newspapers would be a disservice to the many businesses, especially small businesses, that rely upon saturation mail advertising, and would be detrimental to the Postal Service and other mail users who benefit from the contribution saturation mail makes.

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NAA/SMC-T1-6. Please refer to page 9 of your testimony. Do any of the six Newport Media Inc. publications to which you refer at page 8 of your testimony publish news and sports reporting?

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No, but we do publish useful consumer information such as free community announcements, consumer and personal financial advice columns, history columns, and items of general reader interest such as free birth announcements, horoscopes, crosswords and other puzzles, and reader contests. NAA/SMC-T1-7. Do you believe that your customers get a better response rate when their advertisements are mailed than when they are delivered with a newspaper?

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Our customers generally do, although response can vary depending on the kind of business, the profiles of the business's consumer audience compared to mail and newspaper editorial environment and distribution coverages, and other factors. A fashion retailer selling designer dresses, for example, might get a higher response rate from display ads in a more editorially-driven environment like a newspaper than in our saturation mail program, whereas a neighborhood delicatessen would likely get a higher response rate in our publication targeted to one or two zones near the store. In any event, response rate is only one of several factors that advertisers must consider, along with total advertising cost and advertising efficiency (<u>i.e.</u>, cost per customer acquired).

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NAA/SAC-T1-8. Do you believe that the prices that you charge customers are usually more or less than the prices charged to them by newspapers?

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It varies and depends on the types of businesses and ads that are being compared, and on how the "price" is viewed. In many cases the more important factor from the advertiser's standpoint is not the unit price but the total advertising cost and effectiveness. For example, an advertiser wanting to cover only one zone of 12,000 households may pay a higher rate per thousand than with a newspaper but have a lower total advertising cost because the newspaper's minimum zone for classifieds may be much larger than ours. Moreover, the newspaper classified ad may not reach every household in the area the advertiser wants to cover, and may reach well beyond the advertiser's prime market area.

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CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Does any participant have 1 additional written cross-examination for the witness? 2 3 There doesn't appear to be any, and as best I can tell, Mr. Buckel, it doesn't appear that anyone had 4 requested oral cross-examination. 5 Does anyone here today who had not previously done 6 so wish to cross-examine the witness? 7 If not, then the question becomes are there 8 9 questions from the bench. COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: No, I'll get a reputation. 10 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: I don't think you have to worry 11 about getting a reputation. 12 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Nor do you, Mr. Chairman. 13 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If there are no questions from 14 the bench then, Mr. Buckel, I want to thank you. We 15 appreciate your appearance here today and your contributions 16 to the record, and it was good to see you again, if only for 17 18 a moment. THE WITNESS: Good to see you. 19 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If there's nothing further, 20 21 you're excused. THE WITNESS: Thank you. 22 [Witness excused.] 23 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Our next witness is Dr. John 24 Haldi, who is already under oath in this proceeding, and he 25

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is appearing today to present testimony on behalf of Nashua
 Photo, District Photo, Mystic Color Labs, Seattle Film
 Works, and Merck-Medco Managed Care.

I'm going to let everybody get settled in, and I think that it probably would be a good idea to take our short break right now before we begin with Dr. Haldi, so we'll come back in ten minutes at roughly 25 of the hour or thereabouts and pick up.

9 [Recess.]

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10 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: When last we met, counsel, you 11 were about to proceed with your witness' testimony.

MR. OLSON: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. William Olson, representing Nashua, District, Mystic, Seattle and Merck-Medco Managed Care. And on their behalf we would call to the stand Dr. John Haldi.

16 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Dr. Haldi's already under oath,
17 so you can proceed to introduce his testimony, if you wish.
18 Whereupon,

DR. JOHN HALDI,
a witness, was called for examination by counsel for Nashua

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21 Photo, Inc., District Photo, Inc., Mystic Color Lab,

22 Seattle Filmworks, Inc., and Merck-Medco Managed Care,

23 L.L.C. and, having been previously duly sworn, was examined 24 and testified as follows:

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DIRECT EXAMINATION

ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD. Court Reporters 1250 I Street, N.W., Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 842-0034

BY MR. OLSON: 1 Dr. Haldi, I'd like to hand to you two copies of 2 0 3 what is identified as the direct testimony of Dr. John Haldi concerning the proposed Standard A mail parcel surcharge on 4 behalf of Nashua-District-Mystic-Seattle and Merck, 5 identified as NDMS-T-3, and ask you if this is your 6 testimony prepared by you or under your direction. 7 Α Yes, it is. 8 9 Q And do you adopt this as your testimony in these proceedings? 10 Α Yes, I do. 11 MR. OLSON: Mr. Chairman, we have some minor 12 13 errata. 14 BY MR. OLSON: Dr. Haldi, would you identify the errata for us? 15 Q Α Yes, I'd be happy to. 16 17 The first one, if you turn to page 11, footnote 9, the first sentence should remain, and the remainder of the 18 footnote should be struck. 19 The second change is on page 20, footnote 18. 20 At the end of the footnote in the parentheses it says "emphasis 21 22 in original." That should be changed to say "emphasis added." Strike the words "in original" and put "emphasis. 23 "added." 24 The third change is at page 27, line 8. The words 25

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12129 marks "it is no secret" are in quotations. The quotation marks 1 should be removed. 2 The last change, at page 37, line 15, the fourth 3 word in the sentence is "any." That word should be struck 4 and insert at that place "18 percent of the" and then make 5 "parcels" -- change the word "parcel" to "parcels." Make it 6 plural. So it reads "were the only measurements available 7 for 18 percent of the parcels in the study." 8 And with those changes, does your testimony now 9 0 conform to the responses to discovery of the Postal Service 10 that you filed earlier? 11 Yes, it does. Those changes were all noted in 12 Α interrogatory responses filed earlier. They have also been 13 made in the copies which are here before me. 14 MR. OLSON: Mr. Chairman, with that we'd move the 15 admission of this document into evidence. 16 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Are there any objections? 17 Hearing none, Dr. Haldi's testimony and exhibits 18 are received into evidence, and I direct that they be 19 transcribed into the record at this point. 20 [Direct Testimony and Exhibits of 21 Dr. John Haldi, NDMS-T-3, was 22 received into evidence and 23 transcribed into the record.] 24 25

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NDMS-T-3

BEFORE THE POSTAL RATE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, D.C. 20268-0001

POSTAL RATE AND FEE CHANGES, 1997)

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Docket No. R97-1

Direct Testimony of

DR. JOHN HALDI

Concerning

THE PROPOSED STANDARD A MAIL PARCEL SURCHARGE

on Behalf of

NASHUA PHOTO INC., DISTRICT PHOTO INC., MYSTIC COLOR LAB, SEATTLE FILMWORKS, INC., AND MERCK-MEDCO MANAGED CARE, L.L.C.

William J. Olson John S. Miles Alan Woll John F. Callender, Jr. WILLIAM J. OLSON, P.C. 8180 Greensboro Dr., Suite 1070 McLean, Virginia 22102-3823 (703) 356-5070

Counsel for Nashua Photo Inc., District Photo Inc., Mystic Color Lab, Seattle FilmWorks, Inc., and Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C.

December 30, 1997

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AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

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2	My name is John Haldi. I am President of Haldi Associates, Inc., an
3	economic and management consulting firm with offices at 680 Fifth Avenue,
4	New York, New York 10019. My consulting experience has covered a wide
5	variety of areas for government, business and private organizations,
6	including testimony before Congress and state legislatures.
7	In 1952, I received a Bachelor of Arts degree from Emory University,
8	with a major in mathematics and a minor in economics. In 1957 and 1959,
9	respectively, I received an M.A. and a Ph.D. in economics from Stanford
10	University.
11	From 1958 to 1965, I was assistant professor at the Stanford
12	University Graduate School of Business. In 1966 and 1967, I was Chief of
13	the Program Evaluation Staff, U.S. Bureau of Budget. While there, I was
14	responsible for overseeing implementation of the Planning-Programing-
15	Budgeting (PPB) system in all non-defense agencies of the federal
16	government. During 1966 I also served as Acting Director, Office of
17	Planning, United Stated Post Office Department. I was responsible for
18	establishing the Office of Planning under Postmaster General Lawrence
19	O'Brien. I established an initial research program, and screened and hired
20	the initial staff.

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1	I have written numerous articles, published consulting studies, and co-
2	authored one book. Included among those publications are an article, "The
3	Value of Output of the Post Office Department," which appeared in The
4	Analysis of Public Output (1970); a book, Postal Monopoly: An Assessment of
5	the Private Express Statutes, published by the American Enterprise Institute
6	for Public Policy Research (1974); an article, "Measuring Performance in Mail
7	Delivery," in Regulation and the Nature of Postal Delivery Services (1992);
8	and an article, "Cost and Returns from Delivery to Sparsely Settled Rural
9	Areas," in Managing Change in the Postal and Delivery Industries (1997;
10	with L. Merewitz).
11	I have testified as a witness before the Postal Rate Commission in
12	Docket Nos. MC96-3, MC95-1, R94-1, SS91-1, R90-1, SS86-1, R84-1, R80-1,
13	MC78-2 and R77-1. I also submitted comments in Docket No. RM91-1.

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I. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY

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The purpose of my testimony is to subject to critical evaluation the 2 Postal Service's newly-proposed residual shape surcharge in Standard A Mail 3 (hereinafter "proposed Standard A parcel surcharge" or "proposed 4 surcharge"). I show that imposition of the surcharge would likely lead to 5 extensive repackaging of mailpieces, an expenditure by mailers that could 6 perversely reduce Postal Service revenues, while increasing handling 7 costs, thus producing the opposite of the outcome sought by the proposal. I 8 further demonstrate that the cost basis underlying the proposed surcharge is 9 gravely defective, and that de-averaging of transportation costs used to 10 justify the surcharge is inconsistent and inequitable vis-a-vis destination 11 entry discounts. As proposed, the surcharge should be rejected. 12 Should the Commission nevertheless decide to impose a surcharge, 13 then at the very least, the same averaging principles that are used to 14 estimate shipping costs avoided for destination entry discounts should be 15 used to estimate shipping costs incurred for parcels subject to the 16 surcharge. It would violate principles of fairness and equity to reflect the 17 incurrence of the higher shipping cost of parcels by imposition of a parcel 18 surcharge, while not reflecting the avoidance of the same higher shipping 19 costs of parcels in developing destination entry discounts for parcels. 20

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II. INTERVENORS' MAILING PRACTICES AND INTEREST IN THE PROPOSED STANDARD A MAIL PARCEL SURCHARGE

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4	This testimony is presented on behalf of five intervenors. Four are
5	photofinishers: Nashua Photo Inc. ("Nashua"), which does business as York
6	Photo Labs, District Photo Inc. ("District") which does business as Clark
7	Color Lab, Mystic Color Lab ("Mystic"), and Seattle FilmWorks, Inc.
8	("Seattle"), collectively referred to as "NDMS." ¹ Each firm is a through-the-
9	mail film processor which receives exposed film through the mail, and uses
10	the Postal Service to return developed film and prints to its customers. The
11	fifth intervenor is Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C.
12	Overview of the Film Processing Industry
13	Collectively, through-the-mail film processors account for

14 approximately 6 percent of the domestic film processing market. The

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15 remaining 94 percent of the market is divided among a large number of local,

- 16 regional and national (e.g., Eastman Kodak, through Qualex, Inc., and Fuji
- 17 Photo Film, through Fuji Trucolor Inc.) film processing companies that rely
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on the general public taking its film to a drop-off location and then returning

¹ Although not an intervenor herein, another through-the-mail film processor, Skrudland Photo Inc., has joined with and supports the position of NDMS.

to the drop-off location to pick up the finished prints. In some localities,
 competitors do on-site developing and printing, and offer turn-around times
 as short as one hour.

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- Turn-around time and service are critical considerations in the direct
 mail photofinishing business. All four companies operate their respective
 processing plants up to 24 hours a day, seven days a week, as demand
 warrants. Their goal is to have finished pictures back into the mail within 24
 hours after customers' film arrives at the plant.
- 9 Nashua, District, Mystic, and Seattle compete vigorously with each
 10 other, but they compete even more with the multitude of local, regional and
 11 national film processors described above.

12 Mailing Practices of Nashua, District, Mystic and Seattle

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Exposed rolls of film are received from customers accompanied by 13 14 orders to develop the film and make prints. Most rolls of film have 24 or 36 exposures, and customers may order a single or double set of prints. The flat 15 strips of developed film, cut into suitable lengths and enclosed in protective 16 17 jackets, are placed inside paper, Tyvek®, or plastic envelopes, together with 18 any prints or enlargements which are stacked inside. The resulting envelopes are then dropshipped via expedited service to the appropriate SCF, 19 where they are entered as Standard A Mail. Envelopes containing sets of 20 prints are either flat- or parcel-shaped, a packaging decision that is currently 21

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1	not driven by postage costs. Parcel-shaped mailpieces are almost always
2	mailpieces that would be classified as flats if they did not exceed the
3	maximum flat thickness of 3/4". Standard A Mail envelopes mailed by
4	NDMS that are parcel-shaped currently constitute about 30-40 percent of
5	NDMS's Standard A Mail pieces.
6	Mailing Practices of Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C.
7	Merck-Medco Managed Care, L.L.C., is a subsidiary of Merck & Co.,
8	Inc., and is the leading pharmacy benefits manager in the United States.
9	Merck-Medco manages pharmaceutical care for millions of Americans
10	covered by employer-funded health plans, major insurance carriers, labor
11	unions, public sector programs, and managed care plans. It uses Standard A
12	Mail to distribute pharmaceuticals to its customers. Many of these
13	mailpieces would be classified as flats except for exceeding the maximum flat
14	thickness of 3/4".

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III. BACKGROUND INFORMATION ON THE PROPOSED STANDARD A MAIL PARCEL SURCHARGE

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3	The Postal Service's Standard A Mail rate design witness has proposed
4	a surcharge of 10 cents per piece for all parcels. ² The surcharge would apply
5	to all pieces which exceed any of the following dimensions: height of 12",
6	width of 15", or thickness of 3/4". ³ The surcharge would apply to all
7	Standard A Mail parcels, so defined, without exception, and without any
8	consideration of whether such parcels were machinable. It would also apply
9	to any other Standard A Mail "prepared as parcels" (e.g., flats).4
10	The proposal to impose a surcharge on Standard A parcels appears to
11	have been prepared by the Postal Service in response to the concern
12	expressed in the Commission's decision in Docket No. MC95-1, which
13	discussed whether parcels should be charged a higher rate based upon their
14	unit costs. Commissioner LeBlanc's dissenting opinion observed that:
15 16 17 18 19	Parcels come in many shapes and sizes. It is not likely that any rate schedule can be devised to account for the attributable costs of each possible shape or size of parcel. The Commission does know, however, that parcels are not letters or flats, and thus, by definition, they are a residual element of third-class. The

- ² USPS-T-36, pp. 11-15.
- ³ These are the maximum dimensions of a flat, as defined in DMM §C050.3.1.
- ⁴ USPS Request, Attachment A, pp. 25-26.

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1Commission also knows, since the Postal Service tells it, that, on2average, regular third-class parcels are subsidized at3approximately 10 cents per piece and enhanced carrier route4parcels are subsidized at approximately 7 cents per piece. This5is enough information to establish a surcharge for parcels. [Op.6& Rec. Dec., Docket No. MC95-1, Dissenting Opinion of Vice-7Chairman W.H. "Trey" LeBlanc, pp. 1-2.]

8 Supporting Cost and Revenue Data

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9	The only data supporting the proposed surcharge in this docket are
10	those supplied by witness Crum. ⁵ Revenue and volume data for parcels
11	supplied by witness Crum are summarized here in Table 1. As shown in this
12	table, almost nine-tenths (88.5 percent) of all parcels which would be subject
13	to the surcharge are in the Standard A Mail Regular subclass. The volume of
14	nonprofit parcels is comparatively small, less than 5 percent of all Standard
15	A parcels (and less than 0.4 percent of all nonprofit bulk mail). The volume
16	of commercial rate ECR parcels is likewise comparatively small.

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⁵ USPS-T-28 (revised 10/1/97), Appendix K, pp. 10-12.

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2	Table 1				
3 4 5	FY 1996 Bulk Standard A Mail IPPs and Parcels Revenues and Volumes (000)				
6 7		Revenue	Volume	Dist. (%)	
8 9 10 11	ECR Commercial Rate Nonprofit	10,992 178	69,464 1,389	7.07% 0.14%	
12	AII ECR	11,170	70,853	7.21%	
13 14 15 16	REGULAR Commercial Rate Nonprofit	403,812 11,232	869,434 42,360	88.48% 4.31%	
.0 .7 .8	All Regular	415,044	911,794	92.79%	
))	All Standard A	426,214	982,647	100.00%	
	Source: USPS-T-28 (revised 10/1/97), Exhibit K, Tables 1 and 2.				
	The per-piece revenue and	cost data for	r parcels prov	rided by witness	
	Crum are shown in Table 2, along	, with the av	verage weight	t per piece. The	
	average weight of Standard A Mail Regular parcels is 8.9 ounces. The				
	average revenue is 46.4 cents. Using the Postal Service's costing approach				
	and data, the average cost is 51.3	cents. Fina	ally, accordin	g to these Postal	
	Service estimates, on average, cos	ts exceed re	venues by 4.9	9 cents per piece. ⁶	

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⁶ Witness Moeller refers to this difference as the "below cost rate problem." USPS-T-36, p. 12, l. 9.

Unit cost data for the other subclasses are seen to vary considerably, 1 probably because of the small volumes involved, and should be considered as 2 highly unreliable.⁷ Aggregating these unreliable data, for all parcels in all 3 4 four subclasses of Standard A, the Postal Service estimates that average 5 parcel revenues amount to 43.4 cents, while costs average 51.6 cents. These 6 estimates thus imply that (i) parcels are being "cross-subsidized" at 7 approximately 8.2 cents per piece, and (ii) the proposed 10-cent surcharge 8 would eliminate completely any such cross-subsidy.

9 Projected Volumes and Revenues of Standard A Parcels

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10 Without the surcharge, rate increases proposed for Standard A Regular nonletters (the subclass with almost 90 percent of all Standard A 11 12 parcels) range up to 7 percent. For pieces subject to the surcharge, however, 13 rate increases for non-destinating entry pieces range from 12 percent (for a 14 piece that weighs between 15 and 16 ounces) to 51 percent (for a piece that 15 weighs less than 3.3 ounces). The proposed surcharge would impose an increase of 55.6 percent on minimum-per-piece 3/5-digit presort parcels 16 entered at a DSCF.8 17

⁷ See Section VI, *infra*, for a critique of the cost data used to support the surcharge.

⁸ See witness Moeller's response to NAA/USPS-T36-4 (Tr. 6/2777).

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		Table 2	• .	
FY	1996 Bulk Stand Average Rever \$			ls
		Revenue	Cost	Weight (oz.)
ECR				
Com Nong	mercial Rate profit	0.158 0.128	0.455 1.382	2.77 3.06
	All ECR	0.158	0.473	2.78
REGULA	\R	-		
Com	mercial Rate	0.464	0.513	8.90
Nonp	profit	0.265	0.659	6.40
	All Regular	0.455	0.520	8.78
	All Standard A	0.434	0.516	8.35
Source:	Cost: USPS-T-2 Average revent		-	
Despite the hi	gh percentage	rate increas	es proposed	for parcel
witness Moeller estin	nates that test	year after-1	ates volume	e of Standa
parcels will amount	to 1.2 billion, ⁹ :	an increase	of 22 percer	it over the
1996 volume of 982 1		· .		

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⁹ Response of witness Moeller to PSA/USPS-T36-8 (Tr. 6/2886). This---statement is somewhat at variance with witness Moeller's statement that the Postal Service had not calculated Test Year After Rates volume, attributable cost, orrevenue-per-piece data for Standard A flats or residual pieces. See response of witness Moeller to PSA/USPS-T26-1 (Tr. 6/2887).

percentage increase in volume seems implausible, given that the own-price
 elasticity for all Standard A Mail is -0.382.¹⁰

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Overview of Testimony

As indicated above, the only revenue, volume and cost data supporting 4 the surcharge proposal are those presented by witness Crum. Those data are 5 discussed in more detail in Section VI. First, however, it is important to note 6 7 that the Postal Service fails to examine certain immediate and foreseeable consequences that are likely to result from the surcharge as proposed. These 8 are discussed in Section IV. In addition to a study of obvious consequences 9 which ought to have been performed and submitted, the Postal Service 10 presentation is also noticeably lacking in a number of other important 11 respects. These shortcomings are discussed in Section V. My 12 recommendations are contained in Section VII. 13

¹⁰ USPS-T-6, p. 115. Separate own-price elasticities are not computed for letters, flats, and parcels.

IV. THE PROPOSED SURCHARGE WOULD CREATE UNINTENDED PERVERSE INCENTIVES

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3	As shown in Table 1, supra, the Postal Service estimates that
- 4	approximately 982 million Standard A Mail mailpieces were classified as
5	parcels in 1996, and witness Moeller projects 1.2 billion Standard A parcels
6	will be subject to the surcharge in Test Year. Should all of these pieces
7	continue to be mailed as parcels, a surcharge of 10 cents per piece would cost
8	mailers an additional \$98 to \$120 million each year. Postal Service revenues,
9	of course, would increase by the same amount. For many industries,
10	including (but not limited to) through-the-mail film processing, the proposed
11	10-cent surcharge represents a staggering added expense.
12	In highly competitive industries, firms are under constant, tremendous
13	pressure to reduce any expense that does not add value. In the case of the
14	proposed Standard A parcel surcharge, the additional expense could be
15	avoided by repackaging the contents of a parcel-shaped package into a
16	mailpiece with flat-shaped dimensions. ¹¹ Parcel-shaped packages are often
17	used currently because the cost of postage and envelopes are lower than

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¹¹ Witness Moeller observed that certain mailpieces meet the definitions of both parcels and flats. (Tr. 7/3161, ll. 8-19). In fact, he said that it was no secret that "some parcel mailers may ... be able to avoid the surcharge by mailing their smaller parcels as flats." (Tr. 7/3162, ll. 7-11).

repackaging such mailpieces as flats. Aside from economy, however, parcelshaped mailpieces generally do not provide mailers with any added value
over a flat-shaped mailpieces. Therefore, one can predict with a high degree
of confidence that virtually all parcel mailers whose product gives them a
repackaging option will in fact seek to repackage their products into flatshaped mailpieces if confronted with a significant surcharge for parcels.

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7 Moreover, packaging firms and design consultants will have a field day if the proposed Standard A parcel surcharge is implemented as proposed. 8 9 For such suppliers, the proposed surcharge will create a veritable host of new 10 marketing opportunities. Thus, one immediate and highly predictable result of the Standard A parcel surcharge would be a massive repackaging of 11 12 mailpieces now classified as parcels. In light of this consideration, the 13 consequences of possible repackaging would appear to fall into the category of readily foreseeable but nevertheless "unintended consequences," which 14 15 must be examined carefully.

16

Unintended Consequences

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17 The proposed Standard A parcel surcharge is extremely poorly
18 conceived. It would be imposed on every mailpiece that exceeds any one of

the limits for a flat-shaped piece, and it would not be imposed on any
 mailpiece that conforms to those dimensions.¹²
 It is essential to recognize, however, that "flat-shaped" is not
 necessarily synonymous with "easy-to-handle" or "low-cost." As discussed in

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5 more detail below, some flat-shaped mailpieces can be more awkward to 6 handle than many parcels in their existing shape, and can present carriers 7 with new problems in delivery. Yet the proposed surcharge neither 8 recognizes nor gives any incentive for machinability or other characteristics to promote ease of delivery.¹³ Consequently, it contains no incentive to 9 reduce the Postal Service's cost — except, perhaps, by reducing volume 10 mailed.14 11 12 This is a serious shortcoming. What needs to be recognized is that the

13 surcharge may increase the Postal Service's costs far more than ever

14 thought, while failing to produce the forecasted revenues. These

15 unintended consequences are likely to result from repackaging of a

16 substantial proportion of Standard A Mail now classified as parcels. Such

¹² The maximum dimensions for a flat are 15" width, 12" height and 3/4" thickness (DMM §C050.3.1).

¹³ See response of witness Moeller to NDMS/USPS-T36-4 (Tr. 6/2819).

¹⁴ The Postal Service regularly takes account of own-price elasticity in its forecasts. As noted previously, however, the only effect predicted by witness Moeller is an astounding 22 percent increase in volume. *See, e.g.*, witness Moeller's response to PSA/USPS-T36-8 (Tr. 6/2886), where he estimates a bulk Standard A parcel volume subject to the surcharge of 1.2 billion in Test Year 1998.

repackaging will involve items now packaged by mailers in parcel-shaped
 pieces that resemble flats except that they are more than 3/4" thick. Many of
 these pieces can now be sorted mechanically on an SPBS, and fit easily into
 ordinary residential mailboxes.

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Whenever pieces contain multiple stacked items (e.g., photographic 5 prints, Christmas cards, checks, compact disks, etc.), the contents could be 6 repackaged readily through side-by-side placement into thinner stacks. So 7 long as the resulting package is less than 3/4" thick, it would meet the 8 9 definition of a flat, thereby avoiding the surcharge and reducing revenue below that forecast. The resulting package might be (i) a rigid box, or (ii) an 10 11 envelope with internal compartments designed to maintain thickness below the 3/4" limit for a flat. Either of these repackaging strategies could impose 12 significant extra costs on the Postal Service, compared with the costs 13 incurred in handling parcels in their present shape, especially when the 14 existing parcel is readily machinable and the repackaged piece is non-15 machinable. 16

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The Rigid Box Option

18 If mailers chose to repackage the contents into a rigid box, the size of
19 the box could go up to the current maximum dimensions allowed for flats, *i.e.*,
20 12" x 15", x 3/4" without incurring the parcel surcharge. Whether FSM 881s
21 or FSM 1000s could handle boxes of such dimensions is not known. Such

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boxes presumably could be sorted manually into a vertical flat case, or

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perhaps on an SPBS.¹⁵ In terms of the delivery function, maximum size flats 2 may cause extra costs because they would not fit inside the standard "rural" 3 mailbox (about 9" to 10" high), which is common in many suburban and rural 4 locations, nor into a standard post office box or the typical apartment house 5 mailbox, all of which can readily accommodate many more than 3/4" thick 6 "parcels" in their existing form. Thus, repackaging into large rigid boxes 7 could make mail processing and/or delivery tasks more cumbersome, more 8 time consuming, and therefore more costly to the Postal Service.¹⁶ 9

10 The Compartmentalized Envelope Option

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Alternatively, should mailers choose to repackage into an envelope with compartments, this would result in the same incentive to approximate the maximum dimensions for flats, with consequences perhaps even more adverse than the rigid box option. For example, envelopes, especially highly flexible ones such as those of the plastic Tyvek® variety, when divided into internal compartments, would be inclined to flip-flop about a horizontal or

¹⁵ If the contents in their present parcel form (*i.e.*, before repackaging) are being sorted on the SPBS, the Postal Service would not gain any cost reduction in mail processing cost from the repackaging. It would simply have some amount of flat-shaped pieces added to the parcel mailstream.

¹⁶ These extra costs would of course be charged to "flats." Although a quite real added expense, it would be virtually impossible for the IOCS to distinguish and identify the extra costs that would be loaded onto flats.

vertical dividing axis while being processed, not only defeating machinability
 but also making manual sortation into vertical flat cases more cumbersome
 and costly.

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4 The added costs imposed on the Postal Service by the more cumbersome handling of either close-to-maximum size rigid boxes or 5 6 compartmentalized envelopes created by repackaging could very well exceed 7 any added revenue obtained from the parcel surcharge on those packages that do not convert or are simply not sent. In that event, everyone would 8 9 lose. Thus, although some mailers would pay the added surcharge, others 10 would engage in a perverse negative cost sharing by incurring additional 11 packaging expenses that, instead of reducing Postal Service total handling 12 costs, would actually increase those costs. And the Postal Service's gain in extra revenue from the surcharge may not be sufficient to offset the extra 13 14 costs of handling the perversely-created cumbersome flats.

In addition, imposition of the surcharge might have a negative societal impact, even in the event that the Postal Service managed to recoup from the surcharge its extra costs of handling more cumbersome flats created by repackaging. This outcome would result if the extra repackaging costs for the mailers, plus the extra handling costs for the Service, jointly exceeded revenues from the surcharge.

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Summary

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2	The Standard A parcel surcharge, as proposed by the Postal Service in
3	this docket, is extraordinarily myopic. It contains no incentives for reducing
4	Postal Service costs, either via increasing the machinability of parcels or by
5	other increased worksharing. As indicated above, mailers' only incentive
6	would be to repackage, which could lead to unintended and
7	counterproductive effects on the Postal Service's bottom line. Should such
8	mischief result, the net incentive effect of the surcharge could turn out to be
9	highly perverse, and certainly not revenue-enhancing. The surcharge is not
10	even intended, as I show in the next section, to deal with the balance
11	between revenues and costs; it is narrowly focused on cost differences whose
12	conceptual underpinnings are seriously defective.

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V. SHORTCOMINGS OF THE POSTAL SERVICE'S PROPOSED SURCHARGE FOR STANDARD A PARCELS

3 The Proposal Focuses Myopically on Costs

In Docket No. MC95-1, the Commission was concerned that revenues
from parcels were less than the costs attributed to parcels. Witness Moeller
testifies that the proposed Standard A residual shape surcharge was
developed in response to concerns expressed by the Commission in Docket
No. MC95-1 about costs exceeding revenues, and mentions in passing the
"below cost" problem.¹⁷ Presumably this refers to the 8.2 cent difference
between average revenues and costs developed by witness Crum.

11 Nevertheless, witness Moeller states that "the difference between 12 revenues and costs" incurred by parcels "is **not relevant** to the rate design" 13 underlying the residual shape surcharge.¹⁸ He further explains why the 14 comparison between the average revenue and the average cost incurred by 15 the average Standard A parcel is not relevant to the surcharge: "[t]he point 16 of the surcharge isn't to assure cost coverage or that the revenues exceed the 17 costs; it is to recognize cost differences between these two groupings of

¹⁷ USPS-T-36, p. 12.

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¹⁸ See responses of witness Moeller to NDMS/USPS-T36-1-2 (Tr. 6/2816-17) (emphasis in original).

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1	mail." ¹⁹ In	other words, the sole basis of the Postal Service's justification for			
2	the surchar	ge is on (i) the cost of handling parcels, and (ii) the difference			
3	in cost bet	ween parcels and flats — not the difference between parcel			
4	revenues ar	nd costs.			
5	Cost Mode	ls are Woefully Deficient			
6	In light of the expressed concern about the cost of handling parcels, it				
7	is remarkat	ole that the Postal Service has not presented one single cost model			
8	showing ho	w any parcel is handled. This lacuna in the cost presentation			
9	stands in sharp contrast to the detailed cost models for letters and flats				
10	presented by witnesses Daniel and Seckar. ²⁰ The Postal Service's direct case				
11	is silent reg	arding:			
12 13	(i)	productivity achieved by processing parcels on a Small Parcel and Bundle Sorter ("SPBS");			
14 15	(ii)	productivity rates of the SPBS with and without a barcode reader;			
16 17	(iii)	which characteristics prevent certain parcels from being sorted on a SPBS;			
18 19	(iv)	the extent to which parcels could be processed on the FSM 1000; and			

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¹⁹ Tr. 6/2947, ll. 22-24 and Tr. 6/2948, ll. 7-11 and 19-22.

²⁰ USPS-T-29 and USPS-T-26, respectively.

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any plans to improve mechanization and the way small (under 16 ounce) parcels are handled.²¹

Instead, the Postal Service's entire case relies solely on an IOCS-based
cost study.

5 The Causative Roles of Shape and Weight Are Ambiguous

That parcels cost more, on average, to handle than flats would seem to 6 7 be a reasonable proposition, notwithstanding various problems with witness 8 Crum's cost study. For example, on average, parcels weigh more than flats. Consequently, since Standard A rates above the breakpoint are weight-9 10 based, the average parcel pays a higher rate than flats. The first issue that needs to be addressed is the extent to which weight is a causal factor, as 11 opposed to shape. To his credit, witness Moeller recognizes the importance of 12 13 developing evidence documenting what drives or causes a cost difference. Where two hypothetical mailpieces of different shapes and weights have 14 identical cost and revenue differentials, he observes²² 15 16 that's a good thing that the revenue is being obtained for this additional cost of 33 cents but ideally you would want to 17

²² Tr. 7/3158, 11. 12-21 (emphasis added).

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²¹ The silence is all the more noteworthy since the Commission in Docket No. MC95-1 explicitly took note of RIAA's criticisms regarding the lack of data supporting a separate Standard A parcel rate, including: no definition parameters of affected mailpieces, no identification of the different procedures (and resultant costs) for machinable and nonmachinable parcels, and no analysis of potential volume shifts among classes and subclasses of mail. *Op. & Rec. Dec.*, Docket No. MC95-1, para. 5544.

1 2 3 4 5 6 7	know what's causing that cost difference. The pound rate is the right mechanism for getting that additional revenue if it is indeed weight that was causing the cost difference in that hypothetical. To the extent it was shape that was driving that difference, then there would be a basis for a shape surcharge and a lowering of the pound rate because weight would not have been what was causing the cost difference of 33 cents.
8	Witness Moeller went on to state that, "I think we have a study that
9	shows that shape is a big cost determinant." ²³ His reference, presumably, is
10	to witness Crum's cost study, discussed in Section VI, infra.
11	The role of cost drivers, as they affect the relative costs of letters, flats,
12	and parcels of different subclasses, will be taken up in more detail in Section
13	VI in connection with the discussion of the adequacy of cost data used to
14	support the proposed parcel surcharge. It is necessary, however, to comment
15	here further on the role of cost drivers within parcels; i.e., within the residual
16	category of mailpieces known as parcels and IPPs, which in itself comprises
17	the largest variations of shape within all Standard A Mail.

18 Cost Differences and Cost Drivers Within Parcels Are Not Studied

19 A major failure of the Postal Service's filing in this case is the lack of

20 any study demonstrating how the cost of handling various types and shapes

- of parcels varies with different cost-driving characteristics. In Docket No.
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²³ Tr. 7/3159, ll. 1-2.

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MC95-1, the Commission cited RIAA's observation that "the calculation of the

1 'average cost' of a 'parcel' proves nothing about the range of costs that made up that average."²⁴ For example, do rolls, other odd shapes, and "outsides" 2 have extremely high unit costs, which drive up the average cost of all 3 parcels? The IOCS-based cost study sponsored by witness Crum exhibits 4 remarkable, virtually unbelievable, cost differences for parcels of similar 5 weight. Are these cost differences based on real cost-driving characteristics? 6 7 Or do they simply illustrate the futility of relying exclusively on IOCS tallies 8 to study parcel costs? 9 On the one hand, if the substantial cost differences developed by witness Crum are real, they need to be investigated in order to identify cost-10 drivers and quantify their impact. But no information is forthcoming on this 11 important issue. Witness Crum appears indifferent to potentially important 12 questions raised by his own study. 13 On the other hand, if the cost differences are spurious, and amount to 14 nothing more than statistical outliers caused by small sample size, of course 15 they should be disregarded. But how much weight can the Commission, or 16 anyone else for that matter, give to a study if it produces statistically 17

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- 18 meaningless results and literally begs to have disregarded the important
- 19 differences which it surfaces?

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²⁴ Op. & Rec. Dec., Docket No. MC95-1, para. 5547.

1	The Postal Service presentation totally lacks any suggestion or insight
2	— such as how to reduce costs or improve worksharing — that might be
3	helpful to either the Commission or mailers. The proposal is simply an
4	across-the-board surcharge based on the limited information provided by
5	IOCS tallies. The study is extremely limited, as well as disappointing,
6	because of its failure to examine any aspect of the "parcel problem," except to
7	manipulate IOCS tallies. And, since the IOCS-based study is all that is
8	available in this docket, and could be the sole or principal source of cost
9	information in future dockets, one problem deserves special mention —
10	namely, the collection of cost data pertinent to the proposed parcel surcharge.

The Definition of a Standard A Parcel Presents Fundamental Problems

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13 By definition, parcels are neither letters nor flats. This is not to say, however, that a meaningful distinction exists between parcels and flats in 14 Postal Service practice As will be seen, for example, identical size and shape 15 mailpieces can be flats or parcels, depending on the context. Consequently, 16 17 vagaries of Postal Service practices and procedures promote the conclusion that the terms "parcel" and "residual shape" may not provide meaningful 18 criteria for purposes of determining accurate costs, or cost differentials, or for 19 20 the design of cost-based rates.

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The Rural Carrier Cost System Definitions of Letter, Flat and Parcel

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3	Witness Crum observed that "the way rural parcels are counted in the
4	rural carrier cost system there [are] different dimensional criteria". ²⁵ In the
5	rural carrier cost system, all mailpieces with a height exceeding 5" are
6	considered parcels, especially if the item is rigid and cannot be folded. ²⁶ In
7	other words, a rigid greeting card or Christmas card between 5" and 61⁄8" high
8	that would ordinarily be classified as a "letter" under the DMM is identified
9	as a parcel in the rural delivery system. ²⁷ Obviously, a rigid flat in any of
10	the most common sizes (<i>i.e.</i> , 8½" x 11", 10" x 13", 11" x 14", and 12" x 15") also
11	would be identified as a parcel. Perhaps unsurprisingly, this is not the only
12	instance where flats and parcels can have identical dimensions.

13 The Surcharge Would Apply to Flat-Shaped Mailpieces 14 That Are "Prepared As Parcels"

15 The Postal Service's filing in Docket No. R97-1 requests the following

16 changes to the Domestic Mail Classification Schedule:²⁸

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- ²⁶ See Tr. 17/8098, ll. 16-17.
- ²⁷ Tr. 17/8098, l. 12 to 17/8099, l. 19.

²⁸ USPS Request, Attachment A, pp. 25-26. The language here reflects a conscious change by the Postal Service from similar provisions proposed in Docket No. MC97-2, which would have based the surcharge solely on dimensions of the mailpiece.

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²⁵ Tr. 17/8092, ll. 2-4.

1 2 3	321.25	Residual Shape Surcharge. Regular subclass mail is subject to a surcharge if it is prepared as a parcel or if it is not letter or flat shaped.			
4 5 6 7	321.37	Residual Shape Surcharge. Enhanced Carrier Route subclass mail is subject to a surcharge if it is prepared as a parcel or if it is not letter or flat shaped.			
8	As n	oted above, witness Moeller stated "it is no secret" that flats and			
9	parcels can	have the same dimensions. Yet witness Moeller repeatedly			
10	commented	commented that mailpieces of identical weight and dimensions (length,			
11	width, and	width, and height) incur different costs depending on how they are			
12	characteriz	zed — as parcels or flats. ²⁹			
13	Witr	ness Moeller's testimony characterized the surcharge as applying			
14	to every "p	iece of Standard A Mail that is neither letter- nor flat-shaped." ³⁰			
15	However, a	as counsel for RIAA discussed with witness Crum, under the Postal			
16	Service's p	roposals some flat-shaped (but "parcel-prepared") mailpieces			
17	would also	be subject to the surcharge.			
18	Evid	lently, witness Crum was unaware that the surcharge would apply			
19	to mailpied	es prepared as a parcel, regardless of shape. He stated that his			
20	definition o	of a parcel, undergirding his testimony supporting the surcharge,			
21	was drawn	from the IOCS-defined categories of IPP Machinable, IPP			

- ²⁹ See responses of witness Moeller to DMA/USPS-T36-3 (Tr. 6/2740), DMA/USPS-T36-9 (Tr. 6/2747), and NAA/USPS-T36-5 (Tr. 6/2778).
 - ³⁰ USPS-T-36, p. 12, ll. 15-16.

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1 Nonmachinable, Parcel Machinable, and Parcel Outside, which definitions parallel that of DMM §C050.³¹ Yet, as counsel for RIAA pointed out, and 2 3 witness Crum confirmed, the definitions of a parcel defined by IOCS and DMM §C050 — and relied upon by witness Crum in his analysis — do not 4 reflect a mailpiece's "preparation as a parcel."³² 5 In fact, witness Crum confirmed the overlap between the dimensions of 6 flat-shaped pieces and of nonletter, nonflat-shaped pieces.³³ Witness Crum 7 8 noted that flat-shaped pieces may well have been identified as parcels by 9 IOCS tally takers (whose data formed the basis for witness Crum's analyses in Exhibit K).³⁴ 10 Volume and Cost Data for Parcels Need To Be Consistent 11 12 The Postal Service uses separate data systems for collecting information on (i) revenues and volumes, and (ii) costs. In order to obtain 13 meaningful data for rate making purposes, it is essential that in each of the 14 two systems mailpieces be identified in the same manner. That is, all pieces 15 subject to the parcel surcharge should be identifiable as a parcel under the 16

³¹ See responses of witness Crum to NDMS/USPS-T28-3 (Tr. 5/2200) and NDMS/USPS-T28-13 (Tr. 5/2226).

³² Tr. 5/2375 l. 17 to 5/2376, l. 4; Tr. 5/2380, l. 9 to 5/2381 l. 8.

³³ Tr. 5/2377, ll. 5-10; Tr. 5/2381, ll. 4-13.

³⁴ Tr. 5/2384, ll. 2-7.

IOCS.³⁵ Otherwise, there could be, and to a certain extent there may be, 1 chaos. In light of the Postal Service's current procedures and practices, it is 2 submitted that neither the concept of "parcel" nor "residual mail" are 3 meaningful criteria from which to estimate costs or design rates. In this 4 docket, RIAA's oral cross-examination of witness Crum has drawn out the 5 fact that the Postal Service's current residual shape surcharge proposal 6 expressly would treat identical mailpieces differently, if one identical 7 mailpiece is prepared as a flat and the other identical mailpiece is prepared 8 as a parcel. Moreover, no mechanism exists by which the Postal Service has 9 been able to identify correctly the actual shape of such mailpieces when 10 collecting the data used to compute cost allocations. The IOCS instructions 11 used to identify flats and parcels in the mailstream rely on DMM §C050, 12 which does not refer to preparation as a criterion distinguishing flats from 13 parcels.³⁶ 14

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15 Conclusion

Although the proposal for a Standard A parcel surcharge is narrowly
 — indeed, myopically — focused on costs, the conceptual foundation of the
 cost data used for rate making is gravely deficient. Cost models are lacking:

³⁶ Tr. 6/2372-84.

³⁵ See ANM-T-1 for further discussion concerning problems that arise when revenues and volumes are not identified in the same manner as costs.

the causative roles of shape, weight, and other potentially important factors
are ambiguous; cost differentials and cost drivers within the category of
parcels have not been subjected to statistical study; and even the
identification of mailpieces as parcels as between the RPW system and IOCS
is problematic. Instituting a surcharge, which will result is rate increases of
up to 50 percent, on a conceptual foundation shot through with such defects
would be questionable in the extreme.

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1VI. ANALYSIS OF COST DATA USED TO SUPPORT2THE STANDARD A PARCEL SURCHARGE3

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4	The testimony of witness Crum presents a detailed breakdown of cost
5	segment data (i) by subclass and (ii) by shape (letters, flats and parcels) to
6	de-average the cost of parcels. ³⁷ Using data in witness Crum's tables, the
7	volume-variable unit cost for mail processing and delivery of parcels has been
8	computed; see Table 3.
9	Mail Processing Costs Exhibit Wide Differences
10	Examination of Table 3 reveals extremely wide variation in mail
11	processing unit costs. Bulk Rate Regular ("BRR") ECR parcels have the
12	lowest unit cost, 14.62 cents, and the lowest average weight, 2.77 ounces. ³⁸
13	This is the only rate category with a rational correlation with weight. Bulk
14	Rate Nonprofit ("BNP") ECR parcels have the highest unit cost for mail
15	processing (about 37 cents), while their average weight is somewhat less than

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³⁷ USPS-T-28 (revised 10/1/97), Exhibit K, Tables 3A(1), 3A(2), 3B(1) and 3B(2).

³⁸ Reclassification changes were implemented for the former third-class regular rate mail on July 1, 1996. For the former third-class nonprofit rate bulk mail, reclassification changes became effective on October 6, 1996, after the end of the 1996 fiscal year.

1	BRR Other. With	respect to th	e high volume	-variable uni	t cost for nonprofit
2	parcels, witness C	rum states: ³⁵)		
3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15	One might e that level. I one year ac parcels in i into even sm testimony. ' separately o interest of p I am unawa	xpect unit c can not de ccuracy of solation pa aller pieces The Nonprof nly in response roviding a co are of any o	nse to NDMS/ ost fluctuations efinitively vou the results fo articularly whe not specific resu fit specific resu nse to interven omplete record difference in un	s when volur uch for the r Nonprofit n they are by y referred to lts were incl or requests a processing	nes are of stability or ECR roken out in my uded and in the steps that
16			Table 3		
17 18 19			e-Variable Unit C age Weight for F FY 1996		
20 21 22		Pro	Mail cessing Cost (cents)	Delivery Cost (cents)	Average Weight (ounces)
23	Bulk Reg	ular Rate (BR	R)		
24 25	EC Oth		14.62 29.01	28.43 12.61	2.77 8.90
26	Bulk Non	profit (BNP)			
27 28	EC Oth		36.72 37.05	99. 42 22.29	3.06 6.40
29		All Parcels	28.35	14.27	8.35
30 31	Source:		(revised 10/1/97)), 3A(2), 3B(1) ar		

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³⁹ See response of witness Crum to NDMS/USPS-T28-31 (Tr. 17/8012, 8033).

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Presort Cost Savings From Parcels Are Underestimated and Not Studied

3 As noted above, the different rate categories exhibit wide differences in mail processing costs for parcels. Aggregating mail processing costs over all 4 5 parcels yields an average figure of 28.4 cents. This is almost six to seven 6 times more than the average mail processing cost of letters or flats, which 7 amount to 4.1 and 4.9 cents, respectively. Witness Crum indicates that the 8 lower unit costs for letters and flats in part reflect a higher degree of 9 presortation; he estimates that adjusting parcel unit cost for both presort and 10 dropship differences accounts for about 5.1 cents of the difference.

11 Clearly, if mail processing costs are as high as estimated by witness 12 Crum, then presortation of parcels would (and does) result in cost avoidances 13 that are far greater than those that result from presortation of flats. In other words, the more it costs to sort something, the greater is the cost avoidance 14 15 from presortation. Presorted parcels are thus being "short-changed" when 16 the Postal Service uses cost avoidances based on flats. Moreover, since parcel presort discounts are grossly understated with respect to full cost avoidance, 17 the Postal Service is failing to provide desirable incentives and price signals 18 19 that would encourage parcel mailers to undertake more presortation. As pointed out in Section V, supra, the root of the problem is that the 20 Postal Service has (i) no detailed models of parcel processing flows 21

comparable to those presented on the record for letters and flats, (ii) no

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productivity figures for SPBSs, with or without barcode readers, and (iii) no
 downflow density data, all of which are necessary to develop accurate presort
 discounts.⁴⁰

Delivery Costs Exhibit Even Wider Differences Than Mail Processing Costs

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6 The volume-variable unit costs for delivery in Table 3 are the sums of 7 all costs in segments 6, 7 and 10 divided by the respective volumes. The 8 results for delivery costs are even more disparate than for mail processing 9 costs. BRR Other has the lowest unit cost (12.61 cents), but the highest 10 average weight (8.9 ounces). BRR ECR has a unit cost of 28.43 cents, and an 11 average weight of 2.8 ounces. With respect to the cost difference (15.82 12 cents) between BRR ECR and Other parcels, witness Crum offers a few conceivable reasons why there might be "slightly higher costs for ECR 13 parcels."41 14 15 The average weight of BNP ECR (3.1 ounces) is almost two-thirds less than BRR Other, while the unit cost, 99.42 cents, is almost 8 times 16 greater. When asked to explain the dramatic cost difference between BRR 17 and BNP (70.99 cents), witness Crum simply referred to his previous 18

⁴¹ See response of witness Crum to NDMS/USPS-T28-32(b) (Tr. 17/8036).

⁴⁰ The absence of so much critical data and other pertinent information can be easily overlooked, which is reminiscent of Sherlock Holmes' case of the "dog that didn't bark."

1 response, quoted above, which provides no insight or explanation

2 whatsoever.

Cause of Mail Processing and Delivery Cost Differences Are Not Identified

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The data supplied by witness Crum raise troubling questions. Parcels 5 with a comparatively low unit mail processing cost have a comparatively high 6 delivery cost, and variations in unit cost appear uncorrelated, or even 7 inversely correlated, with weight differences. For parcels under 16 ounces, 8 weight may or may not be a significant cost driver with respect to mail 9 processing and delivery costs. But treating weight as of minor importance 10 raises significant questions that call for answers. That is, are these cost 11 differences meaningful at all? Do these cost differences reflect real 12 characteristics that differ among the various shapes of different 13 parcels? Or do they represent nothing more than statistical variation 14 arising from small sample size? 15 The cost differences are so enormous as to render the data worthless. 16 Some unit costs appear to be several standard deviations from the average. 17 If they reflect real, shape-driven causality (e.g., rolls, spheres or other 18 unusual shapes), then the Commission and the Postal Service need to know 19 far more about them, and mailers deserve to have them quantified in a 20 statistically reliable manner. A simple one-size-fits-all 10-cent surcharge 21

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1	would barely begin to recover the unusually large costs caused by such odd-
2	shaped parcels, if such parcels are driving these costs, while imposing an
3	unjust burden on parcels whose handling costs differ only slightly, if at all,
4	from those of flats. To make things worse, the proposed surcharge may
5	potentially create substantial problems in the category of "unintended
6	consequences," as discussed previously in Section IV of this testimony.
7 8	Uncertainties and Inconsistencies Associated with Transportation Costs
9	Witness Crum de-averages the volume-variable transportation costs of
10	Standard A Mail by distributing those costs using estimates of the cubic
11	density of letters, flats and parcels. The de-averaging of transportation costs
12	presents two important difficulties:
13 14	• The estimated density for parcels is subject to considerable uncertainty; and
15 16 17	• Destination entry discounts are inconsistently based on cost avoidances that have not been de-averaged; <i>i.e.</i> , that are averaged over letters, flats and parcels.
18	Different Density Estimates for Standard A Mail Parcels
19	The estimates of density for Standard A Mail parcels are subject to
20	great uncertainty, as cross-examination of witness Crum by counsel for
21	AMMA and other parties has established. The two most recent studies
22	undertaken by the Postal Service have resulted in parcel densities that differ

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1	by a ratio of almost 2:1. A density of 14.93 pounds per cubic foot was
2	developed in a previous study. ⁴² In this docket, witness Crum relies on a
3	slightly more recent study. Using an entirely different methodology, this
4	second study yields a figure of 8.01 pounds per cubic foot for commercial
5	parcels, and 8.12 pounds per cubic foot for commercial and non-commercial
6	parcels combined. ⁴³
7	In the prior study, average density was derived by weighing containers
8	that had been filled with a random sample of parcels, then dividing the
9	weight by the volume of the container. ⁴⁴ Potential for error with this method
10	is inherent in how the container is packed.
11	In the later study, average density was derived by weighing parcels
12	individually and estimating the volume from measurements of length and
13	girth. Potential for error with this method is inherent in how the individual
14	volume of each parcel is calculated, since length and girth were the only (18) percent of the
15	measurements available for any parcels in the study.45 Taken together, length
16	and girth are insufficient to determine the volume of even a fairly
17	regular–shaped parcel, let alone one that is of irregular shape. To estimate

⁴² Docket No. MC95-1, LR-PCR-13.

- ⁴³ Tr. 17/8059-8060, II. 5-8.
- ⁴⁴ Tr. 17/8061, ll. 15-16.

⁴⁵ Tr. 17/8066-67.

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1	volume, it was necessary for witness Crum to make additional assumptions
2	so obscure that he was unable to explain them on the witness stand. ⁴⁶
3	For the present docket, witness Crum uses the density of 8.1 lbs/cubic
4	foot for parcels, which was derived by the second method described above.47
5	The variance between the two very different estimates of density is startling.
6	Cross-examination brought out witness Crum's lack of awareness that the
7	methodology of the earlier study was less subject to human error of
8	measurement for different samples of parcels than the later study.48 Clearly,
9	this raises serious doubts, especially in regard to sources of error in
10	measurement, as to whether the later estimate that witness Crum uses in
11	this docket is not in fact inferior to the earlier estimate.
12	Using a parcel density of 15 pounds per cubic foot, rather than 8
13	pounds per cubic foot, would almost halve the estimate of attributable
14	transportation costs, a major cost component for parcels, thereby reducing
15	significantly the estimated cost difference between flats and parcels. For all
16	parcels, the average cost for vehicle service drivers (cost segment 8) and
17	transportation (cost segment 14) is 8.84 cents. The vast majority of these
18	costs are distributed by cube. Using the higher density in the previous Postal

⁴⁶ See Tr. 17/8067-68.

⁴⁷ USPS-T-28, Exhibit K, Table 3 (revised 10/1/97).

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⁴⁸ Tr. 17/8062-63.

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Service study would reduce this average cost by about 4 cents per piece,
 which is approximately one-half of the revenue shortfall now asserted by
 witness Crum.

4 Destination Entry Discounts Are Based 5 On Average Transportation Costs

6 Destination entry discounts for Standard A Mail are developed in LR-7 H-111. That study assumes throughout that all Standard A Mail has the same density. That assumption is acceptable when all other costs for 8 9 Standard A Mail are developed by averaging together letters, flats and 10 parcels in the customary top down approach to cost development and rate 11 design. However, it is completely inconsistent with the de-averaging of costs carried out by witness Crum. Not only is it totally inconsistent, but it would 12 also be unfair and inequitable to parcel mailers to charge them extremely 13 high transportation costs based on a tenuous Postal Service estimate of 14 density, on the one hand, while denying them destination entry discounts 15 based on the exact same Postal Service estimate, however tenuous it may be, 16 on the other. 17

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Two Ways to Resolve the Inconsistency

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Should the Commission decide to impose a surcharge, it can resolve
the inequity discussed above in one of two ways:

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1 2 3 4	• Estimate the cost of parcels using average transportation costs for letters, flats and parcels combined, consistent with the average transportation costs used to develop destination entry discounts; or
5 6 7	• De-average the destination entry discounts for parcels, using the same density that is assumed when estimating bottom up transportation costs of parcels.
8	If the Commission opts to use the average transportation cost for
9	letters, flats and parcels, which amounts to approximately 0.5 cents, the
10	average cost of parcels will be reduced by about 6.6 cents, and unit cost will
11	exceed average revenue by only about 1.6 cents. Witness Moeller proposes a
12	10-cent surcharge to cover a purported deficit of 8.2 cents. Witness Moeller's
13	"margin" is thus 1.8 cents, which exceeds the purported deficit by about 22
14	percent. Using the same 1.8-cent margin, the surcharge would be reduced to
15	3.4 cents, while setting the surcharge at 122 percent of the deficit would
16	result in a surcharge of 2.2 cents. This option has several merits.
17 18	• First, it leaves the established method of determining destination entry discounts in place, untouched.
19 20 21	 Second, it does not require separate destination entry discounts to be derived and assessed for different shapes; hence, it is simple.
22 23	• Third, it avoids all controversy and uncertainty concerning the correct density of parcels.
24 25 26	• Fourth, a more modest surcharge will invite far fewer unpleasant surprises arising from any unintended consequences, such as widespread repackaging.

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1	Further, all of these results could be obtained while better data would
2	be collected, as mailing statements would be prepared more accurately in
3	specifying shape, since parcel shape, for the first time, would have Standard
4	A Mail rate consequences. Therefore, in the future, these data on parcels
5	would be more reliable than at present, when forms may be filled out which
6	carelessly mis-identify shape, because there are no rate consequences
7	whatsoever.
8	On the other hand, should the Commission disagree with my proposal,
9	and instead decide to de-average transportation costs for parcels using either

of witness Crum's density estimates, fairness would require the Commission 10 to recompute separate de-averaged destination entry discounts for parcels. 11 The parcel discounts will of course be larger (significantly so, if the lower 12 Postal Service estimate of density is used). While separate discounts for 13 14 parcels are a more complex option than a lower surcharge, larger destination 15 entry discounts for parcels would have the merit of promoting more dropshipment (i.e, greater worksharing), which not only would save 16 transportation costs, but would also avoid some mail processing functions. 17 Since the discounts for presortation and destination entry of parcels are both 18 understated, giving parcels a destination entry discount that fully reflects 19 cost avoidance would seem both fair and desirable in allowing mailers of 20 parcels the opportunity to offset that portion of the surcharge being imposed. 21

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1 VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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2	Conclusions					
3	The Postal Service proposal for a Standard A Mail parcel surcharge					
4	lacks merit in four critical respects.					
5	1. Unintended consequences. As proposed, the surcharge is poorly					
6	formulated, with even the most obvious issues not even touched upon.					
7 8 9	• It creates a powerful incentive to repackage parcels into flats wherever feasible. Inescapably, that will reduce revenues from the surcharge.					
10 11 12 13	 More importantly, the costs of handling repackaged parcels could increase sharply over existing costs for handling the same contents in their existing form. 					
14 15	 The contribution to overhead, instead of being increased, may actually be reduced. 					
16 17 18	 The net impact on the Postal Service, as well as the mailing public, taken together, could very well be negative. 					
19	2. Lack of desirable incentives. As proposed, the surcharge:					
20 21 22	 gives mailers no incentives to reduce Postal Service costs by any known method; <i>e.g.</i>, by increased machinability, barcoding, presortation, or destination entry; and 					
23 24 25 26	 fails to distinguish between parcels that have dimensions, handling, and cost characteristics similar to flats, and truly awkward irregular packages with inherently high handling costs. 					

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1	3. Defective cost estimates.
2 3	• The cost estimates proffered are shot through with critical shortcomings and fail to support the proposed rates.
4	4. Inconsistency and inequity.
5 6	• Cost incurrences are de-averaged, while cost avoidances are not.
7 8 9 10 11	• To be consistent and equitable, handling and shipping costs used to support the parcel surcharge should be reflected in symmetrical fashion in the structure of presort and destination entry discounts. The proposed parcel surcharge fails this simple test.

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Primary Recommendation

13	For the foregoing reasons, I strongly suggest that the Commission
14	defer recommending any parcel surcharge based on the Postal Service's
15	proposal in this docket. As proposed, the surcharge is not well thought out.
16	In fact, it may well create far more problems than it solves.

Secondary Recommendation 17 18 Should the Commission feel that some action is necessary at this time, it should consider recommending a shell classification, without any specific 19 rate, and request the Postal Service to submit a new proposal which 20 addresses the more important deficiencies of the current proposal. 21 Should the Commission nevertheless feel compelled to go beyond a 22 shell classification, and should it adopt witness Crum's de-averaged bottom-23

1 up costs as the basis for a surcharge at this time, then I suggest that the

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2 surcharge not exceed 2 to 3 cents, for the reasons set out herein.

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1 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Dr. Haldi, have you had an 2 opportunity to examine the packet of designated written cross-examination that was made available earlier today? 3 THE WITNESS: Yes, I have. 4 5 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: And if these questions were asked of you today, would your answers be the same as those 6 7 you previously provided in writing? THE WITNESS: Yes, they would. 8 9 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: That being the case, I'm going to provide two copies of the designated written 10 cross-examination of Witness Haldi to the reporter and 11 direct that they be accepted into evidence and transcribed 12 13 into the record at this point. 14 [Designation of Written Cross-Examination of Dr. John 15 Haldi, NDMS-T-3, was received into 16 17 evidence and transcribed into the 18 record.] 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD. Court Reporters 1250 I Street, N.W., Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 842-0034

BEFORE THE POSTAL RATE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20268-0001

Postal Rate and Fee Changes, 1997

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Docket No. R97-1

DESIGNATION OF WRITTEN CROSS-EXAMINATION OF NASHUA PHOTO INC., DISTRICT PHOTO INC., MYSTIC COLOR LAB, AND SEATTLE FILMWORKS, INC. WITNESS JOHN HALDI (NDMS-T3)

Party Parcel Shippers Association <u>Interrogatories</u> USPS/NDMS-T3-1-2, 6, 11, 14, 17, 19, 23, 25-28, 30-31, 33-37, 41-42

United States Postal Service

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USPS/NDMS-T3-1-42

Respectfully submitted,

Margant P. anekan

Margaret P. Crenshaw Secretary

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INTERROGATORY RESPONSES OF NASHUA PHOTO INC., DISTRICT PHOTO INC., MYSTIC COLOR LAB, AND SEATTLE FILMWORKS, INC. WITNESS JOHN HALDI (T3) DESIGNATED AS WRITTEN CROSS-EXAMINATION

Interrogatory: USPS/NDMS-T3-1 USPS/NDMS-T3-2 USPS/NDMS-T3-3 USPS/NDMS-T3-4 USPS/NDMS-T3-5 USPS/NDMS-T3-6 USPS/NDMS-T3-7 USPS/NDMS-T3-8 USPS/NDMS-T3-9 USPS/NDMS-T3-10 USPS/NDMS-T3-11 USPS/NDMS-T3-12 USPS/NDMS-T3-13 USPS/NDMS-T3-14 USPS/NDMS-T3-15 USPS/NDMS-T3-16 USPS/NDMS-T3-17 USPS/NDMS-T3-18 USPS/NDMS-T3-19 USPS/NDMS-T3-20 USPS/NDMS-T3-21 USPS/NDMS-T3-22 USPS/NDMS-T3-23 USPS/NDMS-T3-24 USPS/NDMS-T3-25 USPS/NDMS-T3-26 **Designating Parties:** PSA, USPS PSA, USPS USPS USPS USPS PSA, USPS USPS USPS USPS USPS PSA, USPS USPS USPS PSA, USPS USPS USPS PSA, USPS USPS PSA, USPS USPS USPS USPS PSA, USPS ·USPS PSA, USPS PSA, USPS

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Interrogatory: USPS/NDMS-T3-27 USPS/NDMS-T3-28 USPS/NDMS-T3-29 USPS/NDMS-T3-30 USPS/NDMS-T3-31 USPS/NDMS-T3-32 USPS/NDMS-T3-33 USPS/NDMS-T3-34 USPS/NDMS-T3-35 USPS/NDMS-T3-36 USPS/NDMS-T3-37 USPS/NDMS-T3-38 USPS/NDMS-T3-39 USPS/NDMS-T3-40 USPS/NDMS-T3-41 USPS/NDMS-T3-42

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Designating Parties: PSA, USPS PSA, USPS USPS PSA, USPS PSA, USPS USPS PSA, USPS PSA, USPS PSA, USPS PSA, USPS PSA, USPS USPS USPS USPS PSA, USPS PSA, USPS

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-1 Page 1 of 3

USPS/NDMS-T3-1.

Please see your testimony at page 3, line 5-8, where you state that the residual shape surcharge will likely lead to extensive repackaging of mailpieces.

- (a) Please quantify "extensive" in terms of the percentage of pieces which would otherwise be subject to the surcharge without repackaging. Provide any documentation supporting your contention.
- (b) Please explain how such expenditures would lead to a reduction of revenues.
- (c) Are there any other rate implications for some of those mailers who repackage their mailpieces? If so, please list those implications.
- (d) If the answer to part (c) is yes, please confirm that these rate implications would lessen the likelihood of the mailer repackaging.
- (e) Are there any preparation implications for those mailers who repackage their mailpieces? If so, please list those implications.
- (f) If the answer to part (e) is yes, please confirm that these preparation implications could lessen the likelihood of mailer repackaging.
- (g) If the answer to part (e) is yes, please confirm that these preparation implications could lower the cost to the Postal Service of processing these pieces.

Response:

(a) The attachment to the response to RIAA/USPS-T7-4 (Docket No. MC97-2)

NUMBER OF STREET

indicates that a sample of 68,895,941 Standard A parcels included the different types of items shown in the table below, which I have classified here as (i) clear candidates for repackaging (*e.g.*, the typical plastic container for a CD disk is

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-1 Page 2 of 3

construction.

less than 0.5" thick), (ii) possible candidate, because the description does not provide sufficient information (e.g., an "other box" or "other" could be a box of greeting cards, which could readily be repackaged), and (iii) non-candidates, based on the description provided and the likelihood that the contents could not easily be repackaged into a container that meets the flat-sized dimensions of the DMM.

			Share	
	Volume		Total	
Clear Candidates:				
CD Box	20,925,143			
Check Box	10,290,773			
Film Envelopes	3,295,638			
Subtotal		34,511,554	50.1%	
Possible Candidates:				
Other Box	8,991,132			
Other	17.364.062			
Subtotal		26,355,194	38.3%	
Non-Candidates:				
Video Box	3,277,929			
Roll/Tube	86,093			
Clothing Bag	1,381,531			
Prescription Drug	682,354			
Sample	2,601,286	8.029.193	11.7%	
Total		68,895,941	100.1%	
	Total adds up to more than 100 percent due to rou			

You will note that approximately 50 percent of the sample falls into the category of clear candidates for repackaging, while another 38 percent are classified here as possible candidates. I consider such potential for repackaging to be extensive. Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-1 Page 3 of 3

(b) Parcels that are transformed to pieces with a flat-sized dimension via repackaging will not have to pay the surcharge, thereby reducing Postal Service revenues from those requested by the Postal Service in this docket.

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(c) and (e)

Pieces with flat-sized dimensions must be presorted to 3-digits in order to qualify for the 3-digit presort discount. Any mailer who converts machinable parcels to flats but does not have sufficient density to qualify for the 3-digit presort discount would have to pay a higher rate, thereby offsetting some of the savings from avoiding the surcharge.

(d) and (f)

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Confirmed that it could reduce the incentive for those mailers of machinable parcels that do not have sufficient density to presort to 3 digits.

(g) Finer presortation should reduce Postal Service handling costs.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-2 Page 1 of 1

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USPS/NDMS-T3-2.

Please see your testimony at page 6, lines 4-5, where you state the percentage of Standard Mail (A) envelopes mailed by NDMS that are parcel-shaped. Please provide the number of pieces represented by this percentage.

Response:

The range provided was an estimate only, and the number is estimated to be in excess

of 5 million.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-3 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-3.

Please see your testimony at page 6, line 12.

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- (a) Please confirm that prescription drugs are being mailed at Standard Mail (A) rates.
- (b) Please estimate the monetary value of the contents of a typical mailing by Merck-Medco Managed Care.

Response:

- (a) Confirmed
- (b) I am advised that the mailings vary from a few dollars to in excess of \$100. No mailing is typical, as they vary widely.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-4 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-4.

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Please see your testimony at page 7, lines 14 through page 8, line 7, where you cite Commissioner LeBlanc's dissenting opinion in Docket No. MC95-1 regarding a Standard Mail (A) parcel surcharge.

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- (a) Please confirm that Commissioner LeBlanc's opinion also proposed a 5-cent surcharge for Regular and ECR parcels.
- (b) Please confirm that Commission LeBlanc also stated that "the Commission need not know that each and every parcel is being cross-subsidized in order to justify a surcharge."

Response:

- (a) Confirmed
- (b) Confirmed; you have quoted correctly from Commissioner Le Blanc's

dissenting opinion, which speaks for itself.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-5 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-5.

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Please see your testimony at page 9, footnote 6. Please confirm that the quotation attributed to witness Moeller is actually the characterization of the Commission in its Recommended Decision (PRC Op., MC95-1, at page V-230, **§**5569).

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Response:

Confirmed that the term used by witness Moeller at USPS-T-36, p. 12, l. 9. is almost

identical to that used by the Commission in its Op. & Rec. Dec., Docket No. MC95-1,

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page V-230, ¶ 5569.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-6 Page 1 of 1

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USPS/NDMS-T3-6.

Please see your testimony at page 10, lines 10-12, where you discuss rate increases of up to 7 percent for Regular nonletters.

(a) Please identify the specific rate which is proposed to increase by this amount.

(b) Please confirm that the proposed increase for Regular automation 3/5-digit flats (e.g. nonletters) is 9.5 percent.

- (a) The testimony looked to the Postal Service's proposed increase to piece-rated Standard A Regular nonautomation 3/5 digit DSCF-entry nonletter rates, which would actually be an increase of 7.25 percent, to be precise. The true size of the rate increases faced by some Standard A Regular nonletter mailers (excepting the residual shape surcharge) under the Postal Service's proposal are even greater than stated in my testimony.
- (b) Confirmed.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-7 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-7.

Please see your testimony at page 11, footnote 9.

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(a) Please confirm that in the response to PSA/USPS-T36-8 cited in the footnote, witness Moeller provides a projection of Test Year volume subject to the residual shape surcharge. If you cannot confirm, please explain.

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- (b) Please confirm that in response to PSA/USPS-T26-1, witness Moeller provides a citation to the Test Year volume subject to the residual shape surcharge in the Regular subclass (which was the subclass requested in the interrogatory).
- (c) Please clarify how the two responses cited in the footnote are "somewhat at variance"?

Response:

- (a) Confirmed.
- (b) **Confirmed**.
- (c) A review of witness Moeller's response to PSA/USPS-T26-1 indicates that the Postal Service does not have separate Test Year cost or per-piece revenue data for residual shaped pieces, but it does report volume estimates. Accordingly, the footnote should end after the first sentence, with the remainder of the footnote withdrawn.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-8 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-8.

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Please see your testimony at page 11, line 23, through page 12, line 2.

(a) Assuming a 10 cent residual shape surcharge, do you have a projection of the number of pieces which will be subject to the surcharge in the test year? If so, please provide the projection.

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- (b) Do you have an own-price elasticity estimate for pieces subject to the residual shape surcharge? If so, please provide the estimate.
- (c) Please confirm that price changes are not the only factor affecting volumes from year to year. If you cannot confirm, please explain.

- (a) See my testimony at p. 13, lines 3-6. I do not have any Test Year projection for residual shaped pieces other than that provided by the Postal Service.
- (b) I do not have any estimate of own-price elasticity for residual shaped pieces other than that provided by the Postal Service.
- (c) I believe that the statement in this part of your question is generally true for every class, subclass and rate category of mail.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-9 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-9.

Please see your testimony at page 13.

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(a) Would the alternative packaging which would allegedly occur increase the cost to the mailer?

(b) If the answer to part (a) is no, please explain why mailers aren't packaging their mailpieces as flats today.

- (a) Yes, all parcel mailers would necessarily incur a one-time non-recurring cost to change over to a package that has flat-shaped dimensions. Whether the recurring cost of new packaging (with flat-shaped dimensions) would exceed the cost of existing packaging would depend upon each mailer's circumstances (e.g., cost of current packaging, volume, the particular design selected for any new packaging, etc.).
- (b) Not applicable

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-10 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-10.

Please see your testimony at page 14.

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- (a) Please confirm that you are predicting that virtually all parcel mailers who can repackage their mailpieces will indeed repackage the pieces as a flat.
- (b) What percentage of current non-flat nonletters in Standard Mail (A) can be repackaged?
- (c) Provide any quantitative information supporting your contention that "virtually all" mailers who can repackage will indeed do so.

Response:

- (a) My testimony at p. 14 states that "virtually all parcel mailers whose product gives them a repackaging option will in fact seek to repackage their products into flat-shaped mailpieces if confronted with a significant surcharge for parcels." (Emphasis added.) It was not my intention to say that those parcel mailers who have an option will in fact repackage, because I have neither surveyed nor discussed the matter with any parcel mailers other than the sponsors of my testimony. The word "seek" was intended to mean that imposition of a significant surcharge will cause virtually all parcel mailers to reexamine all of their options to avoid the surcharge, including repackaging in those circumstances where that is an option.
- (b) See my response to USPS/NDMS-T3-1a.
- (c) See my response to preceding part a.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-11 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-11.

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Please see your testimony at page 14, lines 1-3, where you state that, other than economy, parcel-shaped pieces do not provide mailers with any added value over a flat-shaped mailpiece.

- (a) Please quantify the economy offered to mailers by parcel-shaped pieces versus flat-shaped pieces.
- (b) Can you say that there is no added value to the recipient of a parcel-shaped piece versus a flat-shaped piece, all else equal?

- (a) Since the rate for flats and parcels is currently identical, the economy relates to the cost of packaging. For example, photographic prints returned by mail are inserted into a gussetted envelope. An envelope with some kind of an internal divider to keep the contents under 3/4" in thickness might cost more than the envelope currently used by photo finishers. Similarly, a box of checkbooks is inserted into a simple paperboard outer box. A redesigned, flat-shaped outer box might cost more.
- (b) For items that can be packaged as a parcel or a flat (e.g., photographs, books of checks, or greeting cards), it is the outer packaging that determines the dimensions, which in turn determines whether the mailpiece can qualify as a flat. In all instances of which I am aware, after being opened the outer packaging is discarded. Assuming that the outer packaging has been designed to protect the contents so that they arrive in the same condition as occurs with the existing parcel-shaped package, I am not aware of any added value to the recipient of a parcel-shaped piece versus a flat-shaped piece.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-12 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-12.

Please see your testimony at page 14, line 14, regarding unintended consequences.

- (a) If widespread repackaging occurred, and indeed the repackaged pieces were significantly more costly than other flats, might one of the consequences be a change in the definition of a flat?
- (b) Would the possibility of a change in the definition of a flat temper a mailer's enthusiasm to pursue a repackaging effort to produce, as you describe them, "perversely created cumbersome flats?"

- (a) Inasmuch as the Postal Service determines the definition of a flat, I would suppose that "anything is possible" along the line which your question suggests. I would note, however, that although some flats assertedly cost much less to process than other flats (e.g., polywrapped tabloids that are, or have been, non-machinable), the Postal Service has not attempted to change the definition of a flat, or impose a surcharge on such pieces. A review of available old DMMs reveals that there has been no change in the definition of a flat for at least 11 years (back through DMM 24, issued in 1987).
- (b) Mailers typically deal with rules as they are, not how they might be.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-13 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-13.

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Please see your testimony at page 15, lines 6-7.

(a) Might one of the new problems presented to a carrier as a result of the repackaging be the inability to fit the piece into the mailbox, requiring the recipient to retrieve the piece at the post office?

- (b) Would such an outcome be desirable from the perspectives of (i) the recipient and (ii) the mailer?
- (c) Would the mailer consider this effect on the recipient when deciding whether to engage in repackaging "mischief," as you describe it at page 19 of your testimony?

- (a) This definitely is one distinct possibility that could arise from such repackaging, most especially for rigid boxes that are within the dimensions of a flat as specified in the DMM.
- (b) For the recipient, it would probably be less convenient than having the piece delivered in the mailbox. The attitude of mailers is more difficult to project. Some may not consider it at all, while others might consider it undesirable. It would also be less desirable from the perspective of the Postal Service.
- (c) As discussed in my response to part b, some mailers might consider this effect, while others might not.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-14 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-14.

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Please see your testimony at page 15, lines 7-9, where you state that the proposed surcharge neither recognizes nor gives any incentive for machinability, citing witness Moeller's response to NDMS/USPS-T36-4.

(a) Please reconcile your statement that "machinability is not recognized" with witness Moeller's statement in the cited response that "machinability is factored into the calculation of the cost differences."

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(b) Is it your testimony that machinability of parcels is not encouraged at all by rates or preparation requirements?

Response:

- (a) I do not see anything to "reconcile." Witness Moeller's statement pertains to the calculation of cost differences, whereas the statement in my testimony pertains to incentives provided to mailers by the "rate design" of the proposed surcharge.
 Witness Moeller's response to the above-referenced interrogatory also states:
 - "Pieces not meeting the definition of a letter or flat...are subject to the residual shape surcharge. <u>Machinability, per se, is not a determinant.</u>" (Emphasis added.)
 - "The surcharge itself is not designed to encourage machinability."
- (b) This is a compound question. With respect to rates, yes, that is my testimony. To elaborate, one reason that the rate structure provides no incentives to encourage machinability may be the fact that the Postal Service has done so little to mechanize the processing of small parcels. For further discussion on this point, see my response to USPS/NDMS-T3-17.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-14 Page 2 of 2

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With respect to preparation requirements, the answer is no. For further discussion, see my response to USPS/NDMS-T3-1, USPS/NDMS-T3-21, and USPS/NDMS-T3-22.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-15 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-15.

Please see your testimony at page 20, line 12, where you quote parts of an interrogatory response of witness Moeller, and the accompanying footnote 18, which states that the emphasis in your testimony on the words "not relevant" was in the original of the quoted passage. Is it your testimony that the response by witness Moeller contained the emphasis? If this is not your testimony, please provide a revised page 20.

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Response:

This correction will be noted in an errata.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-16 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-16.

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Please see your testimony at page 20, line 11, through page 21, line 4.

- (a) Please confirm that a rate difference between letters and nonletters was implemented for third-class mail in 1991.
- (b) Is it your understanding that the rate differential was instituted so that nonletters would cover their costs?
- (c) Were carrier route nonletters not covering their costs prior to the institution of a letter/nonletter rate differential?
- (d) Do you advocate elimination of the rate distinction between letters and nonletters in ECR?
- (e) If the rate difference were eliminated in ECR, would nonletters cover their costs?

- (a) Confirmed
- (b) No.
- (c) Carrier route nonletters were covering their costs, to the best of my knowledge.
- (d) No.
- (e) Yes.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-17 Page 1 of 2

USPS/NDMS-T3-17.

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Please see your testimony at page 22, lines 6-9. You state that it is a reasonable proposition that parcels, on average, cost more to handle than flats.

(a) Please confirm that the first factor you cite to explain why the average parcel costs more to handle than the average flat is the heavier weight of parcels on average.

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- (b) What other factors can you offer to explain why parcels cost more than flats?
- (c) Is it your testimony that weight is the only reason parcels are more costly than flats, and that shape plays no role?

Response:

(a) Confirmed.

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(b) The Postal Service has invested far more to mechanize the handling of flats than it has to mechanize the handling of parcels. For example, widespread deployment of the second-generation flat-sorter (the FSM 1000) is well underway, and barcode readers are reported to have been ordered for all FSM 1000s. Ordering and deployment of a third-generation flat sorter is said to be in the advanced planning stage. Parcels, by contrast, are still sorted on the SPBS, and the Postal Service has equipped a very few of these with bar code readers on an experimental basis only. Thus, at the present time it would be an exercise in futility for parcel mailers to put barcodes in the address box.

Further, when flats are sorted and put into flat trays, facing of the address is preserved. Development of a high speed flat feeder (HSFF) which requires facing, is said to be in an advanced stage, nearing deployment. With

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-17 Page 2 of 2

respect to small parcels, however, to the best of my knowledge the Postal Service has not developed any form of containerization that preserves facing for any subset of parcels. Thus, even those small parcels that are fully machinable on the SPBS must be faced individually (which often requires turning the parcel over each time they are sorted on the SPBS). Mechanization of parcel handling is thus seen to be somewhat primitive in comparison to mechanization of flat processing.

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Finally, some parcels, such as rolls and tubes, may be totally unamenable to processing on an SPBS, and have to be processed manually at each stage, from acceptance to delivery.

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(c) No. See response to preceding part b.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-18 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-18.

Please see your testimony at page 27, line 8. Provide the citation to the quote "it is no secret" attributed to witness Moeller.

Response:

Tr. 7/3162, ll. 7-14:

As a matter of fact, and this isn't a secret, really, I think when parcel classification was filed, the DMA issued an announcement on their web page that said some parcel mailers may, however, be able to avoid the surcharge by mailing their smaller parcels as flats, so it seemed like it was obvious there that these pieces that are in this grey area can be prepared as flats and avoid the surcharge.

Addition of the quotation marks was inadvertent, and this correction will be noted in an

errata.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-19 Page 1 of 3

USPS/NDMS-T3-19.

Please see your testimony at page 27, footnote 29.

(a) Please explain how witness Moeller's response to DMA/USPS-T36-3 is related to the sentence to which this footnote refers.

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- (b) Please explain how witness Moeller's response to DMA/USPS-T36-9 is related to the sentence to which this footnote refers.
- (c) Please explain how witness Moeller's response to NAA/USPS-T36-5 is related to the sentence to which this footnote refers.
- (d) Please define "characterized" in line 11 of page 27.

Response:

(a) As noted in the sentence of my testimony which immediately precedes the sentence to which the footnote is appended, under oral cross examination witness Moeller states (Tr. 7/3162, ll. 7-14) that it isn't a secret, and is "obvious" that there exists a "grey area" where flat and residual shapes overlap. (See also my response to USPS/NDMS-T3-18.) DMA's interrogatory asked witness Moeller to assume that a residual-shaped piece "has cost-causing characteristics similar to a flat" and is subject to the proposed surcharge. Witness Moeller states "a piece with cost-causing characteristics similar to a flat, so I am not sure the assumption here is particularly realistic." Witness Moeller's answer implies that there are no residual shape pieces with cost-causing characteristics of a flat; *i.e.*, flats are flats, parcels are parcels, and each has its own distinct cost-causing characteristics, which he presumes do not overlap.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-19 Page 2 of 3

- (b) DMA's interrogatory cited witness Moeller's response to NAA/USPS-T36-5(d), and asked him whether his answer implies that the Postal Service has performed studies which show that shape is the factor that differentiates the costs of flats from those of nonflats. Witness Moeller states that his answer to NAA "implies that a piece which meets the definition of a flat, and is not prepared as a parcel, is going to be processed as a flat." Again witness Moeller's answer implies that flats have their own distinct cost-causing characteristics and associated unit costs, which he presumes have little or no overlap with the unit costs of residual shaped pieces. His answer to DMA/USPS-T36-9 cites the cost differences between flats and nonletters described in the testimony of witness Crum (USPS-T-28). However, he fails to note that witness Crum's study contains no information concerning the standard deviation (or any other measure of dispersion about the mean) of the unit costs developed there.
- (c) NAA's interrogatory asked whether it would be possible to define "parcel" in such a manner as to exempt parcels with flat-like cost characteristics from the surcharge. Witness Moeller answered that a piece with "flat-like" costs will likely meet the definition of a flat, in which case it would be exempt from the surcharge, as long as it is prepared in accordance with flat preparation requirements. Moeller's answer thus implies that no residual shape pieces share cost-causing characteristics with flats, while his answer under cross-examination

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(Tr. 7/3162, 11. 7-14) states that it is not a secret, and is "obvious," that there is a "grey area" where flat and residual shapes overlap.

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(d) The term "characterized" is defined in this context as "being regarded for purpose of being recorded [in RPW statistics and IOCS cost data]."

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-20 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-20.

HILL BLACK COMPLEX CONTRACTORS

Please see your testimony at page 29 where you say there may be "chaos" if all pieces subject to the surcharge are not identifiable by IOCS as pieces which are subject to the surcharge.

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- (a) Please explain what you mean by "chaos" in this context.
- (b) Would a requirement that pieces be marked to indicate that they paid the surcharge prevent this "chaos"?

Response:

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- (a) In the context of deriving statistical samples for the purposes of estimating the costs of pieces subject to the surcharge, I take "chaos" to mean data collection procedures subject to such massive confusion as to have any impartial professional observer characterize them as unreliable or unacceptable.
- (b) Yes, provided (i) a one-to-one correspondence exists between the pieces so marked and the pieces actually subject to the surcharge, and (ii) the markings are readily identifiable by IOCS tally clerks.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-21 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-21.

Please see your testimony at page 29, lines 6 through 9.

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(a) Please confirm that, under the current rates and classifications, there are some pieces which are eligible for more than one rate.

(b) Please confirm that if a piece is prepared as a flat, its costs will be different from its costs if it were prepared as a parcel. If you cannot confirm, please explain why the costs would not be dependent on how the piece was prepared.

- (a) Confirmed. For example, anyone with sufficient funds and insufficient sense could send a postcard by Express Mail. Priority Mail contains a substantial number of pieces that weigh less than 12 ounces, and therefore would qualify for First-Class rates.
- (b) There is a presumption that the costs ought to be different, because of the 3digit presort requirement for flats, which is designed to enable the Postal Service to avoid a separation for pieces prepared as a parcel. However, I do not possess any data to confirm that the costs are in fact different.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-22 Page 1 of 2

USPS/NDMS-T3-22.

Please see your testimony at page 33, line 15.

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(a) Please confirm that a machinable parcel presorted to BMC receives the 3/5 digit nonletter presort discount. If you cannot confirm, what presort discount are these pieces eligible for?

- (b) Please confirm that if these machinable parcels were instead flats, they would need to be presorted to 3-digit, at a minimum, to receive the 3/5-digit nonletter presort discount. If you cannot confirm, please explain.
- (c) Please confirm that 3-digit is a finer presortation than BMC. If you cannot confirm, explain.
- (d) Please confirm that it is possible that the parcels presorted to BMC would not have the density required to presort to 3-digit, and therefore, would not qualify for the 3/5-digit presort discount if they were prepared as flats. If you cannot confirm, please explain how, in every instance, a machinable parcel mailing would qualify for the 3/5-digit presort discount if it were instead prepared as a flat mailing.
- (e) Assume that a machinable parcel mailing qualifies for the 3/5digit presort discount, and would not qualify if that same mailing were prepared as non-machinable flats. Would you characterize the presorted parcels as being "short-changed" when it comes to presort discounts?

Response:

- (a) Confirmed.
- (b) Confirmed.
- (c) Confirmed.
- (d) Confirmed.
- (e) In the situation and circumstances posed by this question, the preparation

requirements are used as the basis to charge a non-machinable parcel more than

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-22 Page 2 of 2

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a machinable parcel in similar presort condition, without denominating the difference in rates as a "surcharge" for being non-machinable. Under the presumption that non-machinable parcels do in fact cost somewhat more to handle than machinable parcels, I would not characterize the presorted non-machinable parcels as being short-changed by virtue of using the preparation requirements as a proxy for a cost-related surcharge. Whether it is good policy to allow rates to be set through the DMM in this manner is another question.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-23 Page 1 of 2

USPS/NDMS-T3-23.

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Please see your testimony at page 40, line 13, where you refer to a 1.8 cent "margin."

(a) What percent cost coverage is implied for these pieces, assuming they are in the Regular subclass, with a 1.8 cent "margin?"

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(b) Does your calculation of the "margin" reflect any rate reduction the piece would receive by virtue of the proposed lowering of the pound rate? If not, how would the "margin" be affected? What would the resulting "margin" be?

Response:

(a) For reasons explained below, your question strikes me as ambiguous, but I will try to answer it as I understand it. The basic cost-revenue data in column 1 below are from my Table 2, page 11, and are for the entire Regular subclass, nonprofit and commercial rate combined.

		Regular	Regular
	Regular Subclass Unadjusted	Subclass w/ 10-cent Surcharge	Subclass w/ 8.3-cent Surcharge
Revenue	0.455	0.555	0.538
Cost	0.520	0.520	0.520
Difference	(0.065)	0.035	0.018
Coverage		107%	103%

The second column has a 10-cent surcharge which, when applied only to mail in the Regular subclass, results in a 3.5 cent margin. The third column has an 8.3 cent surcharge which, when applied only to mail in the Regular subclass, results in a 1.8 cent margin.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-23 Page 2 of 2

THE BLUE AND A REAL PRODUCTS

(b) The average margin of 1.8 cents discussed in my testimony at page 40 is based on the data provided by witness Crum and shown in my Table 2 at p. 11. Those data are based on billing determinants and do not reflect the proposed lowering of the pound rate (from 67.7 cents to 65.0 cents for the Regular subclass), nor do they reflect the proposed increase in the piece rate for pieces that qualify for the 3/5 digit rate (from 8.5 to 10.6 cents per piece for the Regular subclass). For the average commercial rate Regular subclass parcel which weighs 8.9 ounces, without any surcharge, the current rate is 46.2 cents and the proposed rate is 46.8 cents. Based on this example, which uses the mean weight for 95 percent of all commercial pieces, I doubt that use of proposed rates would change the picture very much.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-24 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-24.

Please confirm that you have done no analysis to calculate the own-price elasticity for Standard Mail (A) parcels. If you have, please provide your analysis.

Response:

Confirmed; see my response to USPS/NDMS-T3-8b.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-25 Page 1 of 2

USPS/NDMS-T3-25.

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Please refer to your comments on page 13 regarding "highly competitive industries." Also, please refer to the Commission's Opinion and Recommended Decision in Docket No. MC95-1, dated January 26, 1996. The Opinion says that "the parcel pricing problem needs action through a near-term rate filing." PRC Op., MC95-1, at V-230. In his dissent from the Commission's declining to recommend a solution in that case, Commissioner LeBlanc stated that "[w[hat is necessary for the Commission is...to alert the third-class parcel mailers that in the future there may be adjustments in their rates. Thus, they would be wise to adjust their mailing practices to protect themselves against these increased costs". Dissenting Opinion of Vice Chairman W.H. "Trey" LeBlanc at 2. Is it your testimony that the business decision makers in these "highly competitive industries" have taken no steps thus far despite such clear statements as to the likely future changes affecting their businesses? Please state your rationale for describing a foreshadowed 10-cent surcharge as "staggering."

Response:

Without any doubt, the clear statement contained in the dissenting opinion of Vice-Chairman W.H. "Trey" LeBlanc, which you quote, contained considerate, wellintentioned advice. With all due respect, however, Commissioner LeBlanc has no responsibility for formulating Postal Service proposals for parcels nor, has he ever represented that he could foretell the future. At the time Commissioner LeBlanc wrote his dissenting opinion, he had no foreknowledge of how the Postal Service would define a parcel, or whether the Postal Service would not apply the surcharge to parcels that are machinable, or bar-coded, or more finely presorted, or drop shipped. Thus, while advising mailers "to adjust their mailing practices to protect themselves," the direction in which they perhaps should have adjusted their mailing practices was, to say the least, somewhat ambiguous. As it turns out, under the Postal Service proposal which has finally emerged in this docket, about the only change in mailing practice that will avoid the surcharge will be to convert parcel-shaped pieces to flat-shaped pieces

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-25 Page 1 of 2

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wherever that is a feasible option. The surcharge will apply to all pieces that do not so convert. The one possible exception pertains to mailers of flat-shaped pieces that are currently prepared as parcels. Those mailers may be able to avoid the surcharge either (i) by paying the somewhat higher unpresorted flat rate, or (ii) by holding on to their flat-shaped mail until they amass sufficient volume to qualify for the 3-digit discount.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-26 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-26.

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Please refer to page 14 of your testimony where you state "one can predict with a high degree of confidence that virtually all parcel mailers whose product gives them a repackaging option will in fact seek to repackage their products into flatshaped mailpieces if confronted with a significant surcharge for parcels... Thus, one immediate and highly predictable result of the Standard A parcel surcharge would be a massive repackaging of mailpieces now classified as parcels."

- (a) Is it your testimony that the business decision makers in these "highly competitive industries" have taken no steps thus far despite such clear statements as to the likely future changes affecting their businesses? Please state your rationale for describing a foreshadowed 10-cent surcharge as "staggering."
- (b) Is it your testimony that the business decision makers in these "highly competitive industries" have taken no steps thus far despite such clear statements as to the likely future changes affecting their businesses? Please state your rationale for describing a foreshadowed 10-cent surcharge as "staggering."

- (a) See my answer to USPS/NDMS-T3-25. In a highly competitive industry, such as photo finishing, a "staggering" added expense is one that, on the one hand, wipes out a substantial portion of each firm's profit margin, and yet, on the other hand, is not an expense to the vast majority of competitors (who do not use or rely on the Postal Service). The increase in Standard A Regular rates for 3/5 digit DSCF parcels, for pieces under the preakpoint, would be 55.56 percent. This increase is "staggering."
- (b) See response to part a.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-27 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-27.

Please provide any analysis you have done within any industry, or any nationally representative study you have completed, showing the costs of repackaging and retooling production systems versus the costs of a 10 cent surcharge?

Response:

I have not undertaken any analysis or studies of the type described by this

interrogatory. See, however, my response to USPS/NDMS-T3-10a, in which I state

that I have discussed the matter of repackaging with the mailers who are the sponsors

of my testimony. I also received relevant information from professional representatives

of other intervenors in this docket.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-28 Page 1 of 2

USPS-NDMS-T3-28.

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In light of your comments regarding the proposed 10 cent surcharge, please compare the rate for shipping a 15.9-ounce parcel and the rate for shipping a 16.1-ounce parcel, both including and excluding the 10-cent surcharge in Standard Mail (A)? You may make any assumptions regarding dropship or presort that you find reasonable, but please exclude any content restricted subclasses.

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Response:

A 15.9 ounce piece entered in Standard A Regular Subclass, Presort Category, by definition is entered as unzoned bulk mail. Under the proposed rates, Standard B Parcel Post has single-piece (*i.e.*, non-bulk) zoned rates, and bulk rates for entry at DBMC (zoned) and DSCF (unzoned). All Standard B Parcel Post rate tables have a 2-pound minimum, as the Postal Service does not offer hundred-weight pricing to its customers.

The following table compares (i) a 15.9 ounce piece of Standard A mail, SCF entry, at proposed rates with and without a surcharge, with (ii) the proposed 2-pound minimum rate (which would be applicable to a 16.1 ounce parcel) for Parcel Post DSCF entry (cents per piece).

<u>Standard A</u>

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Per Piece Rate: 3/5-Digit Less: SCF entry Subtotal	10.6 <u>-8.8</u> - 1.8
Plus Per Pound: 15.9 oz. @ 65.0 Subtotal	<u>64.6</u> 66.4
Plus Surcharge	10.0

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-28 Page 2 of 2

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Total	76.4	
Parcel Post		
Per Piece (implicit)	136.0	
Plus Per Pound, at 12.0 per pound, 2 pounds		
minimum	24.0	
Total	160.0	

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-29 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-29.

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Please refer to page 15 of your testimony. Please confirm that you have done no analysis regarding the incentives, either intended or otherwise, related to the proposed 10-cent surcharge. If you have, please provide the results of any such analysis used to support your claims.

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Response:

Confirmed.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-30 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-30.

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Please refer to page 17 of your testimony. Please confirm that you have done no nationally representative study to analyze the size and types of delivery receptacles and how packaging changes could raise or lower costs Postal Service delivery costs. If you have, please provide those results.

Response:

Confirmed that I have not undertaken any such study. Moreover, no such study appeared necessary. It strikes me as common sense that when items do not fit into a mail receptacle, the cost of delivery increases. Anyone familiar with (i) mail receptacles in apartment houses, (ii) the "rural" mailbox that is so common in most suburbs, and (iii) the small box that individuals rent in post offices, knows that the DMM dimensions of a flat exceed the dimensions of these receptacles. Most flatshaped mail pieces fit into such receptacles only because they can be and are folded. If the flat-shaped piece is rigid, however, it cannot be folded, and if its dimensions exceed the size of the receptacle, it will not fit.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-31 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-31.

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Is it your testimony that Standard A parcel mailers might spend more than 10 cents to reconfigure their packages as flats? If not, up to how much do you believe such mailers would spend?

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Response:

No. Mailers can be expected to weigh both current and future savings that would accrue through avoidance of the surcharge against costs incurred to avoid the surcharge. Costs incurred to avoid the surcharge would likely be looked upon as an "investment," with estimates for future savings regarded or calibrated as return on the investment. When the return exceeds the "hurdle rate," investment could be reasonably expected to follow. It should be obvious that a mailer's volume will be a critical input to this exercise.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-32 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-32.

Please refer to page 18 of your testimony. Do you have any nationally representative evidence to show that mailers will indeed repackage their product and that this repackaging will either raise or lower Postal Service mail processing costs?

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Response:

No. Nor, apparently, does the Postal Service.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-33 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-33.

Please refer to page 21 of your testimony and witness Crum's response to NDMS/USPS-T28-19. Please explain exactly how modeling mail processing costs would alter the results shown in Table 3, Exhibit K of witness Crum's testimony.

Response:

Because witness Crum's objective was to lay the foundation for development of a "simple, conservative" surcharge, and since his study was designed to match the objective (and no more), the surcharge is presented to mailers and the Commission as a take-it-or-leave-it proposition. No indication is given of the cost difference between mechanized and manual handling, nor of costs avoided through finer presortation. Yet, the very high cost of handling parcels raises the important question of whether separate presort discounts should be established for parcels, as I discuss on page 33 of my testimony. In other words, if parcels cost so much more to handle, then (i) what costs are avoided through finer presortation and dropshipment? and (ii) what incentives should be established to encourage mailers to adopt practices that will avoid more costs? Without such information, which witness Crum fails to provide, it is extremely difficult to develop any realistic alternatives to the Postal Service proposal, just as it is difficult to accept that there is a reasonable foundation for the proposal itself.

USPS/NDMS-T3-34.

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Please refer to page 22, lines 3 and 4 of your testimony. Is it your understanding that the information related to Cost Segments 7, 8, 10, and 14 in Table 3, Exhibit K in witness Crum's testimony is produced by the In-Office Cost System?

Response:

No. A more precise statement would be: Instead, the Postal Service's entire case with respect to mail processing cost rests solely on an IOCS-based cost study. In the context of the preceding paragraphs in that portion of my testimony, that meaning seemed to be implied.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-35 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-35.

Please refer to page 24 of your testimony. Please identify exactly how describing each cost driver to whatever level of detail you desire would alter either the results of the analysis in witness Crum's testimony or the actual surcharge proposed by witness Moeller?

Response:

See my response to USPS/NDMS-T3-33. Also see the discussion in part VI of my testimony, pp. 31-36. By way of example, as pointed out there in Table 3, the unit delivery cost for Nonprofit ECR parcels is 99 cents, and for commercial rate parcels it is 28 cents. The unit delivery cost for each of these ECR subclasses is somewhat higher than the unit delivery cost for "other" parcels (22 and 13 cents, respectively). At the same time, ECR parcels are significantly lighter in weight than "other" parcels. The first question is: Are these cost differences just the result of some anomalous quirk in the data, or are they real? If they result from anomalous, unreliable data, then shouldn't the data be disregarded? (That would change the results of witness Crum's analysis.) Alternatively, if the cost differences are real, then what drives them? Do ECR parcels use detached labels extensively, and if so, are detached labels the source of sharply higher costs? Should detached labels for parcels be banned or subject to a special surcharge? (That proposition would represent a change in witness Moeller's proposal.) Without knowing what cost really is, and the factors that drive that cost to be what it is, the development of sensible cost-based rates ranges between difficult and impossible.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-36 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-36.

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Please provide the sources for your statements on page 34, lines 15-18 and page 35, lines 1-2.

Response:

The data which underlie the comparisons in my statement come directly from Table 3 at page 32 of my testimony. The pertinent data in that table were devised as follows. USPS-T-28, Exhibit K, Table 3A(2) (revised 10/1/97) identifies the total weight of BNP ECR as 266,000 pounds, while the volume was 1,389,000 pieces. $(266/1,389 = 0.192) \times 16 = 3.1$ ounces. The unit delivery cost of BNP ECR is identified as \$0.994.

CS6&7 total:	1,315
CS10 total:	<u>66</u>
Total Delivery	1,381

1,381/1,389 =\$0.9942

USPS-T-28, Exhibit K, Table 3B(1) (revised 10/1/97) identifies the total weight of BRR Other as 483,659,000 pounds, while the volume was 869,434,000 pieces. (483,659/869,434 = 0.556) x 16 = 8.9 ounces. The unit delivery cost of BNP ECR is identified as 0.126

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CS6&7 total:	84,470
CS10 total:	25,173
Total Delivery	109,643

109,643/869,434 =\$0.1261

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-37 Page 1 of 2

USPS/NDMS-T3-37.

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Please refer to your comments on page 36, lines 1-4 and the results of the study described in Appendix C of LR-PCR-38 in Docket No. MC97-2. Please identify the category which these "odd-shaped parcels" which you claim cause "unusually large costs" would fall in. If you are unable to place them in a category, please describe them in detail and submit all data you have regarding their presence in the Standard Mail (A) mailstream and their relative impact on total parcel costs.

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Response:

Please note that my testimony at page 35, which immediately precedes the comments on the top of page 36, discusses the fact that witness Crum's data show a unit mail processing cost of about 15 cents for a commercial ECR parcel, 29 cents for a commercial-rate Other parcel, and about 37 cents for both nonprofit ECR and Other parcels (as shown in Table 3 of my testimony). The portion of my testimony which you cite was giving witness Crum's cost data full credence, and was speculating about what factors might cause the Postal Service to incur such cost differences. It may be entirely possible that witness Crum's cost data are too thin to have any credibility, and should be totally disregarded. In that event, it is of course a waste of time for me (or anyone else) to speculate about underlying causes of such cost differences. Beyond that, if witness Crum believes that his cost data in fact have sufficient credibility to be adopted by the Commission, it really is up to him to support his findings. My term "odd shaped parcels" refers to parcels with a circular cross section, to irregular shapes known as "outsides," and to other irregular parcels that must be processed manually at every stage. Such parcels are generally considered to have unit

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-37 Page 2 of 2

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costs that are somewhat higher than average. Whether they are more concentrated in some subclasses than others I do not know.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-38 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-38.

3.000 (0.1) (a).

Please refer to page 37, lines 13-15 of your testimony as well as Tr. 15/8063 and Tr. 19E/9850-9851. In light of the record testimony cited, please provide an explanation for your statement that "length and girth were the only measurements available for any parcel in the study."

11.08

Response:

Tr. 15/8063 does not exist. Tr. 17/8063 discusses the number of parcels (82 percent)

for which "direct measurement" was recorded. Tr. 19E/9850 states that length, width

and height were recorded for 82 percent of the parcels described in Exhibit USPS-28K,

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Table 3.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-39 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-39.

Please refer to page 38, lines 6-8 of your testimony.

- (a) Please describe which line(s) of the transcript page you cite lead to your conclusions and explain.
- (b) Please provide all data or analysis you have completed to show beyond a merely intuitive level that "the methodology of the earlier study was less subject to human error".

Response:

- (a) Witness Crum's testimony, Tr. 17/8062-63, states that "I would guess, as far as human fallibility, which is only one of the many factors that we would assess in trying to see which is coming up with the best estimate and I can't say this for certain, but my personal intuition might be that the human fallibility factor might be higher for the study that we did, but again, there are many factors other than human fallibility...." Taking *human fallibility* as a synonym for *human error*, 1 take this to be at best a weak guess, perhaps not an awareness, that the earlier study might be less prone to human error.
- (b) No such empirical analysis has been undertaken.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-40 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-40.

Please refer to page 39, lines 2-3 of your testimony. Please provide a citation as to exactly where witness Crum asserts a revenue shortfall.

11.102

Response:

See NDMS-T-3, p. 10, ll. 3-8. A comparison of the revenue data from witness

Crum's testimony, USPS-T-28 (revised 10/1/97), Exhibit K, Table 1 and 2, with the

total attributable cost data in Tables 3A(1), 3A(2), 3B(1) and 3B(2) posit a revenue

shortfall.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-41 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-41.

THE STREET

Please refer to page 41 of your testimony. Do you believe that the Commission should de-average dropship discounts by shape in Standard Mail (A)? Do you believe it would be consistent to fully de-average dropship discounts while passing through only 28.5 percent of the stated cost difference between parcels and flats? Please fully explain any affirmative response.

Response:

Please note that my primary recommendation is not to impose any parcel surcharge at this time, in which case your question becomes moot. To your question in context, if the Commission should nevertheless decide to recommend a surcharge based on costs that incorporate shape-based transportation cost differences, then my answer is yes. I believe it would be consistent to de-average fully dropship discounts by shape when passing through 100 percent (or more) of the stated revenue-cost difference for parcels. I further believe that adoption of the Postal Service's proposal which attempts to identify fully shape-based costs, while ignoring shape-based cost avoidance, would be grossly inconsistent.

USPS/NDMS-T3-42.

Please refer to page 14 of your testimony where you state "one can predict with a high degree of confidence that virtually all parcel mailers whose product gives them a repackaging option will in fact seek to repackage their products into flatshaped mailpieces if confronted with a significant surcharge for parcels... Thus, one immediate and highly predictable result of the Standard A parcel surcharge would be a massive repackaging of mailpieces now classified as parcels."

- (a) Please provide any study or analysis you have produced to support such claims.
- (b) Please define your use of the terms "high degree of confidence" and "highly predictable" and state the basis (if any) for these conjectures.

Response:

- (a) Please see my answers to NDMS/USPS-T3-10 and 27.
- (b) My high degree of confidence in standard microeconomics provides the basis for my high degree of confidence that mailers will react as suggested. At the level of theoretical analysis of prospective business costs and cost savings involved in this discussion, I feel that it is indeed highly predictable that mailers will search for ways to offset the impact of the surcharge. Please note that my prediction pertains only to mailers seeking to do so, not necessarily concluding that it would be costeffective for them to repackage. This much can be derived by standard microanalysis, and my testimony offers it as a conclusion. Conversations with the sponsors of my testimony, who annually mail millions of parcels and therefore would be affected by the surcharge, allow me to go further and assert that the behavior I refer to in my testimony is already underway, and is going forward in a most determined fashion.

1 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Does any participant have additional written cross-examination for Witness Haldi? 2 3 MR. REITER: Yes, I do, Mr. Chairman. CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Mr. Reiter. 4 5 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. REITER: 6 7 Dr. Haldi, I'm handing you two copies of your 0 answers to USPS Interrogatories 44, 45, and 46. Would you 8 take a look at those, please? 9 10 Α Yes. If I asked you those questions orally here today, 11 0 would your answers be as shown? 12 13 Yes, they would. Α Thank you. 14 Q MR. REITER: Mr. Chairman, I will hand these 15 16 copies to the reporter and ask that they be accepted into evidence as the additional written cross of Dr. Haldi. 17 The additional designated CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: 18 written cross-examination of Witness Haldi having been given 19 to the reporter, I direct it be accepted into evidence and 20 transcribed into the record at this point. 21 [Additional Designation of Written 22 Cross-Examination of Dr. John 23 Haldi, NDMS-T-3, was received into 24 evidence and transcribed into the 25

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-44 Page 1 of 3

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USPS/NDMS-T3-44

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Please refer to your response to USPS/NDMS-T3-17 where you state that "Parcels, by contrast, are still sorted on the SPBS".

- (a) Please provide the basis for this understanding.
- (b) Is it your testimony that all Standard Mail (A) parcels are sorted at plants (P&DC)? If not, please provide an estimate of the percentage.
- (c) Are you aware that machines other than an SPBS can sort Standard Mail (A) parcels at plants? If so, please describe them and list the nationally representative percentage you believe receive piece sortation on them by machine.
- (d) Is it your testimony that no Standard Mail A parcels receive piece sortation on BMC Parcel Sorting Machines (PSMs)? If your answer is no, please provide the nationally representative percentage you believe do.
- (e) Are you aware that PSMs have barcode readers?

Response:

Before answering the specific questions posed by your interrogatory, I would like to make it clear that at all places where my response to USPS/NDMS-T3-17 mentioned "parcels," it should be interpreted as referring to Standard A parcels that weigh less than 16 ounces.

(a) It is my understanding that small parcel bundle sorter (SPBS) machines are installed at all P&DCs, and that at least some BMCs are also equipped with one or more SPBS's. It is also my understanding that the SPBS is the preferred machine for sorting small parcels.

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Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-44 Page 2 of 3

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- (b) No. Some Standard Mail A parcels may be sorted at BMCs. However, since most Standard Mail A parcels are made up to 3 digits, they can be sent directly from BMCs to P&DCs, without sortation at the BMC. Some Standard Mail A parcels are dropshipped directly to P&DCs in order to bypass the BMCs and expedite delivery. I do not have data that would enable me to estimate the precise volume of Standard Mail A parcels sorted at P&DCs (as opposed to BMCs), but I would expect it to be a substantial majority of all Standard Mail A parcels.
- (c), (d), and (e) Specifications for the FSM 1000 indicate that it can sort some mailpieces whose dimensions exceed the maximum dimensions for flat-shaped pieces. It is my understanding, however, that at this time the Postal Service generally does not use the FSM 1000 for sorting anything other than flats. Hence, I estimate that the nationally representative percentage that currently receives piece sortation on the FSM 1000 is negligible.

Parcel sorting machines (PSMs) can also be used to sort parcels that weigh less than 1 pound; *e.g.*, Standard Mail A parcels. PSMs are equipped with a barcode reader that can read interleaf barcodes (but not the postnet code used for letters and flats). When sorting parcels that are not barcoded, PSMs must be operated in a manual mode. Since most PSMs are at BMCs, only Standard A parcels that are sorted at BMCs would be processed on PSMs. Since most

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-44 Page 3 of 3

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Standard A parcels are not sorted at BMCs (see response to part b), I expect that only a small percentage are sorted on PSMs. The Postal Service has not offered shippers of Standard Mail A parcels any discount or other encouragement to barcode their parcels. Moreover, when a mailer is preparing labels for Standard Mail A packages that can turn out to be either flats or parcels, even if the mailer were inclined to assist the Postal Service by preprinting a barcode, the mailer would have trouble determining which barcode to use. This "confusion," which can be solved only by the Postal Service, helps illustrate the point that I was trying to make in my response to USPS/NDMS-T3-17. Namely, to the extent that Standard Mail A parcels may have a somewhat higher unit cost of handling, it is because the Postal Service has not directed much attention or investment to increase the mechanized sorting of such parcels.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-45 Page 1 of 3

USPS/NDMS-T3-45

Please refer to your response to USPS-NDMS-T3-26(a).

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- (a) Is it your testimony that price is the key decision making criterion for customers deciding whether or not to have their film developed by mail? If so, do you believe that 10 cents will cause them to pursue other options? Please provide any evidence you might have to support your claims.
- (b) Are other factors, such as convenience, timeliness, quality, or reliability, of equal or greater importance than price for customers deciding whether to have their film developed by mail?
- (c) Please provide the rates that UPS would charge for delivering developed film packages of the type your clients send. Would you characterize the difference between those rates and the rates you now pay as "staggering" or something different? Please explain.
- (d) Please estimate for your clients' businesses the percentage of total costs that the 10-cent surcharge would comprise.

Response:

(a) Photo-finishing is a highly price competitive business, but prices can be and often are reduced in a number of different ways; e.g., a second set of prints is offered "free," or a new roll of film is offered "free" (or at a greatly reduced price only when purchased in conjunction with development), larger prints are offered for the same price as smaller prints, etc. Customers of through-the-mail photofinishers are probably more price-conscious than the average consumer (see response to part b, *infra*). The demand for photofinishing is in the nature of a classic "continuous" demand function, hence I would predict that a 10-cent increase in the price would cause a loss of some customers.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-45 Page 2 of 3

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- (b) All four of the factors which you list play a role in the consumers' choice of photofinishers. The country has a plethora of places that offer photofinishing services. Most large cities have some establishments that develop film on site and have prints available for pickup within one hour, or same-day service (in before 11:00 a.m., back in the afternoon). Where same-day service is not available, overnight service is fairly common. Consumers who place a high value on timeliness would not give any consideration to a through-the-mail photofinisher because even under the best circumstances a round-trip through the mail requires several days. With respect to convenience, the mail may be considered reasonably convenient, but on an almost daily basis a great many customers pass by an equally convenient photofinishing drop-off location such as a drug store, Wal-Mart, etc. Through-the-mail photofinishers must (and do) compete chiefly on the basis of price, quality and reliability.
- (c) I have no idea how much UPS would charge for delivering my clients' developed film, as I am aware that UPS is known to offer volume discounts. Using their published rates (Rate Chart effective 2/1/97), UPS would charge from \$3.44 to \$4.19 for a 1-pound UPS Ground package delivered to a residence, and from \$3.50 to \$4.80 for a 2-pound UPS Ground package delivered to a residence, depending on distance. Unless these rates were deeply discounted, the effect on costs of switching to UPS would be staggering.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-45 Page 3 of 3

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(d) Assuming you mean postage costs, the 10 cent surcharge alone would increase total postage costs for my photofinisher clients by approximately 10 to 13 percent. In terms of postage costs for Standard A Mail only, the surcharge represents an increase that averages about 25 percent. While the surcharge by itself represents a significant increase, the cumulative effect on NDMS of all of the Postal Service's proposed increases they would be forced to pay - i.e., the First-Class Mail nonstandard surcharge plus the 1-cent increase in the rate for the first ounce of First-Class Mail; the proposed Priority Mail rate increase; along with the Standard Mail A surcharge and rate increases for the Standard Mail A Regular subclass — would amount to "rate shock" vis-a-vis an average proposed increase of only 4.5 percent. The Postal Service's proposed rates, applied to 1997 volumes and mailing costs would increase total mailing costs for my through-the-mail photofinisher clients by 18 to 21 percent.

Response of Dr. John Haldi to USPS/NDMS-T3-46 Page 1 of 1

USPS/NDMS-T3-46

Please see your response to USPS/NDMS-T3-19(c).

- (a) Please confirm that there is a "grey area" where flat and residual shape pieces overlap.
- (b) Please confirm that this overlap does not necessarily mean that pieces in the "grey area" cost the same whether they are prepared as flats or parcels.
- (c) Please explain how the statement "a piece with 'flat-like' costs will likely meet the definition of a flat, in which case it would be exempt from the surcharge, as long as it is prepared in accordance with flat preparation requirements" implies that "no residual shape pieces share cost-causing characteristics with flats."

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Response:

- (a) Confirmed.
- (b) Confirmed.
- (c) Because it implies that a piece with 'flat-like' costs would not be defined as a parcel; *i.e.*, parcels do not (and cannot) have flat-like costs because any such piece with flat-like costs would likely be a flat (according to Moeller).

HERE AND A CALLED

CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Anyone else? 1 2 [No response.] CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If not, that moves us to oral 3 cross-examination, and the Postal Service is the only party 4 who has requested cross-examination. Does anyone else with 5 to cross-examine this witness? 6 7 [No response.] CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If not, Mr. Reiter, when you're 8 9 ready, you can begin? MR. REITER: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 10 CROSS-EXAMINATION 11 BY MR. REITER: 12 Good morning, Dr. Haldi. 0 13 Good morning, Mr. Reiter. Α 14 You said at page 13 of your testimony, and I 15 0 quote, for many industries including but not limited to 16 through-the-mail film processing, the proposed ten-cent 17 surcharge represents a staggering added expense, unquote. 18 Do you recall that statement? 19 Yes, I do. 20 А In our Interrogatory No. 26 we asked you to define 0 21 22 "staggering," and your answer said, quote, a staggering added expense is one that on the one hand wipes out a 23 substantial portion of each firm's profit margin, and yet, 24 on the other hand, is not an expense to the vast majority of 25

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12243 the competitors. 1 2 Do you recall that answer? Α Yes, I do. 3 4 0 We were concerned, frankly, about your claim that the Postal Service's proposal would wipe out a substantial 5 portion of these firms' profit margin, so we did a little 6 7 research. Because it is publicly traded, we were able to 8 find Seattle Filmworks' 10K statement on the Internet and I 9 10 have a page of that printed out, which I'll show you and everyone. 11 It is marked USPS Cross-Examination Exhibit 12 NDMS-T-3, Number 1. 13 [Cross-Examination Exhibit 14 USPS/NDMS-T-3-XE-1 was marked for 15 identification.] 16 BY MR. REITER: 17 Dr. Haldi, if you'll look on the second of the two 18 0 pages that I gave you, that is Seattle Filmworks' 19 consolidated statement of income. Do you see that? 20 Yes, I do. А 21 And do you see the net income listed for the last 22 0 fiscal year, which ended December 27th, 1997? 23 Yes, I do. Α 24 25 0 And that shows \$10,145,000? ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD. Court Reporters

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1 A That's correct.

Q In response to our Interrogatory Number 2, if you would take a look at that, you told us that the estimate that you had of the number of standard mailing envelopes mailed by NDMS that are parcel shaped was in excess of five million. Do you see that?

7

A I see the answer, right.

8 Q So for four companies on average, and I realize 9 this is rough, each one of them mails approximately 10 1,250,000 parcel shaped packages. Would that be correct?

11

A Yes, that's correct.

12 Q And at 10 cents each for the surcharge, that would 13 mean approximately \$125,000 in increased expense for them?

- 14 A Not right.
- 15

Q And why is that?

Because the mail has mixed parcels. Everything to Α 16 go out is mailed as a mixed parcel because they drop ship to 17 destination entry, and if they were to try and take the flat 18 shaped parcels and segregate them into those which are flat 19 shaped and those which are parcel shaped, then they would 20 avoid the surcharge on the flat shaped parcels, but that 21 would cause them to have to ship them separately in the --22 as two separate shipments and they would incur higher costs 23 in the -- they would either then incur higher costs from the 24 separate smaller shipments, for example if they had let's 25

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say 25 pounds to a destination and 10 pounds were parcel 1 shaped and 15 pounds were flat shaped they would have to 2 ship one 10 and one 15 pound shipment instead of one 25 3 pound shipment and that would cost more. 4 So right now in their current shipping everything 5 they ship is subject to a parcel surcharge when they ship it 6 as mixed parcels, so the parcel surcharge would have a much 7 wider and heavier impact than just the number of parcel 8 shaped pieces. 9 I am confused about what you just said, that what 10 Q they ship now is subject to a parcel surcharge? 11 No. It would be under the proposal. There is no 12 Α parcel surcharge at the present time. 13 That's right. I think you meant to say "would be" 14 Q or I didn't hear you. 15 Yes, I'm sorry -- would be. Correct. Α 16 Would you look at your response to our Question 17 Q Number 9, please. 18 In that response -- do you have that? 19 Yes, I do. Α 20 You acknowledge that there would be a one time 21 0 cost for a shipper to convert to an alternate type of 22 packaging to avoid the surcharge, is that right? 23 Α Correct. 24 You didn't seem sure though whether there would be 25 0

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1 a recurring cost for new packaging. Do you believe that 2 there would be?

A Well, first of all, let me say that depending on the conditions of the shipper there may be additional cost to those that I have enumerated here on a one-time basis.

For example, I talked to one of my clients who --I talked to him about this envelope possibility where they would have separated compartments and they would have to get a new sorting machine.

Their existing sorter could not handle that type 10 11 of an envelope and -- now he did add that, the person I 12 talked to said we have been wanting a new sorter anyhow and if the surcharge is applicable to every package, the sorter 13 14 would pay for itself in about 10 months, so with that added proviso there could be additional one-time charges other 15 than just the shifting over the way they insert and so 16 forth. 17

Beyond that, the continuing charges, nonrecurring 18 charges which you alluded to earlier, if the packaging 19 materials had a higher cost -- for example, in a different 20 interrogatory response I noted that the Photo Finishers, for 21 example, use a simple plain gusseted envelope, which is 22 fairly common and fairly economical to produce, and an 23 envelope, large envelope, with interior compartments might 24 cost more. 25

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To the extent that it did cost more, that would be a continuing recurring expense greater than what they are paying right now.

Q So for the Photo Finishers at least it is likely that the packaging that they would have to use on a recurring basis, if they were to convert to flats, would be more expensive than the type of packaging they are using now. Is that what you found out?

9 A Could be, yes. I mean you don't know until you 10 get into it, but there is always a possibility that it could 11 be.

Q They seemed to indicate to you that it would be?
A They don't have any price estimates, firm price
estimates yet.

15 Q Did they have any feeling about it?

16 A No. They are kind of waiting to see what happens17 but they are looking at their alternatives.

Q Alternatives to what?

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19 A Alternative packaging that would qualify

20 everything as a flat.

18

Q Presumably if that kind of packaging were cheaper than the kind they are using now they would already do that in an effort to reduce their overall costs, wouldn't they? A It couldn't be much cheaper than a simple gusseted envelope and as I said there's some problems of switching

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over and when you have got something that is just a simple envelope probably costing a penny or so apiece, they look at other cost factors that loom larger in the total operation than something that is that cheap.

You know, cheaper might mean -- let's assume they are paying two pennies for their gusseted envelope. That is a high estimate considering the volumes they buy and the other envelope might cost them a penny and a half, a penny and three-quarters. Well, sometimes you don't spend every day chasing down those kinds of savings when you have all kinds of other expenses out there.

12 It would be the same ballpark probably.

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13 Q I am confused. Are you saying that it is possible 14 that the alternative packaging would be cheaper?

15 A It's possible it could be cheaper right now but so 16 infinitesimally cheaper that they are not jumping all over 17 it.

Q We'll come back to that, I think -- and I think you indicated before when you were talking about some of the transitional costs that your clients have looked at that as an investment that they might have to make that would be -they would analyze as to how long the return was.

I think you indicated one of them told you 10months.

25 A That is correct.

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1 Q Now if they suspected that there would be a 2 shorter amount of time for them to recoup that investment, 3 that would certainly affect their decision to reconfigure 4 their parcels, wouldn't it?

5. 6

5 A That is correct. The shorter the payback period, 6 the higher the implicit rate of return.

Q I brought some things I want to use to demonstrate
here. I think it will make it easier to picture what we are
saying -- the box of checks that I received in the mail.

I think this is fairly typical of the way checks are delivered. I think it came shrink-wrapped. It has a label on it, but other than that, it is pretty much unchanged.

14 Does that look like something you are familiar 15 with?

16 A I have seen boxes similar to that.

Q Now if I have the right impression, and I am getting some of this from Mr. Olson's cross examination of Mr. Crum recently where he talked about what photo finishers might do, just using the rudimentary office supplies I had in my office I put something together which I am really only using to ask you if this is the type of thing that you think might possibly happen.

24 So presumably there would be some type of flat 25 piece that would have pockets or some way that the checks

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1 could be arranged so they were flat -- is that your 2 understanding of what they might do? 3 A They constitute what I have referred to in my 4 testimony as "stackable items" -- yes, sir. 5 0 So you would end up with a piece, if I can get it 6 in, something like that? 7 А You could, yes. And that would qualify as a flat? 8 0 My understanding is that would qualify as a flat. 9 А 10 Q Now in your response to our Question Number 11, in 11 Part B, you said that you weren't aware of any added value 12 of any particular shape of packaging that is valued to the 13 ultimate consumer, is that right? 14 А Correct. Now if I as a recipient get this piece and I open 15 Q 16 it up and find all my checks are here, I don't know exactly 17 what I'd do with that. I probably would take them out of 18 the little pockets and then be glad that I kept the box from the last bunch of checks that I had. 19 Does that seem reasonable? 20 21 А It seems a possibility. 22 Q All right. 23 А If you kept the box. 24 I might keep the box, I might not have, and I Q might be kind of upset if I had no place to put these --25

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1 isn't that possible also? 2 Α Excuse me? 3 If I didn't keep my old box then I would just have 0 a bunch of loose checks when I opened it up and discarded 4 the flat packaging, wouldn't I? 5 6 Α If you had the packaging that you created, that 7 would be correct, yes. Or some kind of flat packaging that the check 8 0 printers would do, presumably a lot better than what I have 9 10 here. They might come out with the box rather than slide 11 А them up one book apiece the way you have, but the box would 12 13 be less than three-quarter inches thick. 14 0 So there would still be a box in addition to the rest of the packaging or something to keep them flat? 15 There would be something to keep the contents from 16 Α 17 moving around, yes, sir. So instead of just a box with some shrink wrap 18 Q around it --19 20 Α Right. 21 -- there's going to have to be additional 0 22 packaging? 23 Α Correct. 24 And presumably that costs more -- if we are adding Q 25 on to what we do now, then it's got to cost more. Wouldn't

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1 you agree with that?

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2 A The checks I receive -- I get checks in the mail 3 also.

There's two boxes. There is sort of an inner box and then an outer box made of just paperboard that is the mailing box, and then you throw away the outer box and you keep the inner box to keep your checks in.

8 I presume they might create the same thing but it 9 would be higher -- capable of carrying a measure of checks 10 but there are all kinds of alternatives. All they could do 11 is make sure it's less than three-quarter inches thick when 12 it is finished. Then it would be a flat.

13 Q From the consumer's viewpoint there are a lot more 14 choices these days for ordering checks than there used to 15 be. Are you aware of that?

16 A Yes, sir.

Q

Q People used to just go to the bank to get them. Now I know I get inserts every week in the newspaper, sometimes even in the mail, from several companies that do check printing, is that right?

21 A That's correct.

22 Q Have you seen those?

A And it has gotten to be a very competitivebusiness.

25

Yes. They offer all kinds of alternatives,

ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD. Court Reporters 1250 I Street, N.W., Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 842-0034 1 different patterns, address labels that match, things like 2 that, is that right?

3 A That's right.

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Q And it would certainly be possible that a consumer might prefer checks that are sent in a box to ones in some kind of flat packaging?

A Might be.

7

8 Q And do you think the consumer would make that 9 choice even if it cost ten cents more?

10 A Well, if you go out of your way to create a 11 package that is -- makes it very difficult to store the 12 checks, then the answer is yes, that's a possibility.

13 Q And I think you talked about the likelihood of 14 that kind of thing. You called is mischief, the creation of 15 perversely -- or perversely created cumbersome flats?

That's right. And if you take the checks that 16 Α you've got there, pocket-size checkbooks, I believe they're 17 referred to typically, you might be able to create just two 18 stacks in a box that would be twice the height of that box 19 that you have there, or you might create three stacks. 20 It'd be a box about three times the height. The height I guess 21 is about -- from here I'd guess about three, 22

23 three-and-a-half inches, so you could create

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24 different-shaped boxes depending on how many you want to 25 stack in each box.

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Q

But the objective -- I'm sorry.

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2 Α The other comment I was going to make with respect 3 to checks, which is a fairly major item through the mail, some banks these days are not returning checks the way they 4 used to, so you don't need a box to store them in. 5 Thev 6 send you back a photo print of your checks, and they keep 7 the checks, in which case you never have old checks to 8 store, so the box becomes rather superfluous as a storage 9 item.

10 Q In this case I'm storing my unused checks in the 11 box.

12 Α Well, you'll deal with a bank -- and banks have gone to that, by the way, as a way of cutting down their 13 postage. I have a bank that does that, and they get -- I 14 think they get about 10 or 12 checks photostated on one 15 page, so that one page takes up less weight in the return 16 17 envelope than those checks would be if they were all stacked in that envelope. So the incremental-ounce charge for First 18 Class mail has fueled that change in technology with respect 19 to returning checks. 20

Q Now a lot of checks don't happen to be, but I've gotten them before, have duplicates, carbonless duplicates. A consumer might want to keep the box for storing those, wouldn't --

25 A Might.

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Q Now I want to go back to another comment you made about stacking the little checks I think you were talking about, maybe stacking these two or three high.

A Right.

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5 Q I tried that in this piece and I thought I was 6 getting dangerously close to three-quarter inches, which 7 would make it not a flat. That would be a concern, wouldn't 8 it?

9 A Oh, that would definitely be a concern. You want 10 to --

11 Q So that might -- I'm sorry.

12

4

A Stay under three-quarter inches.

13 We skipped a step along the discussion before, Q which was I was assuming that a piece of this nature would 14 15 fit into my mailbox, and I tried it this morning on my way out, at least in my mailbox it doesn't. We asked you about 16 that in our Question No. 13, and I think you indicated that 17 you didn't think that that would be a big issue for the 18 consumer if they had to go to the post office to pick it up. 19 If --20

A Well, as I indicated, obviously a large, rigid box would not fit in the typical mailbox you see in the suburbs, oftentimes referred to as a rural mailbox. I haven't measured one lately, because I live in New York City, but -you don't see many in New York City -- but I think they are

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1 about nine-and-a-half, maybe ten inches high at most, and if 2 you had a rigid box whose dimensions exceeded that, they 3 wouldn't fit inside the mailbox.

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Q And if we focus for a minute on the photofinishing business, isn't one of the main advantages of photofinishing through the mail that the photos are delivered to the consumer's home?

8 A I don't know if -- it's -- I don't know if it's an 9 advantage or not. It's the only way they have to deliver 10 them.

11 Q Well, consumers have other choices. They can go 12 to the supermarket, the drug store, the photo shop. But 13 that requires travel on the consumer's part. Isn't that 14 correct?

15 A For some consumers it might. Many consumers go 16 right by a film processing place every day in their normal 17 routine.

18 Q But they still have to leave home.

19 A Oh, yeah, they would have to leave --

20 Q Whereas if you do it through the mail, you21 presumably don't.

22 A Right.

Q Now if photo finishers reconfigure their pieces to be rigid flats that don't fit into the mailbox, then that advantage of that type of photo finishing would be lost or

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12257 at least compromised, wouldn't it? 1 2 Α Correct. So the through-the-mail photo finishers by 3 0 4 reconfiguring their pieces would lose one of the clear 5 advantages they have over their competitors -- supermarkets, drug stores, photo shops? 6 They would be more likely to go to a divided 7 Α envelope, which would flip-flop around an axis, either 8 vertical or horizontal axis. That would fold and fit very 9 10 neatly into a mailbox. It might be difficult for the carrier to handle. 11 Was that -- I think Mr. Olson had a piece like 12 0 13 that when he cross-examined Mr. Crum. Α Correct. 14 And it kind of flopped around in the middle like 15 0 16 this. I'm familiar with it. I created it. 17 Α Q We'll come back to that. 18 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Mr. Reiter, before you move on 19 any further, are you going to put those checks into evidence 20 here and leave them with us? 21 MR. REITER: No, I wasn't planning on it, Mr. 22 23 Chairman. CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Just wanted to try. 24 MR. REITER: Believe me, there's not enough behind 25

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12258 1 them to make it worth --2 BY MR. REITER: 3 0 Continuing actually with the photo finishing industry, we did a little research on that, too, and I have 4 5 copies of this as well. This is an order form from Seattle 6 Filmworks which I'll show you. 7 And if you look where it says prints up in the 8 upper left-hand section, deluxe four-by-six, two sets, the 9 price there is 16.25. Do you see that? Which set is this? 10 А Up where it says prints, deluxe four-by-six. 11 0 It's the fifth item listed there. 12 13 Α Yes. And for 36 exposures it says 16.25; is that right? 14 Q 15 А Correct. And then down in the lower right-hand corner if 16 Q 17 you request standard delivery you pay an additional dollar 18 forty-five for that, for shipping. А Right, I see that. Yes. 19 And the total would be 17.70 then. 20 0 21 Α Right. If you'll accept my math. 22 0 23 We also went to CVS to see the same price, and 24 while I don't have a piece of paper from them, what they told me was a dollar -- I'm sorry, 11.99, and I guess you 25

1181 ALC ALC \$ 1.48.50 (Fig. 1) and

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12259 1 pay five-and-three-quarters percent D.C. tax there, and that 2 comes to 12.68. 3 Who's this? Α This was at CVS. 4 0 5 А Oh, okay. 6 Q For the same type of 36-exposure, double 7 four-by-six prints. I conclude from that that that's a difference of 8 9 five dollars and two cents. By the way, that's a 40-percent 10 difference. Does this -- these kind of prices -- are you familiar at all with the prices that your clients charge or 11 your competitors? 12 I don't track their individual prices for their 13 A different -- all the different configurations. I would note 14 that Seattle gives you the roll of film free. That's 15 16 included. I don't think --17 Q Actually --CVS gives you free film, do they? 18 Α This was for double prints or single prints and a 19 0 roll of film, so I think they --20 21 Α At CVS? 0 Either one. Yes. 22 Α Okay. 23 24 In any event, my point really is whether you're Q aware that price differentials of this nature are not 25

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unusual in the industry.

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A I know that Seattle charges considerably more than
District or Nashua.

Q So for someone to choose to use Seattle rather than go to CVS, there has to be something involved other than price, I would assume.

7 A There probably is; yes.

Q Do you know what that might be?

Α Well, in the case of Seattle, they give you a 9 special film, but there's very few people in this country 10 can develop that film. It's a special type of film. 11 I'm not sure what it is. And if you take a Seattle Filmworks 12 roll of film into a CVS or something, they really can't do 13 an adequate job of developing it and giving you prints back. 14 So you become a quasi-captive of Seattle. 15

16 Q But either one of them can develop ordinary film; 17 isn't that right?

A Seattle could. I don't think they get very much ordinary film. They get it mostly from people to whom they send their own film to.

Q But with the price differential in the range of five dollars, then presumably people using Seattle are doing it for reasons such as service, I think that's what you were talking about, convenience as well.

25 A Yes. I haven't talked as much to Seattle because

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they're on the west coast, as their name implies, but I do know that discussions with the other photo finishers who are here on the east coast whom I see more often, that a large part of their clientele is actually in rural areas, and in rural areas as opposed to urban areas, small towns, rural areas, it's not as convenient typically.

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Those people don't go by a film processor every 7 day in a shopping mall or something like that. If anything, 8 they have to go into town to find a local drug store or 9 someplace, and that drug store oftentimes has a pickup 10 that's served by a more distant, bigger town, and it's at 11 12 least overnight if not two days or three days, so the mail becomes somewhat more convenient for people in those 13 geographic circumstances. 14

Q So given that if Seattle and the other companies needed to raise their prices by 10 cents or whatever they needed to recoup the surcharge, it probably wouldn't affect their business that much if the people who use them have many other considerations for using them, such as those you mentioned.

21 Wouldn't you agree with that?

A Seattle would be affected less, partly because they charge higher prices and a 10 cent increase in their price would be a lower percentage increase than it would be for District or Nashua.

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THE REPORT OF A REAL PLACE 12262 1 I don't have with me any price charts like this 2 for them but they are readily available. I don't know if 3 you checked those or not. Okay. Thank you. Coming back for a minute to this 4 0 5 floppy type of piece that you mentioned before where the 6 flat is essentially folded in the middle, I quess you're 7 assuming that the Postal Service would measure it this way in determining that it is a flat, isn't that right? 8 9 А That's right. 10 0 What if the Postal Service measured it that way? It might end up not being a flat, isn't that right? 11 If you folded it over, it might not be a flat. 12 Α That's correct, but --13 0 As I recall from the piece that Mr. Olson had when 14 15 he cross examined Mr. Crum it seemed to me that that thing tended to flop over, isn't that right? 16 17 Α Very much so. 18 0 And if the Postal Service were to -- let's back 19 up. If your clients reconfigured their pieces in that 20 way, and the Postal Service decided, hey, these are flats --21 22 I'm sorry -- hey, these are parcels, that would sort of 23 negate the investment horizon that you were talking about earlier for conversion, wouldn't it? 24 MR. OLSON: Mr. Chairman, could I ask if the 25

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12263 1 question presupposes a change in the DMM definition of a 2 parcel and a flat? CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: In order that you understand 3 4 the question that is being asked of your witness, I think that it's not unreasonable. 5 MR. REITER: Not at all, and we can assume it 6 7 either way. 8 Let's assume that the Postal Service doesn't change it and measures the piece like this and says, hey, 9 10 that's too thick or let's assume that we change it to make 11 that clear that that is how we are measuring it. 12 We can assume either. CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Let me ask a question along the 13 same lines because I was a little confused too. 14 15 If you have one of those floppy envelopes, and the address label is fitted squarely in the middle of the front 16 17 side of the envelope, why would the Postal Service fold it over to process it? Or would they just fold it over for 18 purposes of charging more money? 19 20 MR. REITER: No, my assumption from the piece that Mr. Olson had was that the thing kind of folds itself and 21 maybe we would tell them, hey, put the address label so that 22 it can be read. 23 I am assuming that is what is going to happen to 24 those pieces when they are processed. That's -- I don't 25

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want to argue about that. That is my assumption that I am
 asking Dr. Haldi to make.

CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Well, I am kind of curious and the DMM is relevant because there are requirements for flexibility and the like as well as thickness, so that certain types of envelopes can fit through sorting equipment os it becomes relevant but I am not here to cross examine you and you are not here to try and enlighten me.

9 MR. REITER: No, but I want to make the question 10 clear and I think that is why you are asking. I appreciate 11 that.

12

BY MR. REITER:

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Q Let's just assume that the Postal Service through whatever means has defined this as a parcel. Whether -- I don't think it matters if the Postal Service can change the DMM, so let's assume that we do that in case there's any lack of clarity -- so I will come back to me question, Dr. Haldi.

Assuming a piece like that is considered a parcel through a DMM change and that would certainly extremely shorten the horizon that you were talking about, about an investment decision and reconfiguring to flat shape,

23 wouldn't it?

A Well, you asked an interrogatory to that effect **7**. I am just curious to know if you are referring to that

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interrogatory or if this is a different question? 1 2 0 Which one are you looking at? 3 Α I haven't found it yet. Oh, well, I will try to find it also. 4 0 I believe it's number 12, your Interrogatory 5 Α 6 Number 12. All right. We will take a look at that. 7 0 8 Well, I think there you are discussing the possibility of a change and I guess my question now is 9 10 asking you to assume that the change is made and get your opinion on how that would affect the decisions that we were 11 talking about before in terms of reconfiguration. 12 Well, if you make the change before they make any 13 Α 14 changes, so as to sort of shore up your recommendation to make sure they can't do something like that, then I don't 15 suppose they would do it because there would be a cost with 16 17 no reward at that point. Let's -- that's fine. Let's say that given that a 18 0 lot of this is in the realm of speculation, certainly in 19 terms of exactly how these would be repackaged, as you 20 indicated, what if the scenario was that your client started 21 doing this kind of repackaging and the Postal Service maybe 22 concluded there were some operational problems or whatever 23 and then proceeded to make the change we talked about. 24 I can't quite hear you. Would you speak into the 25 Α

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Q I'm sorry. Let's assume that some of your clients made the kind of change we are talking about with the floppy piece and the Postal Service decided that it was having operational problems with that, and then proceeded to make the kind of DMM change we were talking about.

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7 Under those circumstances, how would that affect8 your client's investment decision?

9 A Well, if they have already made the investment,
10 they would have to look back and decide they'd been
11 frustrated by the Postal Service again.

12 Q And if that was something that they saw ahead of 13 time as a possibility, how do you think that would affect 14 their decision either to make that investment or to 15 reconfigure their pieces in that fashion?

16 A I'll stick by the answer I gave to Part B of your 17 Interrogatory Number 12. I don't think that they would 18 weigh that possibility very heavily.

19 Q So they would ignore that and just go ahead?20 A Probably.

Q Would you look at your response to our Question 14, please, particularly Part B and particularly the first sentence on page 2 of your response there.

Are you saying that preparation requirements created an incentive for machinability?

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12267 1 А What do I say in my other responses? You have the -- I guess I was thinking about the 2 3 response to Number 22 where you distinguish between machineable and non-machineable. Those are flats. 4 5 With respect to parcels, I am trying to think how the preparation requirements do encourage machinability and 6 7 I am hard-pressed to think of any just parcels as such how 8 the preparation requirements encourage machinability per se. 9 0 Well, isn't it true that if a parcel is 10 machineable, it can be prepared to a BMC and get the 3/5 11 digit rate? 12 I guess that's what I was thinking of at the time А 13 I wrote this, yes. 14 0 Okay, whereas if it is not it has to be presorted 15 to three digit --16 Α Right. -- so there would be that incentive? 17 0 18 THE REPORTER: Is that a question? 19 THE WITNESS: Oh, is that a question? 20 BY MR. REITER: 21 Q Yes. Was that your conclusion? Α 22 Yes. Thank you. Would you look at your response to our 23 0 24 Question 44, where you answered Parts (c), (d), and (e) 25 together, the second page of that? It is actually page 3 of

ANN RILEY & ASSOCIATES, LTD. Court Reporters 1250 I Street, N.W., Suite 300 Washington, D.C. 20005 (202) 842-0034 1 3 of the whole response.

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nation to the structure of the state

2 Actually I am looking at the sentence that starts at the very bottom of page 2 and continues on page 3: 3 "Since most Standard A parcels are not sorted at BMCs" --4 5 could you tell me the basis for your assumption there? My assumption about which? 6 Α 7 0 That most Standard A parcels are not sorted to 8 BMCs -- at BMCs, I'm sorry. is that Well, my understanding the BMCs prefer, if they 9 Α are presorted to three digits, they prefer to kick them 10 P+DC. along to the PMDCs, and that they only take them inside to 11 P+DCs sort them if they can't move them along to the **PMDCs**. 12 I want to go back to your statement about what a 13 0 staggering expense it would be for your clients, and your 14 definition that I read earlier was that it wiped out a 15 substantial portion of each firm's profit margin. Do you 16 have a particular percentage of profit margin in mind? 17 affects I would say something that effects profits by 10 А 18 to 20 percent would be fairly staggering. If they are not 19 in a position -- particularly, when they are not in a 20 position to pass it on. 21 If -- you know, if all photo finishers, for 22 example, were through the mail, so that all photo finishers 23 were going to be faced with the same price increase, then 24

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they would all be in the position of having to pass on the

1 cost and it probably would not be nearly as influential as 2 an expense, which is strictly limited to some, a group of 3 firms that have only 6 percent of the total market, and 4 where the 94 percent doesn't use the mail at all.

alation constrained in the

Q But as we discussed before, to the extent that the through-the-mail photo finishers are -- to the extent that their customers are deciding to use them for reasons other than price, then that becomes somewhat less of an issue, doesn't it?

Oh, I am not pretending that the demand curve is 10 Α perfectly elastic. I think you have a fairly elastic demand 11 curve and, given the large number of customers, it almost 12 fits the classic mode of what the economists call a 13 continuous demand curve when they draw a demand curve on a 14 blackboard or a chalkboard or something like that. And 15 whenever you have sort of a continuous demand curve, and you 16 move the price up a little bit, you lose some customers. 17 You retain a large base, but you lose some, depending on the 18 elasticity, the number that you lose. 19

But if you raise your price independent of 96 percent of -- 94 percent of your competitors, and that's what the demand curve really means, relative price, you expect to lose some customers. And you would not expect to lose them all either because it is not a perfect -- you are right, there are other factors and it is not a perfectly

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1 competitive situation. 2 MR. REITER: Thank you. That's all I have, Mr. 3 Chairman. CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Is there any follow-up? 4 Questions from the bench? 5 6 [No response.] 7 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Would you like some time with your witness for redirect? 8 MR. OLSON: Please, Mr. Chairman, just two 9 minutes. 10 11 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Okay. Thank you. [Recess.] 12 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Mr. Olson. 13 14 MR. OLSON: Mr. Chairman, we have no redirect. CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If that is the case, I get to 15 16 thank Dr. Haldi yet again for his appearance and his contributions to our record. 17 If there is nothing further, you are excused. And 18 I quess we won't see you again until the last day of 19 20 hearings? THE WITNESS: Wrong, Mr. Chairman. 21 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Oh, my goodness gracious. 22 THE WITNESS: Let's try Monday. 23 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Well, --24 THE WITNESS: Have a good weekend. 25

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1 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: We look forward to seeing you 2 on Monday, and you have good weekend, too. 3 COMMISSIONER LeBLANC: Have a nice trip home. COMMISSIONER HALEY: Go back to New York City. 4 THE WITNESS: Right. 5 [Witness excused.] 6 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: We'll give everybody a moment 7 to get settled at the counsels' and witness' tables and the 8 9 like. Ms. Dreifuss, are you ready to introduce your 10 witness so that I can swear him in? 11 MS. DREIFUSS: Yes, Chairman Gleiman. OCA calls 12 James Callow to the stand. 13 14 Whereupon, JAMES F. CALLOW, 15 a witness, was called for examination by counsel for the 16 Office of the Consumer Advocate and, having been first duly 17 sworn, was examined and testified as follows: 18 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Please be seated. 19 DIRECT EXAMINATION 20 BY MS. DREIFUSS: 21 22 Q Would you state your full name, please? James F. Callow. Α 23 Do you have before you two copies of a document 24 Q marked OCA-T-500? 25

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12272 Α Yes, I do. 1 2 Is that your testimony in this proceeding? Q Yes, it is. I have one change to make. On page 3 Α 12 line 8, the word "cost" should be changed to "costs" and 4 those are marked in the two copies I have here for the 5 6 record. 7 0 All right. Were there any other changes to OCA-T-500 since the time it was initially filed on December 8 9 30th? Yes, I should mention that on page 60, which was 10 Α revised on the 18th of February, line 15 originally said 43 11 12 percent, it should say 33 percent, and those changes are made in -- also made in the copies for the record. 13 MR. RUBIN: Could you repeat the first change you 14 made? 15 THE WITNESS: Yes. In the testimony, on page 12, 16 line 8, the word "cost" should be changed to "costs". 17 MR. RUBIN: Thank you. 18 BY MS. DREIFUSS: 19 If you were to testify orally, would this be your 20 Q 21 testimony? 22 Α Yes. MS. DREIFUSS: Mr. Chairman, I move that OCA-T-500 23 be admitted into evidence. 24 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Are there any objections? 25

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1	[No response.]
2	CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Hearing none, Mr. Callow's
3	testimony and exhibits are received into evidence, and I
4	direct that they be transcribed into the record at this
5	point.
6	[Direct Testimony and Exhibits of
7	James F. Callow, OCA-T-500, was
8	received into evidence and
9	transcribed into the record.]
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OCA-T-500 Docket No. R97-1

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

JAMES F. CALLOW

ON BEHALF OF

THE OFFICE OF THE CONSUMER ADVOCATE

DECEMBER 30, 1997

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1	DIRECT TESTIMONY OF
2	JAMES F. CALLOW
3	STATEMENT OF QUALIFICATIONS
	STATEMENT OF QUALIFICATIONS
4	
5	My name is James F. Callow. I am a Postal Rate and Classification
6	Specialist. I have been employed by the Postal Rate Commission since June 1993,
7	and since February 1995 in the Office of the Consumer Advocate (OCA).
8	I previously testified before this Commission in Docket Nos. MC96-3 and
9	MC95-1. My testimony in Docket No. MC96-3 opposed the Postal Service's non-
10	resident surcharge on post office boxholders, and proposed alternative box fees
11	designed to equalize inter-group cost coverages and reduce the disparity in cost
12	coverages by box size. In Docket No. MC95-1, my testimony summarized the
13	comments of persons expressing views to the Commission and the Office of the
14	Consumer Advocate on postal rates and services.
15	As Special Assistant to former Commissioner Quick, I participated in Docket
16	Nos. MC93-1, MC93-2 and R94-1. In the latter docket, I was assigned responsibility
17	for substantive subject areas considered by the Commission in its Opinion and
18	Recommended Decision. Specifically, I analyzed quantitative testimony of the
19	Postal Service with respect to the estimation of workers' compensation costs and
20	evaluated rate design proposals of the Postal Service and other parties related to
21	special postal services.

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Prior to joining the Commission, I held positions on the legislative staff of a
 US Senator and a Member of Congress from Michigan, and served as an aide to the
 Governor of the State of Michigan in Washington.
 I am an accountant by training. In 1985, I earned an MS degree in

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5 accounting from Georgetown University. My course work included cost accounting

6 and auditing. In 1977, I obtained my BA degree from the University of Michigan-

7 Dearborn with a double major in political science and history and a minor in

8 economics.

1 I. PURPOSE AND SCOPE OF TESTIMONY

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2	This testimony addresses the post office box fee proposals of the Postal
3	Service. ¹ I propose a classification change that would restructure current Fee
4	Groups C and D into six new fee groups based upon the Cost Ascertainment Group
5	(CAG) of post offices. Three new fee groups, C-I, C-II and C-III, would be formed
6	from CAG A-D, E-G and H-L offices, respectively, in Fee Group C. Three new fee
7	groups, D-I, D-II and D-III, would also be formed from the same CAG level offices in
8	Fee Group D. The new fee groups and proposed fees represent a proposed
9	transition to a further restructuring that would ultimately merge these parallel fee
10	groups into three fee groups.
11	The fees I propose are based on a new cost allocation methodology. The
12	Postal Service's current allocation methodology results in higher volume-variable
13	unit box costs in smaller offices and lower unit costs in larger offices than if costs
14	were allocated according to office location and size, as measured by CAG.
15	Consequently, I propose a new cost allocation methodology that distributes a
16	portion of volume-variable post office box costs by CAG. My proposed post office

1 314 9

¹ My testimony consists of this document, OCA-T-500, and workpapers which contain spreadsheets showing the development of my post office box fee proposal, filed as library reference OCA-LR-10. In addition, I sponsor the library reference OCA-LR-2.

1 box fees are virtually the same as or lower than those proposed by the Postal

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- 2 Service in the new fee groups consisting of CAG E-G and H-L offices, where
- 3 allocated costs are lower under the new methodology, while box fees are higher in

4 fee groups consisting of CAG A-D offices, where allocated costs are higher.

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II. CURRENT POST OFFICE BOX FEES AND FEE GROUPS DO NOT
 ADEQUATELY REFLECT THE HIGHER COSTS OF PROVIDING BOX
 SERVICE IN LARGER CAG POST OFFICES, NOR THE LOWER COSTS
 OF SERVICE IN SMALLER OFFICES
 5

- 6 The Postal Service proposes to increase fees for all post office boxes in Fee
- 7 Groups A-D.² The testimony of witness Needham (USPS-T-39) describes post
- 8 office box service and presents justifications for the Postal Service's proposed fee
- 9 increases.
- 10 The current post office box fee groups, designated A-E, were established in
- 11 Docket No. MC96-3 at the behest of the Postal Service.³ The testimony of witness
- 12 Lion (USPS-T-24) describes the current fee groups and develops estimates of the
- 13 number of boxes in use for each group. According to witness Lion, the five post
- 14 office box fee groups "are now defined principally in terms of the fees paid."
- 15 USPS-T-24 at 2. Fee groups generally "depend upon specified ZIP Codes,
- 16 customer characteristics, and type of carrier delivery service." Tr. 3/1064
- 17 (OCA/USPS-T24-2).

² USPS-T-39, Table 11, at 59. Fee Group E boxholders, those ineligible for any type of carrier delivery service, "pay" a fee of \$0, and no fee increase is proposed by the Postal Service for these boxholders.

³ See PRC Op. MC96-3 at 47-48.

1 The testimony of witness Lion also presents the Postal Service's methodology for allocating volume-variable post office box costs to develop test year 2 3 before rates (TYBR) unit box costs. Witness Lion describes the allocation 4 methodology generally: "Volume-variable costs are allocated to post office boxes in 5 three categories: space provision, space support, and all other using the same methodology as in Docket No. MC96-3." USPS-T-24 at 3. 6 7 The current post office box fee groups, and the Postal Service's allocation 8 methodology, result in higher volume-variable unit costs for boxes in smaller post 9 offices, and lower unit box costs in larger offices, than if costs were allocated to 10 boxes with greater consideration to office location and size. Consequently, fees 11 based upon the Postal Service's unit box costs are higher for boxholders in smaller 12 post offices than would otherwise be necessary if current fee groups were 13 restructured and volume-variable costs were de-averaged based upon CAG. 14 Α. Postal Service Costs Are Higher In Larger CAG Post Offices Than In Smaller 15 Offices 16 17 The Postal Service classifies post offices by Cost Ascertainment Group (CAG).⁴ Post offices are classified from A-L (excluding the letter "I") based upon the 18

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⁴ Glossary of Postal Terms, Publication 32, April 1988, at 16.

1	amount of revenue generated, as measured by "revenue units."5 CAG A post			
2	offices, defined as offices with 356,250 or more revenue units, generate the greates			
3	revenues, while CAG L offices, with 35 or fewer revenue units, generate the least. ⁶			
4	For Fiscal Year 1996, the most recent year available, a revenue unit equals			
5	\$306.65.7 Consequently, a CAG A post office would generate revenues of at least			
6	\$109,244,063 (\$306.65*356,250 revenue units), and a CAG L office would generate			
7	revenues less than or equal to \$10,733 (\$306.65*35 revenue units).			
8 9 10	 Average postal rental costs are higher in larger post offices, as measured by CAG 			
11	Witness Lion acknowledges that average postal rental costs are higher in			
12	CAG A, B and C post offices than average postal rental costs in CAG K and L post			
13	offices. Tr. 3/1173 (OCA/USPS-T24-85). Postal Service data support this			
14	conclusion. In Docket No. R90-1, Postal Service data revealed: ⁸			
15 16 17	there is a <i>significant relationship</i> between the CAG designation of a facility and its associated square-foot rent (e.g. CAG A offices have higher rents than CAG L offices). [emphasis added]			

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⁸ Docket No. R90-1, USPS Library Reference F-183, at 2, n. 2.

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⁵ A revenue unit is "[T]he average amount of revenue per fiscal year from postal rates and fees for 1,000 pieces of originating mail and special service transactions." Id. at 54.

⁶ See U.S. Postal Service Handbook F-4, June 1992, at 22, for the range of revenue units defining each CAG.

⁷ Postal Bulletin 21940, February 27, 1997, at 51.

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1	The Postal Service's Library Reference F-183, from that same docket, further			
2	concluded that "CAG A and B offices tend to be located in higher-rent urban areas,			
3	while CAG K and L offices tend to be located in lower-rent rural areas." Id. at 15.			
4	More recently, in Docket No. MC96-3, when average rental costs were again			
5	examined for post offices classified by CAG, the data revealed an almost uniform			
6	decline in the average rental cost as the size of post office declines. ⁹			
7 8	2. Other postal costs are higher in larger CAG post offices			
9	Aside from average postal rental costs, other costs vary by CAG, and are			
10	higher in larger CAG offices. Two conditions produce this result. First, certain labor			
11	costs are not incurred in smaller post offices. While the salaries and benefits of			
12	mailhandlers are uniform nationwide, there are more mailhandlers in higher CAG			
13	offices, and proportionately more costs, than in lower offices. ¹⁰ In fact, there are			
14	virtually no mailhandlers, and consequently almost no mailhandler costs, to be found			
15	in CAG F-L offices. Ibid. Similarly, there are virtually no supervisors in offices CAG			
16	H or below. Ibid. Hence, virtually no supervisor costs are incurred in such offices.			

⁹ Docket No. MC96-3, Tr. 8/2916. Response of United States Postal Service to Interrogatory of the Office of the Consumer Advocate, OCA/USPS-88.

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¹⁰ Tr. 13/7040-46. OCA/USPS-T5-11-13, Attachment 1, at 1, revised September 25, 1997. The cited material isn't limited to information on mailhandlers, but includes information on postmasters and supervisors, too.

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1	Second, certain other costs, while present in all post offices, are incurred in		
2	proportionally greater amounts in higher versus lower CAG offices. For example,		
3	postmaster salaries and benefits are dependent, in part, on CAG and therefore vary		
4	by CAG. Tr. 13/7069 (OCA/USPS-T24-66b). In Fiscal Year 1996, the average		
5	salary for postmasters in CAGs K-L was \$39,309, while the average salary for CAG		
6	A-G postmasters was \$55,220 40 percent greater than the average salary of CAG		
7	K-L postmasters. Tr. 13/7061 (OCA/USPS-T5-37).		
8 9 10 11	B. The Postal Service's Methodology For Allocating Certain Post Office Box Volume-Variable Costs Does Not Recognize Higher Costs In Larger Post Offices And Lower Costs In Smaller Offices		
12	In developing unit box costs, the Postal Service allocates volume-variable		
13	Space Provision costs to post office boxes utilizing an average postal rental cost for		
14	fee groups, and assigns an average of All Other costs to all boxes. In the case of		
15	Space Provision costs, the use of an average rental cost to distribute such costs		
16	does not recognize the wide variation in rental cost by CAG within Fee Groups C		
17	and D. In the case of All Other costs, assigning an average cost to all boxes does		
18	not recognize the fact that some costs are proportionately greater in larger CAG		
19	post offices, or not incurred at all in smaller CAG offices.		

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1. Allocating volume-variable Space Provision costs to post office boxes using average postal rental costs for fee groups masks widely different 2 rental costs by CAG in Fee Groups C and D 3 4

Volume-variable Space Provision costs are allocated to boxes, in part, upon 5 6 the average postal rental cost for each fee group. First, the average rental cost for 7 each delivery group is computed as an average of the rental cost per square foot for each facility in each delivery group. Tr. 3/1067 (OCA/USPS-T24-5). Second, the 8 9 average rent for each fee group is calculated as the weighted average of boxes installed by delivery group, using the percentages in Table 5 of USPS-T-24.¹¹ 10 11 Space Provision costs are then allocated in direct proportion to a measure of box 12 capacity and rental cost per square foot for each fee group. USPS-T-24 at 20. 13 In the case of Fee Groups A and B, rental costs are computed from the average of facilities' rental costs per square foot in designated high-cost ZIP Codes. 14 Fee Group A consists of ZIP Codes in Manhattan, New York, and Fee Group B 15 consists of ZIP Codes in eight large cities and some surrounding suburbs.¹² By 16 contrast, the city-other and non-city delivery groups, which form the basis of Fee 17 Groups C and D, respectively, do not represent rent-homogeneous groupings. 18

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¹¹ See USPS LR-188, at 15, 15A and 15B, revised August 11, 1997.

¹² See Section D910.5.3., DMM 52, July 1, 1997.

Table 1 shows the average postal rental cost by CAG for city-other and noncity delivery offices. For both delivery groups, there is a wide disparity in average
rental costs by CAG. In the city-other delivery group, the average rental cost for
CAG A offices (\$8.98) is more than double that of CAG L offices (\$4.37). In the
non-city group, the average rental cost for CAG C offices is 32 percent
(\$7.46/\$5.65-1) greater than for CAG L offices, while the average for CAG E offices

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Table 1. Average Rental Cost by CAG for City-Other and Non- City Delivery Offices				
		Average		Average
	City-Other	Rental Cost	Non-City	Rental Cost
CAG	Offices	(\$/sq.ft.)	Offices	(\$/sq.ft.)
A	1,005	\$8.98	0	NA
В	576	\$9.02	3	\$5.93
C	988	\$9.41	12	\$7.46
D	448	\$8.57	16	\$7.31
E	691	\$7.80	87	\$8.43
F	659	\$7.11	268	\$7.90
G	911	\$6.01	1,166	\$7.07
н	470	\$5.21	2,431	\$6.26
J	142	\$4.77	3,517	\$5.82
ĸ	144	\$4.44	5,971	\$5.70
L	16	\$4.37	699	\$5.65
TOTAL	6,050	\$7.73	14,170	\$6.00

7 is more than 49 percent (\$8.43/\$5.65-1) greater when compared to CAG L offices.

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By contrast, average rental costs by CAG show greater similarity across
delivery groups. Average rental costs vary in a range from 8 percent (\$8.43/\$7.80-

11 1) for CAG E offices to 29 percent (\$5.65/\$4.37-1) for CAG L offices. The

1	percentage	difference in average rental cost for each delivery group is also 29
2	percent (\$7	.73/\$6.00 -1) .
3 4 5 6	2.	Allocating an average of All Other volume-variable costs to post office boxes generates unit box costs that are too low for larger post offices and too high for smaller offices in all fee groups

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7 All Other volume-variable costs consist primarily of labor costs. USPS-T-24 at 19. Under the Postal Service's methodology, these cost are allocated 8 9 proportionately to the number of boxes since, it is reasoned, "labor costs do not 10 depend upon box size or location." Id. at 20. This proportional allocation, without regard to office location or size, results in \$6.69 (\$104,580,000/15,620,769 boxes) 11 12 being distributed by the Postal Service to all boxes in the TYBR. Id. at 24. 13 The Postal Service's proportional allocation of All Other costs to boxes 14 ignores the fact that certain costs do vary by CAG. As discussed previously, 15 postmasters costs vary by CAG, and it is not reasonable to expect mailhandler and 16 supervisor costs in offices in which they are not located. See supra, II. A. 2. 17 Nevertheless, the Postal Service's approach allocates mailhandler and supervisors 18 costs even to those offices that have no mailhandlers or supervisors working in 19 them. The effect of allocating an average cost to all post office boxes unfairly 20 increases unit box costs in smaller CAG offices and reduces such costs relative to larger CAG offices. 21

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1 C. Post Office Box Fees Based Upon Current Fee Groups And The Postal 2 Service's Cost Allocation Methodology Results In Unjustifiably Higher Fees In 3 Smaller Post Offices And Fees That Are Too Low In Larger Offices 4 5 The Postal Service's methodology of averaging higher cost, high CAG post 6 offices with lower cost, low CAG offices has the effect of inappropriately raising 7 volume-variable unit box costs in smaller offices and concomitantly lowering volume-8 variable unit box costs for larger offices. For Fee Groups C and D, the use of 9 average postal rental costs for allocating Space Provision costs to boxes masks 10 differences in average rental costs by CAG. That is, higher CAG offices have higher 11 average rental costs than lower CAG offices. Similarly, the Postal Service's 12 methodology of allocating an average of All Other costs to all post office boxes 13 unjustly increases unit box costs in smaller CAG offices and reduces such costs for 14 larger CAG offices. 15 Post office box fees based on these average costs would necessarily mean

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that box fees are too high in smaller CAG post offices, while box fees are too low in
larger CAG offices.

III. CURRENT POST OFFICE BOX FEE GROUPS SHOULD BE RESTRUCTURED TO BETTER REFLECT DIFFERING COSTS OF LARGER AND SMALLER POST OFFICES 4

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5 A. Fee Groups C And D Should Be Restructured Based Upon The CAG Of The
 6 Post Offices

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8 I propose to restructure post office box fee groups by creating six new fee 9 groups. Three new fee groups would be formed from the current Fee Group C and 10 three from current Fee Group D, based upon CAG. CAG A-D post offices in Fee 11 Groups C and D would become new Fee Groups C-I and D-I, respectively. CAG E-12 G post offices in each fee group would become new Fee Groups C-II and D-II. 13 respectively. The remaining CAG H-L post offices in each fee group would become 14 new Fee Groups C-III and D-III, respectively. This parallel grouping of CAGs from 15 the current fee groups would serve as a prerequisite to merging the six new fee 16 groups, and thereby eliminating a separate fee structure for Fee Groups C and D, in 17 a future proceeding. 18 1. Fee Groups C and D are similar in fundamental ways 19 20 There is a general recognition that Fee Groups C and D are fundamentally

21 similar. In Docket No. MC96-3, the difficulty of pricing post office boxes with a single

22 rate structure where costs are essentially the same was stated succinctly:

When areas are categorized and prices are set to reflect average cost
 differences some of the resulting prices may seem irrational, as when a
 suburban area and a rural area are in close proximity and have essentially
 the same costs, but have different rates.¹³

6 In this docket, the Postal Service's fee proposal for Fee Groups C and D is 7 premised, in part, on a recognition that there are "similarities in Groups C and D with respect to costs and service" USPS-T-39 at 65. According to witness 8 9 Needham, Fee Groups C and D are similar in that both consist of offices providing 10 carrier delivery service, either city or rural. Tr. 3/688-89. Moreover, "there really is no difference in the type of box service and very minimal differences in the type of 11 12 costs for these . . . two fee groups." Tr. 3/691. These "minimal differences" in costs 13 are evident in the testimony of witness Lion, which shows that Postal Service unit 14 costs for providing box service in Fee Group D are approximately 10 percent less than in Fee Group C.¹⁴ Table 1 shows similarities in cost from another perspective. 15 16 Average rental costs by CAG show greater similarity between the city-other and 17 non-city delivery groups, which form the basis of Fee Groups C and D, than within 18 these delivery groups. See supra, II. B. 1.

¹³ Docket No. MC96-3, Tr. 7/2296-97, Direct Testimony of OCA Witness Roger Sherman, OCA-T-100.

¹⁴ USPS-T-24, Table 13, at 27, revised October 1, 1997.

1 These similarities in cost suggest that merging Fee Groups C and D, and 2 establishing three fee groups based upon CAGs A-D, E-G and H-L, would produce more rent-homogeneous fee groups than the current fee groups.¹⁵ However, I did 3 not take this step at this time because of my concern about substantial fee 4 5 increases for affected boxholders. See infra, V. A. 2. Restructuring Fee Groups C and D based upon CAGs A-D, E-G and 6 H-L produces more rent-homogeneous fee groups 7 8 In the alternative, Fee Groups C and D were separately restructured by CAG, 9 creating more rent-homogeneous fee groups. Table 2 shows the average rental 10 11 cost for offices in the city-other and non-city delivery groups displayed by CAGs A-D, E-G and H-L. The first two columns under the headings "City-Other" and "Non-12 City" offices replicate the same office and average rental cost data by CAG from 13 14 Table 1. The last column under each heading shows the "Weighted Average Rental Cost (\$/Sq.Ft.)" when offices are grouped by CAGs A-D, E-G and H-L. 15 Average rental costs for each grouping by CAG are more rent-homogeneous 16 17 than the average for the delivery group as a whole. For city-other offices, the

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¹⁵ See OCA-LR-2 at 15, which shows the average rental costs when the cityother and non-city delivery offices are combined by CAG.

Tab	Table 2. Weighted Average Rental Cost for City-Other and Non-City Delivery Offices by CAG										
		City-Other Of	fices		Non-City Offices						
			Weighted			Weighted					
		Average	Average		Average	Average					
			Rental Cost		Rental Cost	Rental Cost					
CAG	Offices	(\$/Sq.Ft.)	(\$/Sq.Ft.)	Offices	(\$/Sq.Ft.)	(\$/Sq.Ft.)					
Α	1,005	\$8.98	\$2.99	0	NA	NA					
В	576	\$9.02	\$1.72	3	\$5.93	\$0.57					
С	988	\$9.41	\$3.08	12	\$7.46	\$2.89					
D	448	\$8.57	\$1.27	16	\$7.31	\$3.77					
	3,017		\$9.07	31	_ 1 1 1 1 1	\$7.24					
Е	691	\$7.80	\$2.39	87	\$8.43	\$0.48					
F	659	\$7.11	\$2.07	268	\$7.90	\$1.39					
G	911	\$6.01	\$2.42	1,166	\$7.07	\$5.42					
	2,261		\$6.88	1,521		\$7.30					
Н	470	\$5.21	\$3.17	2,431	\$6.26	\$1.21					
J	142	\$4.77	\$0.88	3,517	\$5.82	\$1.62					
Κ	144	\$4.44	\$0.83	5,971	\$5.70	\$2.70					
L	16	\$4.37	\$0.09	699	\$5.65	\$0.31					
	772		\$4.96	12,618		\$5.84					

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weighted average rental cost for the largest offices, CAGs A-D, is \$9.07, and \$4.96
for the smallest offices, CAGs H-L. This compares to an average rental cost for all
city-other offices of \$7.73. See Table 1.

6 In restructuring Fee Groups C and D, the grouping of offices according to

7 CAG A-D to form new Fee Groups C-I and D-I was suggested to me by the same

8 grouping of CAG offices in the "City-B" delivery group. See OCA-LR-2 at 11. I

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9 determined the other two groupings of offices by CAG, which form new Fee Groups

- 1 C-II and D-II, and C-III and D-III, by dividing the remaining "Average Rental Costs
- 2 (\$/Sq.Ft.)" by two dollar increments.

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- B. The Development Of Base Year And Post-MC96-3 Estimates Of The Number Of Boxes In Use Is Similar To The Approach Followed By The Postal Service
 1. Development of the Base Year estimates of the number of boxes in use involves introduction of CAG groupings
- 9 Table 3 shows the estimated number of boxes installed by the type of carrier
- 10 delivery service offered. Table 3 is analogous to, and uses the same definition of
- 11 carrier delivery group as, Table 1 of USPS-T-24.¹⁶

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	Table 3. Estimated Number of Boxes Installed										
	Carrier Delivery Group										
Box Size											
1	35,535	58,079	4,201,907	3,577,136	918,567	8,791,224					
2	1,987	16,525	2,028,034	1,548,797	323,245	3,918,588					
3	1,162	5,899	718,205	411,307	80,017	1,216,590					
4	118	1,154	170,547	35,300	5,590	212,709					
5	5 51 747 40,696 6,680 3,680 51										
TOTAL	38,853	82,404	7,159,389	5,579,220	1,331,099	14,190,965					

¹⁶ The totals by box size and for each carrier delivery group are similar to the figures in Table 1 of witness Lion's testimony. I used data contained in Postal Service Library Reference H-278, which was provided in response to OCA/USPS-T24-86, Tr. 3/1174. The data in LR-H-278 reflects the September 1997 Delivery Statistics File (DSF), the most recent data available. Consequently, the data by box size and delivery group are different from those contained in the testimony of witness Lion, who utilized the June 1997 DSF. See USPS LR-H-278 at 2.

Table 4 shows the estimated number of boxes in use by carrier delivery

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	Table 4. Estimated Number of Boxes in Use									
Carrier Delivery Group										
Box Size City-A City-B City-other Non-city Delivery Tota										
1	26,350	49,829	3,498,063	2,928,396	742,423	7,245,061				
2	1,644	11,966	1,483,084	1,217,569	244,690	2,958,953				
3	922	4,309	491,133	318,872	58,774	874,010				
4	96	674	104,946	25,503	3,907	135,126				
5	28	678	21,979	2,829	414	25,928				
TOTAL	29,040	67,456	5,599,205	4,493,169	1,050,208	11,239,078				

2 group, and is analogous to witness Lion's Table 2.

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4 Table 5 presents the "expansion factors" by carrier delivery group that are 5 used to estimate the number of boxes in use, pre-MC96-3. Unlike Table 3 in 6 witness Lion's testimony, however, Table 5 also shows the expansion factors for 7 each grouping by CAG in the city-other, non-city and nondelivery carrier delivery 8 groups. The expansion factors, based on the number of boxes installed from two data 9 10 sources, the Delivery Statistics File (DSF) and the Post Office Box Survey (POB Survey), are calculated as the ratio of column [a] to column [b].¹⁷ These factors are 11 12 then used to "expand" the number of boxes in use obtained from the POB Survey in 13 Table 4 to estimate the number of boxes in use prior to Docket No. MC96-3.

¹⁷ See USPS-T-24 at 6-7.

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Table 5	5. Expar	sion Factors by	CAG by Delivery G	roup	
Carrier Delivery		Boxes Installed	Boxes Installed	Expansion	
Group	CAG	(Sept 97 DSF)	(POB Survey)	Factor	
		[a]	[b]	[c]	
City-A	_A	104,384	38,853	2.68664	
City-B	A-D	202,719	82,404	2.46006	
City-othe r	A-D	6,608,169	3,989,487	1.65640	
	E-G	3,828,343	2,890,257	1.32457	
	H-L	333,537	279,645	1.19272	
	Total	10,770,049	7,159,389	1.50433	
Non-city	A-D	70,428	44,937	1.56726	
	E-G	2,202,548	1,544,979	1.42562	
	H-L	4,797,066	3,989,304	1.20248	
	Total	7,070,042	5,579,220	1.26721	
Nondelivery	A-D	15,983	6,633	2.40962	
	E-G	336,871	231,101	1.45768	
	H-L	1,357,016	1,093,365	1.24114	
	Total	1,709,870	1,331,099	1.28456	
GRAND TOTAL		19,857,064	14,190,965	1.39928	

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Table 6 displays the results of applying the expansion factors to the
estimated number of boxes in use from Table 4. Totals are presented for each CAG
grouping within the city-other, non-city and non-delivery carrier delivery groups, and
the total for each carrier delivery group. This table is analogous to Table 4 in
USPS-T-24, with the addition of CAG groups.

Table 6. Estimate	ed Boxes in U	lse by CAG b	y Delivery G	roup, Pre MC96-3
	City-A	City-B		
Box Size	CAG A-D	CAG A-D		
1	70,793	122,582		
2	4,417	29,437		
3	2,477	10,600		
4	258	1,658	i	
5	75	1,668		
Total	78,020	165,946		
		City-other		
Box Size	CAG A-D	CAG E-G	CAG H-L	Total
1	3,174,930	1,927,797	150,137	5,252,863
2	1,450,575	752,140	47,117	2,249,833
3	491,012	240,967	15,241	747,219
4	115,388	44,961	1,598	161,947
5	27,912	6,207	527	34,646
Total	5,259,817	2,972,072	214,620	8,446,508
		Non-city		
Box Size	CAG A-D	CAG E-G	CAG H-L	Total
1	33,345	1,166,835	2,511,555	3,711,735
2	20,434	550,702	983,920	1,555,055
3	7,029	147,968	253,237	408,233
4	1,066	16,674	15,785	33,525
5	155	1,860	1,714	3,729
Total	62,029	1,884,038	3,766,211	5,712,278
		Nondelivery		
Box Size	CAG A-D	CAG E-G	CAG H-L	Total
1	6,361	200,871	747,141	954,373
2	4,595	62,785	247,869	315,249
3	1,523	16,268	58,311	76,102
4	164	2,294	2,811	5,269
5	53	197	319	569
Total	12,696	282,415	1,056,451	1,351,562
GRAND TOTAL				15,754,314

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Table 7 presents the assumptions for allocating post office boxes to fee

3 groups resulting from Docket No. MC96-3. As in Table 5 of witness Lion's

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1	testimony, these assumptions are used to estimate the number of customers in
2	classified post offices and contract stations who are ineligible for carrier delivery
3	service, and thus entitled to a post office box at no fee. Table 7 also extends the
4	subgroup naming convention (e.g., "C" and "E-0;" "D-1" and "E-1;" "D-2" and "E-2;"
5	etc.) used by witness Lion to indicate eligible and ineligible customers.
6	In the non-city delivery group, Table 7 shows the percent of eligible and
7	ineligible customers in classified offices and contract stations by CAG groupings.
8	For example, "D-1" represents the subgroup of customers eligible for delivery from
9	CAG A-D classified offices in the non-city delivery group, while "D-2" represents the

10 subgroup of eligible customers from CAG A-D contract stations.

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Tabl	e 7. Assu	mptions for A	Allocation t	o Fee Gi	roups		
Delivery Group	CAG	Percent Classified/ Contract	Eligible Customers		Ineligible Customers		
			Subgroup	Pct.	Subgroup	Pct.	
		[a]		[b]		[c]	
City-other Offices			С	99%	E-0	1%	
Non-city Offices							
Classified	CAG A-D	100.00%	D-1	98.00%	E-1	2.00%	
Contract	CAG A-D	0.00%	D-2	0.00%	E-2	0.00%	
Classified	CAG E-G	87.94%	D-3	86.18%	E-3	1.76%	
Contract	CAG E-G	12.06%	D-4	1.21%	E- 4	10.85%	
Classified	CAG H-L	97.66%	D-5	95.71%	E-5	1.95%	
Contract	CAG H-L	2.34%	D-6	D-6 0.23%		2.10%	
Nondelivery			D-7	70%	E-7	30%	
Offices							

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1 Because offices are grouped by CAG, separate estimates of the percentage

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- 2 of eligible and ineligible customers from classified offices and contract stations are
- 3 necessary. These percentages, shown in column [a] of Table 7, are developed in
- 4 Table 7A.

Table 7A. I	•	•	ons on Percer act Stations by		t Classified
CAG	Number of Boxes In Use at Non- city Delivery		Adjustment to Number of Boxes at Contract Stations		Percent of Boxes at Contract Stations
	[a]	[b]	[c]	[d]	[e]
A B C D	0 8,098 24,821 29,110	0	0	•	
Total	62,029	0	0	100.00%	0.00%
E F G	204,416 468,080 1,211,542	5,078 1,305	28,200		
Total	1,884,038			87.94%	12.06%
H J K L	1,483,834 1,287,203 963,414 31,760	1,469 1,393 1,148	31,744 30,102		
Total	3,766,211	4,070	87,950	97.66%	2.34%
GRAND TOTAL	5,712,278	14,583	315,131	94.48%	5.52%

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Tables 8A-C show the estimated number of boxes in use, pre-MC96-3. The tables result from applying the percentages for eligible and ineligible delivery service 7 boxholders to the estimated boxes in use found in Table 6. Table 8A summarizes

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the number of boxes in use for Fee Groups A, B and C. Fee Group C is the sum of
 three subgroups by CAG. Table 8B provides the same information for Fee Group D,
 which is the sum of nine subgroups. Table 8C shows the same information for Fee
 Group E.

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	Table 8A. Estimated Boxes in Use, Pre-MC96-3										
	Fee Groups										
Box Size	A B C [A-D] C[E-G] C[H-L] Total C										
1	70,793	122,582	3,143,180	1,908,519	148,635	5,200,334					
2	4,417	29,437	1,436,070	744,619	46,646	2,227,334					
3	2,477	10,600	486,102	238,557	15,088	739,747					
4	258	1,658	114,234	44,512	1,582	160,328					
5	75	1,668	27,633	6,145	522	34,300					
Total	78,020	165,946	5,207,218	2,942,351	212,473	8,362,043					

	Table 8B. Estimated Boxes in Use, Pre-MC96-3											
	Fee Groups											
Box Size	D-1	D-2	D-3	D-4	D-5	D-6	D-7[A-D]	D-7[E-G]	D-7[H-L]	Total D		
1	32,678	0	1,005,613	14,070	2,403,846	5,865	4,453	140,610	522,999	4,130,134		
2	20,025	0	474,611	6,640	941,724	2,298	3,217	43,950	173,508	1,665,973		
3	6,889	0	127,523	1,784	242,377	591	1,066	11,387	40,818	432,435		
4	1,044	0	14,370	201	15,108	37	115	1,606	1,968	34,449		
5	152	0	1,603	22	1,640	4	37	138	223	3,820		
Total	60,788	0	1,623,721	22,718	3,604,695	8,795	8,887	197,691	739,516	6,266,811		

	Table 8C. Estimated Boxes in Use, Pre-MC96-3											
Fee Groups												
Box Size	E-0	E-1	E-2	E-3	E-4	E-5	E-6	E-7	Total E			
1	52,529	667	0	20,523	126,629	49,058	52,786	286,312	588,503			
2	22,498	409	o	9,686	59,764	19,219	20,679	94,575	226,830			
3	7,472	141	o	2,603	16,058	4,946	5,322	22,831	59,373			
4	1,619	21	0	293	1,810	308	332	1,581	5,964			
5	346	3	0	33	202	33	36	171	824			
Total	84,465	1,241	0	33,137	204,462	73,565	79,155	405,469	881,494			

1 2. The post-MC96-3 estimated number of boxes in use shows CAG 2 groupings 3 Tables 9A-E show the estimated number of boxes in use resulting from fee 4 5 changes in Docket No. MC96-3. The post-MC96-3 estimate is derived by applying the Commission's elasticities for each box size in each fee group.¹⁸ Table 9A shows 6 the results for Fee Groups A and B. Table 9B presents the estimate for Fee Group 7 C, with the results displayed separately for each grouping by CAG. Table 9C shows 8 the estimates for Fee Group D, maintaining separate estimates for the effects of 9 price increases for each grouping by CAG. Table 9D presents the results for Fee 10 Group E. Table 9E summarizes the estimates by fee group in terms of paid and free 11 boxes, and for caller service and reserve call numbers. 12

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¹⁸ See PRC Op. MC96-3, Appendix D, Schedule 3, at 17. See also Docket No. R97-1, USPS-T-24, Tables 7A-D, at 12-15.

Ta	Table 9A. Estimated Boxes in Use by Fee Group, Post-MC96-3										
Fee Groups A & B											
Fee Box Pre 96-3 Post 96-3 Pct. Pre 96-3 Elasti- F											
Group	Size	Fees	Fees	Change	Boxes	city	Boxes				
	1	\$48	\$48	0%	70,793	-0.522	70,793				
	2	\$74	\$74	0%	4,417	-0.601	4,417				
Α	3	\$128	\$128	0%	2,477	-0.517	2,477				
	4	\$210	\$242	15%	258	-0.517	238				
	5	\$348	\$418	20%	75	-0.517	67				
Total A					78,020		77,992				
	1	\$44	\$44	0%	122,582	-0.478	122,582				
	2	\$66	\$66	0%	29,437	-0.603	29,437				
В	3	\$112	\$112	0%	10,600	-0.517	10,600				
	4	\$190	\$218	15%	1,658	-0.517	1,532				
	5	\$310	\$372	20%	1,668	-0.517	1,496				
Total B					165,946		165,647				

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	Table 9B. Estimated Boxes in Use by Fee Group, Post-MC96-3												
				Fee Grou	Jp C								
Fee		Box	Pre 96-3	Post 96-3	Pct.	Pre 96-3	Elasti-	Post 96-3					
Group	CAG	Size	Fees	Fees	Change	Boxes	city	Boxes					
		1	\$40	\$40	0%	3,143,180	-0.522						
		2	\$58	\$58	0%	1,436,070	-0.605	1,436,070					
С	A-D	3	\$104	\$104	0%	486,102	-0.517	486,102					
		4	\$172	\$172	0%	114,234	-0.517	114,234					
		5	\$288	\$288	0%	27,633	-0.517	27,633					
Subtotal	C[A-D]					5,207,218		5,207,218					
		1	\$40	\$40	0%	1,908,519	-0.522	1,908,519					
		2	\$58	\$58	0%	744,619	-0.605	744,619					
С	E-G	3	\$104	\$104	0%	238,557	-0.517	238,557					
		4	\$172	\$172	0%	44,512	-0.517	44,512					
		5	\$288	\$288	0%	6,145	-0.517	6,145					
Subtotal	C[E-G]			_		2,942,351		2,942,351					
		1	\$40	\$40	0%	148,635	-0.522	148,635					
		2	\$58	\$58	0%	46,646	-0.605	46,646					
С	H-L	3	\$104	\$104	0%	15,088	-0.517	15,088					
		4	\$172	\$172	0%	1,582	-0.517	1,582					
		5	\$288	\$288	0%	522	-0.517	522					
Subtotal	C[H-L]			,		212,473		212,473					
Total C						8,362,043		8,362,043					

T:	Table 9C. Estimated Boxes in Use by Fee Group, Post-MC96-3												
	Fee Group D												
Fee Group	}	Box	Pre 96-3	Post 96-3	Pct.	Pre 96-3	Elasti-	Post 96-3					
	CAG	Size	Fees	Fees	Change	Boxes	city	Boxes					
		1	\$8			32,678							
D-1		2	\$13			20,025		•					
Classified	A-D	3	\$24	· · ·		6,889	-0.152	•					
eligible		4	\$35	· ·		1,044	-0.152	963					
		5	\$55			152	-0.152						
Subtotal						60,788		57,318					
		1	\$2	\$12	500%	0	-0.054	0					
D-2		2	\$2			0	-0.069	0					
Contract	A-D	3	\$2		1700%	0	-0.036	0					
eligible		4	\$2			0	-0.024	0					
Ū		5	\$2			0	-0.015	0					
Subtotal						0	,	Ō					
		1	\$8	\$12	50%	1,005,613	-0.085	962,900					
D-3		2	\$13			474,611	-0.136						
Classified	E-G	3	\$24	\$36	50%	127,523	-0.152	-					
eligible		4	\$35	\$53	51%	14,370	-0.152						
-		5	\$55	\$83	51%	1,603	-0.152	1,479					
Subtotal						1,623,721		1,535,340					
		1	\$2	\$12	500%	14,070	-0.054	10,301					
D-4		2	\$2	\$20	900%	6,640	-0.069	2,507					
Contract	E-G	3	\$2	\$36	1700%	1,784	-0.036	690					
eligible		4	\$2	\$53	2550%	201	-0.024	76					
		5	\$2	\$83	4050%	22	-0.015	8					
Subtotal						22,718		13,582					
		1	\$8	\$12	50%	2,403,846		2,301,744					
D-5		2	\$13	\$20	54%	941,724	-0.136	872,844					
Classified	H-L	3	\$24	\$36		242,377	-0.152	223,931					
eligible		4	\$35	\$53	51%	15,108	-0.152	13,925					
		5	\$55	\$83	51%	1,640	-0.152	1,513					
Subtotal						3,604,695		3,413,957					
		1	\$2	\$12	500%	5,865	-0.054	4,294					
D-6		2	\$2			2,298	-0.069						
Contract	H-L	3	\$2	\$36	1700%	591	-0.036	229					
eligible		4	\$2	\$53	2550%	37	-0.024	14					
		5	\$2	\$83	4050%	4	-0.015						
Subtotal						8,795		5,405					

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Table 9C	. Est	imate	d Boxes i	n Use by Fo	ee Group	, Post MC96		inued)					
	Fee Group D												
		1	\$8	\$12	50%	4,453	-0.054	4,334					
D-7		2	\$13	\$20	54%	3,217	-0.069	3,097					
Nondelivery	A-D	3	\$24	\$36	50%	1,066	-0.036	1,047					
eligible		4	\$35	\$53	51%	115	-0.024	113					
		5	\$55	\$83	51%	37	-0.015	37					
Subtotal						8,887		8,627					
		1	\$8	\$12	50%	140,610	-0.054	136,843					
D-7		2	\$13	\$20	54%	43,950	-0.069	42,313					
Nondelivery	E-G	3	\$24	\$36	50%	11,387	-0.036	11,182					
eligible		4	\$35	\$53	51%	1,606	-0.024	1,586					
		5	\$55	\$83	51%	138	-0.015	137					
Subtotal						197,691		192,061					
		1	\$8	\$12	50%	522,999	-0.054	508,990					
D-7		2	\$13	\$20	54%	173,508	-0.069	167,046					
Nondelivery	H-L	3	\$24	\$36	50%	40,818	-0.036	40,081					
eligible		4	\$35	\$53	51%	1,968	-0.024	1,943					
		5	\$55	\$83	51%	223	-0.015						
Subtotal						739,516		718,282					
		1				4,130,134		3,960,696					
D		2				1,665,973		1,547,132					
Total		3				432,435		401,341					
eligible		4				34,449		31,865					
		5				3,820		3,537					
Total D						6,266,811		5,944,572					

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Table	9D. E	stimated	Boxes in l	Jse by Fe	e Group,	Post-MC9	6-3
		····	Fee Gr	oup E			
Fee Group	Box	Pre 96-3	Post 96-3	Pct.	Pre 96-3	Elasticity	Post 96-3
	Size	Fees	Fees	Change	Boxes	-	Boxes
E-0	1	\$8	\$0		52,529		52,529
City-other	2	\$13	\$0		22,498		22,498
ineligible	3	\$24	\$0		7,472		7,472
_	4	\$35	\$0		1,619		1,619
	5	\$55	\$0		346		346
Subtotal					84,465		84,465
E-1	1	\$8	\$0	······································	667		667
Non-city	2	\$13	\$0		409		409
Classified	3	\$24	\$0		141		141
ineligible	4	\$35	\$0		21		21
	5	\$55	\$0		3		3
Subtotal					1,241		1,241
E-2	1	\$2	\$0		0		0
Noncity	2	\$2	\$0		0		0
Contract	3	\$2	\$0		0		0
ineligible	4	\$2			0		0
	5	\$2	\$0		0		0
Subtotal					0		0
E-3	1	\$8	\$0		20,523)	20,523
Noncity	2	\$13	\$0		9,686		9,686
Classified	3	\$24			2,603		2,603
ineligible	4	\$35	\$0		293	1	293
	5	\$55	\$0		33	1	33
Subtotal					33,137		33,137
E-4	1	\$2			126,629		126,629
Noncity	2	\$2			59,764		59,764
Contract	3	\$2			16,058		16,058
ineligible	4	\$2			1,810		1,810
	5	\$2	\$0		202		202
Subtotal					204,462	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	204,462
E-5	1	\$8			49,058	1	49,058
Noncity	2	\$13			19,219	1	19,219
Classified	3	\$24			4,946		4,946
ineligible	4	\$35	1 · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	1	308	1	308
	5	\$55	\$0		33		33
Subtotal					73,565		73,565

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OTHER ALL REPORTED

Table 9D. E	Estimat	ed Boxes	in Use by	Fee Group, Post	IC96-3 (continued)
			Fee G		
E-6	1	\$2	\$0	52,786	52,786
Noncity	2	\$2	\$0	20,679	
Contract	3	\$2	\$0	5,322	5,322
ineligible	4	\$2	\$0	332	332
	5	\$2	\$0	36	36
Subtotal				79,155	79,155
E-7	1	\$8	\$0	286,312	286,312
Nondelivery	2	\$13	\$0	94,575	94,575
ineligible	3	\$24	\$0	22,831	22,831
	4	\$35	\$0	1,581	1,581
	5	\$55	\$0	171	171
Subtotai				405,469	405,469
E	1		\$0	588,503	588,503
Total	2		\$0	226,830	226,830
ineligible	3		\$0	59,373	59,373
	4		\$0	5,964	5,964
	5		\$0	824	824
Total E				881,494	881,494

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Tab	Table 9E. Estimated Boxes in Use by Fee Group, Post-MC96-3												
A	All Fee Groups plus Caller Service and Reserve Numbers												
Fee Group	Box Size	Pre 96-3 Fees	Post 96-3 Fees	Pct. Change		Elasti- city	Post 96-3 Boxes						
Paid Boxes													
(A+B+C+D)					14,872,820		14,550,254						
Free Boxes	(E)				881,494		881,494						
TOTAL BOX	ES				15,754,314		15,431,749						
Caller Servi	ce	\$349	\$451	29%	100,770	-0.398	89,055						
Reserve Nu	mbers	\$30	\$30	0%	178,717		178,717						
GRAND TOT	TAL				16,033,801		15,699,521						

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 C. The Test Year Before Rates And After Rates Estimates Of The Number of Boxes In Use And Revenues Reflect The New Fee Groups

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- 4 Table 10 reconfigures the post-MC96-3 fee groups into the proposed new fee
- 5 groups. The test year before rates (TYBR) number of boxes in use is also

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- 6 computed by applying the Postal Service's 1.9 percent growth factor. See
- 7 USPS-T-24 at 16.

		d Boxes in Us										
r		Groups, TYB	Y									
	New Fee Groups Growth Factor = 0.019											
New Fee	Box	Post 96-3	TYBR Boxes									
Groups	Size	Boxes										
A	1	70,793	72,138									
	2 3	4,417	4,501									
		2,477	2,524									
	4	238	242									
	5	67	69									
Total A		77,992	79,474									
В	1	122,582	124,912									
	2	29,437	29,996									
	2 3 4	10,600	10,802									
	4	1,532	1,561									
 	5	1,496	1,524									
Total B		165,647	168,795									
C-I	1	3,143,180	3,202,901									
	2 3	1,436,070	1,463,355									
	3	486,102	495,338									
	4	114,234	116,404									
	5	27,633	28,158									
Total C-I		5,207,218	5,306,156									
C-II	1	1,908,519	1,944,781									
	2	744,619	758,767									
	2 3	238,557	243,090									
	4	44,512	45,357									
	5	6,145	6,262									
Total C-II		2,942,351	2,998,256									

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		Boxes in Use	-
New Fe		s, TYBR (cont	inued)
L		ee Groups	154 (50
C-III	1	148,635	151,459
	2 3	46,646	47,532
		15,088	15,375
	4	1,582	1,612
	5	522	532
Total C-III		212,473	216,510
D-I	1	35,624	36,301
	2 3	21,657	22,069
	3	7,411	7,552
	4	1,076	1,096
	5	177	180
Total D-I		65,945	67,198
D-II	1	1,110,045	1,131,135
	2	484,717	493,926
	3	129,690	132,154
	4	14,907	15,190
	5	1,624	1,655
Total D-II		1,740,982	1,774,061
D-III	1	2,815,028	2,868,513
	2	1,040,758	1,060,532
	2 3	264,241	269,261
	4	15,882	16,184
	5	1,736	1,769
Total D-III		4,137,645	4,216,260
E	1	588,503	599,685
	2	226,830	231,140
	3	59,373	60,501
	4	5,964	6,078
	5	824	840
Total E	· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·	881,494	898,243
GRAND TOT	AL	15,431,749	15,724,952

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Fee Groups A and B are the same as the post-MC96-3 fee groups. Fee
Groups C and D are reconfigured into the proposed new Fee Groups C-I, C-II and
C-III and D-I, D-I, and D-III. C-I and D-I consist of CAG A-D post offices,
representing the largest post offices in the current Fee Groups C and D,

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12311 respectively. New Fee Groups C-II and D-II consist of medium-sized post offices, 1 2 CAG E-G, while C-III and D-III consist of the smallest post offices, CAG H-L. Tables 11A and B show the development of the estimated boxes in use and 3 revenues in the TYAR. Table 11A shows the proposed fees, and presents the 4 TYAR boxes in use, revenues, and the change in revenues from the test year before 5 rates to the test year after rates for the new fee groups. Table 11B summarizes the 6 estimated boxes in use and revenues in the TYAR by paid and free boxes, and for 7 caller service and reserve call numbers. Revenues are estimated to increase \$73 8 million to a total of \$690 million. 9

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·			Table	11A. Es	timated Boxe	s in Use	by New Fee	Groups, TYAR		
						Fee Gro				· · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
New Fee	Box		Proposed	Pct.	OCA TYBR	Elasti-	OCA TYAR	OCA TYBR	OCA TYAR	Change in
Groups	Size	Fees	Box Fees	Chg.	Boxes	city	Boxes	Revenues	Revenues	Revenues
A	1	[a] \$48	[b] \$75	[c] 56%	[d] 72,138	[e] -0.522	[f] 50,960	[g]	[h]	[]]
<u>^</u>	2	\$74 \$74	\$110	49%	4,501	-0.522	3,186	\$3,462,625 \$333,056		\$359,38
	3	\$128	\$190	48%	2,524	-0.517	1,892	\$323,090		\$17,39 \$36,47
	4	\$242	\$330	36%	242	-0.517	197	\$58,595	\$64,891	\$6,29
	5	\$418	\$550	32%	69	-0.517	57	\$28,713		\$2,90
Total	A				79,474		56,293	\$4,206,080	\$4,628,536	\$422,45
В	1	\$44	\$65	48%	124,912	-0.478	96,390	\$5,496,107	\$6,265,339	\$769,23
	2	\$66	\$95	44%	29,996	-0.603	22,055	\$1,979,763	\$2,095,190	\$115,42
j	3	\$112	\$160	43%	10,802	-0.517	8,410	\$1,209,804		\$135,80
	4 5	\$218	\$290	33%	1,561	-0.517	1,295	\$340,285		\$35,14
Total	-	\$372	\$485	30%	1,524	-0.517	1,285	\$566,923		\$56,21
		640	E.C.	400/	168,795	0.500	129,434	\$9,592,883	\$10,704,697	\$1,111,81
C-I	1 2	\$40 \$58	\$56 \$81	40% 40%	3,202,901	-0.522	2,534,252	\$128,116,026	\$141,918,088	\$13,802,06
	3	\$00 \$104	\$146 S	40% 40%	1,463,355 495,338	-0.605 -0.517	1,112,183 391,986	\$84,874,580 \$51,515,132	\$90,086,804 \$57,220,016	\$5,212,22
	4	\$172	\$240	40%	116,404	-0.517	92,628	\$20,021,558	\$57,229,916 \$22,230,648	\$5,714,78 \$2,209,09
	5	\$288	\$402	40%	28,158	-0.517	22,399	\$8,109,453	\$9,004,508	\$895,05
Total	C-I				5,306,156		4,153,447	\$292,636,749	\$320,469,963	\$27,833,21
C-11	1	\$40	\$46	15%	1,944,781	-0.522	1,792,531	\$77,791,222	\$82,456,416	\$4,665,19
	2	\$58	\$67	16%	758,767	-0.605	687,515	\$44,008,463	\$46,063,521	\$2,055,05
	3	\$104	\$120	15%	243,090	-0.517	223,768	\$25,281,331	\$26,852,110	\$1,570,78
	4	\$172	\$198	15%	45,357	-0.517	41,815	\$7,801,448	\$8,279,348	\$477,90
	5	\$288	\$331	15%	6,262	-0.517	5,779	\$1,803,345	\$1,912,715	\$109,37
Total (C-II				2,998,256		2,751,407	\$156,685,809	\$165,564,111	\$8,878,30
C-111	1	\$40	\$40	0%	151,459	-0.522	151,459	\$6,058,375	\$6,058,375	\$
	2	\$58	\$58	0%	47,532	-0.605	47,532	\$2,756,864	\$2,756,864	\$
l l	3	\$104 \$172	\$104 \$172	0% 0%	15,375 1,612	-0.517 -0.517	15,375	\$1,598,978	\$1,598,978	\$
ĺ	5	\$288	\$288	0%	532	-0.517	1,612 532	\$277,319 \$153,165	\$277,319 \$153,165	\$ \$
Total C	-			070	216,510	-0.517	216,510	\$10,844,702	\$10,844,702	\$
D-1	1	\$12	\$24	100%	36,301	-0.054	34,356	\$435,608	\$824,544	\$388,93
- /	2	\$20	\$40	100%	22,069	0.069	20,542	\$441,377	\$821,698	\$380,32
	3	\$36	\$72	100%	7,552	-0.036	7,279	\$271,869	\$524,117	\$252,24
	4	\$53	\$106	100%	1,096	-0.024	1,070	\$58,107	\$113,378	\$55,27
	5	\$83	\$166	100%	180	-0.015	178	\$14,978	\$29,495	\$14,51
Total I	D-1				67,198		63,425	\$1,221,940	\$2,313,232	\$1,091,29
D-11	1	\$12	\$18	50%	1,131,135	-0.054	1,100,837	\$13,573,626	\$19,815,069	\$6,241,44
	2	\$20	\$30	50%	493,926	-0.069	476,845	\$9,878,524	\$14,305,338	\$4,426,81
	3	\$36	\$54	50%	132,154	-0.036	129,769	\$4,757,533	\$7,007,536	\$2,250,00
	4 5	\$53 \$83	\$80 \$125	51%	15,190	-0.024	15,001	\$805,088	\$1,200,115	\$395,02
Total C		\$03	¢1∠0	51%	1,655 1,774,061	-0.015	1,642	\$137,377	\$205,283	\$67,90
D-III		\$12	\$15	25%	2,868,513	-0.054	1,724,095	\$29,152,148	\$42,533,342	\$13,381,19
D -111	1 2	\$12	\$15	25% 25%	2,868,513	-0.054	2,830,096	\$34,422,158 \$21,210,646	\$42,451,433 \$26,054,849	\$8,029,27 \$4,844,20
	3	\$36	\$25 \$45	25%	269,261	-0.036	266,832	\$9,693,407	\$12,007,445	\$4,044,20 \$2,314,03
	4	\$53	\$66	25%	16,184	-0.024	16,087	\$857,763	\$1,061,762	\$203,99
	5	\$83	\$104	25%	1,769	-0.015	1,762	\$146,827	\$183,260	\$36,43
Total D)-III		1		4,216,260		4,156,971	\$66,330,801	\$81,758,749	\$15,427,94
Ë	1	\$0	\$0		599,685		599,685	\$0	\$0	\$
	2	\$0	\$0	1	231,140		231,140	\$0	\$0	\$
	3	\$0	\$0		60,501		60,501	\$0	\$0	\$
	4	\$0	\$0	ľ	6,078		6,078	\$0	\$0	\$
	5	\$0	\$0		840		840	\$0	\$0	\$
Total	E	T			898,243		898,243	\$0	\$0	\$

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			Tabl	e 11B. 1	Estimated Bo	xes in U	se by Fee Gro	ups, TYAR		
			All F	ee Grou	ups plus Call	er Servic	e and Reserve	e Numbers		
New Fee Groups	Box Size	Current Fees	Proposed Fees	Pct. Chg.	OCA TYBR Boxes	Elasti- city		OCA TYBR Revenues	OCA TYAR Revenues	Change in Revenues
Paid Boxe: Free Boxe:	s (E)				14,826,709 898,243		13,251,582 898,243	\$570,671,113 \$0	\$638,817,332 \$0	\$68,146,21 \$
TOTAL BO				_	15,724,952		14,149,825	\$570,671,113		\$68,146,21
Caller Serv Reserve Ni	umbers	\$451 \$30	+	22% 33%	90,747 182,113		82,161) 150,749	\$40,926,917 \$5,463,379	\$45,188,468 \$6,029,976	\$4,261,55 \$566,59
GRAND TO	TAL				15,997,812		14,382,735	\$617,061,409	\$690,035,776	\$72,974,36

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IV. POST OFFICE BOX VOLUME-VARIABLE COSTS SHOULD BE ALLOCATED SO THAT HIGHER COSTS ASSOCIATED WITH LARGER POST OFFICES ARE DISTRIBUTED TO BOXES IN THOSE OFFICES 4

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- 5 A. Space Provision Costs Should Be Allocated Based Upon Average Rental
 6 Costs For The New Fee Groups To Better Reflect Costs In Larger And
 7 Smaller Post Offices
- 8
- 9 In developing unit box costs, I allocate Space Provision costs in direct
- 10 proportion to both a measure of box size (capacity) and the particular average rental
- 11 cost per square foot for each respective fee group. This is the same general
- 12 approach followed by witness Lion. See USPS-T-24 at 20. However, my allocation
- 13 is formed by the product of the average postal rental cost for each fee group and the
- 14 equivalent capacity by box size.
- 15 Table 12 shows the allocation of Space Provision costs to derive the total
- 16 cost by box size and the unit box costs in the TYBR. The distribution key is shown
- 17 in column [e], "Rent x Equivalent Capacity."

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	Та	ble 12. Allo	cation of Sr	ace Provision	Costs by Ne	w Fee Groups	, TYBR	
				New Fee Gr		•	,	
New					Average	Rent x	Total	
Fee	Box	TYBR	Capacity	Equivalent	Rent	Equivalent	Costs	Cost Per
Groups	Size	Boxes	Factor	Capacity	(\$/sq. ft.)	Capacity	(\$000)	Box
		[a]	[b]	[c]	[d]	[e]	[f]	[g]
A	1	72,138	1	72,138	\$23.49	1,694,558	\$2,269	\$31.45
	2	4,501	1.5	6,751	\$23.49	158,588	\$212	
	3	2,524	3	7,572	\$23.49	177,880	\$238	
	4	242	6	1,453	\$23.49	34,126	\$46	
Tata	5	69	12	824	\$23.49	19,363	\$26	
Total		79,474	1.12	88,739	\$23.49	2,084,516	\$2,791	\$35.12
В	1	124,912	1	124,912	\$16.74	2,091,401	\$2,800	
	2 3	29,996	1.5	44,995	\$16.74	753,348	\$1,009	
		10,802 1,561	3 6	32,405	\$16.74	542,566	\$726	
	4 5	1,561	6 12	9,366 18,288	\$16.74 \$16.74	156,810 306,195	\$210 \$410	
Total		168,795	1.36	229,965	\$16.74	3,850,319	\$5,155	
C-I						29,044,275		
6-1	1 2	3,202,901	1	3,202,901	\$9.07 \$9.07		\$38,884	
	∠ 3	1,463,355 495,338	1.5 3	2,195,032 1,486,013	\$9.07 \$9.07	19,904,807 13,475,342	\$26,649 \$18,041	1 1
	4	495,338	6	698,426	\$9.07 \$9.07	6,333,412	\$18,041	
	5	28,158		337,894	\$9.07	3,064,061	\$4,102	
Total	-	5,306,156		7,920,267	\$9.07	71,821,898	\$96,155	
C-II	1	1,944,781		1,944,781	\$6.88	13,379,446	\$17,912	-
0-11	2	758,767	1.5	1,138,150	\$6.88	7,830,094	\$10,483	
	3	243,090	3	729,269	\$6.88	5,017,130	\$6,717	
	4	45,357	6	272,144	\$6.88	1,872,257	\$2,507	
	5	6,262	12	75,139	\$6.88	516,934	\$692	1
Total		2,998,256		4,159,483	\$6.88	28,615,862	\$38,311	
C-III	1	151,459	1	151,459	\$4.96	751,983	\$1,007	
	2	47,532	1.5	71,298	\$4.96	353,990	\$474	1
	3	15,375	3	46,124	\$4.96	229,004	\$307	
	4	1,612	6	9,674	\$4.96	48,030	\$64	1
	5	532	12	6,382	\$4.96	31,686	\$42	
Total (C-III	216,510	1.32	284,938	\$4.96	1,414,692	\$1,894	\$8.75
D-I	1	36,301		36,301	\$7.23	7	\$351	
	2	22,069		33,103			\$320	
	3	7,552	3	22,656	\$7.23	163,788	\$219	\$29.04
	4	1,096		6,578	\$7.23	47,557	\$64	
	5	180		2,165	\$7.23	15,655	\$21	
Total	D-I	67,198	1.50	100,803	\$7.23	728,749	\$976	
D-II	1	1,131,135		1,131,135	\$7.29	8,241,234	\$11,033	
	2	493,926		740,889		5,397,976	\$7,227	
	3	132,154		396,461	\$7.29	2,888,539	\$3,867	
	4	15,190		91,142	\$7.29	664,044	\$889	
	5	1,655		19,862	\$7.29		\$194	4
Total	D-11	1,774,061	1.34	2,379,490	\$7.29	17,336,501	\$23,210	\$13.08

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Ta	ble 12	. Allocation	of Space P	rovision Costs	by New Fee	Groups, TYB	R (continue	ed)						
	New Fee Groups													
D-III	1	2,868,513	1	2,868,513	\$6.07	17,410,496	\$23,309	\$8.13						
	2	1,060,532	1.5	1,590,798	\$6.07	9,655,382	\$12,927	\$12.19						
	3	269,261	3	807,784	\$6.07	4,902,860	\$6,564	\$24.38						
	4	16,184	6	97,105	\$6.07	589,382	\$789	\$48.76						
	5	1,769	12	21,228	\$6.07	128,844	\$172	\$97.51						
Total	D-III	4,216,260	1.28	5,385,429	\$6.07	32,686,964	\$43,761	\$10.38						
Е	1	599,685	1	599,685	\$6.98	4,185,123	\$5,603	\$9.34						
	2	231,140	1.5	346,709	\$6.98	2,419,640	\$3,239	\$14.01						
	3	60,501	3	181,502	\$6.98	1,266,678	\$1,696	\$28.03						
	4	6,078	6	36,467	\$6.98	254,498	\$341	\$56.06						
	5	840	12	10,080	\$6.98	70,344	\$94	\$112.12						
Tota	E	898,243	1.31	1,174,442	\$6.98	8,196,283	\$10,973	\$12.22						
GRAND														
TOTAL		15,724,952		21,723,555		166,735,784	\$223,226	\$14.20						

The development of the "Average Rent (\$/sq.ft.)" in Table 12 is shown in Tables 12A-B. Table 12A presents, based upon the estimated number of boxes installed, the conversion of the average postal rental costs by delivery group into the weighted average rental costs for the new fee group. Table 12B develops the number of boxes installed for each new fee group, using the percentages shown in Table 7. The average rents for the new fee group are simply the weighted average of boxes installed by delivery group, which are shown on the last row of Table 12A.

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				-	ed Average							
			Box	xes install	ed by Deliv			w Fee Gro	ups			•
						FEE GRO						
CARRIER DELIVERY GROUPS		A	В	C-I	C-II	C-III	D-I	D-II	D-III	E	TOTAL	AVERAGE RENT
											[a]	[b]
CITY-A		104,384									104,384	\$23.49
CITY-B			202,719								202,719	\$16.74
CITY-OTHER											10,770,049	
	CAG A-D			6,542,087							6,542,087	\$9.0
	CAG E-G	1			3,790,060						3,790,060	\$6.88
	CAG H-L					330,202					330,202	\$4.96
	E-0									107,700	107,700	\$7.19
NON-CITY											7,070,042	
Classified	CAG A-D						69,019			1,409	70,428	\$7.24
Contract	CAG A-D						0			0	0	\$7.24
Classified	CAG E-G				1			1,898,222		38,739	• •	\$7.30
Contract	CAG E-G							26,559		239,028		
Classified	CAG H-L								4,591,342			
Contract	CAG H-L								11,202	100,821		
NONDELIVERY											1,709,870	
	CAG A-D						11,188	1			11,188	
	CAG E-G							235,810			235,810	
	CAG H-L								949,911		949,911	
	E-7									512,961	512,961	\$7.19
TOTAL		104,384	202,719	6,542,087	3,790,060	330,202	80,208	2,160,591	5,552,455	1,094,359	19,857,064	
AVERAGE RENT	PER											
SQ.FT., NEW FEE	GROUP	\$23.49	\$16.74	\$9.07	\$6.88	\$4.96	\$7.23	\$7.29	\$6.07	\$6.98		

· ·			Fee Grou	05			······································			
	A	В	C [A-D]	C[E-G]	C[H-L]	Total C				
Boxes Installed	104,384	202,719	6,542,087		330,202	10,662,349				
<u> </u>	I			[]	Fee Grou	ps				
	D-1	D-2	D-3	D-4	D-5	D-6	D-7[A-D]	D-7[E-G]	D-7[H-L]	Total D
Boxes Installed	69,019	0	1,898,222	26,559	4,591,342	11,202	11,188	235,810	949,911	7,793,253
	I	, , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,		Fee	Groups					
	E-0	E-1	E-2	E-3	E-4	E-5	E-6	E-7	Total E	
Boxes Installed	107,700	1,409	0	38,739	239,028	93,701	100,821	512,961	1,094,359	

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- B. A Portion Of All Other Costs Should Be Allocated To The New Fee Groups
 Based Upon Groupings By CAG To Better Reflect Costs In Larger And
 Smaller Post Offices
- 4
- 5 I allocate a portion of All Other costs to boxes by CAG. Table 13 summarizes
- 6 the allocation of All Other costs and the development of TYBR unit box costs.

	Table	13. Summary	of Allocati	on of All Oth	er Costs by	New Fee G	roups, TYB	R
				New Fee Gr	oups			
New Fee Groups	Box Size	TYBR Boxes	Post- masters Costs (000)		Mailhandler Costs (000)	Non-CAG Costs (000)	Total (000)	Cost per Box
		[a]	[b]	[c]	[d]	[e]	[f]	[g]
Α	1	72,138	\$0		\$154	\$375	\$582	\$8.07
	2 3	4,501 2,524	\$0 \$0		\$10 \$5	\$23 \$13	\$36 \$20	\$8.07
	4	2,524	\$0 \$0	\$2 \$0	ຸ ຈຸວ \$1	৯।১ \$1	\$20 \$2	\$8.07 \$8.07
	5	69	\$0 \$0		\$0			\$8.07
Total		79,474	\$0	\$58	\$170			\$8.07
В	1	124,912	\$2	\$91	\$268	\$650		\$8.08
	2	29,996	\$0	\$22	\$64	\$156		\$8.08
	3	10,802	\$0	\$8	\$23	\$56	\$87	\$8.08
	4	1,561	\$0	\$1	\$3	\$8	\$13	\$8.08
5		1,524	\$0	\$1	\$3	\$8	\$12	\$8.08
Total B		168,795	\$3	\$122	\$361	\$878	\$1,365	\$8.08
C-I	1	3,202,901	\$105	\$2,321	\$6,859	\$16,667	\$25,951	\$8.10
	2	1,463,355	\$48	\$1,060	\$3,134	\$7,615	\$11,857	\$8.10
	3	495,338	\$16	\$359	\$1,061	\$2,578	\$4,013	\$8.10
	4	116,404	\$4	\$84	\$249	\$606	\$943	\$8.10
	5	28,158	\$1	\$20	\$60	\$147	\$228	\$8.10
Total		5,306,156	\$173	\$3,845	\$11,363	\$27,611	\$42,993	\$8.10
C-ll	1	1,944,781	\$336	\$1,409	\$0	\$10,120	\$11,865	\$6.10
	2	758,767	\$131	\$550	\$0	\$3,948	\$4,629	\$6.10
	3	243,090	\$42	\$176	\$0	\$1,265	\$1,483	\$6.10
	4	45,357	\$8	\$33	\$0 ©0	\$236	\$277	\$6.10
	5	6,262	\$1	\$5	\$0	\$33	\$38	\$6.10
		2,998,256	\$518	\$2,172	\$0	\$15,602	\$18,292	\$6.10
C-[]]	1	151,459	\$80 \$80	\$0	\$0 \$0	\$788	\$868	\$5.73
	2	47,532	\$25	\$0 \$0	\$0 ¢0	\$247	\$272	\$5.73
	3	15,375	\$8	\$0 ©0	\$0 ©0	\$80 ©	\$88	\$5.73
	4 5	1,612 532	\$1 \$0	\$0 \$0	\$0 \$0	\$8 \$3	\$9 \$3	\$5.73 \$5.73
Total C		216,510	\$0 \$114	\$0 \$0	\$0 \$0	\$3 \$1,127	\$3 \$1,241	\$5.73 \$5.73
TULAT		210,010	¢114	ወር	Ф О	φ1, IZ7		φο./ Ο

Table	13. Su	immary of Allo	ocation of A	Il Other Cos	ts by New F	ee Groups,	TYBR (con	tinued)
				New Fee Gro	oups			
D-I	1	36,301	\$2	\$26	\$78	\$189	\$294	\$8.11
	2	22,069	\$1	\$16	\$47	\$115		\$8.11
	3	7,552	\$0	\$5	\$16	\$39	\$61	\$8.11
	4	1,096	\$0	\$1	\$2	\$6	\$9	\$8.11
	5	180	\$0	\$0	\$0	\$1	\$1	\$8.11
Total	D-I	67,198	\$3	\$49	\$144	\$350	\$545	\$8.11
D-II	1	1,131,135	\$133	\$820	\$0	\$5,886	\$6,839	\$6.05
	2	493,926	\$58	\$358	\$0	\$2,570	\$2,986	\$6.05
	3	132,154	\$16	\$96	\$0	\$688	\$799	\$6.05
	4	15,190	\$2	\$11	\$0	\$79	\$92	\$6.05
	5	1,655	\$0	\$1	\$0	\$9	\$10	\$6.05
Total I	D-II	1,774,061	\$208	\$1,285	\$0	\$9,232	\$10,725	\$6.05
D-III	1	2,868,513	\$1,108	\$0	\$0	\$14,927	\$16,034	\$5.59
	2	1,060,532	\$410	\$0	\$0	\$5,519	\$5,928	\$5.59
1	3	269,261	\$104	\$0	\$0	\$1,401	\$1,505	\$5.59
	4	16,184	\$6	\$0	\$0	\$84	\$90	\$5.59
	5	1,769	\$1	\$0	\$0		\$10	\$5.59
Total I	D-111	4,216,260	\$1,628	\$0	\$0	\$21,940	<u>\$</u> 23,568	\$5.59
E	1	599,685	\$358	\$0	\$0	\$3,121	\$3,478	
	2	231,140	\$138	\$0	\$0	\$1,203	\$1,341	\$5.80
	3	60,501	\$36	\$0	\$0	\$315	\$351	\$5.80
	4	6,078	\$4	\$0	\$0	\$32	\$35	
	5	840	\$1	\$0	\$0		\$5	
Total	E	898,243	\$536	\$0	\$0	\$4,674	\$5,210	
GRAND T	OTAL	15,724,952	\$3,183	\$7,531	\$12,039	\$81,827	\$104,580	\$6.65

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There are two types of costs to be allocated. One type of cost is allocated by CAG. The second type of cost, which cannot be allocated by CAG, is allocated proportionately to the number of boxes in the same manner as performed by witness

5 Lion. See USPS-T-24 at 24.

6 Postmaster costs are allocated according to the distribution of postmasters by

7 CAG. Table 13A presents the allocation of postmaster costs.

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Table	13A. Dis	tribution of Pe	ostmaster Co	sts to Boxes
New Fee			Percent of	Postmaster
Groups	Box Size	TYBR Boxes	Fee Group	Costs (000)
		[a]	[b]	[c]
Α	1	72,138	90.77%	\$0
	2	4,501	5.66%	\$0
	3	2,524	3.18%	\$0
	4	242	0.30%	\$0
	5	69	0.09%	\$0
Tot	al A	79,474	100.00%	\$0
В	1	124,912	74.00%	\$2
	2	29,996	17.77%	\$0
	3	10,802	6.40%	\$0
	4	1,561	0.92%	\$0
	5	1,524	0.90%	\$0
Tot	al B	168,795	100.00%	\$3
C-I	1	3,202,901	60.36%	\$105
	2	1,463,355	27.58%	\$48
	3	495,338	9.34%	\$16
	4	116,404	2.19%	\$4
	5	28,158	0.53%	\$1
Tota	al C-I	5,306,156	100.00%	\$173
C-II	1	1,944,781	64.86%	\$336
	2	758,767	25.31%	\$131
	3	243,090	8.11%	\$42
	4	45,357	1.51%	\$8
	5	6,262	0.21%	\$1
	I C-II	2,998,256	100.00%	\$518
C-111	1	151,459	69.95%	\$80
	2	47,532	21.95%	\$25
	3	15,375	7.10%	\$8
	4	1,612	0.74%	\$1
	5	532	0.25%	\$0
Tota	C-III	216,510	100.00%	\$114
D-I	1	36,301	54.02%	\$2
	2	22,069	32.84%	\$1
Ì	3	7,552	11.24%	\$0
	4	1,096	1.63%	\$0
	5	180	0.27%	\$0
Tota	I D-1	67,198	100.00%	\$3

Table '	13A. Dist			osts to Boxes								
		(continu										
	New Fee Groups											
D-II	1	1,131,135	63.76%	\$133								
	2	493,926	27.84%	\$58								
	3	132,154	7.45%	\$16								
	4	15,190	0.86%	\$2								
	5	1,655	0.09%	\$0								
Tota	al D-II	1,774,061	100.00%	\$208								
D-III	1	2,868,513	68.03%	\$1,108								
	2	1,060,532	25.15%	\$410								
	3	269,261	6.39%	\$104								
	4	16,184	0.38%	\$6								
	5	1,769	0.04%	\$1								
Tota	I D-III	4,216,260	100.00%	\$1,628								
E	1	599,685	66.76%	\$358								
	2	231,140	25.73%	\$138								
	3	60,501	6.74%	\$36								
	4	6,078	0.68%	\$4								
	5	840	0.09%	\$1								
Tot	tal E	898,243	100.00%	\$536								
GRAND	TOTAL	15,724,952		\$3,183								

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2 Table 13B begins the process of allocating postmaster costs by CAG. Column [a] displays the number of offices by CAG in each fee group, and column [b] 3 computes the percent of offices by CAG in each fee group to the total number of 4 5 offices by CAG. For example, the data show 29 CAG A offices in Fee Group A, which represents 2.55 percent (29/1,138) of the total number of offices in CAG A. 6 7 The percentages computed in column [b] are used to distribute the number of employees in each CAG to the CAG levels in each fee group. Continuing the 8 9 example for postmasters, I estimate that there are two CAG A postmasters in Fee

Group A, as shown in column [c]. This represents 0.01 percent (2/26,403) of all
postmasters. The resulting percentages, displayed in column [d], of postmasters at
each CAG level are then used to distribute total postmaster costs of \$3,183,000 to
each CAG level in the fee groups. The amounts so distributed are totaled by fee
group and transferred to Table 13A, where the totals are allocated proportionately

6 by box size in each fee group.

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Table 13	Table 13B. Distribution of Postmasters Costs by CAG, and Index of Supervisors and Mailhandlers by CAG													
				Р	ostmaster	ŝ	Supervisors	Mailhandlers						
New Fee Groups	CAG	Number of Offices	Percent of Total CAG Level		Percent at CAG Level	Total Costs (000)	Index of Employment at CAG Level	Index of Employment at CAG Level						
		[a]	[b]	[C]	[d]	[e]	[f]	[g]						
A	CAG A	29	2.55%		0.01%	\$0	1	1						
	Total	29		2		\$0	1	1						
В	CAG A CAG B	56 42	4.92% 6.13%		0.01% 0.04%	\$0 \$1	1 1	1						
	CAG C CAG D	9 2	0.73% 0.30%	2	0.02% 0.01%	\$1 \$0	1	1						
	Total	109		21		\$3	1	1						
C-I	CAG A CAG B CAG C CAG D	1,053 637 1,213 638	92.53% 92.99% 97.74% 96.96%	68 163 661 545	0.26% 0.62% 2.50% 2.06%	\$8 \$20 \$80 \$66	1 1 1	1 1 1						
	Total	3,541	00.0070	1,437	2.0070	\$173	1	1						
C-II														
	CAG E CAG F CAG G	1,228 1,264 1,238	91.23% 79.25% 50.82%	1,334 1,456 1,505	5.05% 5.51% 5.70%	\$161 \$176 \$181	1 1 1	0 0 0						
	Total	3,730	/	4,295		\$518	1	0						
C-111	CAG H	520	17.22%	620	2.35%	\$75	0	0						
	CAG J CAG K	130 136	3.15% 1.68%	148 151	0.56% 0.57%	\$18 \$18	0	0						
	CAG L Total	23 809	2.04%	28 946	0.11%	\$3 \$114	0	0						
i	Total	009		940		⊅114	U	U						

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Table 1	3B. Dist	ribution o	f Postma	sters Cost	s by CAG	, and Inde	ex of Supervisors	and Mailhandlers
					AG (conti			·····
D-1		·		Nev	Fee Gro	ups		
D-1	CAGA		0.00%		0.000/	*		
	CAGA	0	0.00%		0.00% 0.00%			
	CAGC	14	1.13%		0.00%			
	CAGD	17	2.58%	15	0.03%			
	Total	36	2.50%	23	0.05%	\$2 \$3	1	1
D-II	iotai			23				11
	CAGE	106	7.88%	115	0.44%	\$14	4	
	CAGF	294	18.43%	339	1.28%	\$14 \$41	 	0
	CAG G	1,049	43.06%	1,276	4.83%	\$154	1	0
	Total	1,449		1,729	4.0070	\$208	1	0
D-III		,,,,,		1,120		Ψ200	I	0
	CAG H	2,186	72.38%	2,604	9.86%	\$314	0	0
	CAG J	3,284	79.59%	3,748	14.20%	\$452	ō	0
	CAGK	5,759	70.98%	6,375	24.15%	\$769	ŏ	0 0
	CAGL	640	56.89%	777	2.94%	\$94	ŏ	ŏ
	Total	11,869		13,505		\$1,628	0	0
E								
	CAG A	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	1	1 1
	CAG B	1	0.15%	0	0.00%	\$0	1	1
	CAG C	5	0.40%	3	0.01%	\$0	1	1 1
	CAG D	1	0.15%	1	0.00%	\$0	1	1
	CAGE	12	0.89%	13	0.05%	\$2	1	1
	CAG F	37	2.32%	43	0.16%	\$5	1	0
	CAG G	149	6.12%	181	0.69%	\$22	1	0
	CAG H	314	10.40%	374	1.42%	\$45	0	0
	CAG J	712	17.26%	813	3.08%	\$98	0	0
	CAG K	2,219	27.35%	2,456	9.30%	\$296	0	0
	CAGL	462	41.07%	561	2.12%	\$68	00	0
	Total	3,912		4,445		\$536	0	0
GRAND	TOTAL	25,484		26,403		\$3,183		

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The allocation of supervisor and mailhandler costs by CAG is based on a
different method. Table 13C shows the allocation of supervisor and mailhandler
costs. In order to allocate such costs, however, I used an index to represent the
employment, or the absence thereof, of supervisors and mailhandlers at certain
CAG levels. This "Index of Employment," consisting of a "1" to indicate employment,

and a "0" to indicate no employment, is shown in Table 13B, columns [f] and [g]. 1 Where a 1 is assigned to all CAG levels in a fee group, a 1 is also assigned to the 2 fee group. Similarly, where a 0 is assigned to all CAG levels in a fee group, a 0 is 3 also assigned to that fee group. The index number for each fee group is multiplied 4 by the TYBR number of boxes in each fee group to determine the number of 5 "supervisor" boxes and "mailhandler" boxes, as shown in columns [b] and [d] of 6 7 Table 13C. The percent of total "supervisor" boxes in column [c] is used to allocate 8 volume-variable supervisor costs of \$7,531,000. With respect to mailhandlers, I determined volume-variable mailhandler costs to be \$12,039,000, or 16.83 percent, 9 of Cost Segment 3 volume-variable post office box costs of \$71,527,000.¹⁹ Volume-10

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¹⁹ See USPS LR-H-9 at 19-20. Total costs for Cost Segment 3 are \$16.456 billion, of which 16.83 percent (\$2.770/\$16.456) are mailhandler costs.

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- 1 variable mailhandler costs are then allocated based upon the percent of total
- 2 "mailhandler" boxes shown in column [e].

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New					or and Mailhan			
Fee	Box	TYBR	"Supervisor"		"Mailhandler"		Supervisor	Mailhar
Groups	Size	Boxes	Boxes	Percent	Boxes	Percent	Costs (000)	
		[a]	[b]	[c]	[d]	[e]	[f]	[9]
Α	1	72,138	72,138	0.69%	72,138	1.28%	\$52	
	2	4,501	4,501	0.04%	4,501	0.08%	\$3	
	3	2,524	2,524			0.04%	\$2	
	4	242	242	0.00%		0.00%		
	5	69	69	0.00%		0.00%	\$0	
Tota	A	79,474	79,474	0.76%	79,474	1.41%	\$58	
В	1	124,912	124,912	1.20%		2.22%	\$91	
	2	29,996	29,996					
	3	10,802	10,802	0.10%	10,802	0.19%	\$8	
	4	1,561	1,561	0.02%		0.03%		
	5	1,524	1,524	0.01%	1,524			
Total	В	168,795	168,795	1.62%	168,795	3.00%		
C-I	1	3,202,901	3,202,901	30.82%			\$2,321	\$6
	2	1,463,355	1,463,355	14.08%			\$1,060	\$3
	3	495,338	495,338	4.77%			\$359	\$1
	4	116,404	116,404	1.12%				
	5	28,158	28,158	0.27%				
Total	C-I	5,306,156	5,306,156	51.05%		94.39%	\$3,845	\$11
C-II	1	1,944,781	1,944,781	18.71%		0.00%	\$1,409	
	2	758,767	758,767	7.30%		0.00%		
	3	243,090	243,090	2.34%	0	0.00%	\$176	
	4	45,357	45,357	0.44%	0	0.00%		
	5	6,262	6,262	0.06%	0	0.00%		
Total		2,998,256	2,998,256	28.85%	0	0.00%	\$2,172	
C-III	1	151,459	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	
	2	47,532	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	
	3	15,375	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	
	4	1,612	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	
	5	532	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	
Total (216,510	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	
D-1	1	36,301	36,301	0.35%	36,301	0.65%	\$26	
	2	22,069	22,069	0.21%	22,069	0.39%	\$16	
	3	7,552	7,552	0.07%	7,552	0.13%	\$5	
	4	1,096	1,096	0.01%	1,096	0.02%	\$1	
	5	180	180	0.00%	180	0.00%	\$0	
Total	D-I	67,198	67,198	0.65%	67,198	1.20%	\$49	

	Table	13C. Distribu	tion of Super	visor and	Mailhandler Co	osts to Bo	xes (continu	(ed)
				New Fee				<u></u>
D-11	1	1,131,135	1,131,135	10.88%	0	0.00%	\$820	\$(
	2	493,926	493,926	4.75%	0	0.00%	\$358	\$0
	3	132,154	132,154		0	0.00%	\$96	\$0
	4	15,190	15,190	0.15%	0	0.00%	\$11	\$0
	5	1,655	1,655	0.02%	0	0.00%	\$1	\$0
Total	D-ll	1,774,061	1,774,061	17.07%	0	0.00%	\$1,285	\$0
D-III	1	2,868,513	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	\$0
	2	1,060,532	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	\$0
	3	269,261	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	\$0
	4	16,184	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	\$0
	5	1,769	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	\$C
Total	D-III	4,216,260	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	\$0
E	1	599,685	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	\$0
	2	231,140	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	\$0
	3	60,501	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	\$0
	4	6,078	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	\$0
	5	840	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	\$0
Tota	IE	898,243	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	\$0	\$0
GRAND					-			
TOTAL		15,724,952	10,393,939	100.00%	5,621,622	100.00%	\$7,531	\$12,039

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The remaining costs, referred to as "non-CAG costs," are allocated

3 proportionally to the total number of boxes, as shown in Table 13D. Non-CAG costs

4 include \$59,488,000 of clerk costs from Cost Segment 3. The allocation of non-

5 CAG costs is consistent with the methodology used by witness Lion for All Other

6 costs.

Table	Table 13D. Distribution of Costs by Box Size					
New Fee	Box	TYBR		Non-CAG		
Groups	Size	Boxes	Percent	Costs (000)		
		[a]	[b]	[c]		
Α	1	72,138	0.46%	\$375		
	2	4,501	0.03%	\$23		
	3	2,524	0.02%	\$13		
	4	242	0.00%	\$1		
	5	69	0.00%	\$0		
Tota	IA	79,474	0.51%	\$414		
В	1	124,912	0.79%	\$650		
	2	29,996	0.19%	\$156		
	2 3 4	10,802	0.07%	\$56		
		1,561	0.01%	\$8		
	5	1,524	0.01%	\$8		
Tota	I B	168,795	1.07%	\$878		
C-I	1	3,202,901	20.37%	\$16,667		
	2	1,463,355	9.31%	\$7,615		
	2 3	495,338	3.15%	\$2,578		
	4	116,404	0.74%	\$606		
	5	28,158	0.18%	\$147		
Total	C-I	5,306,156	33.74%	\$27,611		
C-II	1	1,944,781	12.37%	\$10,120		
	2	758,767	4.83%	\$3,948		
	3	243,090	1.55%	\$1,265		
	4	45,357	0.29%	\$236		
	5	6,262	0.04%	\$33		
Total	C-II	2,998,256	19.07%	\$15,602		
C-III	1	151,459	0.96%	\$788		
	2	47,532	0.30%	\$247		
	3	15,375	0.10%	\$80		
	3 4	1,612	0.01%	\$8		
	5	532	0.00%	\$3		
Total	C-111	216,510	1.38%	\$1,127		
D-I	1	36,301	0.23%	\$189		
	2	22,069	0.14%	\$115		
	2 3	7,552	0.05%	\$39		
	4	1,096	0.01%	\$6		
	5	180	0.00%	\$1		
Total	D-I	67,198	0.43%	\$350		

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Table	Table 13D. Distribution of Costs by Box Size (continued)					
		New Fee Gro				
D-II	1	1,131,135	7.19%	\$5,886		
	2	493,926	3.14%	\$2,570		
	3	132,154	0.84%	\$688		
	4	15,190	0.10%	\$79		
	5	1,655	0.01%	\$9		
Total	D-II	1,774,061	11.28%	\$9,232		
D-III	1	2,868,513	18.24%	\$14,927		
	2	1,060,532	6.74%	\$5,519		
	3	269,261	1.71%	\$1,401		
	4	16,184	0.10%	\$84		
	5	1,769	0.01%	\$9		
Total	D-III	4,216,260	26.81%	\$21,940		
E	1	599,685	3.81%	\$3,121		
	2	231,140	1.47%	\$1,203		
	3	60,501	0.38%	\$315		
	4	6,078	0.04%	\$32		
	5	840	0.01%	\$4		
Tota	IE	898,243	5.71%	\$4,674		
GRAND T	OTAL	15,724,952	100.00%	\$81,827		

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and the TYAR unit box costs. I assumed a volume variability for All Other costs in
the TYAR of 1.002067747. See Tr. 13/7338-39.

Table 14 shows the development of the TYAR All Other costs by box size,

Table 14. Allocation of All Other Costs to Boxes in New Fee Groups, TYAR									
	New Fee Groups								
			Elasticity =	1.002067747					
New					TYBR	TYAR Total	Other		
Fee	Box		OCA TYAR	TYBR Total	Cost per	All Other	Cost		
Groups	Size	Boxes	Boxes	(000)	Box	Costs	per Box		
		[a]	[b]	[c]	[d]	[e]	[f]		
Α	1	72,138							
	2	4,501	3,186	\$36,333		\$25,696			
	3	2,524	1,892		-	\$15,267	· · ·		
	4	242	197	\$1,955		•	• •		
	5	69	57	\$555					
Total		79,474			\$8.07	\$454,042			
В	1	124,912	96,390				1		
	2	29,996		\$242,513					
	3	10,802	8,410			•			
	4	1,561	1,295	\$12,620					
	_ 5	1,524		\$12,321	\$8.08				
Total	В	168,795	129,434	\$1,364,661	\$8.08				
C-I	1	3,202,901	2,534,252	\$25,951,183					
	2	1,463,355	1,112,183	\$11,856,686	\$8.10	\$9,005,466			
	3	495,338	391,986	\$4,013,425	\$8.10	\$3,174,294			
	4	116,404	92,628	\$943,155	\$8.10				
	5	28,158	22,399	\$228,146	\$8.10	\$181,391	\$8.10		
Total	C-I	5,306,156	4,153,447	\$42,992,595	\$8.10	\$33,633,577	\$8.10		
C-II	1	1,944,781	1,792,531	\$11,864,885	\$6.10	\$10,934,106	\$6.10		
	2	758,767	687,515	\$4,629,149	\$6.10	\$4,193,554	\$6.10		
	3	243,090	223,768	\$1,483,063	\$6.10	\$1,364,937	\$6.10		
	4	45,357							
	5	6,262	5,779			\$35,248	\$6.10		
Total	C-11	2,998,256	2,751,407	\$18,292,018	\$6.10	\$16,782,908	\$6.10		
C-III	1	151,459				\$867,950	\$5.73		
	2	47,532			J	J			
	3	15,375					\$		
	4	1,612		\$9,240		,			
	5	532		\$3,048			1		
Total		216,510							

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Tabl	Table 14. Allocation of All Other Costs to Boxes in New Fee Groups, TYAR									
(continued)										
	New Fee Groups									
D-l	1	36,301	34,356	\$294,463	\$8.11	\$278,656	\$8.11			
	2	22,069	20,542	\$179,018	\$8.11	\$166,610	\$8.11			
	3	7,552	7,279	\$61,260	\$8.11	\$59,044	\$8.11			
	4	1,096	1,070	\$8,893	\$8.11	\$8,676	\$8.11			
	5	180	178	\$1,464	\$8.11	\$1,441	\$8.11			
Total	D-I	67,198	63,425	\$545,098	\$8.11	\$514,427	\$8.11			
D-II	1	1,131,135	1,100,837	\$6,838,511	\$6.05	\$6,654,958	\$6.05			
	2	493,926	476,845	\$2,986,132	\$6.05	\$2,882,648	\$6.05			
	3	132,154	129,769	\$798,962	\$6.05	\$784,516	\$6.05			
	4	15,190	15,001	\$91,836	\$6.05	\$90,692	\$6.05			
5		1,655	1,642	\$10,006	\$6.05	\$9,928	\$6.05			
Total	D-11	1,774,061	1,724,095	\$10,725,448	\$6.05	\$10,422,742	\$6.05			
D-III	1	2,868,513	2,830,096	\$16,034,333	\$5.59	\$15,819,143	\$5.59			
	2	1,060,532	1,042,194	\$5,928,133	\$5.59	\$5,825,414	\$5.59			
	3	269,261	266,832	\$1,505,109	\$5.59	\$1,491,502	\$5.59			
	4	16,184	16,087	\$90,466	\$5.59	\$89,923	\$5.59			
	5	1,769	1,762	\$9,888	\$5.59	\$9,850	\$5,59			
Total	D-111	4,216,260	4,156,971	\$23,567,929	\$5.59	\$23,235,832	\$5.59			
E	1	599,685	599,685	\$3,478,273	\$5.80	\$3,478,273	\$5.80			
	2	231,140	231,140	\$1,340,649	\$5.80	\$1,340,649	\$5.80			
	3	60,501	60,501	\$350,914	\$5.80		\$5.80			
	4	6,078	6,078	\$35,252			\$5.80			
	5	840	840				\$5.80			
Tota	ΙE	898,243	898,243	\$5,209,959	\$5.80	\$5,209,959	\$5.80			
GRAND		15,724,952	14,149,825	\$104,580,000	\$6.65	\$92,540,001	\$6.54			
TOTAL										

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2 C. Space Support Costs Should Be Allocated Using The Same Methodology
3 Used By The Postal Service

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I allocate Space Support costs on the basis of equivalent capacity. This is

6 the same allocation methodology as presented by witness Lion in USPS-T-24, and

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1 in Docket No. MC96-3. Table 15 shows the allocation of Space Support costs and

4 **14 /14** . . .

2 the development of TYBR unit costs.

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Tabl	e 15. /	Allocation of S			oxes by New Fe	e Groups,	TYBR	
	New Fee Groups							
New					Percent of	Total		
Fee	Box	TYBR Boxes	Capacity	Equivalent	Equivalent	Costs	Cost Per	
Groups	Size		Factor	Capacity	Capacity_	(\$000)	Box	
		[a]	[b]	[c] _	[d]	[e]	[f]	
Α	1	72,138	1	72,138	0.3321%	\$930	\$12.89	
	2	4,501	1.5	6,751	0.0311%	\$87	\$19.33	
	3	2,524	3	7,572	0.0349%	\$98	\$38.66	
	4	242	6	1,453	0.0067%	\$19	\$77.32	
	5	69	12	824	0.0038%	\$11	\$154.63	
Total	Α	79,474	1.12	88,739	0.41%	\$1,143	\$14.39	
В	1	124,912	1	124,912	0.5750%	\$1,610	\$12.89	
	2	29,996	1.5	44,995	0.2071%	\$580	\$19.33	
	3	10,802	3	32,405	0.1492%	\$418	\$38.66	
	4	1,561	6	9,366	0.0431%	\$121	\$77.32	
	5	1,524	12	18,288	0.0842%	\$236	\$154.63	
Total	В	168,795	1.36	229,965	1.06%	\$2,963	\$17.56	
C-I	1	3,202,901	1	3,202,901	14.7439%	\$41,272	\$12.89	
	2	1,463,355	1.5	2,195,032	10.1044%	\$28,285	\$19.33	
	3	495,338	3	1,486,013	6.8406%	\$19,149	\$38.66	
	4	116,404		698,426	3.2151%	\$9,000	\$77.32	
	5	28,158	12	337,894	1.5554%	\$4,354	\$154.63	
Total	C-I	5,306,156	1.49	7,920,267	36.46%	\$102,060	\$19.23	
C-11	1	1,944,781	1	1,944,781	8.9524%	\$25,060	\$12.89	
	2	758,767	1.5	1,138,150	5.2392%	\$14,666	\$19.33	
	3	243,090	3	729,269	3.3570%	\$9,397	\$38.66	
	4	45,357	6	272,144	1.2528%	\$3,507	\$77.32	
	5	6,262	12	75,139	0.3459%	\$968	\$154.63	
Total	C-11	2,998,256		4,159,483	19.15%	\$53,599	\$17.88	
C-III	1	151,459		151,459	0.6972%	\$1,952		
	2	47,532		71,298	0.3282%	\$919		
	3	15,375				\$594	\$38.66	
ł	4	1,612		1 '		\$125	\$77.32	
	5	532			0.0294%	\$82	\$154.63	
Total	C-III	216,510			1.31%	\$3,672	\$16.96	

Table 1	Table 15. Allocation of Space Support Costs to Boxes by New Fee Groups, TYBR									
(continued)										
New Fee Groups										
D-I	1	36,301	1	36,301	0.1671%	\$468	\$12.89			
	2	22,069	1.5	33,103	0.1524%	\$427	\$19.33			
	3	7,552	3	22,656	0.1043%	\$292	\$38.66			
]	4	1,096	6	6,578	0.0303%	\$85	\$77.32			
	5	180	12	2,165	0.0100%	\$28	\$154.63			
Total	D-I	67,198		100,803	0.46%	\$1,299	\$19.33			
D-II	1	1,131,135	1	1,131,135	5.2070%	\$14,576	\$12.89			
	2	493,926	1.5	740,889	3.4105%	\$9,547	\$19.33			
	3	132,154	3	396,461	1.8250%	\$5,109	\$38.66			
	4	15,190	6	91,142	0.4196%	\$1,174	\$77.32			
5 1,655 12 19,862					0.0914%	\$256	\$154.63			
Total	D-II	1,774,061		2,379,490	10.95%	\$30,662	\$17.28			
D-III	1	2,868,513	1	2,868,513	13.2046%	\$36,963	\$12.89			
	2	1,060,532	1.5	1,590,798	7.3229%	\$20,499	\$19.33			
	3	269,261	3	807,784	3.7185%	\$10,409	\$38.66			
	4	16,184	6	97,105	0.4470%	\$1,251	\$77.32			
	5	1,769	12	21,228	0.0977%	\$274	\$154.63			
Total I	D-111	4,216,260		5,385,429	24.79%	\$69,396	\$16.46			
E	1	599,685	1	599,685	2.7605%	\$7,727	\$12.89			
	2	231,140	1.5	346,709	1.5960%	\$4,468	\$19.33			
	3	60,501	3	181,502	0.8355%	\$2,339	\$38.66			
	4	6,078	6	36,467	0.1679%	\$470	\$77.32			
	5	840	12	10,080	0.0464%	\$130	\$154.63			
Total	E	898,243	1.31	1,174,442	5.41%	\$15,134	\$16.85			
GRAND		15,724,952		21,723,555	100%	\$279,928	\$17.80			
TOTAL										
<u> </u>		<u></u>	1		······································		<u> </u>			

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Table 16 summarizes the unit volume-variable box costs for the fee groups in

3 the test year before rates.

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Table 1	Table 16. Total Volume-Variable Costs Per Box by New Fee Groups,TYBR								
			New Fee G	roups					
New	New								
Fee	Box	TYBR	Space	Space		Cost Per			
Groups	Size	Boxes	Provision	Support	Other	Box			
		[a]	[b]	[c]	[d]	[e]			
A	1	72,138	\$31.45	\$12.89	\$8.07	\$52.41			
	2	4,501	\$47.17	\$19.33	\$8.07	\$74.58			
	3	2,524	\$94.35	\$38.66	\$8.07	\$141.08			
	4	242	\$188.69	\$77.32	\$8.07	\$274.08			
	5	69	\$377.39	\$154.63	\$8.07	\$540.09			
Tota	IA	79,474	\$35.12	\$14.39	\$8.07	\$57.58			
В	1	124,912	\$22.42	\$12.89	\$8.08	\$43.39			
	2	29,996	\$33.62	\$19.33	\$8.08	\$61.04			
	3	10,802	\$67.25	\$38.66	\$8.08	\$113.99			
	4	1,561	\$134.49	\$77.32	\$8.08	\$219.89			
	5	1,524	\$268.99	\$154.63	\$8.08	\$431.70			
Tota	IB	168,795	\$30.54	\$17.56	\$8.08	\$56.18			
C-I	1	3,202,901	\$12.14	\$12.89	\$8.10	\$33.13			
	2	1,463,355	\$18.21	\$19.33	\$8.10	\$45.64			
	3	495,338		\$38.66	\$8.10	\$83.18			
	4	116,404	J	\$77.32	\$8.10	\$158.26			
	5	28,158	\$145.68	\$154.63	\$8.10	\$308.42			
Total	C-I	5,306,156	\$18.12	\$19.23	\$8.10	\$45.46			
C-II	1	1,944,781	\$9.21	\$12.89	\$6.10	\$28.20			
	2	758,767	\$13.82	\$19.33	\$6.10	\$39.25			
	3	243,090	\$27.63	\$38.66	\$6.10	\$72.39			
	4	45,357	\$55.26	\$77.32	\$6.10	\$138.68			
	5	6,262	\$110.53	\$154.63	\$6.10	\$271.26			
Total	C-II	2,998,256	\$12.78	\$17.88	\$6.10	\$36.76			
C-111	1	151,459	\$6.65	\$12.89	\$5.73	\$25.26			
		47,532			\$5.73	\$35.03			
	2 3	15,375			\$5.73	\$64.33			
	4	1,612	1	1	\$5.73	\$122.93			
	5	532		\$154.63	\$5.73	\$240.13			
Total	C-111	216,510	+ <u> </u>	\$16.96	\$5.73	\$31.44			
D-I	1	36,301	\$9.68		\$8.11	\$30.68			
	2	22,069		· ·		\$41.96			
	3	7,552	1		l i	\$75.81			
	4	1,096		1 '		\$143.50			
	5	180				\$278.89			
Total	L	67,198				\$41.96			

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Table 1	Table 16. Total Volume-Variable Costs Per Box by New Fee Groups,TYBR (continued)							
			New Fee G					
D-II	1	1,131,135	\$9.75		\$6.05	\$28.69		
	2	493,926	\$14.63	\$19.33	\$6.05	\$40.01		
	3	132,154	\$29.26	\$38.66	\$6.05	\$73.97		
ſ	4	15,190	\$58.53	\$77.32	\$6.05	\$141.89		
	5	1,655	\$117.05	\$154.63	\$6.05	\$277.73		
Total	D-II	1,774,061	\$13.08	\$17.28	\$6.05	\$36.41		
D-III	1	2,868,513	\$8.13	\$12.89	\$5.59	\$26.60		
	2	1,060,532	\$12.19	\$19.33	\$5.59	\$37.11		
	3	269,261	\$24.38	\$38.66	\$5.59	\$68.63		
	4	16,184	\$48.76	\$77.32	\$5.59	\$131.66		
	5	1,769	\$97.51	\$154.63	\$5.59	\$257.73		
Total	D-III	4,216,260	\$10.38	\$16.46	\$5.59	\$32.43		
E	1	599,685	\$9.34	\$12.89	\$5.80	\$28.03		
	2	231,140	\$14.01	\$19.33	\$5.80	\$39.14		
:	3	60,501	\$28.03	\$38.66	\$5.80	\$72.49		
	4	6,078	\$56.06	\$77.32	\$5.80	\$139.18		
	5	840	\$112.12	\$154.63	\$5.80	\$272.55		
Tota	IE	898,243	\$12.22	\$16.85	\$5.80	\$34.86		
GRAND TOTAL		15,724,952	\$14.20	\$17.80	\$6.65	\$38.65		

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V. PROPOSED POST OFFICE BOX FEES SHOULD REFLECT THE HIGHER COSTS OF PROVIDING BOX SERVICE IN LARGER VERSUS SMALLER POST OFFICES, AND ENSURE A REASONABLE CONTRIBUTION TO INSTITUTIONAL COSTS

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6	Under my proposal, post office box fees would increase for Fee Groups A, B,
7	C-I, C-II, D-I, D-II and D-III. No fee increase is proposed for Fee Group C-III, or the
8	\$0 fee for Fee Group E boxholders. Proposed fee increases for boxholders in Fee
9	Group A range from 32 to 56 percent, and from 30 to 46 percent in Fee Group B.
10	Proposed fees for new Fee Groups C-I and C-II would increase by 40 percent and
11	15 to 16 percent, respectively. For new Fee Group D-I, fees increase by 100
12	percent. For new Fee Groups D-II and D-III, fees increase 50 to 51 percent and 25
13	percent, respectively.
14	I propose fee increases for caller service averaging 22 percent, and I propose
15	a 33 percent increase for reserve call numbers. Table 17 presents the current
16	annual fees, the fees proposed by the Postal Service, and my proposed fees. The
47	and the second

17 percentage change in fees is also presented.

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,	Ta	able 17. F	Post Office	Box Fee C	omparison	
New		Current	USPS	OCA	USPS	OCA
Fee	Box	Box	Proposed	Proposed	Percent	Percent
Groups	Size	Fees	Box Fees	Box Fees	Change	Change
		[a]	[b]	[c]	[d]	[e]
Α	1	\$48	\$70	\$75	46%	56%
	2	\$74	\$105	\$110	42%	49%
	3	\$128	\$185	\$190	45%	48%
	4	\$242	\$325	\$330	34%	36%
	5	\$418	\$550	\$550	32%	32%
Tota	A					
В	1	\$44	\$60	\$65	36%	48%
	2 3	\$66			36%	44%
		\$112	\$150	1	34%	43%
	4	\$218			33%	33%
	5	\$372	\$435	\$485	17%	30%
Tota	В					
C-1	1	\$40			13%	40%
	2	\$58			12%	40%
	3	\$104			11%	40%
	4	\$172	\$195		13%	40%
	5	\$288	\$325	\$402	13%	40%
Total						
C-II	1	\$40			13%	15%
	2 3	\$58			12%	16%
		\$104			11%	15%
	4	\$172	1 .		13%	15%
	5	\$288	\$325	\$331	13%	15%
Total		<u> </u>			4004	
C-III	1	\$40		4	13%	
	2	\$58	1		12% 11%	0% 0%
	3	\$104	1		11%	0% 0%
	4 5	\$172			13%	0%
Total		\$288	 	φ200	1370	070
		\$12	\$18	\$24	50%	100%
D-I	1	\$12		1	50%	100%
	2 3	\$20			53%	100%
1	4	\$50			51%	100 %
	5	\$83	1 .		51%	100%
Total						
		1		<u> </u>		

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Та	able 1	7. Post O	ffice Box F	ee Compa	rison (conti	nued)
D-II	1	\$12	\$18	\$18	50%	50%
	2	\$20	\$30	\$30	50%	
	3	\$36	\$55	\$54	53%	50%
	4	\$53	\$80	\$80	51%	51%
	5	\$83	\$125	\$125	51%	51%
Total	D-II					
D-III	1	\$12	\$18	\$15	50%	25%
	2	\$20	\$30	\$25	50%	25%
	3	\$36	\$55	\$45	53%	25%
	4	\$53	\$80	\$66	51%	25%
	5	\$83	\$125	\$104	51%	25%
Total	D-111					
Е	1	\$0	\$0	\$0	0%	0%
	2	\$0	\$0	\$0	0%	0%
	3	\$0	\$0	\$0	0%	0%
	4	\$0	\$0	\$0	0%	0%
	5	\$0	\$0	\$0	0%	0%
Tota	E					

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Collectively, these changes result in a cost coverage of 116 percent and net

3 revenues of \$94.3 million. The before rates and after rates revenues, costs and

4 cost coverage for my proposal are shown in Table 18.

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Table 18. Summary of Revenues and Costs, Proposed New Fee Groups, TYBR and TYAR											
New Fee Groups											
											OCA
		OCA			OCA						TYAR
New Fee	Bay	TYBR	C	Dupupped		TYBR	TYAR			OCA TYAR	Cost
Groups	Box Size	Boxes		Proposed Box Fees	Boxes	Revenues		OCA TYBR	OCA TYAR	TTL Rev -	Cover
							Revenues	Total Costs	Total Costs	TTL Costs	-age
A	1	72,138				\$3,462,625		\$3,780,583	\$3,609,269		
	2 3	4,501	\$74 \$129	\$110 \$190	· ·	\$333,056 \$323,090			\$325,008		
	4	2,524 242	\$128 \$242	\$190		\$58,595		· ·	\$350,991	\$8,578	
	5	242	\$242 \$418	\$550		\$28,713		\$66,363 \$37,100	\$65,995		
Total	_	79,474	\$410	\$550	56,293				\$37,010		
						\$4,206,080			\$4,388,273		
в	1	124,912	\$44 \$66	\$65 \$05		\$5,496,107		\$5,419,447	\$5,188,379		
	2	29,996	\$66			\$1,979,763			\$1,766,553		
	3 4	10,802	\$112 \$218	\$160 \$200		\$1,209,804		\$1,231,292	\$1,211,915	· ·	
	5	1,561 1,524	\$210 \$372	\$290 \$485		\$340,285			\$341,084		
Total	-		\$372		,	\$566,923			\$655,973		
	_	168,795			129,434	\$9,592,883		\$9,482,783	\$9,163,904	\$1,540,794	
C-I	1	3,202,901	\$40 \$50		2,534,252						
	2 3	1,463,355	\$58 \$104		1,112,183	\$84,874,580		\$66,790,269	\$63,939,049		
	3 4	495,338 116,404	\$104 \$172	\$146 \$240		\$51,515,132					
	5	28,158	\$172	\$240 \$402		\$20,021,558					
Total	-			\$4UZ		\$8,109,453		\$8,684,387	\$8,637,632		
		5,306,156	0.40		4,153,447	\$292,636,749					1
C-11	1	1,944,781	\$40		1,792,531	\$77,791,222			• • • • • • • • • • • • •	\$28,549,610	•
	2	758,767	\$58	\$67		\$44,008,463		•••	\$29,342,599		1
	3	243,090	\$104	\$120	r - 1	\$25,281,331			\$17,479,179		
	4	45,357	\$172	\$198		\$7,801,448		\$6,290,119.	\$6,268,463		
	5	6,262	\$288	\$331	5,779	\$1,803,345			\$1,695,560		
Total (2,998,256			2,751,407			\$110,201,717		\$56,871,504	
C-III	1	151,459	\$40	\$40		\$6,058,375			\$3,826,400		
	2	47,532	\$58	\$58		\$2,756,864					
	3	15,375	\$104	\$104	15,375	\$1,598,978					1
	4	1,612	\$172	\$172		\$277,319					
	5	532	\$288	\$288		\$153,165	\$153,165	\$127,705			
Total C		216,510			216,510	\$10,844,702	\$10,844,702	\$6,806,408	\$6,806,408		
D-I	1	36,301	\$12	\$24	34,356	\$435,608	\$824,544	\$1,113,576			
	2	22,069	\$20	\$40		\$441,377	· ·				
	3	7,552	\$36	\$72		\$271,869	· ·				
	4	1,096	\$53	\$106		\$58,107	· ·				
	5	180	\$83	\$166		\$14,978	\$29,495	\$50,327	\$50,304		
Total	D-I	67,198			63,425	\$1,221,940	\$2,313,232	\$2,819,693	\$2,789,0 <u>2</u> 2	-\$475,790	0.83

									:	1234
	Table 18	Summa	rv of R	evenues and	Costs Propo	sed New Fee G		nd TVAP (conti		
					New Fee				ildeu)	
	1,131,135	\$12	\$18	1,100,837	\$13,573,626	\$19,815,069	\$32,447,603	\$32,264,050	-\$12,448,981	0.61
	493,926	\$20	\$30	476,845	\$9,878,524	\$14,305,338	\$19,759,988	\$19,656,504		
	132,154	\$36			\$4,757,533			\$9,760,461	-\$2,752,925	0.72
	15,190	\$53			\$805,088	\$1,200,115	\$2,155,308	\$2,154,163		0.56
	1,655	\$83	\$125	1,642	\$137,377	\$205,283	\$459,678	\$459,600		
	1,774,061			1,724,095	\$29,152,148	\$42,533,342	\$64,597,483	\$64,294,778	-\$21,761,436	
	2,868,513	\$12	\$15	2,830,096	\$34,422,158	\$42,451,433	\$76,306,951	\$76,091,761	-\$33,640,328	0.56
	1,060,532	\$20	\$25	1,042,194	\$21,210,646	\$26,054,849	\$39,353,669	\$39,250,949	-\$13,196,101	0.66
	269,261	\$36	\$45	266,832	\$9,693,407	\$12,007,445	\$18,478,102	\$18,464,495		
	16,184	\$53	\$66	16,087	\$857,763	\$1,061,762	\$2,130,823	\$2,130,280		0.50
	1,769	\$83	\$104	1,762	\$146,827	\$183,260	\$455,926	\$455,888		0.40
	4,216,260			4,156,971	\$66,330,801	\$81,758,749	\$136,725,470	\$136,393,373		0.60
1										

\$0

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\$45,188,468

\$6,029,976

\$638,817,332 \$607,734,000

\$690,035,776 \$607,734,000

\$16,808,809

\$9,047,734

\$4,385,562

\$31,316,921

\$845,883

\$228,933

\$16,808,809

\$9,047,734

\$4,385,562

\$845,883

\$228,933

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-\$4,385,562

-\$845,883

-\$228,933

-\$31,316,921

\$43,123,331

\$45,188,468

\$6,029,976

\$94,341,775

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TO	TAL
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D-II

D-III

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TOTAL

Caller

Service Reserve

Number GRAND

1 2

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4

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1 2

3

4

5

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2

3

4

5

Total D-II

Total D-III

Total E

599,685

231,140

60,501

898,243

90,747

182,113

15,997,812

15,724,952

6,078

840

\$0

\$0

\$0

\$0

\$0

\$451

\$30

\$0

\$0

\$0

\$0

\$0

\$550

\$40

599,685

231,140

60,501

898,243

82,161

150,749

6,078

840

14,149,825 \$570,671,113

14,382,735 \$617,061,409

2 Table 19 compares the revenues, costs and cost coverage for the Postal

\$40,926,917

\$5,463,379

\$0

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3 Service's proposal and my proposal.

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Table 19. Compar	ison of Postal Servic TYAR	e and OCA Proposals,
Post Office Box and Caller Service	USPS Proposal	OCA Proposal
Revenues	\$683,362,079	\$690,035,776
Costs	\$589,954,455	\$595,694,001
Net Revenues	\$93,407,624	\$94,341,775
Cost Coverage	116%	116%

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A. Proposed Fees And The New Fee Groups Constitute A Transition To De Averaged Allocated Costs And Further Restructuring Of Fee Groups
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The proposed fees for boxes in new Fee Groups C-I, C-II and C-III and D-I, 4 5 D-II and D-III constitute a transition to a uniform fee by box size for each CAG grouping comprising the new fee groups. As stated previously, combining Fee 6 Groups C and D to create three fee groups out of CAG A-D, E-G and H-L offices 7 8 was tabled for the present. To propose a uniform fee for each box size for such 9 combined fee groups would cause large percentage increases for boxholders from 10 Fee Group D. For example, if a new fee group, comprised of boxes in CAG A-D offices from Fee Groups C and D, were formed, a uniform fee of \$56 for all size 1 11 12 boxes would represent a 40 percent (\$56/\$40-1) increase for size 1 boxholders from 13 Fee Group C. However, a \$56 fee for a size 1 box from Fee Group D would represent a 367 percent (\$56/\$12-1) increase. Because of my concern about "rate 14 shock" for Fee Group D boxholders, I decided to move toward merging Fee Groups 15 C and D in separate stages. 16

17 Consequently, I formed three new fee groups from Fee Group C and three 18 from Fee Group D. This permits differential fee increases for boxes by CAG within 19 Fee Groups C and D until such time as Fee Groups C and D are merged and 20 restructured by CAGs A-D, E-G and H-L. In so doing, the proposed fees result in

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more gradual fee increases for boxholders in CAGs A-D, E-G and H-L from current
 Fee Group D.

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B. The Proposed Post Office Box Fees Satisfy The Pricing Criteria Of The
 Postal Reorganization Act

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6 The pricing criteria for postal rates and fees are enumerated in Section 3622(b), paragraphs 1 through 9, of the Postal Reorganization Act. In developing 7 the proposed fees for post office boxes, I considered the relevant pricing criteria. 8 9 The proposed fees reflect my judgment as to the application of those criteria. 10 Criterion number one refers to "the establishment and maintenance of a fair and equitable schedule." The proposed fees are fair and equitable. Proposed fees 11 12 for Fee Groups A and B are higher than those proposed by the Postal Service. 13 reflecting the higher allocation of All Other costs to boxes in the larger CAG offices 14 that comprise these fee groups. 15 For the other fee groups, current post office box fees are misaligned with 16 costs. Under current fees, boxholders who are similarly situated in terms of CAG 17 pay vastly different rates. That is, boxholders with size 1 boxes in CAG A-D offices 18 in Fee Group C pay much higher rates than size 1 boxholders in Fee Group D, i.e., 19 \$40 and \$12, respectively. Nevertheless, unit box costs in the TYBR for size 1 20 boxes are much closer together, i.e., \$33.13 and \$30.68, respectively.

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1	The proposed fees begin to reduce this inequity with higher fees for
2	boxholders in CAG A-D offices from Fee Group D, forming new Fee Group D-I.
3	These boxholders face a 100 percent increase. In comparison, boxholders in CAG
4	A-D offices from Fee Group C face a smaller increase of 40 percent. Similarly,
5	boxholders in CAGs E-G and H-L offices from Fee Group C, which form new Fee
6	Groups C-II and C-III, respectively, face smaller increases than boxholders in CAGs
7	E-G and H-L offices from Fee Group D, which form new Fee Groups D-II and D-III,
8	respectively. Fees for boxholders in new Fee Groups C-II and C-III would increase
9	by 15 to 16 percent and 0 percent, respectively, while fees in new Fee Groups D-II
10	and D-III would increase 50 to 51 percent and 25 percent, respectively. By contrast,
11	the Postal Service's proposed fees increase between 11 and 13 percent for all
12	boxholders in Fee Group C, and between 50 and 53 percent for all boxholders in
13	Fee Group D.
14	Moreover, the proposed fees permit a more gradual transition to a further

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14 Moreover, the proposed lees permit a more gradual transition to a further
15 restructuring of the classification schedule. Higher box fees for new Fee Groups D16 I, D-II and D-III, and comparatively lower fees for new Fee Groups C-I, C-II and C-III
17 would, over time, ease the transition for boxholders into fee groups consisting of
18 CAG A-D, E-G and H-L offices from merged Fee Groups C and D in a future
19 proceeding.

20 The second criterion directs that consideration be given to "the value of the 21 mail service actually provided." Post office box service is an alternative form of

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delivery service that is valued by some customers. Box features such as privacy,
security and the generally earlier availability of box mail vis-à-vis carrier delivery
service are valued features. The value of service to boxholders is explicitly
recognized in the elasticities adopted by the Commission in Docket No. MC96-3,
and utilized in developing my after rates volumes and revenues.

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6 The third criterion -- recovery of attributable costs -- requires that revenues for each mail class or service be at least equal to the attributable costs for that class 7 8 or service. My proposed fees for post office boxes alone results in an implicit cost coverage of 107 percent.²⁰ Including caller service and reserve call numbers results 9 10 in combined net revenues of \$94.3 million, with a cost coverage of 116 percent 11 (without the 1 percent contingency). This cost coverage is identical to the Postal Service's proposed cost coverage for post office boxes, caller service and reserve 12 13 call numbers, i.e., 116 percent (without the 1 percent contingency).

Criterion number four concerns "the effect of rate increases" on the general public. Considerable attention was given to the effect of proposed fee increases on boxholders. Combining Fee Groups C and D to form three new fee groups by CAG

²⁰ Under the Postal Service's proposal, witness Needham claims post office box revenues "make a small contribution with a 106 percent proposed implicit cost coverage." USPS-T-39 at 66.

1 was tabled at this time because of the significant percentage fee increases that 2 could attend a uniform fee by box size for certain boxholders now in Fee Group D. 3 In order to limit such percentage fee increases, three new fee groups were 4 created from Fee Group D, with proposed fee increases limited to 100 percent for boxholders in CAG A-D offices in Fee Group D -- boxholders in the larger (CAG A-5 6 D) offices that comprise the new Fee Group D-I. In all, fee increases of this magnitude are limited to only 63,425 boxholders. Similarly, proposed fee increases 7 8 for boxholders in CAG E-G offices in Fee Group D, which comprise new Fee Group 9 D-II, are limited to 51 percent, nearly the same percentage fee increase as proposed by the Postal Service. At the same time, fee increases for all boxholders 10 11 in the smallest offices (i.e., CAG H-L) in Fee Group D, which comprise new Fee 12 Group D-III, are limited to 25 percent. Boxholders in new Fee Groups C-III and D-III experience the lowest 13 14 percentage fee increases, as compared to other boxholders from current Fee 15 Groups C and D, respectively, because of the lower allocated costs to boxes in the smaller offices that comprise new Fee Groups C-III and D-III. 16 The fifth criterion directs consideration to the role of available alternatives at 17 reasonable cost. For boxholders subject to the proposed box fee increases, the 18 most feasible alternative is free carrier delivery service, if the proposed box fees are 19 considered too high or private sector alternatives prohibitive. 20

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1	Criterion number seven refers to the "simplicity of [the] structure for the entire
2	schedule and simple, identifiable relationships between the rates or fees charged."
3	For Fee Groups A, B and E, there is no change in the fee structure. However, the
4	proposed fee group structure is more complex than the current fee group structure
5	for Fee Groups C and D. Fee Groups C and D are proposed to be replaced by six
6	new fee groups, C-I, C-II and C-III, and D-I, D-II and D-III, as a transition to a further
7	restructuring of the fee schedule. Consequently, the proposed fee schedule
8	represents a balance between substantial fee increases for certain boxholders and
9	a temporarily more complex fee structure for the Postal Service to administer.
10 11 12	C. The Proposed New Fee Groups Accord With The Classification Criteria Of The Postal Reorganization Act
13	The classification criteria for changes in mail and special service
14	classifications are found in Section 3623(c), paragraphs 1 through 6, of the Postal
15	Reorganization Act. I have considered the relevant classification criteria in relation
16	to my development of the proposed new fee groups. Establishment of the new fee
17	groups reflect my judgment as to the application of those criteria.
18	Classification criterion one refers to the "establishment and maintenance of a
19	fair and equitable classification system for all mail." The proposed new fee groups
20	are fair and equitable in that they maintain the basic distinction in the existing fee
21	group structure, i.e., that between boxholders eligible for carrier delivery service and

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1 those not eligible for carrier delivery, with boxholders eligible for delivery paying box 2 fees, and those not eligible paying no box fees. Establishing three new fee groups 3 by CAG from Fee Group C that parallel three new fee groups from Fee Group D begins the process of eliminating the dichotomy between Fee Groups C and D, 4 5 where boxholders pay differing fees depending upon their eligibility for city or "rural" delivery, respectively, and explicitly recognizes the similarities between these 6 groups in terms of box service, the availability of carrier delivery service, and costs. 7 8 Classification criterion five concerns "the desirability of special classifications from the point of view of both the user and the Postal Service." From the point of 9 view of boxholders, the new fee groups better reflect the costs of providing box 10 11 service in post offices of comparable size. From the point of view of the Postal Service, the fact that boxholders in Fee Groups C and D are eligible for delivery 12 services provided by either city or rural carriers would, in the future, no longer lead 13 to significantly different post office box fees. 14

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1 VI. CONCLUSION

2 Current post office box fees and the existing fee groups do not adequately recognize the higher costs of providing box service in larger offices nor the lower 3 4 costs in smaller offices. The existing fee group structure and the Postal Service's 5 methodology for allocating certain post office box costs results in unfairly high costs 6 for boxholders in smaller offices and inappropriately low costs to boxholders in 7 larger offices. As a result, current fees, and the Postal Service's proposed fees, 8 produce fees that are too high in smaller CAG offices and too low in larger CAG 9 offices. 10 The restructured post office box fee groups and the new cost allocation 11 methodology proposed herein provide a more reasonable cost-basis for setting fees. 12 Restructuring Fee Groups C and D based upon CAG produces more rent-13 homogeneous fee groups that better reflect cost in larger and smaller offices. 14 Similarly, my new cost allocation methodology, that distributes a portion of volume-15 variable post office box costs by CAG, better reflects costs in larger and smaller 16 offices. 17 The proposed post office box fees satisfy the relevant statutory pricing and

classification criteria. My proposed box fees, combined with caller service and
reserve call number fees, provide virtually the same net revenues as proposed by
the Postal Service, and a reasonable contribution to institutional costs. The

1 proposed classification changes establish a more fair and equitable classification for

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2 post office boxes by creating a more rational structure of fee groups based upon

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3 CAGs.

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CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Mr. Callow, have you had an l 2 opportunity to examine the packet of designated written 3 cross-examination that was made available earlier today? THE WITNESS: Yes, I have. 4 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: And if these questions were 5 6 asked of you today, would your answers be the same as those 7 you previously provided in writing? THE WITNESS: Yes. I have two -- I'm sorry, three 8 corrections to be made. On Interrogatory No. 11, in Part B, 9 the first line, "emphasis" should be changed to "emphasize". 10 11 In Interrogatory 28, C, in the second line of that response, "was" should be changed to "were". And those -- those would 12 be my changes. 13 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: I thought you mentioned three 14 changes, and I got --15 16 THE WITNESS: I am jumping ahead here. I'm sorry. MS. DREIFUSS: Right. There was another 17 Interrogatory response that is going to be changed, but I 18 believe it is going to be moved into evidence orally this 19 20 morning. It hasn't yet been included in that designated 21 packet. CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Have those two changes been 22 incorporated into the package? 23 MS. DREIFUSS: Yes, sir, they have. 24 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: And with those changes, your 25

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12352 1 answers would be the same as those you previously provided 2 in writing? 3 THE WITNESS: Yes. CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: That being the case, I am going 4 5 to provide two copies of the corrected designated written cross-examination of Witness Callow to the reporter and 6 direct that it be accepted into evidence and transcribed 7 into the record at this point. 8 [Designation of Written 9 Cross-Examination of James F. 10 Callow, OCA-T-500, was received 11 into evidence and transcribed into 12 13 the record.] 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

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BEFORE THE POSTAL RATE COMMISSION WASHINGTON, DC 20268-0001

Postal Rate and Fee Changes, 1997

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Docket No. R97-1

DESIGNATION OF WRITTEN CROSS-EXAMINATION OF OFFICE OF THE CONSUMER ADVOCATE WITNESS JAMES F. CALLOW (OCA-T500)

<u>Party</u> Douglas F. Carlson Interrogatories USPS/OCA-T500-4, 6-10, 14, 16-18, 20-23, 25, 27-28, 32-35

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United Parcel Service

United States Postal Service

USPS/OCA-T500-1-20, 22-36

Respectfully submitted,

USPS/OCA-T500-12

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Margaret P. Crenshaw Secretary

INTERROGATORY RESPONSES OF OFFICE OF THE CONSUMER ADVOCATE WITNESS JAMES F. CALLOW (T500) DESIGNATED AS WRITTEN CROSS-EXAMINATION

Interrogatory:
USPS/OCA-T500-1
USPS/OCA-T500-2
USPS/OCA-T500-3
USPS/OCA-T500-4
USPS/OCA-T500-5
USPS/OCA-T500-6 (as revised 2/18/98)
USPS/OCA-T500-7
USPS/OCA-T500-8
USPS/OCA-T500-9
USPS/OCA-T500-10
USPS/OCA-T500-11
USPS/OCA-T500-12
USPS/OCA-T500-13
USPS/OCA-T500-14
USPS/OCA-T500-15
USPS/OCA-T500-16
USPS/OCA-T500-17 (as revised 2/18/98)
USPS/OCA-T500-18
USPS/OCA-T500-19
USPS/OCA-T500-20
USPS/OCA-T500-21
USPS/OCA-T500-22
USPS/OCA-T500-23 (as revised 2/18/98)
USPS/OCA-T500-24
USPS/OCA-T500-25
USPS/OCA-T500-26

Designating Parties: USPS USPS USPS Carlson, USPS USPS Carlson, USPS Carlson, USPS Carlson, USPS Carlson, USPS Carlson, USPS USPS UPS, USPS USPS Carlson, USPS USPS Carlson, USPS Carlson, USPS Carlson, USPS USPS Carlson, USPS Carlson Carlson, USPS Carlson, USPS USPS ·Carlson, USPS USPS

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 Interrogatory:

 USPS/OCA-T500-27

 USPS/OCA-T500-28

 (as revised 2/19/98)

 USPS/OCA-T500-29

 USPS/OCA-T500-30

 USPS/OCA-T500-31

 USPS/OCA-T500-32

 USPS/OCA-T500-33

 USPS/OCA-T500-34


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 USPS/OCA-T500-36

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Designating Parties: Carlson, USPS Carlson, USPS USPS USPS Carlson, USPS Carlson, USPS Carlson, USPS Carlson, USPS Carlson, USPS

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USPS/OCA-T500-1. Did you consider any alternatives to creating groups of offices other than by using CAG designations? If so, please describe each alternative, why it was rejected.

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A. No.

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USPS/OCA-T500-2. If you could determine costs for each office, would grouping offices directly into cost-homogeneous groups be preferable to using CAGs to group the offices? Please explain your answer.

A. Since I did not have cost data for each office, I do not know whether costs by

office would have been preferable to CAG cost data in developing my fee groups. In

the absence of such cost data, I do not know a priori whether a reasonable basis for

grouping offices might have emerged from the data.

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USPS/OCA-T500-3. Please refer to page 8, lines 10 to 11, where you state that "certain labor costs are not incurred in smaller post offices." Are you stating that certain work (regardless of who performs it) is done only in larger offices and not in smaller offices? If so, please explain. If not, is your position that smaller offices perform such work more efficiently? Please explain.

A. No. It would be reasonable to expect that certain work is required to maintain and service post office boxes, wherever located. What I am saying is that certain labor costs so categorized by the Postal Service (e.g., mailhandler and supervisor costs) are not incurred in smaller post offices because there are no mailhandlers or supervisors in such offices. I do not know whether "certain work" is performed more efficiently in smaller offices. It is clear, however, that such work is not being performed by mailhandlers or supervisors.

USPS/OCA-T500-4. Please refer to your Table 2.

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(a) Please confirm that for non-city offices the highest average rental cost is for CAG E, and the second highest cost is for CAG F. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(b) Please confirm that for non-city offices CAGS C, D, E, F, G, and H have higher average rental costs than CAG B. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

A. (a) Confirmed.

(b) Confirmed. However, it should be noted that the average rental cost of

\$5.93 per square foot for CAG B is computed from only three offices. This small

number of observations might explain the comparatively low average rental cost for

CAG B offices.

USPS/OCA-T500-5. Please refer to library reference OCA-LR-2, page 16.
(a) Please confirm that for city offices, the maximum rental cost for each of CAGS A through G is between \$33 and \$36. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.
(b) Please confirm that for non-city offices, the maximum rental cost for each of CAGS E through L is between \$17 and \$18, while the maximum rental cost for each of CAGS B through D is between \$9 and \$14. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

A. (a) Confirmed, if you round the maximum rental cost for CAG E offices to the nearest dollar.

(b) Confirmed.

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USPS/OCA-T500-6. Please refer to your testimony at page 14, lines 5 through 14. (a) When an office's revenue changes so that it moves between CAGS D and E, or between CAGS G and H, would that office be reclassified into a different fee group under your proposal?

(b) If so, would that reclassification be at the same time as the CAG move, or later. If later, how much later?

- A. (a) Yes.
 - (b) The reclassification of an office into a different fee group, where the office

is placed in a new CAG level caused by the office's change in revenues, could be

addressed in several ways. One possible approach would be to reclassify an office into

a different fee group at the time changes in post office box fees are implemented by the

Postal Service. Ultimately, however, the determination of when to make such a

reclassification should rest with the Postal Service, in a manner that is administratively

convenient to the Postal Service.

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USPS/OCA-T500-7. Please refer to your testimony at page 17, lines 6 to 8. If in the future some offices in the city-B delivery group were reclassified into CAG E, or some CAG E offices were added to the city-B delivery group, would you adjust Fee Groups C-I and D-I so that they also include CAG E, as well as CAGs A through D? Please explain your answer.

A. The city-B delivery group, and consequently Fee Group B, consists of "specific

high-cost ZIP Code areas in eight large cities and their suburbs." USPS-T-39 at 60.

These high-cost ZIP Code areas encompass certain CAG A-D offices. In developing

my new Fee Groups C-I and D-I, I accepted the Postal Service's (and the

Commission's) determination from Docket No. R90-1 that some CAG A-D offices were

in high-cost areas. I decided to use this determination as a basis for my new Fee

Groups C-I and D-I. If it were determined that CAG E offices were also in high-cost

areas, I would not rule out the possibility of including CAG E, as well as CAG A-D

offices, in new Fee Groups C-I and D-I.

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USPS/OCA-T500-8. Please refer to your testimony at page 17, line, 8, to page 18, line 2. Assume that during 1998 the average rental costs for CAG H increased to at least \$5.80 for city-other offices, and \$6.43 for non-city offices. Also assume that the average rental costs for the other CAGS remained the same, so that the CAG H averages were within \$2 of the average CAG E rental cost. Under these conditions, would you adjust your fee group definitions so that CAGS E through H were grouped together? Please explain your answer.

A. I am unable to answer the question as framed because I did not make my determination to group CAGs E-G and H-L in the manner described. Rather, I started with the intention of merging the same CAG level offices from the city-other and non-city delivery groups, which form the basis of Fee Groups C and D. Although this effort was tabled to a future proceeding, see OCA-T-500 at 65-66, the data were used to develop my proposed fee groups.

I decided that three CAG groupings would best achieve the goal of having boxholders in smaller, lower-cost offices pay lower fees associated with the lower costs in those offices. To achieve this goal, I "de-averaged" rental costs by CAG. I reasoned that three CAG groupings would effectively minimize the recovery of costs from boxholders in the smallest CAG offices. I rejected establishing two fee groups because costs would not be de-averaged enough. Four or more fee groups were also unacceptable because they create too complicated a fee schedule.

The first grouping, hypothetical fee group CD-I (CAGs A-D), was based on the CAG level offices constituting the City-B delivery group. The other two groups result from finding an appropriate division of CAG E-L offices. The data presented at page 15 of OCA-LR-2 were the basis of my determination to group CAG E-G offices and H-L



offices into the remaining two groups: hypothetical fee groups CD-II and CD-III, respectively.

As a first step, I grouped CAG E-G offices and H-L offices to balance the number of CAGs. The computed average rental costs (the upper table of OCA-LR-2 at 15) revealed that the averages for hypothetical fee groups CD-I, CD-II and CD-III fall roughly into two dollar increments, i.e., the average rental cost of hypothetical fee group CD-I is in the \$9 range; the average cost of hypothetical fee group CD-II is in the \$7 range; and the average cost of hypothetical fee group CD-III is in the \$5 range. 1 considered this a reasonable and acceptable result. The largest CAG offices were shown to have the highest average rental costs and the smallest CAG offices the lowest. Moreover, the average rental cost for hypothetical fee group CD-III (\$5.79) was less than the average for the non-city delivery group as a whole (\$6.00), ensuring lower costs for boxholders in the smallest offices. Because of my desire to avoid "rate shock." I retained the separate fee structure for the city-other and non-city delivery groups. However, I maintained the same groupings by CAG (CAGs A-D, E-G, and H-L) and finally proposed the three groupings separately for the city-other and non-city delivery groups.

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USPS/OCA-T500-9. Please refer to section V, part A of your testimony. If your proposal and fees are implemented, do you believe that Groups C-I and D-I, C-II and D-II, and C-III and D-III could be merged in the next case involving post office box fees, without imposing "rate shock." If so, please explain how, with reference to how large fee increases would need to be to merge the groups. If not, please estimate how many cases would be needed to complete the merger of the C and D groups.

A. No. In developing my fees, the maximum fee increases were limited to 100

percent. In the context of my proposal to restructure fee groups and de-average costs,

I considered fee increases of more than 100 percent to be burdensome. In the next

rate proceeding, fee increases of more than 100 percent for boxholders in new Fee

Groups D-I, D-II and D-III would be necessary if such fees were to be brought to parity

with boxholders in new Fee Groups C-I, C-II and C-III. Consequently, I believe merging

new Fee Groups C-I and D-I, C-II and D-II, and C-III and D-III would require two more

rate proceedings.

USPS/OCA-T500-10. Please refer to page 66 of your testimony, lines 11 through 15.
(a) Please confirm that Table 16 of your testimony presents total costs per box for Groups A and B that are lower than those presented by the Postal Service in witness Lion's Table 13, as revised October 1, 1997. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(b) What is the basis for your proposing higher fees for Groups A and B than the Postal Service has proposed?

A. (a) Confirmed.

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(b) Almost all my fees differ from those of the Postal Service, some higher

and some lower. My total unit box costs in Fee Groups A and B are only slightly below

those of the Postal Service, ranging from 0.49 percent to 4.64 percent less.

Nevertheless, I proposed somewhat higher fees for boxholders in Fee Groups A and B

because Fee Groups A and B represent high cost areas which are reflected in relatively

higher unit box costs, as compared to other fee groups.

USPS/OCA-T500-11. Please refer to page 67 of your testimony, lines 1 to 4.
(a) Please confirm that under your proposal Group C-I faces larger dollar increases in box fees than Group D-I. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.
(b) How would this greater fee increase for Group C-I than for Group D-I ease the transition when merging fee groups C-I and D-I in the future, as you assert on page 67, lines 14 to 18.

A. (a) Confirmed.

(b) I must emphasis that the percentage increase in fees for new Fee Group C-I is considerably lower than for new Fee Group D-I. I recommend a 40 percent increase for new Fee Group C-I and a 100 percent increase for new Fee Group D-I. It is the relative percentage change in fees for new Fee Groups C-I and D-I that, over time, permits a more gradual transition for boxholders and leads to the merger of the fee groups. In this proceeding, for example, I am proposing a fee of \$56 for box size 1 in Fee Group C-I, a fee that is 133 percent greater (\$56/\$24-1) than the proposed \$24 fee for the same size box in Fee Group D-I. In a subsequent proceeding, I might propose a \$48 (\$24*2.0%) fee for box size 1 in Fee Group D-I, and a \$78 (\$56*1.40%) fee for box size 1 in Fee Group C-I, a fee that is 63 percent (\$78/\$48-1) greater. In this way, the fees for Fee Groups C-I and D-I would tend to converge.

By implication, the question is proposing that new Fee Groups C-I and D-I receive the same dollar increase. By way of illustration, for a box size 1, fees in new Fee Group D-I would be increased by \$16 (rather than \$12) or, in the alternative, fees in new Fee Group C-I would be increased by \$12 (rather than \$16).

Both alternatives are problematic. Increasing fees by \$16 for a box size 1 in new Fee Group D-I would have constituted a 133 percent ((\$12+\$16)/\$12-1) increase. In fact, any fee increase of more than \$12 would have been greater than 100 percent.

considered fee increases greater than 100 percent to be burdensome. Increasing fees by only \$12 for new Fee Group C-I would have required that additional revenues be obtained through higher fees from other fee groups. My proposed fees balance the need for additional revenues among fee groups and boxes in the context of deaveraging costs and better aligning fees with costs.


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ANSWERS OF OCA WITNESS JAMES F. CALLOW TO INTERROGATORIES USPS/OCA-T500-12-21

USPS/OCA-T500-12. Please confirm that the classification of post offices by CAG is based upon post office revenue, rather than post office costs. If you do not confirm, please explain your answer fully and provide the source of your information.

A. Confirmed. See OCA-T-500 at 6-7.





USPS/OCA-T500-13. Please confirm that post office box fees are based (in part) on post office costs, but not on post office revenues. If you do not confirm, please explain your answer fully and provide the source of your information.

A. I am unable to answer this question. It is not clear from the question whether

reference is being made to the Postal Service's post office box fee proposal or my

proposal. In developing my fee proposal, I would note that my new fee groups are

based upon groupings of CAGs, which are dependent upon post office revenues.

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USPS/OCA-T500-14. Please refer to page 3, line[s] [11-] 14, of your testimony, where you state that "the Postal Service's current allocation methodology results in higher volume-variable unit box costs in smaller offices and lower unit costs in larger offices than if costs were allocated according to office location and size, as measured by CAG."

(a) Please explain how a CAG designation can be used to "measure" an office's location.

(b) In what way does a CAG designation indicate an office's size?

(c) Please confirm that an office's CAG designation does not provide information on the costs, number of employees, size of facility, or volume of incoming mail processed for that office. If you do not confirm, please explain your answer fully and the source of your information.

A. (a) Strictly speaking, an office's CAG designation does not "measure"

location. However, a CAG designation does reveal something about an office's

location. According to the Postal Service, "CAG A and B offices tend to be located in

higher-rent urban areas, while CAG K and L offices tend to be located in lower rent

rural areas." Docket No R90-1, U.S. Postal Service Library Reference F-183 at 15.

(b) Revenues, as measured by revenue units. See Glossary of Postal

Terms, Publication 32, April 1988, at 16. See also U.S. Postal Service Handbook F-4,

June 1992, at 22.

(c) Not confirmed. It is my understanding that the CAG level of an office is

highly correlated with the items listed. However, I do not have facility-specific

information available to me to demonstrate the correlation.

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ANSWERS OF OCA WITNESS JAMES F. CALLOW TO INTERROGATORIES USPS/OCA-T500-12-21

USPS/OCA-T500-15. Please refer to page 8 beginning at line 9, where you state that

aside from average postal rental costs, other costs vary by CAG, and are higher in larger CAG offices. Two conditions produce this result. First, certain labor costs are not incurred in smaller post offices. While the salaries and benefits of mailhandlers are uniform nationwide, there are more mailhandlers in higher CAG offices, and proportionately more costs, than in lower offices. In fact, there are virtually no mailhandlers, and consequently almost no mailhandler costs, to be found in CAG F-L offices. Similarly, there are virtually no supervisors in offices CAG H or below. Hence, virtually no supervisor costs are incurred in such offices.

(a) Is it your contention that window service costs related to post office box service are lower in small offices than in large ones because small offices have no supervisors or mail handlers?

(b) Are you aware that clerks and postmasters in small offices often perform the same functions in small offices as mailhandlers and supervisors perform in larger offices? Please provide your understanding of how the functions performed by mailhandlers and supervisors in larger offices are performed in small offices.

(c) Are you aware that postmasters in large offices generally do not perform window service activities related to post office box service? Please provide your understanding of how the functions of postmasters differ in large and small offices.

A. (a) In developing my cost allocation methodology for All Other costs, I

examined Postal Service data showing the absence of mailhandlers and supervisors in

smaller offices. I considered it reasonable to conclude that where there were no

mailhandlers or supervisors there would be no such costs associated with post office

box service. At that time, I had no other basis for allocating costs. It should be noted

that those costs I determined to be clerk costs are allocated in the same manner as

witness Lion.

(b) I do not know how the functions performed by mailhandlers and

supervisors in larger offices are performed in small offices. However it would not be

unreasonable to expect clerks and postmasters in smaller offices to perform similar

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functions as mailhandlers and supervisors in larger offices.

(c) I do not know how the functions of postmasters differ in large and small

offices. However, it would not be unreasonable to expect postmasters to perform

different activities in larger versus smaller offices.

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USPS/OCA-T500-16. Please refer to page 9, line 3, of your testimony, where you state that:

postmaster salaries and benefits are dependent, in part, on CAG and therefore vary by CAG. In Fiscal Year 1996, the average salary for postmasters in CAGs K-L was \$39,309, while the average salary for CAG A-G postmasters was \$55,220 - 40 percent greater than the average salary of CAG K-L postmasters.

(a) Please confirm that the example you have used reflects a difference in the average salaries of postmasters, not a difference in the total cost of Postmasters relating to post office box service. If you do not confirm, please explain your answer fully.

(b) Assume that postmasters in smaller offices spend a greater proportion of their time on post office box functions than postmasters in large offices. Under this scenario would the additional hours spent on post office box functions by postmasters in smaller offices result in a larger portion of their salaries being spent on post office box operations than in larger offices where fewer or no postmaster hours are spent on post office box operations? If you answer is other than yes, please explain your answer fully.

(c) Please refer to pages 9 and 10 of Exhibit USPS-5A (Testimony of Joe Alexandrovich). Please confirm that volume variable costs are allocated to post office box service for postmasters EAS 23 and below, but not for postmasters EAS 24 and above. If you do not confirm, please explain your answer fully

(d) Please confirm that postmasters EAS 23 and below are generally found in smaller post offices, and that postmasters EAS 24 and above are generally found in larger post offices. If you do not confirm please explain your answer fully.

- A. (a) Confirmed.
 - (b) Yes.
 - (c) Confirmed.
 - (d) Confirmed.

USPS/OCA-T500-17. Please refer to page 14, line 8 of your testimony where you state:

I propose to restructure post office box fee groups by creating six new fee groups. Three new fee groups would be formed from the current Fee Group C and three from current Fee Group D, based upon CAG. CAG A-D post offices in Fee Groups C and D would become new Fee Groups C-I and D-I, respectively.

(a) In determining that CAG A-D city delivery offices are analogous to and properly included in the same group as CAG A-D non-city delivery offices, have you examined the individual characteristics of any CAG A-D non-city delivery offices in this category and compared them to CAG A-D city delivery offices? If so, please present any conclusions you reached based on your examination.

(b) Are you aware that CAG A-D non-city delivery offices may be very small offices in towns having a very large plant load mailer providing enough revenue to qualify the office for a CAG A-D classification?

(c) To what extent would the type of CAG A-D non-city delivery office described in part (b) share cost characteristics with CAG A-D city delivery offices? Please explain.

(d) Should small CAG A-D non-city delivery offices in towns having a very large plant load mailer have the same post office box fees as much larger CAG A-D city delivery offices? Please explain your answer fully.

(e) How does your post office box fee proposal address the issue discussed in part (d)?

A. (a) No

(b) I have no personal knowledge of the situation described, and I doubt that

there are very many examples of this situation. Since I did not examine the individual

characteristics of any CAG A-D non-city delivery offices, however, I do not know the

extent of the situation described.

(c) I did not examine the cost characteristics of any CAG A-D city delivery or

non-city delivery offices. Therefore I am unable to answer this question.

(d) Yes, in the absence of data concerning the extent of the situation

server and the server of agric of the

described. In developing my fee proposals, I relied on the Postal Service's conclusion in Docket No. R90-1 Library Reference F-183 that there is a significant relationship between the CAG designation of a facility and its associated square-foot rent, wherein higher CAG offices have higher rents and lower CAG offices have lower rents. It would not be unexpected to find exceptions to this "significant relationship." However, I did not examine the individual characteristics of any CAG city-other or non-city delivery offices to know the extent of the situation described.

(e) My fee proposal did not address the situation discussed in part (d). If the Commission adopts my proposal and the situation described in part (d) is found to be a significant problem, the Postal Service could consider, in this or a later proceeding, identifying those offices (or areas) by specific ZIP Codes, in the same manner as Fee Groups A and B, with separate fee schedules.

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USPS/OCA-T500-18. Please refer to your testimony at page 37. Please confirm that your method for allocating space provision costs is equivalent to the method used by witness Lion. If you do not confirm, please describe the differences between your methodology and witness Lion's.

A. Confirmed. Using witness Lion's methodology for allocating space provision

costs, the "constant of proportionality" i.e., c=\$223,226,000/Q, in Table 12 of

OCA-T-500, would be 1.338800798.

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USPS/OCA-T500-19. Please refer to your testimony at page 48, lines 8 to 10. Witness Lion defines "All Other" costs as "primarily labor costs for window service, and related supervisory and personnel costs." USPS-T-24 at 19, lines 21-22.

(a) Please confirm that your estimate of volume variable mailhandler costs of \$12,039,000 assumes that mailhandler costs make up the same proportion of post office box Cost Segment 3 "All Other" post office box service costs as they make up of total Cost Segment 3 costs. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(b) Why do you believe that mailhandlers would perform post office box service functions to the same extent they perform all other Cost Segment 3 functions?

(c) On what basis do you believe that mailhandlers perform window service type functions?

A. (a) Confirmed.

(b) - (c) I made a simplifying assumption based upon the information I had

available at the time.

USPS/OCA-T500-20.

(a) Please provide versions of Tables 18 and 19, Summary of Revenues and Costs, Proposed and New Fee Groups, TYBR and TYAR, (pages 63 and 64) - based on the cost methodology presented by witness Lion (USPS-T-24), i.e., without your proposed new allocation of costs.

(b) To what extent does the closer fit of costs you claim for your proposed fee groups depend on the changes you are proposing to witness Lion's cost methodology?

- A. (a) See Tables 18 and 19, attached.
 - (b) My proposed cost allocation methodology distributes only a portion of

volume-variable post office box costs by CAG. Only \$22,753,000, or 21.8 percent of

total All Other costs of \$104,580,000 in the TYBR, are distributed by CAG. However,

under my methodology, more than one-half of the \$22,753,000 is distributed to boxes in

the largest, e.g., CAG A-D, offices.

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Attachment to Response to USPS/OCA-T500-20(a) Page 1 of 2

Table 18. Summary of Revenues and Costs, Proposed New Fee Groups, TYBR and TYAR											
·	New Fee Groups										
				TYBR	TYAR	OCA TYBR	OCA TYAR	OCA TYAR	OCA		
Group	Size	TYBR	Box Fees	Proposed	TYAR	Revenues	Revenues	Total Costs	Total Costs	TTL Rev -	TYAR
		Boxes		Box Fees	Boxes	j		ļ	j	TTL Costs	Cost
					1		1				Cover
											-age
A	1	72,138	\$48	\$75	50,960	\$3,462,625	\$3,822,014	\$3,678,000	\$3,536,864	\$285,150	
	2	4,501	\$74	\$110	3,186	\$333,056	\$350,447	\$329,245	\$320,482	\$29,965	
	3	2,524	\$128	\$190	1,892	\$323,090	\$359,568	\$352,511	\$348,301	\$11,267	
	4	242	\$242	\$330	197	\$58,595	\$64,891	\$66,019	\$65,716	-\$825	
_	5	69	\$418	\$550	57	\$28,713	\$31,617	\$37,003	\$36,928	-\$5,311	0.86
Tota	IA	79,474			56,293	\$4,206,080	\$4,628,536	\$4,462,777	\$4,308,290	\$320,246	1.07
B	1	124,912	\$44	\$65	96,390	\$5,496,107	\$6,265,339	\$5,240,303	\$5,050,225	\$1,215,114	
	2	29,996	\$66	\$95	22,055	\$1,979,763	\$2,095,190	\$1,787,873	\$1,734,946	\$350,244	
	3	10,802	\$112	\$160	8,410	\$1,209,804	\$1,345,605	\$1,215,801	\$1,199,861	\$145,744	
	4	1,561	\$218	\$290	1,295	\$340,285	\$375,429	\$341,003	\$339,228	\$36,202	
	5	1,524	\$372	\$485	1,285	\$566,923	\$623,133	\$655,725	\$654,131	-\$30,997	
Tota	B	168,795			129,434	\$9,592,883	\$10,704,697	\$9,240,704	\$8,978,391	\$1,726,306	
C-1	1	3,202,901	\$40	\$56	2,534,252	\$128,116,026		\$101,457,958	\$97,001,861		
	2	1,463,355	\$58	\$81	1,112,183	\$84,874,580	\$90,086,804	\$64,665,736		\$27,761,394	
	3	495,338	\$104	\$146	391,986	\$51,515,132	\$57,229,916		\$39,794,959		1.44
	4	116,404	\$172	\$240	92,628	\$20,021,558	\$22,230,648	\$18,253,201			
	5	28,158	\$288	\$402	22,399	\$8,109.453	\$9,004,508	\$8,643,507	\$8,605,130		
Total	C-1	5,306,156			4,153,447	\$292,636,749	\$320,469,963	\$233,504,133	\$225,822,105	\$94,647,858	
C-II	1	1,944,781	\$40	\$46	1,792,531	\$77,791,222	\$82,456,416	\$55,906,612	\$54,891,970		
	2	758,767	\$58		687,515	\$44,008,463	\$46,063,521	\$30,195,281	\$29,720,439		
	3	243,090	\$104	\$120	223,768	\$25,281,331	\$26,852,110				
	4	45,357	\$172	\$198	41,815	\$7,801,448	\$8,279,348		\$6,291,444		
	5	6,262	\$288	\$331	5,779	\$1,803,345	\$1,912,715	\$1,701,955			
Total	C-11	2,998,256			2,751,407	\$156,685,809	\$165,564,111	\$111,849,829	\$110,204,748	\$55,359,362	2 1.50
C-111	1	151,459	\$40	\$40	151,459	\$6,058,375	\$6,058,375	\$3,965,742	\$3,965,742	\$2,092,634	
l •	2	47,532	\$58			\$2,756,864	\$2,756,864				
	3	15,375			15,375	\$1,598,978	\$1,598,978				
	4	1,612			1,612	\$277,319	\$277,319				
Į	5	532			532	\$153,165	\$153,165				
Total	Total C-III 2			1	216,510	\$10,844,702	\$10,844,702	\$7,005,596	\$7,005,596		
D-1	1	36,301	the second s	\$24	34,356	\$435,608	\$824,544	\$1,060,533			0.79
<u>``</u> ۱	2	22,069				\$441,377	\$821,698	\$893,735			
1	3	7,552				\$271,869	\$524,117	\$561,444			
ł	4	1,096				\$58,107					
	5	180				\$14,978	\$29,495	\$50,063			
Tota	D-1	67,198		†	63,425	\$1,221,940	\$2,313,232	\$2,721,502	\$2,696,357	-\$383,125	5 0.86

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ANSWERS OF OCA WITNESS JAMES F. CALLOW TO INTERROGATORIES USPS/OCA-T500-12-21

Attachment to Response to USPS/OCA-T500-20(a) Page 2 of 2

	Table 18. Summary of Revenues and Costs, Proposed New Fee Groups, TYBR and TYAR (continued)										
	New Fee Groups										
D-11	1	1,131,135	\$12	\$18	1,100,837	\$13,573,626	\$19,815,069	\$33,131,796	\$32,929,878	-\$13,114,809	0.60
	2	493,926	\$20	\$30	476,845	\$9,878,524	\$14,305,338	\$20,058,750	\$19,944,913		0.72
]	3	132,154	\$36	\$54	129,769	\$4,757,533	\$7,007,536	\$9,854,843	\$9,838,951		0.71
	4	15,190	\$53	\$80	15,001	\$805,088	\$1,200,115	\$2,164,496	\$2,163,237	- \$9 63,122	0.55
	5	1,655	\$83	\$125	1,642	\$137,377	\$205,283		\$460,593		0.45
Total	D-II	1,774,061			1,724,095	\$29,152,148	\$42,533,342	\$65,670,563		-\$22,804,231	0.65
D-111	1	2,868,513	\$12	\$15	2,830,096	\$34,422,158	\$42,451,433	\$79,349,885		-\$36,642,424	0.54
	2	1,060,532	\$20	\$25	1,042,194	\$21,210,646	\$26,054,849	\$40,478,687	\$40,356,474	-\$14,301,626	0.65
	3	269.261	\$36	\$45	266,832	\$9,693,407	\$12,007,445	\$18,763,736	\$18,747,547	-\$6,740,102	0.64
	4	16,184	\$53	\$66	16,087	\$857,763	\$1,061,762				0.49
	5	1,769	\$83	\$104	1,762	\$145,827	\$183,260			-\$274,497	0.40
Total	D-III	4,216,260			4,156,971	\$66,330,801	\$81,758,749	\$141,198,101	\$140,802,980	-\$59,044,231	0.58
Ε	1	599,685	\$0	\$0	599,685	\$0	\$0	\$17,318,786	\$17,318,786	-\$17,318,786	0.00
	2	231,140	\$0	\$0	231,140	\$0	\$0	\$9,244,297	\$9,244,297		0.00
	3	60,501	\$0	\$0	60,501	\$0	\$0	\$4,437,012			0.00
	4	6,078	\$ 0]	\$0	6,078	\$0	\$0				0.00
	5	840	\$0	\$0	840	\$0	\$0	\$229,647	\$229,647		0.00
Tota	I E	898,243			898,243	\$0	\$0			-\$32,080,794	0.00
τοτ	AL	15,724,952			14,149,825	\$570,671,113	\$638,817,332	\$607,734,000	\$597,236,834	\$41,580,498	1.07
Caller Service		90,747	\$451	\$550	82,161	\$40,926,917	\$45,188,468			\$45,188,468	
Reserv Numbe	-	182,113	\$30	\$40	150,749	\$5,463,379				\$6,029,976	
GRANI TOTAL		15,997,812			14,382,735	\$617,061,409	\$690,035,776	\$607,734,000	\$597,236,834	\$92,798,942	1.16

Table 19. Comparison of Postal Service and OCA Proposals, TYAR					
Post Office Box and Caller Service	USPS Proposal	OCA Proposal			
Revenues	\$683,362,079	\$690,035,776			
Costs	\$589,954,455	\$597,236,834 \$92,798,942 116%			
Net Revenues	\$ 93,407,624				
Cost Coverage	116%				

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USPS/OCA-T500-21. Refer to library reference OCA-LR-10, page 22. Please confirm that footnote [c] should read "[b] * Table 13E, Col. [b] by CAG." instead of "[b] / Table 13E, Col. [b] by CAG." If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

A. Confirmed. See OCA-LR-10, Table 13B, revised 1-23-98.

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USPS/OCA-T500-22. Please refer to your testimony at page 6, line 14. Clarify the meaning of "larger CAG offices." Does this refer to larger offices in each CAG category, or higher CAG offices (with CAG A the highest and CAG L the lowest)?

A. The phrase "larger CAG offices" refers to higher CAG offices, i.e., CAG A offices the highest and CAG L offices the lowest.

USPS/OCA-T500-23. Please refer to your testimony at page 7, lines 8 to 9, where you state that:

Average postal rental costs are higher in larger offices, as measured by CAG.

(a) Please confirm that, according to Table 2 on page 17 of your testimony, the CAG rankings by average rental costs start with CAG E with the highest cost, followed by CAGs F, C, D, G, H, B, J, K, and L, with the lowest cost. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(b) Please confirm that your statement on page 7 therefore does not hold true for non-city offices. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(c) Is the reason that average rental costs are greater for CAGs E through L non-city offices than for CAGs E through L city-other offices, respectively (according to your Table 2), that the non-city offices are larger on average than the city offices in each of those CAGs? Please explain your answer fully.

A. (a) Partially confirmed. The ranking of offices by CAG level in part (a) applies only to the non-city delivery offices in Table 2. The ranking does not apply to city-other delivery offices.

(b) Not confirmed. The ranking in part (a) simply shows the fact that the average postal rental costs by CAG are not monotonic. When CAG levels are viewed from highest to lowest, some lower CAG offices have higher average rental costs than higher level CAG offices. This condition holds not only when average rental costs by CAG are examined for non-city delivery offices, but also for city-other delivery offices, *see* OCA-LR-2 at 16, and for all offices by CAG. *See* Docket No. MC96-3, Tr. 8/2916.

Nevertheless, even with the variation in average rental costs by CAG, the general proposition stated in the quoted passage still holds: Average postal rental costs are higher in larger CAG offices. Excluding CAG B offices for non-city delivery,

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only two CAG levels have average rental costs greater than CAG C; six CAG levels have average rental costs below CAG C. Similarly, for CAG D offices, only three CAG levels have average rental costs higher than CAG D, and five have average rental costs below CAG D.

Moreover, I rejected establishing my new fee groups based upon individual CAG levels. Thus, my fee groups are unaffected by the fact that the average rental costs by CAG are not monotonic. Instead, my new fee groups are based upon groupings of CAG levels. The result is that the groupings of the highest CAG levels (e.g., A-D) have, with one exception, higher average rental costs than groupings of lower CAG level offices (e.g., E-G, and H-L). It should be noted that when the average rental cost for the three non-city CAG B offices is excluded, the weighted average rental cost for CAG A-D non-city delivery offices has a higher average rental cost (\$7.38) than the other two grouping of offices by CAG.

In developing my new fee groups, I considered that the six fee groups I proposed would be merged into three in a future proceeding. Consequently, the existence of one new fee group (e.g., D-I) with an average rental cost one percent less than average for D-II did not seem problematic.

(c) I do not know.

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USPS/OCA-T500-24. Please refer to your testimony at page 8, lines 12 to 13, and page 9, lines 1 to 2 and 18 to 19.

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(a) Please explain what you mean by "proportionately" and "proportionally".

(b) Does each of the cited statements apply to costs per box? Please provide any data supporting an affirmative response.

A. (a) - (b) In preparing my testimony, I considered the terms "proportionately"

and "proportionally" to be synonymous. Rather than give every boxholder (separately

for Fee Groups C and D) an equal amount of such costs, I distributed them more

proportionately than did witness Lion because I only allocated such costs to offices that

incurred them and refrained from including such costs in the volume-variable cost base

of offices in which such costs were not present.

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USPS/OCA-T500-25. Please refer to Table 1 on page 11 of your testimony.

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(a) Please confirm that the average rental costs for CAG A through D cityother offices are all within 84 cents of each other, while each of these costs (excluding CAG A, for which there is no non-city comparison) are at least \$1.26 more than the average rental cost for the comparable CAG B through D non-city office (e.g., CAG B city-other is \$3.09 greater than CAG B non-city). If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(b) Please confirm that the average rental costs for CAG H through L non-city offices are all within 61 cents of each other, while each of these costs are at least \$1.05 more than the average rental cost for the comparable CAG H through L city-other office (e.g., CAG H non-city is \$1.05 greater than CAG H city-other). If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

A. (a) Confirmed. However, comparing the average rental cost of city-other

CAG B offices and non-city CAG B offices is of questionable value. The average rental

cost of \$5.93 per square foot for CAG B offices in the non-city delivery group is

computed from only three offices. This small number of observations might explain the

comparatively low average rental cost for CAG B offices in this delivery group, and

relative to CAG B offices in the city-other delivery group.

(b) Confirmed. The facts stated in the question reinforce my position that,

eventually, new fee groups C-III and D-III should be merged, because, while CAG H-L

city-other average rental costs are somewhat lower than CAG H-L non-city average

rental costs, the current fees paid by city-other boxholders are far higher than those paid by non-city boxholders.

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USPS/OCA-T500-26. Please refer to Table 3, on page 18 of your testimony.

(a) Please confirm that the difference between the total installed boxes (14,190,165) in Table 3 and the corresponding total (14,290,298) in Table 1 of witness Lion's testimony (USPS-T-24) is due entirely to your omission of boxes from records in Postal Service library reference H-278 for which there is no data on Delivery Group or CAG. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(b) Do you know the effect on your analysis of omitting these records? If so, please explain the effect.

- A. (a) Confirmed.
 - (b) I did not consider the difference in the number of boxes installed on my

analysis since my proposal is based upon post office boxes in offices grouped by CAG

level, which form my new fee groups.

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USPS/OCA-T500-27. Please refer to Table 17, at pages 61-62 of your testimony.
 (a) Please confirm that your proposed fees for proposed fee groups C-II and C-III are higher than your proposed fees for proposed fee groups D-I, D-II, and D-III, even though group D-I consists of higher CAGs than either group C-II or C-III, and group D-II consists of higher CAGs than group C-III. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(b) Is it reasonable to conclude that your proposed fees for groups C-I, C-II, C-III, D-I, D-II, and D-III are based primarily on delivery group, and only secondarily on CAG? Please explain.

A. (a) Confirmed.

(b) No. I proposed different fees for my new fee groups that, although

consisting of the same CAG levels and found in Fee Groups C and D, reflected the

higher allocated costs for boxes in my new fee groups having higher CAG offices. The

differential fees in the new fee groups consisting of the same CAG levels in Fee Groups

C and D also served to avoid rate shock and ease the transition to a uniform fee by box

size for each CAG grouping comprising the new fee groups. See OCA-T-500 at 65-66.

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Revised 2-19-98

ANSWERS OF OCA WITNESS JAMES F. CALLOW TO INTERROGATORIES USPS/OCA-T500-22-28

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USPS/OCA-T500-28. Please refer to your testimony at page 72, lines 12-13, where you state that:

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Restructuring Fee Groups C and D based upon CAG produces more renthomogeneous fee groups that better reflect cost in larger and smaller offices.

(a) With reference to the upper table on page 15 of OCA-LR-2, please confirm that the coefficients of variation for new groups CD1, CD2, and CD3 are 76.6 percent, 64.3 percent, and 47.7 percent, respectively. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(b) With reference to the upper table on page 15 of OCA-LR-2, and considering those rents (RCSF) that are within one standard deviation of the mean rent for each of groups CD1, CD2, and CD3, please confirm that there is substantial overlap of the variable RCSF among these three groups. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(c) Based on the coefficients of variation and the overlap of rents for new groups CD1, CD2, and CD3, do you consider each of these new groups to be "rent-homogeneous"? Please explain your reasoning.

(d) With reference to the lower table on page 15 of OCA-LR-2, please confirm that the coefficients of variation[] for rental cost per square feet for CAGs A through L range from 45.5 percent (CAG J) to 80.7 percent (CAG A). If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(e) With reference to the lower table on page 15 of OCA-LR-2, and considering those rents (RCSF) that are within one standard deviation of the mean rent for each CAG, please confirm that there is substantial overlap of the variable RCSF among the CAGs. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(f) Based on the coefficients of variation and the overlap of rents that can be derived from the lower table on page 15 of OCA-LR-2 for each CAG, do you consider each of CAGs A through L to be "rent-homogeneous"? Please explain your reasoning.

(g) Please provide a version of the upper table on page 15 of OCA-LR-2 that divides groups CD1, CD2, and CD3 into the fee groups you propose in your testimony - C-I, C-II, C-III, D-I, D-II, and D-III.

A. (a) [Please note this answer is being revised to conform with the response to

USPS/OCA-T500-43.] Although I am not a statistician, I am aware that when the

standard deviation is divided by the mean for CD1, CD2 and CD3, I obtain the

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percentages 76.6, 64.3 and 47.7 cited in part (a) of the interrogatory. Please note that I

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did not rely on such comparisons in developing my groups. It should also be noted that, using the same calculation, the percentages for new groups CD1 and CD2 are smaller than the percentage calculated for delivery group C, and the percentage for CD3 is smaller than the percentage for delivery group D. See table below.

USPS			Std. Dev. /
GROUP	Mean	Std. Dev.	Mean
Α	\$23.49	17.1993379	73.2%
в	\$16.74	10.6920571	63.9%
С	\$7.71	6.0529773	78.6%
D	\$6.00	2.8884734	48.1%
E	\$7.19	3.8095395	53.0%

Source: US Postal Service LR-H-188 at 23 and 24.

(b) While it is apparent that there is overlap among the groups CD1, CD2 and

CD3, I am unable to confirm whether it constitutes "substantial" overlap. *Compare* OCA Groups A, B, CD1, CD2 and CD3 with USPS Groups A, B, C and D, below.

OCA			Mean - Std.	Mean + Std.
GROUP	Mean	Std. Dev.	Dev.	Dev.
Α	\$23.49	17.1993379	6.2911601	40.6898359
В	\$16.74	10.692057 1	6.0510012	27.4351154
CD1	\$9.05	6.9274203	2.1220541	15.9768947
CD2	\$7.05	4.5347886	2.5127599	11.5823371
CD3	\$5.79	2.7621283	3.0250878	8.5493444
E	\$7.19	3.8123217	3.3812584	11.0059018

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Source: OCA-LR-2 at 15.

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Revised 2-19-98

ANSWERS OF OCA WITNESS JAMES F. CALLOW TO INTERROGATORIES USPS/OCA-T500-22-28

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USPS			Mean - Std	Mean + Std
GROUP	Mean	Std. Dev.	Dev	Dev
Α	\$23.49	17.1993379	6.2911601	40.6898359
В	\$16.74	10.6920571	6.0510012	27.4351154
С	\$7.71	6.0529773	1.6521167	13,7580713
D	\$6.00	2.8884734	3.1126676	8.8896144
E	\$7.19	3.8095395	3.3837174	11.0027964

Source: US Postal Service LR-H-188 at 23 and 24.

(c) Yes. In developing my new groups, C-I, C-II, C-III, D-I, D-II and D-III, I found that the average rental costs for each new group $\frac{\psi \in \mathcal{R} \in \mathcal{E}}{\psi \oplus \mathcal{R}}$ more rent-homogeneous than the average for their respective delivery groups as a whole. See OCA-T-500 at 16-17.

(d) [Please note this answer is being revised to conform with the response to USPS/OCA-T500-43.] Although I am not a statistician, I am aware that when the standard deviation is divided by the mean for CAGs A through L, I obtain percentages for the CAG levels that range from 45.5 percent (CAG J) to 80.7 percent (CAG A). Please note that I did not rely on such comparisons in developing my groups.

(e) While it is apparent that there is overlap among the CAG levels, I am unable to confirm whether it constitutes "substantial" overlap.

(f) See response to (c) above. In any event, the rent homogeneity of individual CAG levels is irrelevant to my proposal because my new fee groups are based on groupings of several CAG levels.

(g) See attached table. See also OCA-T-500, Table 2.





Attachment to Response to USPS/OCA-T500-28(g) Page 1 of 3

Rental Cost per SF, by NEWGRP, H-216 data 1 08:53 Monday, February 2, 1998

Analysis Variable : RCSF

NEWGRP	N Obs	N	Mean	Std Dev	Minimum	Maximum
Α	30	30	23.4904980	17.1993379	0.0019685	64.0482433
В	153	153	16.7430583	10.6920571	0.0051282	43.5236769
CI	3017	3017	9.0681161	6.9529147	0.0076923	35.7997936
CII	2261	2261	6.8796686	5.1052680	0.0076923	34. 4827586
CIII	772	772	4.9649169	2.6802886	0.8640000	26.6166667
DI	31	31	7.2352096	3.2521942	1.4803597	13.3088042
DII	1521	1521	7.2971055	3.5066756	1.2860483	17.8618682
DIII	12618	12618	5.8375263	2.7592156	1.2847966	17.8722003
E	4170	4170	7.1935801	3.8123217	1.0666667	23.3690360

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Attachment to Response to USPS/OCA-T500-28(g) Page 2 of 3

```
*
     Program: NBOXSQF.SAS
*
*
     This program retabulates the H-216 data file RENT.DATA
*
     to produce cost per square foot estimates for the
*
     Delivery groups requested by the Postal Service in
*
     in OCA/USPST500-28(q)
filename in1 't:\r97-1\libref\h-216\rent.data';
filename in1 'c:\trash\rent.data';
proc format; *formats for the delivery group codes;
    value $dgrp
    'A'='City-A'
    'B'='City-B'
    'C'='City-Other'
    'D'='Non-city'
    'E'='Nondel.'
data a;
 infile in1 dlm=', ' firstobs=2;
 input group $ cag $ rcsf ra sf;
 if cag~="; **eliminate records with missing cag or group;
 if group~="; **eliminate records with missing cag or group;
    if group='A' then newgrp='A ';
    if group='B' then newgrp='B ';
    if group='C' then do;
         if 'A'<=cag<='D' then newgrp='CI ';
         else if 'E'<=cag<='G' then newgrp='CII ';
         else if 'H'<=cag<='L' then newgrp='CIII';
         end:
    if group='D' then do;
         if 'A'<=cag<='D' then newgrp='DI ';
          else if 'E'<=cag<='G' then newgrp='DII ';
          else if 'H'<=cag<='L' then newgrp='DIII';
         end;
```

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Attachment to Response to USPS/OCA-T500-28(g) Page 3 of 3

if group='E' then newgrp='E ';

*if group='C' or group='D' then do;

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- * if 'A'<=cag<='D' then newgrp='CD1';</pre>
- * if 'E'<=cag<='G' then newgrp='CD2';</pre>
- * if 'H'<=cag<='L' then newgrp='CD3';</pre>
- * end;

*save formatted delivery group as DGROUP; dgroup=put(group, \$dgrp.);

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USPS/OCA-T500-29. Please refer to your testimony at page 48, lines 8 to 10.

(a) Please confirm that in FY 1996, only 0.329 percent of all weighted tallies for cost segment 3 post office box and caller service costs were mailhandler tallies, while 99.671 percent were clerk tallies. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(b) Please confirm that, using these percentages, one would estimate volume-variable mailhandler costs to be \$235,000, or 0.329 percent of Cost Segment 3 volume-variable post office box and caller service costs of \$71,527,000.

(c) Do you believe that this \$235,000 estimate or the \$12,039,000 estimate in your testimony is a better estimate for mailhandler costs for post office box and caller service? Please explain your reasoning.

A. (a) - (c) Unable to confirm. I am unfamiliar with, and do not recognize, the

percentages cited, nor do I know how they were developed. Please note that no source

documents have been cited or provided.

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USPS/OCA-T500-30. Please refer to Table 13 of your testimony, at pages 42-43.

(a) Please confirm that "Non-CAG Costs" are allocated among fee groups according to the number of boxes in each group. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(b) Please confirm that "Non-CAG costs" constitute about 78 percent of total "All Other" costs (\$81,827/\$104,580). If you do not confirm, please explain.

(c) Please confirm that "Supervisor Costs" and "Mailhandler Costs" are allocated among fee groups according to the number of boxes in each group, except that the boxes are zeroed for those CAGs that have no (or virtually no) supervisors or mailhandlers, respectively. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(d) Please confirm that "Postmaster Costs" are allocated among fee groups according to your estimate of the number of postmasters in each group, and then to box size according to the number of boxes of each size in each group. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(e) Please confirm that you allocate CAG-related "All Other" labor costs (postmaster, supervisors, and mailhandlers) for your proposed fee groups as follows:

Labor Costs Per Box			
\$2.86			
\$2.87			
\$2.89			
\$0.89			
\$0.53			
\$2.90			
\$0.84			
\$0.39			
\$0.60			
\$1.45			

A. (a) Not confirmed. Non-CAG costs "are allocated proportionally to the total number of boxes, as shown in Table 13D." OCA-T-500 at 51. Also, *compare* OCA-T-500, Table 13D, and USPS-T-24, Table 10.

(b) Confirmed. See my response to USPS/OCA-T500-20(b).

(c) Not confirmed. Supervisor and mailhandler costs are allocated based

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upon the percent of total "supervisor" boxes and "mailhandler" boxes, respectively.

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See OCA-T-500, Table 13C, Columns [c] and [e]. See also OCA-T-500 at 47-49 for a description of the allocation process.

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(d) Confirmed. However, a more complete description of the process of allocating postmasters costs is found in OCA-T-500 at 45-46.

(e) Confirmed.

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USPS/OCA-T500-31. Please refer to your response to interrogatory USPS/OCA-T500-3.

(a) Please confirm that your method for allocating postmaster costs assumes that each postmaster incurs the same dollar amount of post office box "All Other" costs. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(b) Do you believe that postmasters at large offices are as likely to perform post office box "All Other" work as postmasters at small offices? If so, please explain the basis for your response.

(c) Please confirm that your allocation of post office box labor costs does not reflect the possibility that post office box "All Other" activities that are performed by mailhandlers and supervisors at larger offices are performed by postmasters and clerks at smaller offices. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

A. (a) In the absence of average postmasters salaries by CAG, I used the

number of postmasters in each CAG level in each fee group to distribute volume-

variable postmasters costs. Consequently, in my allocation methodology, each

postmaster has an equal weight in the distribution of postmaster costs to fee groups.

On that basis, confirmed.

(b) According to witness Lion, "All Other costs are primarily labor costs for

window service, and related supervisory and personnel costs." USPS-T-24 at 19. I do

not know whether postmaster in larger offices are as likely to perform post office box

"All Other" work as postmasters at smaller offices. However, it would not be

unreasonable to expect that, in larger offices where mailhandlers and supervisors (in

addition to clerks) are employed, postmasters do not perform as much "All Other" work

as postmasters in smaller offices.



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(c) Confirmed, with respect to clerks. Not confirmed, with respect to postmasters. My allocation methodology distributes a larger amount of postmaster costs to boxes in smaller offices than larger offices.

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ANSWERS OF OCA WITNESS JAMES F. CALLOW TO INTERROGATORIES USPS/OCA-T500-30-35

USPS/OCA-T500-32. Please refer to your Table 18. Please confirm that you are proposing a 40 percent fee increase for over 62 percent of Group C boxes, and a 25 percent increase for over 69 percent of Group D boxes. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

A. Partially confirmed. In the TYAR, 58.3 percent

(4,153,447/(4,153,447+2,751,407+216,510)) of boxes in Fee Group C have a 40

percent increase, while 69.9 percent (4,156,971/(63,425+1,724,095+4,156,971)) of

boxes in Fee Group D have a 25 percent increase.

In developing my proposed fees, new Fee Group C-I boxholders pay higher fees

because they have higher unit box costs. By contrast, new Fee Group D-III boxholders

have lower unit box costs. Consequently, boxholders in new Fee Group C-I have a

higher percentage fee increase than new Fee Group D-III.

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USPS/OCA-T500-33. Please refer to your response to interrogatory USPS/OCA-T500-6(a). Please confirm that an office's revenues could change, so that it needs to be reclassified, even though there has been no change in the office's costs. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

A. Partially confirmed. The question seems to imply that a change in an office's revenues would automatically result in the reclassification of an office to a different fee group, even though there is no change in an office's costs. Please note that such a reclassification would arise at four places: between CAGs D and E and CAGs G and H within Fee Groups C and D. (When the new fee Groups are ultimately merged, the need to reclassify an office would arise at only two places). However, as stated in my response to USPS/OCA-T500-6(b), the reclassification of an office into a different fee group could occur at the time changes in post office box fees are implemented by the Postal Service.

The situation described in the question is possible in the short-term but unlikely over the long-term. Changes in an office's revenues would likely involve changes in cost. Given the Postal Service's determination that there is a significant relationship between the CAG designation of an office and its associated square-foot rent, I would expect that, over time, a higher (or lower) CAG designation would reflect higher (or lower) average rental costs (and possibly other costs as well), even though there is no change in an office's costs at the time of reclassification.

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USPS/OCA-T500-34. Please refer to your response to interrogatory USPS/OCA-T500-7, and to library reference LR-OCA-2 at page 17.

(a) Please provide the mean cost for all offices, combining City-Other and Non-city.

(b) Please confirm that OCA-LR-2 shows that there are offices with high rental costs (at least twice the mean cost) in each of the CAGs.

(c) In your response to interrogatory USPS/OCA-T500-7, you state that you decided to use the Postal Service's determination from Docket No. R90-1 that some CAG A-D offices were in high-cost areas as the basis for defining your new fee groups C-I and D-I. Is your goal for groups C-I and D-I to include offices "in high cost areas", offices with high postal costs, or offices with high revenues? Please explain your response.

A. (a) The mean cost for all city-other and non-city offices, combined, is 6.5147106=((6,050/20,220*7.7266699)+(14,170/20,220*5.9972545)). See OCA-LR-2 at 17.

(b) Confirmed. However, the comparison is not relevant. I rejected

establishing fee groups based upon individual CAG levels, and instead established my

new fee groups based upon groupings of CAG levels.

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A more relevant comparison, if one is to be made, is between offices with high rental costs and the mean of each delivery group. Comparing the mean and the maximum for delivery groups reveals offices with average rental costs at least twice the mean in each delivery group proposed by the Postal Service and my proposed delivery groups. *Compare* US Postal Service LR-H-188 at 23-24, and my response to USPS/OCA-T500-28(g).

(c) The question presumes that the three choices-offices "in high cost areas," offices with high postal costs, and offices with high revenues-are unrelated. The CAG

BARK CONTRACTOR OF A DECEMBER OF A DECEMBERO designation of an office clearly provides information as to whether an office generates "high" versus "low" revenues. The CAG designation also reveals something about location. As stated in my response to USPS/OCA-T500-14(a), the Postal Service has determined that higher CAG offices tend to be located in higher rent urban areas, while lower CAG offices tend to be located in lower rent rural areas. Finally, the CAG designation of an office also informs about postal costs. Again, according to the Postal Service, "there is a significant relationship between the CAG designation of a facility and its associated square-foot rent (e.g. CAG A offices have higher rents than CAG L offices)." Docket No. R90-1, USPS Library Reference F-183, at 2, n. 2.

It is my goal to define new Fee Groups C-I and D-I by grouping offices with high average postal rental costs. I am able to group offices with high average postal rental costs because of the CAG designations of the offices.

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USPS/OCA-T500-35. Please refer to your response to interrogatory USPS/OCA-T500-9.

(a) Do you believe that the Groups C and D fees can be merged with two more changes of the same magnitude you propose in this case?

(b) Please confirm that two more 40 percent increases for Group C-I, and 100 percent increases for Group D-1, would leave Group D-1 more than \$13 below Group C-1. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

(c) Please confirm that a similar process for Groups C-II and D-II, and Groups C-III and D-III would leave gaps even larger than \$13 between these fee groups after the second proceeding. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

A. (a) No. However, in my response to UPS/OCA-T500-9, I did not assume two subsequent increases of exactly the same magnitude as proposed in this case. For example, in new Fee Group C-I, fee increases of less than 40 percent in subsequent proceedings could be utilized. Similarly, in new Fee Groups D-II and D-III, fee increases of more than 50 percent and 25 percent, respectively, would likely be necessary. As a result, I believe that, through a combination of increases that are both greater than and less than those proposed in this proceeding, fees for boxholders in new Fee Groups D-I, D-II and D-III could be brought to parity with fees for boxholders in new Fee Groups C-I, C-II and C-III in two more rate proceedings.

(b) Partially confirmed. Two more 40 percent increases for new Fee Group C-I, and two more 100 percent increases for new Fee Group D-I, would leave only box sizes 1, 4 and 5, from new Fee Group D-I more than \$13 below the same size boxes in new Fee Group C-I. Two more fee increases of this magnitude would result in box sizes 2 and 3 in new Fee Group D-I exceeding the fees for the same size boxes in new Fee Group C-I.

(c) Confirmed. However, in my response to UPS/OCA-T500-9, I did not assume two subsequent increases of exactly the same magnitude as proposed in this

case. See my response to part (a) above.

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USPS/OCA-T500-36. Please refer to your response to interrogatory USPS/OCA-T500-2, where you state that since you do not have cost data for each office, you do not know "*a priori* whether a reasonable basis for grouping offices might have emerged from the data." Please explain specifically what cost data would not provide a reasonable basis for grouping offices based on costs for each office, assuming such costs were available. For example, would not one be able to simply order all offices by costs, and then divide the offices into equally-sized groups, such as quartiles?

A. My response to USPS/OCA-T500-2 was not intended to address whether certain cost data for each office would not provide a reasonable basis for grouping offices. The cost data that would *not* be reasonable could be limitless. Rather, I would be willing to consider relevant post office box cost data for each office as a basis for grouping offices, if such costs were available. Nevertheless, since I did not have cost data for each office, I could not make any statement or determination about the use of office cost data.

In my view, the issue is, What would be a reasonable basis for grouping offices? The question suggests an approach. In the absence of cost data for each office, however, it is not possible to judge whether such an approach is reasonable.

1 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Is there any additional written 2 cross-examination? MR. RUBIN: Yes, there is. 3 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Mr. Rubin, if you would 4 5 approach the witness. 6 CROSS-EXAMINATION BY MR. RUBIN: 7 Good morning, Mr. Callow. 8 Q А Good morning. 9 I have handed you two copies of your responses to 10 Q Interrogatories T-500-37 through 45. 11 12 А Yes. Have you reviewed those response? 13 Q 14 А Yes, I have. And if you were to testify orally here today, 15 Q would those be your response? 16 Yes, with the third change that I mentioned 17 Α earlier. On No. 43, the word, in Part A, the word 18 "confirmed" should be changed to "confirm". 19 MR. RUBIN: In that case, I will provide the two 20 copies of Mr. Callow's responses to Interrogatories 37 to 45 21 to the reporter and I ask that they be entered into 22 evidence. 23 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: I will direct that the 24 additional designed written cross-examination of Witness 25

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USPS/OCA-T500-37. Please refer to your response to interrogatory USPS/OCA-T500-13. Please confirm that **the current** post office box service fees are based (in part) on post office costs, but not on post office revenues. If you do not confirm, please explain why not.

A. Confirmed.

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USPS/OCA-T500-38. Please refer to your response to interrogatory USPS/OCA-T500-14(a), which quotes the Postal Service concerning CAG A, B, K, and L offices. Does the designation of an office as CAG C though CAG J reveal anything about that office's location. If so, please explain what.

Α. Yes. I relied on findings presented in Postal Service's Library Reference F-183 from Docket No. R90-1. According to the Postal Service, "space provision costs tend to vary with facility location (square foot rents are higher in urban and suburban locales than in rural areas) . . ." (Emphasis added) Docket No. R90-1, US Postal Service Library Reference F-183 at 2. Moreover, the Postal Service has determined that "there is a significant relationship between the CAG designation of a facility and its associated square-foot rent (e.g. CAG A offices have higher rents than CAG L offices)." Id. This determination is supported by Postal Service data. See table below, reproduced from Docket No. MC96-3, Tr. 8/2916, Response of United States Postal Service to Interrogatory of the Office of the Consumer Advocate, OCA/USPS-88(h). See also Docket No. R90-1, US Postal Service Library Reference F-183, Table 6, at 16. In both cases, the data reveal that, "as one goes from CAG A offices to CAG L offices, there is, with two exceptions, a uniform decline in average square foot rent." Id. at 15. Finally, the Postal Service concluded that "[t]his is not surprising, given that CAG A and B offices tend to be located in higher-rent urban areas, while CAG K and L offices tend to be located in lower-rent rural areas." Id.

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ANSWERS OF OCA WITNESS JAMES F. CALLOW TO INTERROGATORIES USPS/OCA-T500-37-41

CAG	NUMBER OF	AVERAGE RENTAL		
	FACILITIES	COST		
		(\$ / square foot)		
А	1,185	\$9.13		
В	691	\$9.07		
С	1,111	\$9.29		
D	495	\$8.54		
E	815	\$7.65		
F	1,008	\$7.13		
G	2,284	\$6.35		
Н	3,400	\$6.04		
J	4,650	\$5.75		
к	9,055	\$5.76		
L	1,572	\$5.57		

Source: Docket No. MC96-3, OCA/USPS-88(h).

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USPS/OCA-T500-39. Please refer to your response to USPS/OCA-T500-14(b), where you state that revenues can be used to indicate an office's size.

(a) Is it possible for a small office to generate a relatively large amount of revenue? If your answer is other than yes, please explain why this is not possible.

(b) Is it possible for a large office to generate a relatively small amount of revenue? If your answer is other than yes, please explain why this is not possible.

(c) Please confirm that for small offices that have a relatively high number of revenue units and for large offices that have a relatively low number of revenue units, CAG designation would not be a reliable indicator of office size. If you do not confirm, please explain why?

A. (a)-(b) No. As explained in my response to USPS/OCA-T500-14(b), when

I used the term "size" I was referring to revenues, as measured by revenue units.

Therefore, questions (a) and (b) are a logical impossibility as I use the term "size."

(c) Unable to confirm. See my response to (a) and (b) above.

USPS/OCA-T500-40. Please refer to your response to interrogatory USPS/OCA-T500-14(c). What is the basis of your understanding that the CAG level of an office is highly correlated with each of the following:

(a) the costs for that office;

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(b) the number of employees for that office;

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(c) the size of the facility;

(d) the volume of incoming mail processed for that office?

In answering for each of items (a)-(d), please identify any data, including data averaged by CAG, that support your response.

A. (a) For post office boxes, one of the most important costs is rental costs. As

explained in my response to USPS/OCA-T500-38, an office with a high CAG

designation means an office with a high rental cost, and an office with a low CAG

designation means a low rental cost.

(b) There is a high correlation between the estimated average number of

employees in an office and the CAG designation of that office, with a higher average

number of employees found in higher CAG offices. See table below.

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	Number		Average
	of	Number of	per
CAG	Offices	Employees	Office
	[a]	[b]	[c]
A	1,138	421,882	371
B	685	66,316	97
C	1,241	120,033	97
D	658	50,400	77
E	1,346	66,653	50
F	1,595	40,665	25
G	2,436	33,994	14
н	3,020	23,996	8
J	4,126	20,384	5
ĸ	8,114	26,267	3
L	1,125	3,212	3

NOTES AND SOURCES:

- [a] OCA-LR-2 at 12.
- [b] OCA/USPS-81-82, Attachment 1.

[c] [b]/[a]

(c) When I used the term "size," I was referring to revenues, as measured by revenue units. See my response to USPS/OCA-T500-39, above. Consequently, there is a high correlation between an office with a high CAG designation and size (i.e., revenue units).

(d) I have no data.

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USPS/OCA-T500-41. Please refer to your response to interrogatory USPS/OCA-T500-15(a), where you state that, at the time that you developed your cost methodology, you had no other basis for allocating post office box window service costs to offices in which there are no mailhandlers and supervisors. Do you <u>now</u> have any other basis for allocating these costs? If so, please present that alternative basis for allocating costs.

A. No. In responding to USPS/OCA-T500-15(a), I excluded from consideration the

allocation methodology proposed by witness Lion in USPS-T-24 at 19-23, since I was

seeking a methodology that better reflected costs for boxes in higher and lower cost

offices. Nevertheless, witness Lion's methodology would be another basis for allocating

costs.

USPS/OCA-T500-42. Please refer to your response to USPS/OCA-T500-17(b), where you state that you doubt that there are very many examples of this situation where CAG A-D non-city delivery offices may be very small offices in towns having a very large plant load mailer providing enough revenue to qualify the office for a CAG A-D classification.

(a) Please confirm that there are 31 non-city delivery offices which are classified as CAGs A through D (if necessary, see LR-H-216, file "Rent.Data"). If you do not confirm, please provide the correct number.

(b) Please confirm that 25 of the offices referenced in part (a) have rents of under \$10 per square foot. If you are unable to confirm, please provide the correct number.

(c) Please confirm that 30 of the 31 of the offices referenced in part (a) have less than 10,000 square feet of interior space, and that 27 of the 31 have less than 5,000 square feet of interior space. If you are unable to confirm, please provide the correct numbers.

(d) Please explain why post office box customers at these 31 facilities should face the 100 percent fee increase that you propose for fee group D-I.

A. (a) Confirmed. See also OCA-LR-2 at 16.

(b) Confirmed. However, all the average rental costs in Table 2 of my

testimony are below \$10 per square foot.

(c) Confirmed. However, the interior space of an office is not how I defined

size. See my response to USPS/OCA-T500-39.

(d) The interior space of an office is not relevant to my proposal. The size of

an office that is important is revenues generated, as measured by revenue units. As

explained in USPS/OCA-T500-38, the Postal Service has determined that there is a

"significant relationship" between an office's CAG designation and its associated

square-foot rent.

It should be noted that the 31 offices referred to represent slightly over 1 percent (31/3,048) of CAG A-L city-other and non-city offices, combined, and only 0.2 percent

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(31/14,170) of all non-city office. Consequently, I do not consider an exception for these 31 offices to be warranted, given the Postal Service's determination of a significant relationship between CAG and average rental costs.

Nevertheless, if it is determined that special treatment for these 31 offices is warranted, the Postal Service could consider, in this or a later proceeding, identifying those offices (or areas) by specific ZIP Code, in the same manner as Fee Groups A and B, and establishing separate fee schedules.

USPS/OCA-T500-43. Please refer to your response to USPS/OCA-T500-28, part (a).

(a) Please confirm that the coefficient of variation is a standard normalization that measures the dispersion of a set of measurements. If you do not confirm, please explain.

(b) Please confirm that the coefficient of variation is calculated by dividing the standard deviation of such a group by the mean of the group, rather than the "mean...divided by the standard deviation" as stated in your response. If you do not confirm, please explain.

(c) Please confirm that the percentages cited in your response to part (a) of USPS/OCA-T500-28 (i.e., 76.3, 64.3, and 47.7) are the result of the correct calculation method identified in part (b) of this interrogatory. If you do not confirm, please explain and provide the correct data.

A. (a) Unable to confirme. I am not a statistician. However, according to J. E.

Freund, Modern Elementary Statistics (1973) at 74, the Coefficient of Variation is a

measure of relative variation, "which express[es] the magnitude of the variation relative

to the size of whatever is being measured."

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(b) Confirmed. The Coefficient of Variation "simply expresses the standard

deviation of a set of data (or distribution) as a percentage of its mean." Id. at 75.

(c) Confirmed.

USPS/OCA-T500-44. Please refer to your response to USPS/OCA-T500-28, part (c) and your testimony at pages 16-17.

(a) Please provide your definition of the term "rent-homogeneous."

(b) Please confirm that this term refers to the range (or dispersion) of rental costs within a fee group. If you do not confirm, please explain fully.

(c) Please confirm that with respect to post office box fees "rent homogeneity" is a desirable property, with a smaller range of values being more desirable than a larger range. If you do not confirm, please explain fully.

(d) Please confirm that the only statistics cited in the referenced response regarding CAGs are the average rental costs of CAG groups. If you do not confirm, please explain.

(e) Please refer to your statement in the response to OCA/USPS-T500-28, part (c), where you state that the "average rental cost for each new group was more rent-homogeneous than the average for their respective delivery groups as a whole." Please explain how a single number, an average, can be considered "homogeneous" when compared to other averages.

(f) Assuming that the statement is intended to assert that post office box fee groups based on offices' CAGs are more homogeneous than groups based upon the type of carrier delivery, please explain how such an assertion can be based on group averages alone.

A. (a) I am not a statistician, and therefore I have not used the term "rent-

homogeneous" in a statistical sense. My use of the term was intended to convey a

grouping of similar elements closer together, which I accomplished by "de-averaging"

rental costs for CAG offices by delivery group into three smaller groupings, i.e., the fee

groups I propose. Consequently, I considered the weighted average rental costs for my

grouping of delivery offices to be more rent-homogeneous than the average for the

entire delivery group because the weighted average rental cost for my grouping of CAG

offices was generally closer to the individual average rental costs for offices in each

CAG level than to the average for the delivery group as a whole. See OCA-T-500,

Tables 1 and 2.

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(b) Confirmed. While the term may refer to the "range (or dispersion) of rental costs within a fee group," it is not how I used the term. See my response to part (a) above.

(c) Confirmed. The weighted average rental costs for my groupings of CAG level offices is based on a smaller range of average rental costs than is the average for their respective delivery groups as a whole. See OCA-T-500, Table 2.

(d) Confirmed.

(e) - (f) See my response to part (a) above.

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USPS/OCA-T500-45. Please refer to your response to USPS/OCA-T500-28, part (a) and Table 18 of your testimony.

(a) Is it your testimony that a coefficient of variation of 76.6 percent for your Group CD1 (vs. 78.6 percent for Group C) is a significant or meaningful improvement? Please explain fully why or why not.

(b) Is it your testimony that a coefficient of variation of 47.7 percent for your Group CD3 (vs. 48.1 percent for Group D) is a significant or meaningful improvement? Please explain fully why or why not.

A. (a) - (b) No, and I did not rely on such comparisons in developing my fee

groups. Rather, my new fee groups represent a meaningful improvement, by

restructuring Fee Groups C and D based upon CAG to produce fee groups that better

reflect costs in larger and smaller offices.

12423 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Anyone else? 1 2 [No response.] 3 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If not, that moves us to oral 4 The Postal Service is the only party that has cross. 5 indicated oral cross-examination. Does anyone else wish to cross-examine? 6 7 [No response.] CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If not, Mr. Rubin, you can 8 9 begin when you are ready. MR. RUBIN: Thank you. 10 BY MR. RUBIN: 11 12 Mr. Callow, would you turn to your response to 0 Interrogatory T-500-31, Part C? 13 14 А I have it. You state there that you allocate a larger amount 15 0 of Postmaster costs to boxes in smaller offices than larger 16 17 offices. А Correct. 18 Would you agree that the reason you allocate more 19 Q Postmaster costs to smaller offices is that there are 20 proportionally more Postmasters in smaller offices than 21 22 larger offices? No, there are not more Postmasters in smaller 23 Α offices than larger offices. There are Postmasters in 24 offices. Maybe I misunderstood the question. 25

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I guess I was referring to total Postmasters. 1 0 Is that 2 the percentage of all Postmasters more than are in smaller offices than larger offices? 3

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more There are smaller offices than there are larger 4 Α offices, so there would be more Postmasters in smaller 5 6 offices.

7 0 Okay. Well, let's say, hypothetically, there is one Postmaster who spends one hour a month on post office 8 box activities, and another one who spends one hour per day 9 on these activities. Would your analysis treat these two 10 Postmasters the same for distributing Postmaster costs? 11

Α 12

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And how would they be treated differently? 0 13 My methodology allocated more costs to Postmasters 14 Α 15 in -- to Postmasters who spent more time on boxes, because in my methodology, the smaller offices have more costs. 16

But that --17 0

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Approximately

No.

18 Α In the smaller, the Postmasters -- my methodology assigned a larger amount of Postmaster costs to smaller 19 20 offices.

But if, hypothetically, there were 90 Postmasters 21 0 in smaller offices and 10 Postmasters in larger offices, 22 wouldn't your methodology assign 90 percent of the 23 Postmaster costs to the smaller offices? 24 Could you repeat the question again?

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Q If, hypothetically, we had 90 Postmasters in smaller offices, and 10 Postmasters in larger offices, then wouldn't your allocation methodology assign 90 percent of the Postmaster costs to the smaller offices and 10 percent to the larger offices?

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A No, because I had -- this gets to Table 13. If you will give me one second. Table 13B, where I had to make two -- basically, a two step process. The first one was where I had information on CAGs by fee group, if you will, but I didn't have information on Postmasters by fee group.

So the column B, if you will, in that table, makes 11 derives the allocation of -- or drives the percentage of offices by 12 CAG, by fee group, and then that percentage is then used to 13 derive the number of Postmasters by CAG, by fee group, and 14then that -- then in column D, the percentage then becomes 15 the way the costs get allocated and then summed by fee 16 group. So it is the first, the column B that results in 17 assigning more costs to the smaller CAG offices, because 18 there are more of them. 19

20 Q But that analysis is based on numbers of 21 Postmasters rather than how much time different Postmasters 22 spend --

23 A Yes.

24 Q -- on post office box activities?

(H) (B) (C) (B) (B) (C) (C) (D) (C)

25 A Yes.

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Q Okay. Would you refer to your response to
 Interrogatory T-500-2?

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3 A I have it.

Q You state there that you do not know a priori whether actual costs for each office would provide a reasonable basis for creating cost homogeneous groups, preferable to the CAG approach you employed, is that correct?

9 A Correct.

And would you agree that CAG is a measure of 10 0 is used as revenue in an office that 'uses a proxy for actual costs? 11 12 Α I used revenues as a measure of office size and once -- using that as a measure of office size I developed 13 fee groups and from those fee groups then I assigned costs 14 but, no, the revenues were not a proxy for costs. They were 15 16 a proxy -- they were a measure of size.

17 Q Interrogatory Number 2 sets up a hypothetical 18 asking you to assume that actual costs for each office are 19 available, is that correct?

20 A Yes.

Q so the two possible data sources that could be used to create cost homogeneous groups consist of, on the one hand, hypothetically, actual costs and on the other hand, the CAG based groupings that you used? Is that right? A I quess I -- what I would like to amplify is that

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1 we did have rental cost data by CAG.

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We didn't have office cost data. I guess when you said revenues is a proxy for costs, that is not true. What I had was rental cost data by CAG, so that's the costs I had by CAG.'

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Q And the rental cost data by CAG is then applied to each office as a measure of its -- of each office's costs? A No. As I understand it, the data that came from the Postal Service contained rental cost data for offices that then were grouped by CAG and then we're able to create average rental cost by CAG.

That is my understanding of the data.

13 Q If you had hypothetically actual cost data for 14 each office, would not that be preferable to the average 15 rental cost by CAG that the Postal Service provided you?

16 A If you are asking me theoretically would office17 cost data be better than simply having CAG data, yes.

18 The problem -- I should say the problem I had with 19 the question was yes, you might have this information but it 20 may -- you still have the affirmative task of determining 21 how you would group those offices.

This question came up again or the follow-up was in T-500-36 and it seemed to me that my difficulty was that even if you had this cost data by office you still had to come up with some reasonable way of grouping the offices

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1 since you were not going to have a fee group based upon 2 individual offices, and the question suggests, you know, 3 divided into four -- into equally sized groups such as guartiles -- well, you know, why quartiles? Why not 4 5 quintiles? Why equally sized? Why not bunched if the 6 office cost data suggested that you had a grouping of higher 7 cost offices or a larger grouping of lower cost offices? I guess that is how I would answer your question. 8 9 Q Thank you. Let's move on to your response to Interrogatory 44. 10 11 А I have it. I want to understand your response to Part A 12 0 better by perhaps seeing a quantitative example of what you 13 14 mean. 15 I am especially interested in the sentence that starts "Consequently" -- the third sentence. 16 Okay. Do you want to provide an example with 17 numbers from your Tables 1 and 2 or should I try to lead you 18 through an example based on my understanding of your answer? 19 Why don't I take a stab at it? 20 Α What I was saying was that the average -- maybe if 21 we look at Table 2, city other offices, CAG A through D, 22 what I was saying is that the offices A through D that the 23 \$9.07 average, the -907, better represented those four offices than 24 \$7.73 did in the case of city offices the 773, which was on page 25

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2 Q That's fine. That actually was what -- that was 3 the example I was going to work on. Thank you.

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4 A Yes.

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5 Q Okay. Let's look at your response to 6 Interrogatory 32.

A I have it.

8 Q Would you agree that you propose a 40 percent 9 increase for all the test year before rates boxes in Group 10 C1?

11 A The 40 percent increase for C1, for the before 12 rate boxes which resulted in a decline in the number of 13 boxes in use, it gives you the after rate boxes to which --14 which actually pay the 40 percent fee increase.

Q Okay, and if you use the test year before rates
numbers, which are found in your Table 18, page 63 --

17 A Yes.

18 Q -- do you agree that the equivalent calculation to 19 what you did for test year after rates subject to check 20 would be -- would end up with 62.3 percent of the test year 21 before rates boxes?

A I'll accept it subject to check. It seemed a little problematic to me because those people didn't pay the rates, the after rates.

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The after rate number of boxes paid the rates and

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3 Okay, I understand. There are two ways of looking 0 4 at it.

5 Is part of the reason why you prefer your proposal 6 to the Postal Service is that it lowers the Postal Service's proposed 50 percent fee increase to 25 percent for most 7 Group D boxes -- and I am referring to Group D-3. 8

9 Right. What I tried to do in looking at average Α rental cost by CAG it was clear that you had over 100 10 percent difference in rental costs between the lowest CAG 11 office, the CAG L office, and the highest CAG office, and 12 specifically I am referring to the city other offices in 13 this case. 14

15 The increase isn't guite so large in the noncity 16 offices.

17 It seemed a worthwhile goal to create groups that 18 reflected those lower costs and therefore given that they had lower costs should have lower fees and that was my goal 19 in creating -- in giving the D3 Group and the C3 Group lower 20 fees. 21

And by lowering the D3 boxes from 50 percent to 25 22 0 23 percent increase, was it therefore necessary to increase the Group C1 -- the increase to 40 percent? 24 I had to obtain revenue from -- I had to obtain

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3**4 06 1**30.36 . . . 6.111 12431 additional revenue, sure, because I wanted to come close to 1 the Postal Service's total revenue, so it was a balancing --2 3 it was a balancing act between attempting to reflect the lower costs in D3 and C3, but also under my methodology C1 4 had higher costs, so those fees reflect the higher cost but 5 6 also I had to balance the revenue. 7 Do you recall that Witness Needham proposed about \cap 8 a 13-percent increase for all of Group C? 9 Α Yes. So does it follow that your proposed increase for 10 0 Group C1 is about three times as much as the increase 11 12 proposed by the Postal Service? 13 Α Yes, and in part that reflects a higher cost of 14 those offices under my methodology. 15 0 And even for your proposed Group C2, you propose a 15-percent increase. 16 17 А Slightly higher; yes. 18 And do you believe it was necessary to hit Group C 0 as hard as you did in order to implement your proposal? 19 20 Α The C2 offices also had under my methodology some slightly higher costs, so they reflect -- those fees reflect 21 the additional cost. 22 And in the last paragraph in your response to 23 0 24 Interrogatory 32 --

25 A Yes.

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1 You say that the C1 boxholders pay higher fees 0 because they have higher unit box costs. 2

3 Ά Yes.

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What are you comparing these costs to? Well, compared to other boxholders in other -- the 5 Α boxholders in C2 and C3. 6

So and when -- and when you refer to lower unit 7 0 box costs for Group D3 in your answer, you're saying --8 you're comparing them to the other groups you've proposed. 9

10 А Yes.

11 0 Finally you say consequently boxholders in new fee group C1 have a higher percentage fee increase than new fee 12 group D3. How does it follow that the percentage fee 13 increase for Group C1 must be higher than the percentage fee 14 increase for Group D3? 15

16 Α As I explained, the C1 boxholders had higher costs under my methodology, while the D3 had lower costs, and 17 therefore had a lower cost increase -- I'm sorry, a lower 18 fee increase. However, in the case of D3, those boxholders 19 are still way below cost under my methodology, under the 20 21 Postal Service methodology. It seemed appropriate that they receive some fee increase given both their lower costs but 22 still being below the implicit cost coverage, not covering 23 their costs per box. 24

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Given that Group D3 as you just said is below cost Q

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1 and would continue to be below cost --

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A Right.

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Q Wouldn't it be reasonable to propose a fee
increase that's higher than 25 percent for them?

5 Well, as I explained, one of my -- one of my -- my Α goals was in establishing the fee groups was to, if you 6 7 will, isolate the boxholders in the smallest offices, because they had lower costs, lower rental costs, and 8 9 therefore with those lower costs would come a smaller fee 10 increase. But again because they are below cost under my methodology and as I said under the Postal Service 11 methodology, they should have some fee increase. 12

13 Q Do you agree that Group C1 already provides a 14 substantial contribution to other costs of the Postal 15 Service?

16 A Do you mean in terms of revenues?

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17 Q Correct.

18 A Yes. It's --

19 Q Revenue -- yes, I guess revenues minus costs in20 your Table 18.

21 A Yes.

Q So I guess I'm still wondering why Group C1 should face a larger percentage fee increase than Group D3 given where these two groups are starting in respect to contribution.

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A I'm not certain what else to say. The C1 boxholders had higher costs relative to their -- C2 and C3. D3 had relatively lower costs. But I felt they should have some fee increase. I guess I'm not certain what else to say. I may be missing something here.

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6 Q Okay. Let's move on to your response to 7 Interrogatory 35A.

A I have it.

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9 Q In that response you suggest that in a following 10 proceeding Group C1 may get a lesser increase than you're 11 proposing in this proceeding, and Groups D2 and D3 might get 12 larger increases than you are proposing in this proceeding. 13 A Yes.

14 Q Why didn't you implement that approach in this 15 proceeding?

A Because as I stated earlier, my goal -- one of my goals was to in fact isolate the lower-cost offices, the smallest offices, and with those lower costs should come lower fees. And that was my purpose in this proceeding.

You know, alternatively, you know, fee increases for C2 and C3 wouldn't necessarily have to go up by the same amount either, and you could bring them closer together over time. It's not an either/or or it's not -- you simply don't have to just continually raise the C2 -- the D3 to bring it to parity. And that seemed to me where this question was

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Q Well, it sounds to me like you're -- in this proceeding you're focusing on proposing fee increases to track the changes in costs, and in later proceedings you may focus more on what's needed to get to a merger of the groups. Is that reasonable?

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A Well, the question asks, you know, how long would it take, how many rate cases or proceedings would it take, and it seemed to me that it could be accomplished in two. I wouldn't say I'm going to ignore costs, but the desire to merge C1 and D1 and C2 and D2 and C3 and D3 given the desire to if you will simplify the fee structure was what I was directing my attention to here.

14 Q Okay. Please refer to your response to15 Interrogatory 42.

16 A I have it.

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Q And on the top of the second page you state that you do not believe that an exception for these 31 offices is warranted.

20 A Yes.

Q Haven't you in effect provided exceptional treatment for these offices by proposing a 100-percent fee increase only for them?

A No. What I -- given the Postal Service's determination that there's a significant relationship

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between CAG and average rental costs, I did not think it was warranted for these 31 offices to be given an exception, and I don't consider -- didn't consider my treatment special, considered it the same, in that they would be grouped ultimately with the same size offices from city delivery.

1 CONTRACTOR

6 That is, CAG A through D offices in noncity 7 delivery would also be grouped with CAG A through D offices 8 in city delivery and therefore would have the same fee. So 9 no, I didn't consider it special treatment. In effect this 10 is a way to bring them together, if you will.

11 Q And in part B of your response you confirm that 12 for 25 of the 31 offices the rent per square foot is under 13 \$10.

14 A Correct.

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15 Q Wouldn't it be better to apply the highest fee 16 increase to offices with unusually high rents, such as rents 17 above \$25 per square foot?

I mean, that's done in Fee Group A -- well, that's 18 Α not true, it's -- Fee Group A has average rental costs 19 around \$23 a square foot. But these offices, CAG A through 20 D offices, are the highest-rental-cost offices. In the case 21 of city delivery and in the case of noncity delivery they're 22 not as high, but as I said, I didn't think they warranted 23 special treatment, because they are CAG A through D offices, 24 and the Service has determined that there's a significant 25

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1 relationship in terms of CAG and average rental cost. 2 Q You state in the last paragraph of your response to part B that the Postal Service might consider 3 establishing a separate fee schedule for these offices if 4 5 special treatment for them is warranted. Α Yes. 6 7 Well, do you agree that these are the only offices 0 in your Group D1? 8 Well, I guess what I'd say is that these -- maybe Α 9 10 you can repeat the question again. 11 0 Well, do you agree that the 31 offices that the Postal Service might establish a separate fee schedule for 12 are also the only offices that you've grouped in your 13 proposed Group D1? 14 15 А Correct. So if the Postal Service acted on your suggestion, 16 Q wouldn't that do away with the need for your proposed Group 17 18 D1? Α Yes. 19 Okay. Let's consider hypothetically two city 20 0 delivery CAG B offices, for example. One has no boxes 21 available with a waiting list for new box customers, and the 22 other has one-half of its boxes available. Do you agree 23 that your proposal would result in the same fees for boxes 24 in these two offices? 25

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1	A Yes.
2	Q And would you agree there's also nothing in the
3	Postal Service proposal that addresses utilization?
4	A Correct.
5	Q Do you think that ignoring utilization of boxes is
6	a good pricing approach?
7	A It wasn't something I considered. I didn't give
8	it any thought, so I it's just not something I gave any
9	thought to at this point.
10	Q Did you see any reference to utilization rates in
11	Library Reference 183 when you reviewed it?
12	A None that I recall.
13	MR. RUBIN: Okay. I have no more questions.
14	CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Is there any followup?
15	Questions from the bench?
16	I have a very few questions, Mr. Callow.
17	Am I correct that your testimony does not address
18	the impact of the so-called quarter-mile rule?
19	THE WITNESS: Correct.
20	CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Am I also correct that the
21	quarter-mile rule does not have an impact on your proposal?
22	THE WITNESS: Correct.
23	CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: In your opinion would the fee
24	structure for post office boxes be more fair and
25	understandable to the public if the quarter-mile rule were

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THE WITNESS: Yes. 2 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: And would that be the case for 3 the existing fee schedule and your proposal both? 4 5 THE WITNESS: Yes. CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Okay. 6 7 Any other questions? Followup as a consequence of questions from the 8 bench? 9 10 There doesn't appear to be any followup. MR. RUBIN: That's correct. 11 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: That brings us to redirect. 12 Would you like some time with your witness? 13 MS. DREIFUSS: I think just two minutes should be 14 enough, Mr. Chairman. 15 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Please proceed. 16 [Discussion off the record.] 17 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Ms. Dreifuss. 18 MS. DREIFUSS: Chairman Gleiman, the OCA has no 19 redirect. 20 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: If there's no redirect, then, 21 Mr. Callow, I want to thank you. We appreciate your 22 appearance here today and your contributions to our record, 23 and if there's nothing further, you're excused. 24 THE WITNESS: Thank you. 25

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[Witness excused.]

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2 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: We initially had another witness scheduled for today, Joseph Schick on behalf of 3 Apparently there was some confusion on the part of 4 AMMA . 5 Mr. Schick and his counsel regarding the fact that he'd been rescheduled for today. They had earlier requested that he 6 7 be rescheduled from this past Monday. Be that as it may, 8 the Postal Service counsel and AMMA counsel have worked out 9 an agreement, and we will reschedule Mr. Schick barring some 10 additional changes for next Thursday the 26th.

11 That concludes today's hearing. We'll reconvene 12 on Monday the 23rd.

13 I'm sorry. Mr. Hollies.

MR. HOLLIES: I just wanted to add one piece of information. I take it that Mr. Volner's preference would be to have Mr. Schick appear toward the end of the day.

17 CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Well, we'll see. We always try 18 and accommodate folks, and certainly with respect to this 19 witness we've all attempted to accommodate Mr. Volner, so 20 we'll try once more.

21 MR. HOLLIES: The Commission certainly has been 22 very understanding in this situation. There is a chance 23 that one of the last witnesses scheduled for Thursday the 24 26th will not be crossed, but I can't confirm that at this 25 point.

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CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: Thank you. 1 As I was saying, this concludes today's hearing. 2 3 We'll reconvene on Monday, the 23rd, to receive testimony from Douglas Carlson, who I guess the Postal Service does 4 want to cross. I'd be interested in knowing, because Mr. 5 Carlson is out of town. Have you all decided not to 6 cross-examine him? 7 MR. RUBIN: Yes, that's correct. We filed a 8 notice that we have no plans, and I notified Mr. Carlson of 9 that, and I thought he was going to call over here and see 10 11 if he was excused. CHAIRMAN GLEIMAN: We'll get that one squared away 12 before Monday for sure. 13 Other than Mr. Carlson, who we may not hear from 14 or see, we'll have American Banker Association et al. 15 Witness Clifton and Nashua, District et al. Witness Haldi 16 yet again, and Parcel Shipper Association Witnesses 17 Jellison, Mullin, and Zwieg, and OCA Witness Collins. 18 I want to thank you all for your cooperation 19 today, and have a nice weekend. 20 [Whereupon, at 12:15 p.m., the hearing was 21 recessed, to reconvene at 9:30 a.m., Monday, February 23, 22 1998.] 23 24 25

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